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Abstract 
This thesis uses a discursive approach to examine how `government', Chief Officer `police 
realities' and `feminisms' are accomplished as `doings' in domestic violence policy 
activities across the decade 1990-2000. The main reasons for undertaking this research 
were absences in the governmentality literature around domestic violence, gender, analyses 
of power and changes in political government; unease about `police culture' having slipped 
from currency in academic debate about the policing of domestic violence; and concern 
about what happens to feminisms in the government policy-making context. 
Drawing on domestic violence policy documents, produced in the period 1990-2000, my 
main arguments are that `doing' government is largely demonstrable in the activities of 
problem formulation, constituting victims and forwarding `working together'; and that 
much government truth-telling is founded on the claim of `the already responsible 
government'. Chief Officers of police also self-present as already fulfilling their 
responsibilities; constituting their versions of reality through identity-work, boundary-work 
and the mobilisation of gender as an occasional resource. In contrast, `doing' feminism 
seems less robust. It appears in organisational naming, forwarding causes of domestic 
violence which are not permissive of women blaming and formulating subjects of 
representation. But none of these activities are named as or bounded to `feminism' per se. 
Changes in political government appear to impact differently on these various `doings'. 
New Labour attempts to extend more control than the Conservatives over policy 
community members, gender(ed) understandings of domestic violence and local `crime' 
matters. Chief Officers attune to shifts in government guidance but appear to use these 
truths in the service of their own transactional business. By comparison, shifts in the 
positions from which feminists speak appear to effect changes in their warranting strategies 
and exercisings of power. Thus there is a sense that `feminisms' are perhaps the more 
malleable versions of reality in this context. 
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On the face of it the year 2000 seems to have been the culmination of a decade of domestic 
violence being taken seriously by the government and the police. Through the first part of 
the 1990s the Conservatives generated the first policies for the policing of, and inter- 
agency working around, domestic violence (Home Office, 1990,1995). The Home Office 
published domestic violence research (Grace, 1995; Lloyd et al, 1994; Morley & 
Mullender, 1994). The Home Affairs Select Committee of 1992/3 focused on the issue 
(HASC, 1993a, 1993b) and there were parliamentary debates (Hansard, 1993,1995). 
Legislation generated by this administration was carried forward by New Labour. The 
Family Law Act, Part IV, rationalised the means by which protective injunctions could be 
secured (Harwin & Barron, 2000) and the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 has 
potentially beneficial applications in regard to domestic violence (Kelly, 2001; Kelly & 
Humphreys, 2000b). 
New Labour undertook an integrated programme to end violence against women (The 
Women's Unit, 1999); published research on domestic violence (Hanmer et al, 1999; Kelly 
et al, 1999; Plotnikoff & Woolfson, 1998); produced guidance to local crime reduction 
initiatives (e. g. Mullender, 2000; Walby & Myhill, 2000); rendered multi-agency working 
between the police, local authorities and local groups mandatory through the Crime and 
Disorder Act 1998 (sections 5-7); and revised the policies on the policing of, and multi- 
agency working around, domestic violence (Home Office, 2000a, 2000b). 
The police too made public declarations of taking domestic violence seriously (Stevens, 
2000; Blair, 2000). In particular, the Metropolitan Police held an international conference 
for government personnel, service providers and academics (MPS, 2000b). And from this 
event they distributed copies of their 2000 domestic violence policy (MPS, 2000a). 
Further, working in specialist units addressing domestic violence, long a source of police 
assertions that domestic violence was not `real' police work (e. g. Sheptycki, 1993; 
Waddington, 1993), has apparently become a "good career move" (Aitkenhead, 2003). 
Feminists have been working tirelessly to provide services to, and raise awareness about, 
women experiencing domestic violence since the 1970s (e. g. Binney et al, 1981; Dobash & 
Dobash, 1979; Kelly, 1988; Pizzey, 1974; Southall Black Sisters, 1989; Stanko, 1989). 
And they continue to do so (e. g. Dobash & Dobash, 2000; Harwin, 1999; Kelly, 2001; 
Patel, 1999,2000; Stanko, 2000,2001a, 2001b). In 1992, some were invited to give 
evidence at the Home Affairs Select Committee on domestic violence (HASC, 1993b). 
During the decade, feminists produced Home Office research (Hanmer et al, 1999; Kelly et 
al, 1999; Morley & Mullender, 1994); including authoring much of the government 
guidance to local crime initiatives in 2000 (e. g. Hague, 2000; Levison & Harwin, 2000). 
Further, Women's Aid was consulted regarding the Family Law Act (Harwin & Barron, 
2000) and named as a lead agency in New Labour government documents (Home Office, 
2000a; The Women's Unit, 1999). Feminists still work with the police at the local level, in 
many cases building on informal working arrangements which they themselves initiated 
(Abrar et al, 2000; Kelly et al, 1999). Consequently, it would seem that years of feminist 
campaigning and activism has played a key role in domestic violence's emergence as a 
government and police policy concern. 
However, as a subscriber to Foucauldian accounts of power and governmentality (e. g. 
Foucault, 1976,1991), I am concerned about government's policy interest in domestic 
violence at this point in history and the impact that might have on resistances traditionally 
posed by the police and feminists. As a post-structuralist, I am troubled that critiques of the 
policing of domestic violence grounded in understandings of police culture appear to have 
slipped from academic currency (e. g. Dobash & Dobash, 1979; Dunhill, 1989; Southall 
Black Sisters, 1989); and that debates about what constitutes `doing' feminism are most 
often associated with the research context (e. g. Haraway, 1990; Harding, 1991; Kelly, 
1996; Williamson, 2000). As a feminist, I am drawn by debates which question feminist 
participation in government policy-making activities (Dobash & Dobash, 2000; Patel, 
1999; Scott, 1993); claims that feminism is `in abeyance' (Bagguley, 2002); fears that 
feminist knowledges have been appropriated for aims potentially antithetical to feminism 
(Radford, 2003); and arguments that New Labour see feminism as "yesterday's politics" 
(Coote, 2000, p. 3). Finally, as a discourse analyst, I understand that the various `doings' of 
government, police officers and feminists in the policy arena will be demonstrable in their 
domestic violence policy talk and text. 
Governmentalists, notably Rose (1993,1996,1999a, 1999b, 2000), understand 
`government' as a problematising activity, constituting and seeking to correct a particular 
version of reality. Building on Foucault's later work (1982,1988,1991), governing `at a 
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distance' is framed as the means by which government steers others to do its bidding "by 
way of persuasion inherent in its truths" (Rose, 1999a, p. 10). This marks a shift in the type 
of power exercised from sovereign power, an absolutist form of power that demands a 
specific response, to a form of pastoral power that offers the rewards of health, wealth and 
happiness to those who take responsibility for self-actualising (Foucault, 1982). Thus it can 
be seen as a more economical form of governing. Political discourse of this kind normally 
produces an account of those to be governed (Rose & Miller, 1992). This includes 
formulations of `good citizens', those who have self-responsibilised, and `bad citizens', 
those who have, as yet, failed to do so (Rose, 2000). Part of the correcting process of 
governance is to mobilise `bad citizens' to self-actualise, usually with the help of 
`appropriate' experts. But political discourse also presents a version of the government 
itself (Dean, 1999). And these dual constitutions of `reflexive government' and 
`responsibilised others' are necessary for constituting a government that understands and 
acts upon notions of `good government' (Rose & Miller, 1992). 
A key way of communicating governmental persuasion, and a site where much governance 
is `done', is policy (Shore & Wright, 1997). Policy is constitutive of policy community 
members, including the government, target populations to be acted upon and `appropriate' 
experts. Expert status may well be afforded to statutory bodies but voluntary agencies may 
be so positioned if they are understood to have local "indigenous knowledges" which 
might be beneficial for mobilising `problem populations' (Shore & Wright, 1997, p. 15). 
Consequently, government policy documents are likely to be rich sources of exercisings of 
governmental power including truth-claims and responsibilisations. 
However, herein lies a paradox. Despite drawing on Foucauldian understandings of power, 
governmentality is not a theory of power (Barry et al, 1993). Instead it tends to focus on 
the reflexive, problematising and persuasive aspects of `doing' government. How these 
activities are received or responded to is not normally explored (Kemshall & Maguire, 
2001; Miller, 2001; Stenson, 2000). Thus `doing' government is seemingly accomplished 
in the absence of competing accounts of reality (O'Malley, 2001) even to the extent that a 
top-down, possibly sovereign power relation, is implied (Garland, 1996,2001). For 
Foucault (1976), there is no bi-polar formulation of rulers and the ruled. Rather power can 
be exercised from many positions within power relationships. Wherever there is power, 
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there is also resistance (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982). Resistance may allow power to extend 
its reach but equally it may disrupt power. 
In regard to domestic violence policy, potential resistances to governmental persuasions are 
likely to come from the police and feminists. This is because, at the practitioner level, they 
both produce the kinds of `indigenous knowledges' about domestic violence populations of 
`bad citizens' which might be deemed useful for governing at a distance. But both are 
positioned in different power relationships with government. As statutory agencies, it is 
appropriate for government to direct the police in a way not commensurate with feminists 
working in the women's voluntary sector or academia. Consequently, focusing on 
exercisings of governmental power without considering the different resistances that may 
facilitate or impede its progress is problematic (McLaughlin, 2002b). 
As well as analyses of power, there are other absences in the governmentalist literature 
which have implications for this thesis. Firstly, domestic violence tends to be overlooked in 
favour of generic categories of `crime' or `risk' (as noted by Hughes, 1998; O'Malley, 
1992). And yet, in the decade 1990-2000, domestic violence has emerged and evolved as a 
distinct `governable matter' it its own right (see Chapter One). Secondly, in regard to 
domestic violence, gender understandings may well be important. For example, 
government has a history of attempting to mobilise women, as women, to manage their 
own risk through crime prevention literature (Gardner, 1990; Marcus, 1992; Stanko, 1995, 
1996,1997). Therefore, it is hard to see why government would give up such a potentially 
powerful tradition of responsibilising women `victims' in their domestic violence 
discourse. But governmentalists do not seem unduly concerned by gender (as noted by 
Stanko, 1995,1996; Walklate, 1997,2002). 
Thirdly, the decade 1990-2000 marks a shift in political government from Conservative to 
New Labour. For governmentalists (e. g. Rose, 1999b), New Labour are not seen as 
particularly inventive in their politics. Thus continuities and disjunctures through changes 
in political government tend not to feature large in governmentalist accounts (as noted by 
McLaughlin & Murji, 2001; Newman, 2001). I believe that this oversight on the part of 
governmentalists could be hasty, particularly when New Labour's re-imaginings of crime 
and the community are considered (Matthews & Pitts, 2001; Newman, 2001). For example, 
the re-positioning of feminists in government domestic violence policy-making processes 
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from Select Committee witnesses in 1992 (HASC, 1993b) to authors of government 
guidance in 2000 (see footnote 5) appears too significant to be dismissed as un-inventive. 
Rather, it suggests that, at the very least, New Labour have exercised different persuasions 
on how policy-making participants should work together. 
Consequently, a governmentalist approach offers a way to analyse the policy `doings' of 
government and opportunities, not yet realised, to explore: resistances from the police and 
feminists; the governmental activity of problem formulation in domestic violence policy 
and policy-making processes; government's management and mobilisation of (female) 
gender, particularly in constituting `victims'; and the impact, if any, from changes in 
political government, especially in persuasions to the police and feminists around how they 
should work together. But it does not provide the means for understanding how the police 
and feminists `do' what it is that they do in the policy context. 
`Police culture' has long been cited as influential to how the police understand their world 
(e. g. Chatterton, 1983; Manning, 1977; Reiner, 1992; Westmarland, 2001). But as a 
grounding for feminist critique about the policing of domestic violence (e. g. Dobash & 
Dobash, 1979; Dunhill, 1989; Southall Black Sisters, 1989) it has apparently slipped from 
academic currency. That is, arguments about whether the sexism and racism enacted in the 
police canteen is largely indicative of how the law is enforced around domestic violence 
now tend to be discussed in a backwater of police studies (e. g. Waddington, 1999) rather 
than in feminist and/or governance research. 
The debate as formulated in the 1970s and 1980s was problematic for me for two reasons. 
Firstly, police culture was reified as an organisationally bound set of values, shared by 
those of similar ranks, and language is simply a medium of conveyance. For post- 
structuralist understandings, language is the site where meanings and subjectivities are 
constituted and reproduced (Ramazanoglu, 1993; Weedon, 1997). Therefore, culture can be 
seen as a `verb' (Street, 1993); a `doing' which is constitutive of the organisation and its 
boundaries (Foucault, 1982; Wright, 1994). Discursive studies of the police focus on how 
non-police knowledges are reformulated at notional boundary edges (Tracey & Anderson, 
1999; Whalen & Zimmerman, 1990); how identity-work is used to undermine competing 
versions (Fletcher, 1991); and how gender politics are accomplished (Auburn et at, 1995; 
Wowk, 1984). 
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Secondly, police versions of reality are implied to be the preserve of junior officers only. 
And yet, there is no reason why Chief Officers of police should not be engaging in `police 
culture' activity (Chan, 1996; Savage et al, 2001). Indeed, Chief Officers play a lead role in 
police policy-making processes, can access particular sources of power from the positions 
they occupy and have much to gain from engaging with government guidance (see Chapter 
2, part one). Consequently, Chief Officer accomplishments in `doing' police culture, or 
perhaps more accurately `police realities' as identity-work, boundary-work and the 
mobilisation of gender, could have important implications in the policy context which, to 
date, have not been explored. 
From the feminist literature, it is clear that there is growing concern about what feminist 
participation in policy-making might mean (Abrar et al, 2000; Foley, 1996; Gagne, 1996; 
Jenness, 1999; Kelly, 1999; Lennie, 1999; Scott, 1993). One debate revolves around 
whether feminists should attempt, with care, to convert any opportunity that arises (Kelly 
& Humphreys, 2000b) or to exercise power by not working with governments which have 
abused feminists' previous co-operation (Patel, 1999,2000). It is not the aim of this thesis 
to come down on one or other side of this argument. Rather, in keeping with my focus on 
`doings', I share concern about the possible power relations which such government 
contexts encompass (Dobash & Dobash, 2000; Itzin, 2000; Smart, 1986,1989,1992, 
1995); and I see feminisms as `truth' producing discourse (Bell, 1995,2001,2002). 
Therefore, I am interested in accounting for what happens when feminists do take part in 
government policy-making around domestic violence. 
However, this raises questions about how `feminism' might be accomplished. To date, 
much feminist debate on the `doing' of feminism has been located in the research domain 
(e. g. Harding, 1991; Kelly, 1996; Williamson, 2000). An exploration of what makes 
feminist research `feminist' (Chapter 2, part two) seems to indicate the importance of the 
`politics of production' to feminist-generated knowledges. A problem arises when some 
feminists obscure the relevance of their political concerns to the knowledges which they 
produce (Gill, 1998). Thus there is an implicit assumption that The Truth arising from such 
research will continue to be `true' regardless of the context into which the discourse passes 
(Smart, 1995). But this assumption may be ill-founded. Within policy-making processes, in 
particular, truths are likely to be assimilated and reformulated in line with policy aims 
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(Shore & Wright, 1997); and certain ways of doing, knowing and telling truth are likely to 
be rendered `inappropriate' (Patel, 1999,2000). 
Consequently, the question of how feminisms might be accomplished in policy-making 
becomes one of how feminist politics can be made relevant in the policy arena where 
feminists also have a tendency to play down their political concerns (Abrar et al, 2000; 
Kelly, 1999). Following Kelly (1999), there appear to be three activities which may be 
pertinent in this regard. Firstly, Kelly (1999) suggests that organisational naming, that is 
names that invoke political meanings such as `Southall Black Sisters' and saying those 
names, is an important way within the policy-making context that feminism can continue 
to be made relevant to the knowledges that it has produced. Secondly, Kelly (1999) argues 
that forwarding `causes' in the policy context, in ways that render the `doer of the deed' 
visible and are not permissive of women blaming, could go some way to framing domestic 
violence as a problem for women rather than a problem of women. 
Finally, there is the subject of representation. There is concern that feminisms could 
contribute to their own marginalisation if their politics become exclusionary by not paying 
sufficient attention to how their subjects of representation are formulated (Coote, 2000; 
Kelly, 1996; Mouffe, 1992). In particular, eliding differences in `race', class and 
(dis)ability, and founding claims in the `worth' of motherhood are problematic (Butler, 
1990,1992). But different feminisms may produce incompatible subjects of representation. 
And in this case, contra Kelly (1999), I argue that airing these differences in private rather 
than in the policy arena could facilitate government's assimilation of feminist-generated 
knowledges as a single, united `truth'. Overall, I see organisational naming, forwarding 
causes of domestic violence and producing subjects of representation as providing the basis 
for interrogating the `doing' of feminisms in the government domestic violence policy- 
making arena. 
It is one thing to identify that `doing' government, police realities and feminisms may be 
important for explaining what is accomplished within policy activities. But it is quite 
another to account for what these various `doings' might look like. They need to be 
demonstrable and theoretically sound. Therefore, methodologically, I have fashioned a 
synthetic discursive approach which draws on different analytical modes in order to 
address the questions raised by this thesis. 
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Unsurprisingly, Foucauldian Analysis (e. g. Carabine, 2001)' attunes to Foucauldian 
understandings of discourse, knowledge/truth and power (discussed in detail in Chapter 
One). Thus it is compatible with post-structuralist notions of language and governmentality 
approaches. It is concerned with themes, `dialogues' with counter themes and exercisings 
of power (Carabine, 2001). And it considers the wider rationalities and strategies of 
governance such as problem formulation, constituting victims and forwarding working 
together (Chapter One). Therefore, at the macro level of discursive analysis, it is a suitable 
analytical tool. However, its focus on breadth incurs the penalty of lack of depth. And the 
micro interactions of contestation and resistance, which are important to this thesis, can be 
overlooked in such an analysis (Kitzinger, 2000). 
By contrast, Conversation Analysis (e. g. Heritage, 1984; Jefferson, 1990; Sacks, 1972; 
Schegloff, 1997,1998,1999a, 1999b; Silverman, 1998; Wooffitt, 2001) is concerned with 
micro-political accomplishment. What is produced in interactive talk is all that is necessary 
for understanding the consequential nature of meaning-making. Although that approach is 
not adopted in my methodology, the tenet of `participants' relevance' is taken seriously. 
For example, `doing' police realities cannot be demonstrated in the a priori assertion that 
the speaker `is' a police officer. Rather, the emphasis is on whether and how the utterances 
make `being' a police officer relevant to the truth-claims therein. A post-structuralist 
investigation of police cultures (Chapter 2, part one) indicates that the `doing of being' a 
police officer is important to founding reality claims (Fletcher, 1991; Shearing & Ericson, 
1991). Thus a Conversation Analytical inspired form of Discourse Analysis (Widdicombe, 
1993,1998) is used to illustrate how identity-work around `police officer' is key to 
accomplishments of boundary-work, and to a lesser extent, gender formulations. And this 
forms the basis for interrogating the `doing' of police realities. 
`Discourse Analysis' is a term used for a range of approaches, including Foucauldian and 
Conversation Analysis, although it often indicates one of a myriad of positions somewhere 
between those macro and micro extremes (e. g. Edley & Wetherell, 2001; Edwards & 
Potter, 1992; Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Speer & Potter, 2000; Wetherell & Potter, 1992). 
From this body of work, feminism has been rendered apposite in two ways: how `the 
feminist' is constituted in talk (Edley, 2001; Edley & Wetherell, 2001); and how feminist 
reflexivity is important as an ongoing consideration throughout the research process (Gill, 
I It is not that Carabine (2001) is the only person to be using Foucauldian Analysis. Rather, she is a rare case of a 
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1995a, 1998; Speer, 2002; Wilkinson, 1988). One of the problems generated for this study 
by my data is that `feminist' does not appear as an `appropriate' category for warranting 
accounts within the government policy-making context. Certainly that makes for an 
interesting absence in itself, but it neither facilitates understandings of how feminism is 
`done' nor necessarily indicates that `doing' feminism is absent from policy activities. 
Further where feminists are included at the national level (discussed in Chapter 6) it is as 
`non-statutory service providers' or `academic researchers'. Therefore, not all those who 
participated were feminist. 
Initially, I struggled with who was and who was not feminist and how feminism, if at all, 
was being accomplished. As a feminist, I felt torn by the competing accounts and found 
myself engaging in gut-reaction judgements of who was doing what `better'. I realised I 
was `doing' identity-work, boundary-work and mobilising gender as an occasional 
resource. There were times when it seemed `too difficult' and I wondered whether, if I 
collapsed the thesis down to just the police and government, life would be easier and no- 
one would notice. But the tenets of feminist reflexivity, as having concern for women's 
lives and a desire to elucidate the truths that are produced and attended to about those lives, 
were ultimately too important. 
Consequently, what is often an intuitive and iterative analytical process required additional, 
at times mechanical, self-policing on my part. I therefore treated all the accounts produced 
by voluntary sector service providers and academic researchers as having the potential to 
be `doing' feminism in terms of organisational naming, forwarding the causes of domestic 
violence and producing subjects of representation. By letting go of the notion that only 
feminists `do' feminism I also reaped certain benefits, namely, identifying the ways that 
different participants managed the `rules of engagement'; showing that feminist discourse 
is hard to accomplish consistently during policy-making; and demonstrating that 
government, particularly New Labour, attempts to reformulate feminist-generated truth by 
`doing' a version of feminism itself. 
In order to satisfy the methodological synthesis, my data needed to be, at least notionally, 
in `dialogue' with each other. To satisfy my theoretical concerns, they had to represent a 
change in political government and be viable for investigating the `doings' of government, 
Foucauldian who is explicit about methodological `how to'. 
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Chief Officer police realities and feminisms. Transcriptions from the Home Affairs Select 
Committee on domestic violence (HASC, 1993b) provided interactive policy-making talk 
from police officers (including Chief Officers) and non-statutory service providers. But it 
was also positioned as a government dialogue with these groups between the production of 
a policy on the policing of domestic violence' and one on inter-agency working and 
domestic violence3. 
In 2000, New Labour published revisions of both these polices' which means these 
documents can be understood as dialogic with both their predecessors and their respective 
audiences. There was no domestic violence Home Affairs Select Committee policy-making 
process under New Labour's first term. However, participating feminists were now 
repositioned under the rubric of `academic researchers' producing government guidance for 
local crime reduction initiatives. Thus opportunities to conduct different dialogues from 
1992/3 and to attempt to govern domestic violence at a distance were afforded. By contrast, 
the police had become more obscured in government policy-making arenas. Consequently, 
the Chief Officer data from this period comprise a Metropolitan Police domestic violence 
policy document which was made highly visible and dialogic by its distribution at an 
international conference for government personnel, service providers and academic 
researchers (MPS, 2000a). 
My aim in this thesis is to employ the synthetic discursive methodology outlined above to 
analyse domestic violence policy and policy-making talk and text produced during John 
Major's Conservative administrations and New Labour's first term. The governmentality 
literature provides an account of `doing' government and policy as a technology of 
governance. But as I noted previously, it tends to overlook domestic violence, gender, 
shifts in political government and how non-government `doings' in terms of resistances 
facilitate and/or impede governance's progress. Much literature on police culture is realist 
and not concerned with Chief Officers and the implications arising from that for policy 
activities. Also, the relevance of police culture to the policing of domestic violence seems 
to have slipped from academic currency. Further, although the `doing' of feminism in the 
2 Home Office Circular No. 60 of 1990. 
3 Home Office Circular 1995. This document does not appear to have an issue number, therefore as the only home 
Office Circular from this year quoted in this research, it is consistently named 'HOC 1995'. 
4 Home Office Circular No. 19 of 2000 and Multi-agency guidance on domestic violence (Home Office 2000a). 
5 The full list of these memos is: Crisp & Stanko, 2000; Davidson et al, 2000; Edwards 2000a, 2000b; Hague, 2000; 
Hanmer & Griffiths, 2000; Kelly & Humphreys, 2000a; Levison & Harwin, 2000; Mullender, 2000; Mullender & 
Burton, 2000; Mullender & Hague, 2000; Walby & Myhill, 2000. 
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policy arena has become an important feminist focus, it has yet to be explored at the 
discursive level. This research attempts to contribute to these gaps left by the academic 
literature and to forward discursive understandings of `doing' government, police realities 
and feminisms. My specific aims are: - 
" To investigate the exercisings of power and resistance in the production of truths about 
domestic violence. Focusing on the local interactions of talk and the wider `dialogues' 
with mainstream discourses of texts allows for a fuller account of what is accomplished 
during policy-making activities; particularly how government, Chief Officer police 
realities and feminisms are `done'. 
" To explore the shifts between Conservative and New Labour attempts to govern 
domestic violence. Concentrating on the continuities and disjunctures between 
government accounts will enable me to consider how real or imagined counter-versions 
are managed through strategies of problem formulation, constituting victims and 
forwarding working together. 
" To analyse the `doing' of Chief Officer police realities around domestic violence. 
Forging a methodology to interrogate identity-work, boundary-work and the 
mobilisation of gender as an occasional resource, can overcome the problems of 
understanding police culture as a reified entity that police organisations `have'; and 
render `police culture' a currently viable way of interrogating the policing of domestic 
violence. 
" To present an account of `doing' feminism. By exploring organisational naming, 
constitutions of causes and formulations of subjects of representation in domestic 
violence policy-making talk and text, the focus becomes how `feminism' is, or is not, 
" made relevant to participation, truth-claims and responsibilisations. It may also be 
useful for understanding how successive governments attempt (or not) to mange 
feminisms by `doing' a version of feminism themselves. 
My main objective is to present a discursive analysis of the interactions of truths about 
domestic violence between competing government, Chief Officer and feminist versions 
within the policy-making arena. 
This thesis is set out as follows: - 
In Chapter One I explore Foucauldian understandings of discourse, knowledge and power 
and how this has been influential in the governmentality work of Rose and others. I point 
to how such an approach falls short in regard to overlooking shifts between political 
governments, domestic violence as a discrete topic, the salience of gender and possible 
resistances to governmental exercisings of power. In considering these absences for the 
period 1990 to 2000, I identify problem formulation, constituting victims and forwarding 
working together as key government strategies in problematising and correcting domestic 
violence. 
In Chapter 2I focus on the possible resistances to government truths about domestic 
violence posed by Chief Officers of police and feminists. In Part One, I examine realist 
accounts of police culture and how a post-structuralist position on language affords 
opportunities to ask different questions. In particular, identity-work, boundary-work and 
the mobilisation of gender as an occasional resource can be seen to be instrumental in how 
`police realities' are `done'. I also explore what an investigation of Chief Officer police 
realities, a key absence from the literature, might add to an analysis of police policy- 
making talk and text. In Part Two, I concentrate on feminisms. I interrogate what makes 
feminist-generated knowledges feminist. And I argue that a focus on organisational 
naming, forwarding causes of domestic violence and producing subjects of representation 
provides a viable means for exploring the `doing' of feminism. 
In Chapter 3I outline my discursive methodology. Providing examples of Foucauldian 
Analysis and Conversation Analysis, I explore issues of analytical depth and identity-work, 
indicating what each has contributed to my synthetic approach. Further, inspired by 
Discourse Analysis, I present a reflexive account of how this thesis came to be and how 
theoretical, methodological and data selection decisions were interrelated. 
Chapter 4 marks the beginning of the main analytical findings. Here, two successive 
government policies on the policing of domestic violence are compared; Home Office 
Circular No. 60 of 1990 and Home Office Circular No. 19 of 2000. The emphasis is on the 
governmental activities of problem formulation and constituting victims with a particular 
concern for how power is mobilised to persuade the police audience of the veracity of these 
accounts. 
12 
The Chapter 5 data are Chief Officer domestic violence policy talk and text from 1992 and 
2000. This apparently dissonant pairing of Chief Officer talk at the Home Affairs Select 
Committee (HASC, 1993b) and a Metropolitan Police policy text (MPS, 2000a) reflects 
shifts in the overt positioning of Chief Officers in government policy-making contexts 
across the decade. I compare and contrast `resistances' in the `doing' of Chief Officer 
police realities in terms of identity-work, boundary-work and the mobilisation of gender as 
an occasional resource. And I draw attention to methodological considerations between 
analysing talk and text. 
In Chapter 6 the focus of investigation is the `doing' of feminism in policy-making talk at 
the Home Affairs Select Committee (HASC, 1993b) and in the 2000 What Works? memos 
as government policy-making text'. The producers of this discourse are not exclusively 
feminist. Unlike the police, whose participation is founded in their police status, feminists 
take part in 1992 as `non-statutory service providers' and in 2000 as `academic 
researchers'. Within the contexts of their different positionings, their exercisings of power 
and resistance around the activities of organisational naming, formulating causes of 
domestic violence and producing subjects of representation are interrogated. In addition, I 
compare the similarities and differences between analysing talk and text. 
Chapter 7 brings the focus of analysis back to government discourse. This time the contrast 
is between Home Office Circular 1995, produced by the Conservatives as the first 
government policy on inter-agency working and domestic violence and its New Labour 
successor (Home Office, 2000a). The purpose is to interrogate shifts in the governmental 
strategy of forwarding working together. Discourse about general formulations of statutory 
agency obligations and persuasions is explored. But more specifically, the ways in which 
`Women's Aid' is mobilised to found truth-claims, including responsibilisations, is also a 
key concern. 
In the conclusion, I summarise and draw together the main findings of the thesis. And I 
present these in conjunction with feminist comment and suggestions for future research 
directions. 
6 See footnote 5. 
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Chapter One: 
`Doing' Government: origins, developments and absences 
Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to set out my theoretical framework and to explore from the 
academic literature what is known about the `doing' of government around domestic 
violence policy. The purpose of this is to delineate the focus of this thesis as a whole and to 
raise specific questions that I will take to my government discourse data. 
I examine the origins of my post-structuralist perspective, namely Foucauldian 
understandings of discourse, knowledge, power and governmentality (Foucault, 1976, 
1980,1982,1988,1991). Foucauldian theory puts competing notions of `truth' into 
question. It also renders policy, its power networks and participants, a viable research 
topic. Further, I illustrate how governmentalists, particularly Rose (1993,1996,1999a, 
1999b, 2000) have developed Foucault's work to produce an account of how the `doing' of 
government as a `problematising activity' might be accomplished and analysed. From this 
perspective, two aspects of governance are likely to be demonstrable in government 
discourse: working on itself ('reflexive government') and working on others 
('responsibilised others'). The latter is exemplified through the notions of `community' as 
a means of governance (Rose, 1999b, 2000), policy as `a technology of governance' (Shore 
& Wright, 1997) and `managerialism' (de Lint, 1998). 
I go on to critique the macro level focus of these governmentalist studies, especially how 
they tend to overlook certain issues. Three absences which are central to this study and its 
comparison of the Conservative governments of the early 1990s and New Labour's first 
term are elucidated. Firstly, domestic violence as a current `governable matter' in its own 
right is explored; its `emergence' as a distinct government crime-policy domain in 1990 
and how `domestic violence as crime' might be useful, but in different ways, under New 
Labour. Secondly, gender understandings, which are likely to be made relevant by at least 
some participants in domestic violence policy-making, are interrogated. The focus is on 
how domestic violence and those who commit, experience and deliver service provision for 
it might be rendered governable through gender discourse with a specific emphasis on New 
Labour's formulation of the policy category `violence against women'. 
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Thirdly, analyses of power are examined. A debate between Rose (2000) and Garland 
(1996,2000) highlights that an emphasis on how governmentality works in principle 
misses much of what happens in practice. Indeed, the focus on an `ethos of analysis' rather 
than a theory of power (e. g. Barry et al, 1993) renders analyses of power superfluous 
(Newman, 2001). And yet, even a brief foray into what is known about the evolution of 
crime partnerships indicates that New Labour have maximised the potential of discourses 
of working together as means of governance, especially over feminist organisations. 
Collectively, my concern with changes of political government across domestic violence, 
gender understandings and analyses of power identifies three common governmental 
activities that seem important in how domestic violence was governed in the period 1990- 
2000: `problem formulation', `constituting victims' and forwarding `working together'. 
Within the chapter conclusion, I reiterate my theoretical position and how it and the gaps in 
the academic literature have shaped the scope of this thesis, in order to outline what will be 
taken forward to future chapters. 
1. Origins 
In Foucauldian understandings, discourses are "historically variable ways of specifying 
knowledge and truth" and they delineate "what it is possible to speak of at a given 
moment. " (Ramazanoglu, 1993, p. 19). Language has no inherent meaning of its own. 
Rather it is discourses within a historical/geographical time and space which give language 
its meaning. What is `true' does not matter in and of itself (Foucault, 1980). What is 
important is how `truth' is accomplished in discourse and privileged over competing 
versions. Further, human beings are not seen as producers of truth but as subjects 
constituted through discourse (Foucault, 1982). Thus I am concerned with how discourses 
are formulated and reproduced in `truths' about domestic violence; be they government 
(e. g. Carabine, 2001), police (e. g. Adlam, 2002) or feminist (e. g. Bell, 1995,2001,2002) 
generated. For example, recent government policy has framed domestic violence primarily 
as `crime' (Home Office, 1995,2000a). Therefore, those experiencing domestic violence 
are likely to be constituted as `victims of crime'. Other available subject positions such as 
`women' or `survivors' may be undermined by or attempt to undermine `truths' about 
`victims'. 
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Knowledges, as ways of knowing and accomplishing `truth', are important to Foucauldian 
theory. Discourses of `crime' and `victims' may mean different things at different times. 
But they may also be the site of struggle in one specific historical and geographical locale. 
For example, consultation between agencies about crime at the local level has become a 
common occurrence in recent years (Hughes, 1998; Matthews & Pitts, 2001). In regard to 
such domestic violence co-operations, the participants most often present are the police and 
women's advocates from local refuges (Malos, 2000). The police and women's advocates 
may well produce competing `truths' about domestic violence. For the police, 
organisational culture as a way of knowing will probably influence the `truths' forwarded 
and the meanings accomplished (see Chapter 2). Women's advocates, whether feminist or 
not, are likely to negotiate `truths' around other interests (see Chapter 2). Therefore the 
meanings of `crime' and `victims' may be very different for them. 
How these competing versions of the `truth' fare will be influenced by the 
power/knowledge networks operating in that particular time and place. Certainly the 
government `truth' of `domestic violence as crime' may be a source of power for police 
accounts. But any `expertise' afforded to women's advocate knowledges about `victims' 
might also be important. 
Foucault is most clear about his position on power in The History of Sexuality. Volume 
One (Foucault, 1976, p. 92-96). Here he counters much traditional and radical thought 
about power. Power is productive not repressive. It is integral to and constitutive of a range 
of relations as diverse as economic processes and sexual relationships. It is everywhere 
because it comes from everywhere. There is no bi-polar formulation of the powerful and 
the powerless. Rather, power can be visualised as capillary, spreading out in a multitude of 
directions and networks. Power is not owned or given and it cannot be acquired. But it can 
be exercised from a variety of positions within power relationships. Wherever there is 
power, there is also resistance. Indeed, power relations need to be contested in order to 
keep them in currency: - 
"[P]ower needs resistance as one of its fundamental conditions of operation. It is 
through the articulation of points of resistance that power spreads through the social 
field. But, it is also, of course, through resistance that power is disrupted. 
Resistance is both an element of the functioning of power and a source of its 
perpetual disorder. " (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982, p. 147) 
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For this thesis, a good example of how Foucauldian notions of power may be useful 
concerns `policy' itself. Evaluations of policies for the policing of domestic violence tend 
to critique how and in what ways those charged with specific responsibilities have not met 
them (e. g. Grace, 1995,1999; Plotnikoff & Woolfson, 1998). Critique of practice and 
policy content often leads to assertions that more or better policy is required (Miller & 
Rose, 1990). But focusing on post-policy outcomes misses the point of what policy itself is 
doing (Crinson, 1998); particularly in regard to exercisings of power such as the 
constitutions of subjects and truths. Further, the relationship between those who write 
policy and those whose actions are to be directed by it is posited as a top-down power 
relation, to be regulated by rewards and sanctions. Therefore, policy is seen as a "rational, 
action-orientated instrument that decision makers use to solve problems and affect change" 
(Shore & Wright, 1997, p. 5 (sic)). However, policy is unlikely to ever make a smooth 
transition from drawing board to practice (Miller & Rose, 1990). This is because of the 
vast range of networks of power and knowledges invoked in consultative policy-making 
processes and the diverse interests of participants before practice is ever embarked upon. 
Consequently, policy and the processes that give rise to it are potentially fruitful sites of 
study in their own right. 
In his later work, Foucault (1982,1988,1991) began to consider `governmentality' as a 
way of understanding how modem systems of power work. Power itself was not Foucault's 
main concern but the ways in which "human beings are made subjects" (1982, p. 208). This 
is important for understanding how governmentality is seen to function. From the middle 
of the eighteenth century there was a major shift in the rationality of government whereby 
changes occurred to both concepts of spaces to be governed and the way in which 
governance was to be achieved (1991). The change of focus from sovereign control of 
territory to `the population' made the question of modern government "how to introduce 
economy - that is to say, the correct manner of managing individuals, goods and wealth ... 
into the management of the state" (1991, p. 99). This stands in stark contrast to accounts of 
the state "as a kind of political power which ignores individuals looking only at the 
interests of the totality" (1982, p. 213). 
Foucault sees the state's exercising of power as "both ... individualizing and totalizing" 
(1982, p. 213) due to the way in which the state has harnessed a form of pastoral power. 
Pastoral power in its format in Christianity promises salvation in the next world contingent 
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on self-sacrifice and looking after each individual in this world. In order to work as a form 
of power it requires an integral way of knowing oneself and acting accordingly. The 
modern form of pastoral power promises `salvation' in this world in the form of health, 
wealth and security. It also extends its scope through a range of officials such as the police 
and institutions such as the family. Most importantly it too constitutes a way of knowing 
and experiencing oneself both as an individual and as part of a population (Foucault, 1982). 
A significant element of steering self-knowing populations concerns generating and 
employing knowledges about them. The rise of statistics, `psy' professions and research are 
indicative of not only how `truths' about certain populations can be formulated but also 
`scientifically' justified ways of knowing the `truth' (1976,1991). 
By way of example, it is useful to reprise the government discourse of `domestic violence 
as crime' and the diverse interests and knowledges of probable policy-makers. If domestic 
violence is primarily seen as a problem of crime by government, the presence of the police 
at policy-making does not seem illogical. But by contrast, the presence of those 
representing women's refuges (Home Affairs Select Committee, 1993a, 1993b) and 
academics with a specialism in domestic violence (Home Office What Works? Memos, 
2000: e. g. Liz Kelly and Audrey Mullender) seems potentially dissonant. From a 
governmentality perspective their participation is legitimised through the knowledges they 
have about populations to be governed. If women who experience domestic violence are to 
be promised `health, wealth and security' and rendered capable of aspiring to and pursuing 
them, they need to be mobilised as a population. Therefore, the participation in policy- 
making of those `experts' who could facilitate this desirable outcome is not only logical 
but necessary. And this necessity may afford women's advocates more opportunities to 
exercise power than might be immediately apparent (see Chapter 2). 
In this section I have set out the Foucauldian origins of my theoretical perspective. Notions 
of discourse, knowledge, power and governmentality are important not only to how I 
approach my work but also in framing what is to be studied. I am therefore interested in 
government policy and processes surrounding domestic violence with a particular emphasis 
on discourse, knowledge and exercisings of power by the key participants of government, 
the police and women's advocates. In the next section I focus on how governmentalists 
have developed Foucault's work and how that further influences the direction of this thesis. 
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2. Developments 
Governmentalists, notably Rose (1993,1996,1999a, 1999b, 2000), have developed 
Foucault's notions of the economy of governing `at a distance' through the constitution of 
`governable subjects' and `governable matters'. And this provides an account of the 
'doing' of government. From this perspective, `government' is seen as a "problematizing 
activity", a `doing', which "poses the obligations of rulers in terms of the problems they 
seek to address" (Rose & Miller, 1992, p. 181, my emphasis; Rose, 1993). Therefore 
political discourse becomes the site in which a particular `reality' is constituted and 
analysed and strategies formulated to correct it. These strategies, or perhaps more 
accurately political rationalities, always embody "some account of the persons over whom 
government is to be exercised" (Rose & Miller, 1992, p. 179). 
`Neo-liberalism' (or `advanced liberalism') is understood as a distinct rationality that 
emerged in western societies in the mid-seventies countering the welfarism of the post-war 
period (Rose & Miller, 1992; Rose, 1993,1999a & 2000). The liberalism that preceded 
welfarism was characterised by two principles: there was a limit on what could be 
governed and subjects' rights were important. Therefore, the conundrum for liberal 
government was how to work on civil society for the benefit of all. The solution was to 
valorise freedom whilst at the same time working on shaping that freedom in a way that 
encouraged subjects to self-govern in line with government's ideal of a good society (Rose, 
1993). Integral to this approach was a `reflexivity', a self-questioning by government about 
its legitimacy to rule and what constituted `good government'. Therefore those who are to 
be governed include government itself. 
The re-emergence of liberal ideals in the mid-seventies led to the denigration of post-war 
welfarism that provided for subjects in order to shape society, as a `nanny state' that stifled 
individuality, was expensive and did not work (Rose, 2000). Welfarist government was 
deemed too large and trying to do too much and was critiqued as both malign and arrogant 
(Rose & Miller, 1992). `Good' government was once again conceptualised in terms of `less 
is more' (Rose, 1996). Hence, neo-liberal government has led to "a widespread recasting of 
the ideal role of the state ... (as) ... a partner, animator and facilitator for a variety of 
independent agents and powers" (Rose, 2000, p. 323). The shift in political rationality is to 
"steering and regulating rather than rowing and providing" (Rose, 2000, p. 324). This 
relocation of `doing' government within political discourse in terms of reconstituting its 
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legitimacy to govern and the way it should govern is sometimes termed as `reflexive 
government' in governance studies (e. g. Dean, 1999). 
However, `reflexive government' is not the only component of `governing at a distance'. 
This has another arm that concerns how those to be governed and their relationships to 
government are formulated. The neo-liberal ideal for the `appropriate' citizen to be 
governed by this `appropriate' form of government is characterised as self-regulating, self- 
responsible and investing in and capitalising on their own capabilities (Rose, 1999a). Thus 
the aim of this aspect of `doing' government is to `responsibilise' others. But ensuring 
citizens play their part appropriately cannot be enforced as that would demand more 
`hands-on' government which is antithetical to neo-liberalism. Rather, governmentality is 
the art of exercising modern power "by seeking to invest the individual with subjectivity" 
(Miller, 1986, p. 29, my emphasis). Indeed it: - 
"achieves its effects not through the threat of violence or constraint, but by way of 
persuasion inherent in its truths, the anxieties stimulated by its norms, and the 
attraction exercised by the images of life and self it offers" (Rose, 1999a, p. 10). 
An example of this `self-governing' ideal which is pertinent to my thesis concerns the 
notion of `community". The decentralisation of the `steering and regulating' state has led 
to a fragmentation of the territory to be governed. Consequently, `society' is weakened as a 
means of rallying individuals to a common good (Rose, 1996). By contrast, `community' is 
very flexible. It can be argued on the basis of `self-evident' features (e. g. `Asian 
community') or locale (e. g. `community college'). It can be used to broaden a category 
('the wider community') and to section off specific populations as having shared self- 
interests (e. g. `gay community') (Rose, 1996). Constituting a `community' brings into 
being both a population and `truths' about its common purpose and collective nature 
(Hughes, 1998; McLaughlin, 2002a, 2002b). It has the added benefit of being seemingly 
benign and even logical. The `community' is all of us, it is in us and effectively `just us' 
(Rose, 1999b). And the sense is that `community' is reliable, we can and should rely on 
ourselves and `people like us'. 
I `Community' has been notoriously under-theorised within criminology (McLaughlin, 1994; Lewis et al, 2001). 
Perhaps a key example concerns Braithwaite (2000) who as a proponent of restorative justice recommends `community 
solutions' underpinned by understandings of `community' from Maori culture. In Australia, these modes of correction 
have been imposed disproportionately on Aboriginal peoples whose notions of `community' bear no relation to those in 
Maori culture (Hughes, 1998). 
`Community' also functions in the way in which individuals are included or excluded as 
`good' or `bad' citizens within a specific community. The counterparts of responsible, 
autonomous citizens are "non-citizens, failed citizens, anti-citizens ... those who are unable 
or unwilling to enterprise their lives or manage their own risk" (Rose, 2000, p. 331). 
Consequently, criminals, drug-users and those groups associated as risky or dangerous to 
civil society are not formulated as distinct communities. Nor does their failure place `bad 
citizens' outside of a community. As with any counterpart, one of their functions is to 
constitute the included by definition (Rose, 2000). In this way, `bad citizens' are often 
presented as localised problems for and of particular communities. 
The steering and regulating `reflexive government' does not abandon `bad citizens' nor the 
`communities' that house them. Rather, it concerns itself with helping them to help 
themselves'. This may take the form of ensuring that local service providers such as the 
police consult `community' groups (e. g. Crime and Disorder Act, 1998). Thus as 
government reduces its direct exercisings of power and consequent obligations, 
`communities' are caught in a "double movement of autonomization and 
responsibilization" (Rose, 1999b, p. 476); the problem of the community is theirs and they 
are enabled to be free to contribute to its management as they choose. Therefore, 
"Community ... 
is itself a means of government" (Rose, 2000, p. 329, emphasis in the 
original). 
`Community' as a means of governance can be mobilised in a multitude of ways; and one 
that has resonance for this thesis is `policy'. There is a huge growth in policy and the way 
it impinges on all areas of our lives. Policy achieves its greatest impact "when, through 
metaphors of the individual and society, it influences the way people construct themselves, 
their conduct and their social relations as free individuals" (Shore & Wright, 1997, p. 5). 
The language of policy is often cast in neutral terms that disguise both the authorship and 
its political rationality (Apthorpe, 1997). Such terms as `efficient' and `effective' appeal to 
an abstract notion of economy thereby masking for whom a particular action is beneficial 
(Shore & Wright, 1997). Most importantly, policies constitute `policy communities' 
comprising three key elements: target populations of people to be self-actualised and self- 
responsibilised (bad or failing citizens); an ideal of what `good citizens' might look like; 
2 There is a limit to the `reasonableness' of assistance that will be offered to failed citizens (Rose, 2000). `Hopeless 
cases', those who cannot or will not self-actualise and who are deemed as a drain on and/or a danger to others, will 
ultimately incur heavy penalties (Hindess, 2001). 
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and an account of those `experts' charged with policing (in its generic sense) those to be 
self-actualised (Hyatt, 1997). 
For example, government policies for steering domestic violence interventions are likely, 
where domestic violence is formulated as crime, to create subject positions for `victims' 
and `offenders' as `bad citizens', those unable to manage their own risk and those 
presenting risk to others. But actually reading or coming into direct contact with the policy 
is not a common occurrence. Therefore, the need for victims and offenders to self-regulate 
in line with the policy's bidding (to stop becoming the victims of crime or to stop 
committing crime) will probably be framed as the responsibility of other policy community 
members; those who can be seen as `appropriate' helpers or `experts' in the self- 
responsibilisation process (Shore & Wright, 1997). Within the UK, those most commonly 
afforded `expert' status around domestic violence are the police and women's advocates. 
How they can be persuaded to embrace the responsibilities suggested by policy can be 
understood as mobilising appeals to `community'. 
The police have long been encouraged to consider the `community' as an under-used police 
resource (Goldstein, 1990). Thus the potential appeal of `community' to the police is that it 
positions them where they can influence understandings of `community leaders', `local 
experts' and `responsible citizens'; perhaps even constituting the `community' that is to be 
governed (Stenson, 1993). Indeed: 
"engaging the community holds the potential for involving informal controls that 
are more permanent and more effective than any measures the police themselves are 
in a position to implement" (Goldstein, 1990, p. 45, my emphasis). 
In terms of domestic violence policy community membership, the notion of domestic 
violence as crime continues this encouragement. It positions the police as the. most 
appropriate `professionals' working on it. Dealing with criminals and gate-keeping the 
criminal justice system is within their professional remit. Thus despite how poorly they 
may have policed domestic violence in the past (e. g. Faragher, 1985; Ferraro & Pope, 
1993; and see Chapter 2, part one) arresting those who commit it has always, theoretically, 
fallen within their jurisdiction. Their newer concern surrounds victims and how they might 
be persuaded to become `good citizens' by managing their own risks through the criminal 
justice system. And this, within a governmentalist account of policy, is where feminist 
`expertise' becomes important as a potential police resource. 
Within the UK, refuges for those experiencing domestic violence are almost exclusively 
run by women for women; and in the main they are managed under a feminist ethos. 
Although only 15% of those experiencing domestic violence use refuges (Home Office, 
2003b) and they tend not to be representative of (Levison & Harwin, 2000), or conducive 
to (Haaken & Yragui, 2003), ethnic diversity, they do have a thirty year history of 
mobilising women to seek service provision for domestic violence. As such they produce 
"indigenous knowledges" (Shore & Wright, 1997, p. 15) about a significant section of the 
target population which domestic violence policy seeks to govern; truths that have been 
successful in encouraging `victims' to manage their own risk. Whilst this may seem to 
indicate that such feminist-generated knowledges are invaluable to policy, their future as 
such is not assured. Indigenous knowledges have a shelf-life for policy. That is, whilst they 
are useful and relevant to those charged with new responsibilities, they will be afforded 
`expert' status. But if more useful or more relevant knowledges emerge the older versions 
may well be allowed to slip from currency (Shore & Wright, 1997). 
Thus what government domestic violence policy may do is to found `community' appeals 
to encourage feminist participation. It might position feminists as quasi-community leaders 
of women experiencing domestic violence; `good citizens' who are attempting to help their 
community. And as policy community members, it may afford them (albeit temporary) 
`expert' status to help the police (and others) with their new responsibilities. Accordingly, 
feminists are likely to be constituted as active citizens, located within the community, 
rather than `professionals', acting upon the community. As such, within domestic violence 
policy feminists are likely to be cast in a power relationship of `professionalised police and 
responsibilised public' (O'Malley, 1997). And that is a far cry from the feminist-generated 
informal working relationships with the police, often to feminist aims, which pre-dated 
formal policy provision (Abrar et al, 2000; Kelly et al, 1999). Consequently, policy and the 
ways in which it mobilises `community' to work on the `status' and inter-relationships 
between policy community members can be understood as a `technology of governance' 
(Shore & Wright, 1997). 
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However, `community' may not be the only discourse that policy mobilises as a means of 
governance over the police and feminists. Another key resource, and one that works on 
notions of professionalism, is `managerialism' (Crawford, 2001; Hughes, 1998; 
McLaughlin & Murji, 2001). The managerialist ethos is underpinned by the assumption 
that better management leads to better policing (Hughes, 1998). It can be detected in the 
reduction of the public police's domain, for example, in increases in private security 
(Loader, 2000) and civilianisation3 (Loveday, 1993). And it manifests in how senior 
officers have been made accountable in new ways (O'Malley, 1997): their use of resources 
(Leigh et at, 1999; Stockdale et at, 1999); how they attempt to prevent crime (Liddle & 
Gelsthorpe, 1993,1994a, 1994b); and how they deliver what the public want (Bland, 1997; 
Chatterton et al, 1997; Elliott & Nicholls, 1996). 
In regard to domestic violence, managerialism can be seen to have influenced changes in 
the activities and structures of police organisations. Thus domestic violence is now 
recorded as a `repeat crime' rather than a series of isolated incidents (Farrell et al, 2000). 
And from the 1980s, specialist domestic violence units began to emerge (Sheptycki, 1993). 
Some commentators argue that these structural changes, as aspects of good management, 
will lead to changes in the ways that patrol officers understand and carry out policing (e. g. 
Goldstein, 1990). But governmentalists (notably, de Lint, 1998) contest this. Central to 
managerialism is the notion that good managers persuade staff to be self-motivating and 
self-regulating. However, the nature of patrol work is such that many officers are already 
responsibilised in this way. They carry out much of their work not directly supervised and 
rely heavily on their own discretion. Consequently, moves to be `better managers', in the 
form of heightened activity to persuade patrol officers to self-responsibilise, is more likely 
to produce "refuge from accountability" for senior managers than to have much impact on 
the street (de Lint, 1998, p. 280). In short, self-presentation as `good managers' could be the 
main end product of the managerialist influence. 
The notion of `professionalised police and responsibilised public' suggests that feminists 
engaged in government policy-making processes may not be subject to managerialist 
discourse. But an example from the 1980s indicates that there is precedence for 
government to mobilise `professionalism' in the attempted governance of feminist 
organisations (Foley, 1996). Rape Crisis (RC) is a grass-roots feminist organisation 
3 Civilianisation is a rationale that leads to the assessment of all police posts in order to consider whether or not the job 
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established in the UK in 1976. As such it comprised a `by women for women' service 
which endeavoured to develop theory from practice and use that to campaign for social 
change. It was this campaigning aspect that apparently led to problems when, in the mid- 
eighties, the police and hospitals began to join up in order to offer services to rape victims. 
In some cases these Sexual Assault Centres were set up without consultation with the local 
RC centre which was already providing similar services and had built up a certain 
expertise. In this way, feminist support services were undermined and potentially 
marginalised. 
Although Sexual Assault Centres did not take off in any great numbers, their appearance 
marked significant changes and challenges for RC (Foley, 1996). Government funding was 
now accompanied by quasi-legal agreements which exerted considerable pressure to 
`professionalise' and run RC centres along business lines. This led to some centres moving 
from collective working practices to hierarchical structures, recruiting staff on the basis of 
formal qualifications and providing services for men (Foley, 1996; Gillespie, 1996). 
Competition for funding (and clients) with non-feminist service providers lead to many RC 
centres focusing out of necessity on service provision alone, detached from the major 
feminist concerns of campaigning and consciousness raising (Foley, 1996). This `choice' 
of being marginalised in order to retain their full political ethos or accepting funding and 
the consequent de-politicisation is also apparent in the history of rape crisis centres in the 
USA (Scott, 1993); suggesting that feminist participation in government processes may 
lead to a reduction in the activities which traditionally define `feminism' (Bagguley, 2002). 
Thus managerialism, or at least `professionalism' discourse, could be mobilised by 
government in the constitution of subject positions for the police and feminists as domestic 
violence policy community members. However, it may lead to problems: senior officers 
might simply be empowered to talk up their professionalism as `good managers'; and 
notions of `professionalised feminists' could disrupt the `professionalised police/ 
responsibilised public' dynamic that seems important to policy aims. 
In this section I have explored aspects of governmentalists' work which develop Foucault's 
governmentality thesis. In particular, I have placed emphasis on their view of how the 
`doing' of government can be seen to be done: in terms of constituting problems and 
could actually be done by a civilian at a much reduced cost. 
solutions and through the simultaneous activities of `reflexive government' and 
`responsibilising others'. From this perspective, `community' can be viewed as a means of 
governance; a flexible discourse that both appeals to common-sense notions of belonging 
and `good citizenry' and can be used to justify intervention upon `bad citizens'. Further, 
policy can be understood as a `technology of governance': something that puts physical 
distance between government and `bad citizens' but extends governmental control over 
target populations by working on the power inter-relationships of policy community 
members, such as `professionalised police and responsibilised public'. `Managerialism' 
may also be mobilised by policy as a means of governance over police and feminist 
organisations. But its usage could empower policy community members to disrupt policy's 
aims. 
In the next section I focus on what I see as key omissions from the governmentalist thesis 
in considering how domestic violence might be governed. 
3. Absences 
Although I broadly subscribe to the governmentalist approach outlined in section 2, in 
regard to domestic violence and policy-making it has potential limitations too. Integral to 
this thesis is a contrast in attempts to govern domestic violence from 1990 to 2000, a 
period that marks the emergence of domestic violence as a government policy interest 
under the Conservatives and its reformulation under New Labour's first term. As such, a 
governmentalist focus could miss the potential to explore continuities and disjunctures 
between changes in political government (Newman, 2001; McLaughlin & Murji, 2001). 
And the notion of neo-liberalism may become an a priori understanding rather than 
interrogating shifts (if any) in how `government' is accomplished. Further, an interest in 
the macro level has been criticised for overlooking domestic violence as a specific 
`governable matter' (Hughes, 1998; O'Malley, 1992), gender (Stanko, 1995,1996; 
Walklate, 1997,2002) and analyses of power (Miller, 2001; Newman, 2001; Stenson, 
2000). Therefore, in this section I explore these absences from the governmentalist 
literature. 
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3.1 Domestic violence as a `governable matter' 1990-2000 
Governmentality studies tend to focus on the macro level, either in terms of the 
globalisation of `crime' (e. g. Shearing & Stenning, 1985; and see Braithwaite, 20004) or 
notions of `risk' and `crime' based on Ulrich Beck's work on insurance risk (e. g. 
O'Malley, 1992; and see Dean, 1999; O'Malley, 2001). Both of these approaches ignore 
what happens at the more micro levels (Kemshall & Maguire, 2001; Miller, 2001). Further, 
an emphasis on `crime' loses sight of how a government's problem formulation of 
domestic violence as `crime' renders inappropriate other ways of speaking about the 
matter. In short `crime' is reified as a starting point of research in a way that overlooks any 
benefits or disadvantages to government of steering domestic violence into a `crime' 
classification (Hughes, 1998; O'Malley, 1992)5. 
For governmentalists concerned with `governable matters', the constitution of domestic 
violence as a specific policy domain seems to be a significant omission. In 1975 there was 
a Parliamentary Select Committee on Violence in Marriage (see MPS, 1975). Although 
this resulted in some encouragement to the police to keep statistics, review policy and treat 
domestic violence seriously (Holder, 1999; Hoyle, 1998; Morley, 2000) it is most famous 
for providing police quotations about the sanctity of marriage overriding the relevance of 
police intervention. Government tentatively pressed on with Home Office Circular No. 69 
of 19866. But this document was mainly concerned with sexual offences and domestic 
violence seemed to be tacked on in areas surrounding the more sensitive treatment of 
victims (Hoyle, 1998). Indeed, there is some evidence that `sexual offences' was 
constituted as the `governable matter' of the 1980s (see Foley, 1996). 
By contrast, domestic violence seems to be a prime `governable matter' in government 
policy and policy-making in the period 1990 to 2000'. The first indication of this came in 
1989 with the publication of a Home Office literature review on domestic violence (Smith, 
1989). In 1990, a specific policy for the policing of domestic violence came into being: 
Home Office Circular 60/90 (Home Office, 1990). In 1992/3 the Home Affairs Select 
4 Braithwaite (2000) is an exponent of restorative justice. The notion of re-integrative shaming within this approach has 
been explored by New Labour in regard to youth crime (Home Office, 2003a). And there are those who argue that it 
might be a useful intervention in domestic violence (e. g. Hudson, 2002). But I share the pro-feminist view that apology 
already forms a large part of violent men's cycles of violence against their women partners (Lewis et al, 2001). 
5A notable exception is Merry (2001), see section 3.2. 
6 Home Office Circulars (HOC) are a particular manifestation of government policy in the UK. Regardless of topic, they 
are numbered sequentially within a calendar year. Therefore, HOC 69/1986 is the sixty-ninth HOC issued in 1986. 
Committee held session on domestic violence (HASC, 1993a, 1993b)ß. The Government 
Response to this Select Committee (Home Office, 1993) led to, amongst other things, the 
appointment of an official Interdepartmental Working Party and a Ministerial Group, a 
domestic violence awareness campaign (Don't Stand For It, 1994) and another policy. This 
time Home Office Circular 19959 focused on inter-agency working. This document can be 
seen as encouragement to all those who provide services to those experiencing domestic 
violence to work together to a common end under the banner of `crime' (Patel, 1999). 
There was much optimism that New Labour coming to power in 1997 would treat domestic 
violence more seriously (Malos, 2000) even though no specific manifesto promises were 
made (The Labour Party, 1997). However, a campaign was forthcoming (Home Office, 
1999a), as was a general policy on domestic violence (Home Office, 1999b), a cross- 
departmental strategy on violence against women (Women's Unit, 1999), the establishment 
of The Women's Unit and the appointment of two Ministers for Women. In addition, a 
distinct Interdepartmental Group on violence against women and domestic violence was set 
up. By 2000, New Labour had published a series of What Works? literature reviews" and 
formulated these as the basis of informing and securing funding for local crime prevention 
initiatives (Home Office, 2000d-g). Further, the `policing domestic violence' and `inter- 
agency working' Home Office Circulars set up by the Conservatives were re-drafted and 
reissued (Home Office, 2000a & 2000b). 
Although this list of government activity indicates that domestic violence has emerged and 
developed as a government policy interest in the period 1990-2000, it leaves two key 
questions unanswered: why the problem of domestic violence was formulated as one of 
`crime' by government when it was; and why might New Labour keep the problem 
formulation `domestic violence as crime' in currency. 
The links between domestic violence and crime may well have been influenced by feminist 
critiques of the policing of domestic violence (e. g. Edwards, 1986,1989; Hatty, 1989; 
7 Domestic violence continues to be a `governable matter' in New Labour's second term (e. g. Home Office, 2002, 
2003 a, 2003b). But the focus of this study is a comparison between the Conservative governments of the early 1990s and 
New Labour's first term (see thesis Conclusion on future directions for research). 
8 What a Home Affairs Select Committee does as a policy-making activity is discussed in Chapter 3. 
9 Home Office Circular 1995 is mysteriously unnumbered. As it is the only Home Office Circular from this year named 
in this thesis and is commonly referred to as `Home Office Circular 1995', I retain this tradition. 
10 The full list of these memos is: Crisp & Stanko, 2000; Davidson et al, 2000; Edwards 2000a, 2000b; Hague, 2000; 
Hanmer & Griffiths, 2000; Kelly & Humphreys, 2000a; Levison & Harwin, 2000; Mullender, 2000; Mullender & 
Burton, 2000; Mullender & Hague, 2000; Walby & Myhill, 2000. 
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Southall Black Sisters, 1989; Stanko, 1989,1994a); and feminist activisms for raising 
consciousness about and government interest in domestic violence (e. g. Pizzey, 1974; 
Binney et al, 1981; Mooney, 1993). But not all feminisms forward crime interventions (see 
Snider, 1998) and `crime' is often only one of many issues such as housing, benefits, 
refuge provision, support networks and immigration restrictions which are raised by 
feminists (e. g. Harwin & Barron, 2000; Malos & Hague, 1997; Mama, 2000; Wilcox, 
2000). Also, it is problematic to consider feminist `gains' as linear and resulting from 
sustained campaigning (Smart, 1989). Thus rather than seeing government's formulation of 
`domestic violence is crime' as a product of feminist pressures, it is important to consider 
why, at this point in history, government might selectively `hear' and act upon knowledges 
that had been circulating for nearly fifteen years. 
From this perspective, `domestic violence as crime' can be seen as potentially useful to 
Conservative governments up to and including those of the early 1990s. For a political 
party whose primary claim was to be the party of law and order, the `fact of life' of high 
crime rates posed a serious problem (Garland, 1996,2001). Indeed it was also a problem 
for, predominantly Home Office, criminologists who since the 1970s had found themselves 
in a bit of a no-man's land (Hughes, 1998; O'Malley, 1997). Up until that time Home 
Office criminology had been predominantly concerned with the causes of crime and how 
the criminal, a person predisposed to criminal acts, could be rehabilitated (Hughes, 1998). 
However, much of this research had concluded that `nothing works' (Hughes, 1998; 
O'Malley, 1992; Savage & Nash, 2001; Tilley, 2002) and this rendered crime potentially 
ungovernable. The knowledges produced about crime could offer government no ways of 
exercising power over crime rates. Therefore, this precipitated both government and Home 
Office criminological approaches to change from `crime' to `crime prevention' (see 
Forrester et al, 1988; Sampson et al, 1988). 
Crime prevention and particularly understandings of `repeat victimisation' and `situational 
crime prevention' stem from the work of Ron Clarke; formerly the head of the Home 
Office Planning Unit and involved in the creation of the British Crime Surveys. Early 
British Crime Surveys indicated that half of those victimised by crime were repeat victims 
and that they suffered 81% of all reported crime. Further, four percent of victims were 
chronically victimised and their experiences accounted for 44% of repeat crime. Therefore, 
it seemed logical that working on the victims could be more efficacious than working on 
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criminals (Farrell & Pease, 1993; Pease, 1998; Tilley, 1995). `Situational crime prevention' 
is forwarded as "the scientific arm of routine precautions" (Clarke, 1997, p. 3). That is, 
simple activities such as locking doors and keeping possessions safe could reduce the 
opportunities for crime in a way that was potentially measurable. If the appropriate 
population were to be advised of how to keep their property and themselves safe, the fewer 
opportunities for crime would lead to a reduction in crime. In short, `target hardening' is 
seen to reduce crime". 
Consequently, it is not hard to see why domestic violence, generating some 1300 calls a 
day to the UK police (Stanko, 2000,2001a, 2001b) and its associated patterns of abuse 
(e. g. Smith, 1989), came to be seen as "the quintessential repeat crime" (Farrell et al, 2000, 
p. 15; Hamner et al, 1999); and one that might be preventable through positioning those 
experiencing domestic violence as the targets to be hardened (e. g. Lloyd et al, 1994; Farrell 
& Buckley, 1999). 
In addition, there were The Minneapolis Experiments of the 1980s (Sherman & Berk, 
1984; Berk & Newton, 1985). This research concluded that the police arrest of domestic 
violence offenders did, at least in some circumstances, deter future violence. Despite the 
well documented flaws with these studies 12, the notion that `arrest is a deterrent' was 
adopted with an alacrity not previously seen (Gelles, 1993) and which shocked even the 
researchers who produced it (Sheptycki, 1993). It dis, though, not so surprising that 
governments would seize an opportunity to promote ä `truth' that said domestic violence 
was governable as a crime. After the worrying notion that `nothing works' to reduce crime 
here was `truth' that confirmed what governments wanted to hear. Domestic violence 
produced a substantial amount of crime. Despite arrest's deterrence potential being highly 
contested (e. g. Hoyle & Sanders, 2000; Manning, 1993) `something worked' and was 
measurable in terms of crime prevention. Domestic violence (and therefore crime) was 
reducible if those experiencing it could be encouraged to call the police and the police 
11 Despite doubts about whether such an approach is cost effective (Welsh & Farrington, 1999) and the problem that 
some crime will always be displaced elsewhere (Anderson & Pease, 1997), the logic of situational crime prevention has 
remained popular in Home Office research. 
12 Most criticisms highlight methodological flaws such as research design and the participation of voluntary officers 
who systematically undermined the random nature of the experiment (Smith, 1989). It would also appear that the vast 
majority of the data was collected by one officer who was highly enthusiastic about the whole project (see Sherman & 
Berk, 1984). Also, the design assumed the process by which deterrence works (Manning, 1993). Other critiques 
problematised phone calls to the police as an effective measure for something as complex as domestic violence (Snider, 
1998); there was no exploration of the possibility that women might be better off not calling the police at all (Edwards, 
1989), and; mandatory arrest policies would reduce police discretion which might impinge on police attempts to address 
could be persuaded to use arrest accordingly. Consequently, the parts of feminist-generated 
knowledges which criticised the police for not facilitating women's use of the criminal 
justice system (e. g. Edwards, 1989; Southall Black Sisters, 1989) were useful to and 
therefore `heard' by government (see Hoyle & Sanders, 2000). 
However, it would be a mistake to assume that New Labour simply continued in the same 
vein. Certainly, domestic violence was still framed primarily as crime (e. g. Home Office, 
2000b). Also, feminist-generated knowledges and the notion of `what works' were still 
apparent in government documents (Hope, 2002; What Works? memoranda, see footnote 
9). But New Labour had different concerns, not least of which was to self-present as a 
viable alternative to the Conservatives particularly in regard to wresting their mantle as 
`the party of law and order' (McLaughlin & Murji, 2001; Savage & Nash, 2001). Central to 
this strategy, and commensurate with its `Third Way' rhetoric13, was to re-imagine the roles 
and responsibilities of civil society in a way that would reshape understandings of the 
social democracy relationship between government and the citizenry (Newman, 2001). In 
short, in regard to `crime', New Labour's main problem appeared to be how to constitute 
and mobilise `responsible citizens'. The solution appeared to be notions of `community'. 
The first part of New Labour's strategy can be understood as making `crime' into `the 
public's problem' in three distinct ways. Firstly, the notion of `crime' was reformulated as 
one of `crime and disorder' (Matthews & Pitts, 2001). That is, commensurate with New 
Labour's view of social democracy, the category was expanded in a way that incorporated 
the "prime concerns of ordinary citizens" (Giddens, 2000, p. 4; McLaughlin, 2002a). Thus a 
range of anti-social behaviours and sub-criminal nuisances such as `loutish-ness', noisy 
neighbours and littering all came under the rubric of crime and disorder (see Home Office, 
2003a). In this way, the need for crime prevention was re-framed into a "civilising 
mission" and one which apparently reflected the voiced concerns of the citizenry 
(McLaughlin, 2002b, p. 55). 
the attitude problems that drew attention to the policing of domestic violence in the first place (Buzawa & Austin, 1993). 
The notion of `police culture' and domestic violence is addressed in Chapter 2. 
13 Although Third Way discourse, promoting a `reasonable' course between notions of social democracy and neo-liberal 
concerns with market forces, is a feature of New Labour's approach to social democracy (Crawford, 2001; Giddens, 
1998), it is not a specific concern in this thesis. This is because the bulk of the work accomplished by `The Third Way' 
concerns legitimising New Labour's chosen path as the only viable political alternative rather than a distinct strategy per 
se (Newman, 2001; Rose, 1999b). At the level at which I analyse government policies (Chapters 4 and 7), 1 am more 
concerned with how responsibilisations of citizens and organisations are accomplished in that discourse. 
Secondly, the term `crime prevention' was replaced with the concept of `community 
safety'. `Community Safety' had been recommended to the Conservatives in 1991 by the 
Morgan Report but not taken up (Matthews & Pitts, 2001; McLaughlin, 2002a; Newburn, 
2002; Tilley, 2002). The benefit of this ethos to government was explicitly formulated as 
encouraging the public to embrace crime as a local issue; one that they could and should 
accept some responsibility for rather than seeing it just as a police matter (Hughes, 1998). 
Consequently, `community safety' founded attempts to mobilise citizens to share the 
`ownership' of crime and disorder in their area. 
Thirdly, New Labour's imagining of `community' was heavily influence by the work of 
Etzioni in the USA (Crawford, 2001; Hancock & Matthews, 2001; Hughes, 1998; 
McLaughlin, 2002b; Rose, 1999b). In regard to the argument I am making here, Etzioni's 
most important contribution concerns how a lack of community can be implicated in high 
rates of crime and disorder (Crawford, 2001). Thus combined with the understandings that 
the problem of crime and disorder should be influenced by the public and that citizens are 
stakeholders in their community safety, the community is additionally implicated in the 
state of disorder in which it finds itself. In short, New Labour have constituted a potent mix 
of public rights, citizen responsibilities and community blame which serve to reformulate 
`crime' as the problem of the citizenry. 
However, reformulating a problem and responsibilising people to do something about it is 
only part of what New Labour have apparently accomplished. Therefore, the second part of 
New Labour's strategy can be seen as the government enabling communities to fulfil their 
responsibilities. The `empowerment' of citizens is crucial both in assisting them to play 
their part in governance and well as re-drawing their relationships with government and 
others (Newman, 2001). In regard to crime, the local partnerships made statutory under the 
Crime and Disorder Act 1998 essentially de-centre the responsibility for crime from the 
police (Matthews & Pitts, 2001). The police, local authorities, health authorities and 
probation services are now obliged to work in partnership with each other (see section 3.3), 
joining up their responses to social problems and considering the implications to 
community safety of their combined and individual agency activities (Savage & Nash, 
2001). And consultation with the local community has been rendered a necessity. Thus 
communities are empowered to be `heard' by local services and participate in how local 
issues are addressed. 
But my primary point in exploring New Labour's approach to matters of crime was to 
consider why `domestic violence as crime' might be a useful concept. And one answer 
seems to be `refuges'. In New Labour's understanding, volunteering is central to 
community life (McLaughlin, 2002b). Therefore, as voluntary organisations, refuges stand 
as a ready-made example of `good citizens', defining `the problem', accepting 
responsibility for `the problem' and engaged in community safety activity. Although this 
way of working preceded New Labour discourse it nonetheless is likely to be claimed by 
them as part of their `success story' (Newman, 2001). Also, as I argued in section 2, refuge 
workers have a history of working together with the police. Thus the feminist ethos of 
collaborating with local service providers is broadly contingent with New Labour notions 
of active citizenship. Consequently, `domestic violence as crime' might well be a useful 
concept to New Labour in that it validates certain refuge activities as government successes 
whilst facilitating their assimilation and/or selective reformulation under governance (see 
also section 3.3). 
However, refuges also generate a possible contradiction for New Labour. As well as 
`community', `family' is an important discourse for them in re-generating notions of moral 
order (Newman, 2001). Refuges can be seen to bring women together as a `community' of 
women, often but not exclusively, from the local area. Whether refuges actually form part 
of the wider community in which they are located is debatable due to the often secret 
nature of their locations (Haaken & Yragui, 2003). But interestingly, `community' is 
absent from government policy around domestic violence (Walklate, 2002). And I wonder 
if the idea of women living in a community of women who have, in the main, left `family' 
relationships with men, renders refuges, their client group and those who run them 
`troublesome' for New Labour despite the advantages of their self-responsibilised 
citizenry. This idea is developed further in the following section. 
In this section I argued that domestic violence as a distinct governable matter, warrants 
more attention than it has been afforded by governmentalists. From 1990-2000 domestic 
violence emerged and developed as a government crime policy interest. But to assume that 
the potential usefulness to government of `domestic violence as crime' remained constant 
through the Conservative administrations of the early 1990s and New Labour's first term 
would be problematic. 
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For the Conservatives, the problem formulation of domestic violence as crime was 
seemingly beneficial for lowering crime rates through criminal justice interventions and 
encouraging individual citizens to take responsibility for their safety. Thus their policies 
might be expected to place a heavy emphasis on the `proper' policing of domestic violence 
and how victims might be persuaded to use the criminal justice system. For New Labour, 
the apparent benefits of `domestic violence as crime' can be found in how pre-existent 
forms of working such as refuges and feminist-led police collaborations exemplified the 
responsible citizenry of New Labour's imagination in a number of ways: they exercised the 
right to define problems; they claimed some `ownership' of the problem; they exercised 
responsibility for managing `community safety'; and they worked with local service 
providers. Consequently, their domestic violence policies might be expected to frame a less 
central role for the police and an increased emphasis on the voluntary sector. 
The governmental activity of problem formulation about domestic violence around `crime' 
and `responsibilised others' can be seen to have been useful to both the Conservatives and 
New Labour; although in different ways. But how they constitute domestic violence in 
actual policy discourse is absent from governmentalist and other governance studies. And 
this gap is addressed within this thesis. 
In the next section I pick up a concern that I expressed here in regard to the contradiction 
that communities of women may raise for New Labour around the joint notions of 
`responsibilised citizens' and `the family'. Thus I turn my attention to understandings of 
gender and domestic violence. 
3.2 The salience of gender 
In the same way that governmentalists overlook domestic violence (as noted by Hughes, 
1998; O'Malley, 1992) they also do not generally concern themselves with gender (Stanko, 
1995,1996; Walklate, 1997,2002)" or diversity more generally (Newman, 2001). Further, 
an emphasis on `crime' tends to lead to an exploration of `offenders' as `bad citizens' with 
limited attention paid to how `victims' may be constituted as `bad citizens' (e. g. Rose, 
2000). And yet, it is hard to render gender irrelevant to domestic violence. Statistics 
(Mirrlees-Black & Byron, 1999; Mooney, 1993), accounts by violent men (Anderson & 
14 Foucault's notorious disinterest in gender (see Sumner, 1990) is one reason why his work is often seen as 
incompatible with feminisms; others include notions that we are dupes, doomed regardless of our efforts and a 
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Umberson, 2001; Lewis et al, 2001) and even non-feminist research (Bourlet, 1990; Hoyle, 
1998) contradict conceptions of crime as gender free. And this is particularly pertinent for 
domestic violence policy-making where the presence of women's advocates in 1993 
(Home Affairs Select Committee) and in 2000 (What Works? literature reviews)" suggests 
that `women experiencing domestic violence' are the key population earmarked for 
governance (see also sections one and 2). 
The case is slightly different in the USA where women `victims' are subject to a gendered 
intervention of `separation' whilst at the same time men are made subject to programmes 
of retraining in masculinity (Merry, 2001). This `balance' is not found in the UK, where 
programmes for men are still in their pilot stages despite over ten years of research (Bowen 
et al, 2002; Burton et al, 1998; Eadie & Knight, 2002; Home Office, 2003b). One reason 
for this may concern feminist resistance to them. This has been on the grounds that 
`programmes for violent men' can cover a multitude of interventions from simple anger 
management to pro-feminist ones that engage with gender relations (Lewis et al, 2001; 
Orme et al, 2001). Feminist preferred formats often follow the Duluth model which 
emphasises men's use of power and control over women (see Pence & McMahon, 1999; 
Pence & McDonnell, 2000). Another problem for feminists is that, traditionally, 
government sponsored interventions on men have been at the expense of services for 
women (Burton et al, 1998). A further objection stems from schemes that are linked to 
criminal justice processes (such as CHANGE in Scotland in the early 1990s). These can be 
problematic because offenders may be held accountable to the criminal justice system 
rather than to the women they have committed violence upon (Orme et al, 2001). 
The lack of programmes for violent men in the UK suggests that `men who commit 
domestic violence' may not currently be framed as a specific population to be governed16. 
Rather, they are likely to fall into a generic, ungendered category of `offenders'. 
Consequently, the gender relevance of domestic violence for the purposes of intervention 
might emphasise female gender for `the done-tos' and no specific gender for `the doers'. 
standpointist adherence to the concept of The Truth (see Hartsock, 1990). Perhaps the most comprehensive and 
accessible account of the benefits for and the pitfalls of feminist engagements with Foucault is Ramazanoglu (1993). 
15 See footnote 9. 
16 Scourfield and Drakeford (2002) indicate that New Labour's main masculinity formulations in policy concern 
fathering and the education of boys. 
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Such a precedence is supported by feminist critiques of crime prevention literature 
specifically addressed to women (Gardner, 1990; Marcus, 1992; Stanko, 1995,1996,1997; 
Walklate, 2002). In particular, these documents constitute a disturbing formulation of `the 
responsible woman' (Stanko, 1995, my emphasis). This `responsible woman' polices 
herself and her actions in such a way as to avoid crime, especially that which lurks down 
allies and in dark places. If she becomes a victim of crime she has become an imprudent 
woman (Stanko, 1995,1997). The subject positions constituted for women in this discourse 
render them "vulnerable and victimizable" (Smart, 1992, p. 222; Marcus, 1992). And they 
have the potential to widen women's fears, encourage self-blame and increase their self- 
policing (Stanko, 1996). Thus `being women' not simply being victims of crime is 
problematised; and that could be useful in the `management' of `women' (Ramazanoglu & 
Holland, 1993). 
However, this highlights a potential contradiction between feminist critique and feminist 
policy-making. Often the `woman' of feminist discourse is formulated as a `survivor' in 
need of support, services and interventions to empower her to take control of her life and 
safety (see Chapter 2, section 2.2). In some ways, the `responsible woman' of crime 
prevention discourse, as self-actualising and managing her own risk like a responsible 
`good citizen', can be seen as similar to feminist-generated subjects of representation. And: 
"Feminists have 
... sometimes been unaware of the way in which ... subjects are 
constituted as having inbuilt or essential attributes and defects which require certain 
kinds of intervention and surveillance. The social practices which are aimed at these 
subjects stem directly from the discourses which created them in the first place. " 
(Watson, 2000, p. 74) 
Consequently, feminist policy-makers may have inadvertently contributed to a wider 
understanding of `being women' as problematic but governable around issues of domestic 
violence (see Chapter 2, part two). 
In government policies from 1990 to 2000, `women who experience domestic violence' 
have been steered towards criminal justice solutions (Harwin & Barron, 2000). However, 
there are three distinct differences in the ways that successive political governments can be 
seen to have re-imagined (gendered) victimhood. Firstly, New Labour are credited with 
having wedded discourses of rights and obligations more effectively than their 
predecessors (Lund, 1999; Rose, 1999b). Consequently, "No rights without 
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responsibilities" (Giddens, 1998, p. 65) leaves less room for formulations of (women) 
victims who may be exempted from the need to self-responsibilise (Lund, 1999). This may 
lead to an increase in mobilising/enabling discourse around the constitution of victims 
within crime policy. 
Secondly, New Labour have formulated a new policy category of `violence against 
women' (Women's Unit, 1999); as a governable matter separate from, but related to, 
domestic violence. In the previous section, I argued that domestic violence communities of 
women could be problematic for a government concerned with `the family'. `Violence 
against women' constitutes a policy community of `just women'; it neither genders 
offenders nor renders domestic violence commensurate with gendered victimhood. Thus 
whilst this could be read as a viable government response to feminist claims for a 
constituency of women, it could equally be read as a means by which notions of female 
gender and heterosexual family violence are managed out of domestic violence 
formulations. 
Thirdly, and following on from my second point, it is worth considering the other 
`community' voices that have came to the fore in regard to domestic violence; namely, 
lesbian and gay representations (e. g. Haymes, 2000; Kibblewhite, 2000) and those of 
ethnic minority women (Alibhai-Brown, 2000; hooks, 2000; Huda, 2000; Mama, 2000). I 
am not arguing that domestic violence should be framed as gendered violence; nor that 
these competing versions of reality should not be heard. Rather, I am questioning the 
usefulness of these voices at this time to government should it wish to undermine notions 
of domestic violence as gender(ed) `family' violence. Potentially, both could be used to 
disrupt gender understandings: `race' and ethnicity despite intersecting with gender are 
often treated as a separate issue (e. g. Home Office, 2003b); and gay and lesbian identity 
politics often elide gender difference (Cooper, 1992/3). Further, although discourses of 
homosexuality could be understood as detrimental to `the family', they might also be 
useful to a government concerned with managing the contradiction of `the family' and 
communities of women around domestic violence. 
In this section I have argued that gender, or at the least female gender, is likely to be made 
relevant by some participants in policy-making for domestic violence. Specifically in the 
governmental activity of constituting victims, female gender and responsibility ascription 
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around `being women' are likely to present in both Conservative and New Labour policies; 
but it is also probable that gender/victim formulations will be a source of difference too. It 
would seem that New Labour have created the potential to constitute very different subject 
positions for domestic violence victims from those in Conservative discourse. In particular, 
it appears that notions of female gender, male against female gendered violence and family 
violence are being managed. And this could be related to the contradiction for New 
Labour's notions of `the family' arising from the prevalence of communities of women 
who attempt to take responsibility for their own safety by leaving violent men. Thus the 
absences from governmentalist studies of gender and `bad citizen' victimhood raise 
unanswered questions about gender(ed) understandings of domestic violence in 
government policies. How (if at all) will they be managed? In what ways (if any) are they 
mobilised in constituting victims of domestic violence as governable? This too is a gap in 
research knowledge that this thesis aims to address. 
In the final section of this chapter I consider another key absence from governmentalist 
accounts which is important to this study; namely, analyses of power. 
3.3 Analyses of power 
Perhaps the main problem arising for me from governmentalist studies is how governing at 
a distance is deemed to work in principle rather than in practice. A key example would be 
`resistances'. Much is claimed for resistance but little is demonstrated (Miller, 2001; 
Stenson, 2000). And this tends to frame the `doing' of government as an undisturbed linear 
progression, not something that might evolve in regard to obstacles (O'Malley, 2001)". I 
see this as symptomatic of governmentalist accounts being forwarded as an `ethos of 
analysis' rather than a theory of power (e. g. Barry et al, 1993); in a way that renders 
analyses of power superfluous (Newman, 2001). Therefore, in this section, I explore 
through the example of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (CDA 1998) and `partnership' 
discourse what such a governmentalist approach might miss that is relevant to my thesis. 
The CDA 1998 is seen as important because it enshrines in law the notion of statutory local 
crime partnerships between the police and local authorities (e. g. Matthews & Pitts, 2001; 
Savage & Nash, 2001). From a governmentalist perspective, the appearance of CDA 1998 
does not disrupt the governmentality thesis. Although responsibilisation is the more normal 
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means by which governmental power is exercised, the mobilisation of the law can be seen 
as a continuance of this rationality. Certainly it may involve using the resource of 
sovereign power as entailed by `the law'. But Foucault (1980) never claimed that sovereign 
power was dead and gone, simply that as a means of day-to-day governance it was no 
longer efficacious. Therefore, potentially, invocations of the law may well indicate that 
governmental power has temporarily harnessed sovereign power for its aims (Rose & 
Valverde, 1998). In this account, responsibilisation is still the key rationality and 
`partnership', like `community' and `managerialism', is rendered a potential means of 
governance. 
However, a competing account is provided by Garland (1996,2000). He accepts that 
governments engage in responsibilisation but he sees this as a strategy rather than a 
rationality. That is, he argues that when government mobilises the law it is not in the 
service of a new form of power. Rather, it indicates that sovereign power has been working 
all along. Thus invocation of the law is commensurate with government flexing its 
muscles, reminding the police and others who holds all the power and forcing them to do 
what they would not do when simply responsibilised through other means. From this 
perspective, `partnership' is simply one of many responsibilisation strategies (Garland, 
2000, p. 124). 
My point in presenting these two accounts18 is that both are theoretically possible, 
internally consistent and potentially compelling. But neither demonstrate their positions in 
practice. Certainly, for me as a discourse analyst, how New Labour constitute CDA 1998 
in actual policy discourse is important (See Chapter 7). But even without that depth, much 
can be gleaned from a consideration of the existent academic literature about CDA 1998 
and how that indicates shifts from the Conservatives to New Labour; how `partnership' and 
other discourses of working together have been mobilised; and the political implications 
for non-statutory participants. All of these are important considerations for my thesis and 
all are absent from governmentalist versions. 
`Partnership' is potentially a key discourse in governance (Crawford, 2001; Hughes, 1998, 
2002; Newman, 2001). Its strength lies in its apparent logic and sense of benignity 
17 In Chapter 2, I interrogate how the `doings' of the police and feminists, key non-government domestic violence 
policy-makers, might be identified and analysed as potential resistances. 
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(Hughes, 1998). Service providers who share client groups should consult each other, 
ensuring that clients get the best service available and do not end up moving from 
organisation to organisation seeking what they need. The principle of this logic is 
supported by even the most radical thinkers (e. g. Patel, 2000). And for years feminists 
developed working relationships with the police for just such a purpose (Abrar et al, 2000; 
Kelly et al, 1999). But within governmental understandings, `partnership' is useful for 
masking power differentials between `partners' (Newman, 2001; O'Malley, 1997), eliding 
political differences (Newman, 2001) and working on government's responsibilities for, 
and relationships to, what happens at the local level (Matthews & Pitts, 2001; Newman, 
2001). 
To illustrate the differences between the Conservatives and New Labour around 
`partnership', it is worth briefly considering how crime partnerships, in particular, have 
evolved. Early crime partnerships under the Conservatives comprised the Five Towns 
Scheme in 1986, Safer Cities from 1988 onwards and Crime Concern from 1990 
(Houghton, 2000). But these were never central to the government's thrust on crime policy 
(Tilley, 2002) and were largely concerned with encouraging private investment (Houghton, 
2000). 
In regard to domestic violence, the notion of crime partnerships was introduced in Home 
Office Circular 60/90 in the form of inter-agency working (Home Office, 1990; see 
Chapter 7). Here, following the recommendations of the Home Affairs Select Committee 
(HASC, 1993a, 1993b) the police were encouraged to work together in partnership with 
other statutory and voluntary agencies under the auspices of `crime' (Patel, 1999). No 
additional funding was made available and these working arrangements were advisory 
rather than compulsory (Patel, 1999). The Conservative emphasis on single agency 
effectiveness (Newman, 2001) is perhaps reflected in the discourse `inter-agency'. But this 
document, within its advisory persuasions, did begin to disrupt the notion that domestic 
violence as crime could be effectively dealt with by any one single agency (see Home 
Office, 1995 and Chapter 7). 
For feminists electing to work in inter-agency partnerships, there are potentially mixed 
blessings. Certainly their knowledges are likely to be valued and HOC 1995 can be seen as 
18 In some ways it is hard to call this a debate per se. This is because Garland (2000) never cites Rose and Rose (2000) 
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a response to the HASC where feminist service providers were called as witnesses (see 
Chapter 6). However, government processes are likely to have `rules of engagement' that 
position and work upon participants in particular ways (Dobash & Dobash, 2000; Patel, 
1999; Smart, 1989). These may include delimiting the relevance of knowledges to those 
parts that are useful for crime aims (Crawford, 1994); appropriating feminist-generated 
ways of working together for individual agency benefit (Radford, 2003); and effectively, 
managing feminist organisations by inviting them in where the potentially troublesome 
elements of their knowledges and practices can be rendered inappropriate (Patel, 1999). 
Indeed, the increased participation of feminists in government realms has led to a decline 
in activities traditionally associated with feminist resistances (Bagguley, 2002; and see 
Chapter 2). But the voluntary nature of crime partnerships for the police and other statutory 
agencies, possibly meant that the impetus to work together could still be feminist-led; and 
historically, this has resulted in partnerships run on feminist lines (Abrar et al, 2000; Kelly, 
1999). 
By contrast, New Labour capitalised on the potential of `partnership' as a means of 
governance (Crawford, 2001; Newman, 2001). The CDA 1998 enshrined in law the notion 
that the accomplishment of community safety lay beyond the capability of a single agency 
(Crawford, 2001)19. Consequently, this problem focus necessitated a `joined-up' response 
both at the local level of statutory/voluntary service providers and in terms of the 
relationship between central and local government (Newman, 2001). And the shift in 
working together discourse from `inter-agency' to `multi-agency' appears to reflect this 
move to a social problem emphasis. 
Those implicated in local crime partnerships now had a duty to community safety. But this 
devolution of responsibility was not commensurate with a devolution of power (Crawford, 
2001). For statutory partners, CDA 1998 "prescribes the goals they should pursue, the 
targets they should achieve and the timescales in which they should operate, but not the 
means for their achievement" (Matthews & Pitts, 2001, p. 7). And this is accompanied by a 
complex system of additional funding linked to community safety achievements (Home 
Office, 2000d-g). Thus New Labour ascribes responsibility and allows limited autonomy 
whilst simultaneously holding on to managerialist performance indictors, problem 
in a foray into crime studies quotes Garland as in agreement with his position. 
19 Although domestic violence was not initially rendered a statutory subject of crime partnership in CDA 1998, this has 
been mooted in New Labour's latest government White Paper on domestic violence (Home Office, 2003b). 
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formulation and funding (see Tilley & Laycock, 2000); thereby reducing the amount of 
government that needs `doing' but extending the reach of governance (Crawford, 2001). 
For feminists engaged in this type of partnership work, the additional implications are 
manifold. Firstly, New Labour's imagining of working together assumes consensus 
between partners and therefore does not engage with the complexities of political 
differences (Newman, 2001); feminism in particular is seen as "yesterday's politics" 
(Coote, 2000, p. 3). Secondly, the joined-up approach houses a contradiction whereby 
single agencies still have individual responsibilities that are likely to impact upon their 
partnership activities (Crawford, 2001). Thirdly, the mobilisation of the law in regard to 
partnership impacts on the power positionings of those police and feminists already 
working together voluntarily. The shift for the police from voluntary to compulsory 
participants is not accompanied by a similar shift for feminists. As non-statutory 
participants, government policy cannot directly direct them; thus they remain `public 
volunteers' in a way that formalises the `professionalised police/responsibilised public' 
divide (O'Malley, 1997) and frames their `appropriate' participation as `good citizenry'. 
Consequently, the Rose/Garland `debate' around what type of power is mobilised in 
governance seems to miss the opportunity to explore how crime partnerships have evolved 
through discourses of working together (including `inter-agency' and multi-agency'); how 
New Labour has seemingly maximised the resource of `partnership' as a means of 
governance; and how forwarding working together around domestic violence has been 
potentially useful for governing feminist organisations. 
In this section I critiqued governmentalist accounts which demonstrate governance in 
principle rather than in practice. The absence of potential resistances is a key concern that I 
address in Chapter 2. Here I argued that a competing account of government's mobilisation 
of the law in the form of CDA 1998 was equally compelling but similarly lacking. A 
comparison of the Conservatives and New Labour approaches to crime partnerships 
indicated that the governmental activity of forwarding `working to eg ther' has been 
important to both; although New Labour seems to have extended the reach of its 
governance especially where feminist organisations are concerned. The gaps in the 
governmentalist literature raise questions for this thesis. How do New Labour constitute 
`the law' in the activity of forwarding working together? What shifts between the 
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Conservatives and New Labour are identifiable in formulations of feminist agencies? How 
do Conservative/New Labour accounts of single agency responsibilities differ in policy 
which forwards working together? 
In the chapter conclusion, which follows, I reprise my theoretical position, summarise my 
thesis focus and indicate what is to be taken forward to Chapter 2. 
Conclusion 
This thesis is underpinned by Foucauldian understandings of discourse, knowledge, 
subjectivity, power/resistance and governmentality. Thus I am interested in `truth'; who 
constitutes it, who occupies positions as truth-tellers and how truth is accomplished. I see 
policy as a technology of governance and I am therefore interested in the various 
exercisings of power (and resistance) within policy documents and policy-making 
processes. The key concern of this thesis is domestic violence as a governable matter; that 
is, how truths told about it, including those that mobilise gender understandings, subject it 
to governance in the period 1990-2000. 
I also subscribe to a governmentalist account of the `doing' of government as a 
problematising activity. My primary analytical concern for government policy discourse 
will focus on how the `doings' of `reflexive government/responsibilised others' and 
`professionalised police/responsibilised public' are accomplished through the 
governmental activities of problem formulation, constituting victims and forwarding 
working together. In addition, I will look out for ways in which government policy 
mobilises discourses, such as `community', `managerialism' and `partnership', as means of 
governance. 
Chapters 4 and 7 of this research house my analysis of government policy discourse. Of 
major concern are the continuities and disjunctures between documents produced by the 
Conservatives in the early 1990s and New Labour's first term. 
In Chapter 4 the two policies for comparison are: Home Office Circular 60/90, the first 
ever policy published in the UK, in 1990, for the specific matter of policing domestic 
violence; and Home Office Circular 19/2000, New Labour's revision of 60/90 in 2000. 
Between these two I will explore shifts in the governmental activities of problem 
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formulation and constituting victims; how truth is accomplished, including responsibility 
claims and ascription. Problem formulation is likely to revolve around understandings of 
domestic violence, crime and gender. The literature suggests that the Conservatives may 
place a heavy emphasis on the `proper' policing of domestic violence and frame links 
between domestic violence and female gender. By contrast, New Labour might be expected 
to present a less central role for the police in dealing with domestic violence and to 
undermine gender(ed) formulations. Victim constitution is likely to mobilise gender and 
responsibility discourse. The academic literature seems to imply that the Conservatives 
will generate women victims and possibly some room for them to be exempted from 
responsibility. In comparison, New Labour's victims may well be diverse in terms of 
ethnicity and sexuality. It is anticipated that female gender will be `managed' and that no 
victims will be exempted from responsibilisation. 
In Chapter 7I contrast two government policy documents which promote working together 
in regard to domestic violence: the Conservatives' Home Office Circular 1995, the first 
inter-agency policy of its kind in this country; and New Labour's Multi-Agency Guidance 
(Home Office, 2000a), its revision. The key emphases for similarities and differences 
concern how understandings of domestic violence as a local crime problem are used to 
found appeals to work together and how the feminist organisation Women's Aid is 
constituted in regard to single and joint agency responsibilities. Between the Conservatives 
and New Labour, the literature suggests continuities around the `logic' of working 
together, notions of `professionalised police/responsibilised public' and attempts to 
assimilate but de-politicise feminist-generated knowledges and working practices; and 
New Labour disjunctures around the mobilisation of `the law' (CDA 1998) and the extent 
and means of governance exercised over Women's Aid, including diversity issues and the 
notion of a `good citizenry' success story. 
In this chapter I have set out my theoretical perspective, the thesis focus, my 
understandings of the `doing' of government and how that will be taken forward to the 
relevant analysis chapters. However, I have not examined potential resistances to 
governmental activities; an `analysis of power' omission for which I criticised 
governmentalist approaches. Therefore, in Chapter 2I explore how the domestic violence 
policy `doings' of the police and feminists might be analysable in ways commensurate with 
my post-structuralist position. 
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Chapter 2: 
Possible Resistances: `Doing' Police Realities, `Doing' Feminisms 
Introduction 
In Chapter One I set out my theoretical perspective as subscribing to Foucauldian 
understandings of discourse, subjectivity, `truth' and power; and incorporating a 
governmentalist account of `doing' government. Thus I see `policy' as a technology of 
governance and `government' as a problematising activity which includes accounts of 
those to be governed. These attempts to govern `at a distance' should be demonstrable in 
the governmental activities of problem formulation, victim constitution and the forwarding 
of `working together'. And it is likely that power inter-relationships between policy 
community members such as `reflexive government/responsibilised others' and 
`professionalised police/responsibilised public' will be generated in the `doing' of 
government. I was also critical of the traditional macro level focus of governmentalists 
which tends to overlook domestic violence as a distinct `governable matter', the salience of 
gender, analyses of power and changes in political government. Therefore, this thesis 
attempts to explore these absences by examining the `doing' of government in regard to 
domestic violence policy-making in the period 1990-2000. 
A key concern I was unable to explore in Chapter One arises from the governmentalist 
tendency not to engage in analyses of power; namely, potential resistances (Kemshall & 
Maguire, 2001; Miller, 2001; Stenson, 2000). Specifically, `government' is often presented 
as an uninterrupted accomplishment rather than an on-going and evolving rationality which 
deals (or not) with the challenges posed to it (O'Malley, 2001). Therefore, in this chapter I 
interrogate the `doings' of two other domestic violence policy community members for this 
point in history; that is, the police and feminists. 
In part one I focus on the police. I critique accounts which reify the police culture of junior 
officers. Then through post-structuralist theory reprised from Chapter One, I go on to re- 
conceptualise `police realities' as ways of `doing' truth; particularly through identity-work, 
boundary-work and the mobilisation of gender as an occasional resource. And I place 
emphasis on Chief Officer `doings' of police realities, domestic violence policy-making as 
an opportunity to `do' police culture and potential shifts in these accomplishments between 
1990 and 2000. In part two I explore feminisms. I begin by interrogating what might render 
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feminist activities `feminist'. And after Kelly (1999), I examine how feminism might be 
made relevant to policy-making participation around domestic violence. Specifically, I 
identify organisational naming, forwarding causes of domestic violence and producing 
subjects of representation as ways feminism might be accomplished. 
In the chapter conclusion I summarise how I intend to analyse `doing' police realities and 
`doing' feminisms. And I delineate what is to be taken forward to future chapters. 
1. `Doing' Police Realities 
In the 1970s and 1980s, it was common for feminists to critique `police culture' as relevant 
to the poor policing of domestic violence (e. g. Dobash & Dobash, 1979; Dunhill, 1989; 
Southall Black Sisters, 1989). Two aspects of this position are problematic for me. Firstly, 
it presents a realist account of junior officer `culture' which leads to a theoretical impasse 
in the face of pro-police realist challenges (e. g. Waddington, 1993,1999). Secondly, in 
recent years, police culture seems to have slipped from currency in feminist accounts of 
policing domestic violence. The emphasis now seems to be on influencing the structures 
within which police culture might operate (e. g. Ganapathy, 2002; Stanko, 1994b). Thus 
feminists seem more interested in senior police officers but less concerned with police 
culture per se. 
The aim of this chapter part is to examine what is known about police culture and policy- 
making from the academic literature. The purpose is to delineate Chief Officer police 
realities as a viable and current site of enquiry for this thesis. Therefore, in section 1.1 I 
make a conceptual move from `police culture' to `police realities' by arguing that post- 
structuralist theory offers understandings of police realities as accomplishments; 
particularly around identity-work, boundary-work and the mobilisation of gender as an 
occasional resource. In section 1.2 I bring policy-making as police-work into focus and 
argue that Chief Officers are also likely to `do' police realities. And I suggest that 
interrogating Chief Officer `doings' of cultures in domestic violence policy-making 
activities from 1990-2000 is an, as yet, unexplored but potentially fruitful site for research. 
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1.1 From police culture to police realities 
In common parlance the term `canteen culture' has become synonymous with what the 
police are like (Fielding, 1994; Sheptycki, 1993). At least at the level of the rank and file', 
there is a rowdy and regular set of sexist (Fielding, 1994), racist (Smith & Gray, 1983) and 
homophobic (Burke, 1993) exchanges. Excessive drinking, womanising and sexual 
boasting are common (Skolnick, 1966; Westmarland, 2001). And homosexuality is hated 
and reviled (Frewin & Tuffin, 1998; McKenzie, 1993; Niederhoffer, 1969). Consequently, 
police culture is widely viewed as distinctly `macho' (Brown & Heidensohn, 2000; 
Herbert, 1998; Prokos & Padavic, 2002; Reiner, 1992; Young, 1991). 
This extends to police talk about the work that they do. Although police officers often `talk 
up' the dangerous and `manly' aspects of police-work, this sits in sharp contrast to the 
mundane nature of much of what they actually do (Banton, 1964; Bittner, 1967; Cain, 
1973; Cumming et al, 1965; Ericson, 1982; Herbert, 1998; Manning, 1977; Punch, 1979; 
Reiner, 1991a, 1994; Walker, 1996). Policewomen are seen as a feminising threat to 
traditional police-work (Fielding & Fielding, 1992; Waddington, 1999; Walklate, 1993) 
and even a danger to the policemen who may feel obliged to protect them (Jones, 1986). 
And yet, policewomen too apparently embrace police culture (Brewer, 1991; Brown & 
Campbell, 1991; Holdaway & Parker, 1998; Sheptycki, 1993). Further, there is a set of 
terms within police talk that categorise duties as worthwhile or `rubbish' and members of 
the public as good or bad (Manning, 1977; Reiner, 1992; Waddington, 1993); although, it 
should be noted that there are no neutral formulations for women as there are for men3. 
In regard to the policing of domestic violence, it is commonly asserted that the police make 
decisions based on their understandings of what domestic violence is (e. g. Bell & Bell, 
1991; Felson & Ackerman, 2001; Ferraro, 1989; Ferraro & Pope, 1993; Fyfe et al, 1997; 
LSPU, 1986). Factors considered in deciding whether or not a crime has been committed 
include the perceived worthiness of the victim (Chatterton, 19834; Faragher, 1985; Loseke, 
1989; Westmarland, 2001); and how `serious' the violence is deemed to be (Felson et al, 
2002; Sheptycki, 1993; Waddington, 1993). A `troublesome' woman may be arrested 
1 Television's obsession with realism and the police has provided most of us with ideas about how the police see the 
world (Hurd, 1979; Loseke, 1989; Tulloch & Tulloch, 1992). 
2 'Rank and file' is a shorthand within police studies for those police officers who normally conduct patrol duties. They 
are normally of the rank of constable or sergeant. 
3 The most common `positive' representation of women is `policemen's wives'. They are invariably invoked as paragons 
of virtue (Estridge, 1994), in need of protection from the terrible truth of policing (Fletcher, 1991) and somehow 
important to the doing of being a policeman (as illustrated in Banton, 1964). 
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rather than the man (Banton, 1964)5 or threatened with a counter-arrest (Ferraro, 1996; 
Westmarland, 2001). Further, there is a suggestion that the police are particularly negative 
when incidents of domestic violence occur within same sex partnerships (Haymes, 2000) 
and where the people involved are black, Asian or from other minoritised ethnic groups 
(e. g. Patel, 2000; Stanko, 1989)6. 
However, despite these fairly coherent knowledges about `canteen culture' and the 
`policing of domestic violence', how they may be consequent upon one another is 
contested. Those who understand these two activities to be related tend to be (pro)feminist 
(e. g. Dobash & Dobash, 1979; Dunhill, 1989; Southall Black Sisters 1989). Those who 
contend any inter-relatedness tend to be pro-police (e. g. Holdaway, 1995; Skolnick, 1966; 
Waddington, 1999). Between these two positions there is agreement that `canteen culture' 
exists and that the `policing of domestic violence' leaves something to be desired. The 
disagreement concerns whether the two are part of the same phenomenon (e. g. Southall 
Black Sisters, 1989) or `bifurcated' (Waddington, 1999). 
The feminist perspective from the 1970s and 1980s (e. g. Dobash & Dobash, 1979; Dunhill, 
1989; Southall Black Sisters 1989) asserts the relationship between `police culture' and the 
`policing of domestic violence' as largely self-evident. The sexist talk in the canteen is a 
manifestation of the same values that underpin the way domestic violence is policed. This 
is deemed particularly evident in terms of how the police subject women experiencing 
domestic violence to the same exercisings of patriarchal power that their abusers subject 
them to (Southall Black Sisters, 1989). That is, the macho police service and violent men 
both abuse the privilege of maleness to the detriment of women. Thus police sexism is an 
important consideration. 
By contrast, the pro-police account' claims that `canteen culture' and `policing domestic 
violence' are `bifurcated' (Waddington, 1999). What happens in the canteen is merely a 
concentration of sexist talk (Holdaway, 1995) or a natural response to the pressures and 
4 Within this bracket, Chatterton (1983) is the only one not critical of the way the police deal with domestic violence. 
5 Like Chatterton (1983), Banton's (1964) account is pro-police. In a domestic violence incident he witnessed where a 
drunken woman was arrested he appears to agree that she is the cause of the `trouble'. 
6 In the case of Asian populations, the police often cite their own lack of cultural understandings as a reason not to 
interfere in `family'/`cultural' matters (Patel, 2000). By contrast, black populations tend to be over-policed and this, 
through fear of how they may be treated, can result in the police not being called at all (Edwards, 1989; Ferraro, 1996; 
Mama, 2000; Snider, 1998; Stanko, 1989). 
7 It is noteworthy how many of the ex-police officers working in police studies adopt this position (e. g. Bourlet, 1990; 
Holdaway, 1983,1995; McKenzie, 1993; Niederhoffer, 1969; Waddington, 1993,1999). 
constraints of police work (Reiner, 1992; Skolnick, 1966). It gives "purpose and meaning 
to (an) inherently problematic occupational experience" (Waddington, 1999, p. 287). 
Within the police canteen, officers boast because it helps them feel better about themselves 
and remain untainted by the "dirty work" with which they deal (Waddington, 1999, p. 299). 
Domestic violence generates criticism for the police because the public do not understand 
that the police categorisation for assessing such cases is "domestics" (Waddington, 1993, 
p. 161). This category comprises a range of incidents from squabbling neighbours to lost 
children. The police are interested in crimes and it is difficult to sift crime from what could 
just be spiteful motives (Waddington, 1993). Sexist talk is ubiquitous (Waddington, 1999) 
and police officers' attitudes are not that different from the public's (Scripture, 1997). 
Therefore, police sexism is not that important. 
To some extent these two approaches have reached a theoretical impasse. They see the 
same `canteen culture' and poor policing of domestic violence but they contest what that 
means. For the feminist account presented here, the meaning lies chiefly in the effects of 
these activities and for Waddington, the meaning is to be found in what the police 
themselves understand to be happening. I think both effects and police understandings are 
important. And I see the impasse as a result of both approaches reifying `canteen culture'. 
That is, they assume that culture is `real' and language is simply a medium through which 
thoughts, feelings and accounts are conveyed; in short, they are realist accounts. From a 
post-structuralist perspective police culture, or `police realities', is `a verb'. As a means of 
`doing', including `knowing' and `being', police cultures can be understood to be 
constituting police versions of social reality as true. Therefore, theoretically, this shifts the 
focus of enquiry from what reified police cultures mean. And it generates opportunities to 
ask different questions such as how police cultures may be accomplished and to what 
effect. 
In post-structuralist theory, as I argued in Chapter One, language is the site where 
meanings are produced, subjects constituted and social realities formulated (Weedon, 
1997). Discourse is contradictory (Gill, 1993; Meyers, 1994; Stalans, 1996; Wetherell et al, 
1987) and provides "competing ways of giving meaning to the world" and knowing truth 
(Weedon, 1997, p. 23). Subjectivity too is "a site of disunity and conflict" (Weedon, 1997, 
p. 21) and individuals "the site and subjects of discursive struggle" (Weedon, 1997, p. 93). 
Consequently, subject positions are not something one has or is but they are "ways of 
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being an individual" (Weedon, 1997, p. 3, my emphasis). Also discourse is historically and 
geographically specific (Ramazanoglu, 1993). And there will consequently be limitations 
in any time or place to what can be spoken and how an individual can `be'. Further, 
because of the contested nature of truth, all social realities are fragile and require 
production and reproduction in order to keep them in currency (Weedon, 1997). Therefore, 
a member of a police organisation has certain opportunities to make meanings and occupy 
subject positions. These will shape `the doing of being' a police officer which in itself 
needs to be repetitious in order to be kept current. 
For example, ethnomethodological accounts of policing (Sacks, 19728; Shearing & 
Ericson, 1991) illustrate ways of `doing the being' of a police officer. In regard to patrol 
officers, this comprises seeing the social world differently: - 
"For the police, objects and places having routine uses are conceived in terms of 
favorite misuses. Garbage cans are places in which dead babies are thrown, 
schoolyards are places where molesters hang out, stores are places where 
shoplifters go, etc" (Sacks, 1972, p. 292). 
This version of police social reality is communicated to new police recruits through the use 
of story-telling. Providing anecdotal accounts is also used to convey `rules' about how to 
read an incident and how to react `appropriately' (Shearing & Ericson, 1991). In this way, 
patrol officers, over time, build up a `tool-kit' of situations and responses that imbue their 
subjectivities with a police `sensibility' (Shearing & Ericson, 1991). And this comprises a 
world view that "as a way of seeing, implies a way of being that invites a doing" (Shearing 
& Ericson, 1991, p. 499). 
Therefore, organisational culture is not, as suggested by realist accounts, something that 
people within an organisation have (Wright, 1994). Nor is it something that just `is' within 
the boundaries of the institution (Wright, 1994) or a specific organisational locale such as 
the police canteen. Rather culture is a `verb' (Street, 1993). It is a `doing' that is actively 
and repeatedly produced, reproduced and kept current within a range of processes. As such 
it comprises exercisings of power whereby knowledges are formulated and forwarded as 
truth. 
8 Considering the distinction between ethnomethodology and conversation analysis (Antaki & Widdicombe, 1998, p. 1) 
this paper of Sacks' is more in the vein of ethnomethodology. This is because he seems to be musing about how the 
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From this perspective, it is possible to explore what `doing' police realities might 
comprise. McNulty (1994) suggests that public encounters generate opportunities to 
reproduce police versions of reality. And this seems to be borne out by discursive studies 
of emergency calls to the police (Tracey & Anderson, 1999; Whalen & Zimmerman, 
1990). These illustrate how public claims of truth are interrogated and reformulated when 
they are presented to a police organisation. In short, public meanings are changed in order 
to generate a police response or justify no response. This is a common feature of 
institutional discourse (Agar, 1985) whereby accounts passing from the outside into an 
organisation are effectively `recontextualised' (Linell, 1998). No talk is produced outside 
of a context. A person calling the police is making meanings of their own which are 
contextually bound to what they think they are asking for or what their expectations of the 
police might be. Therefore, when the incoming truth is reformulated to make sense within 
police versions of social reality it is recontextualised. Further, this exercising of power over 
competing knowledges constitutes an organisational boundary (Foucault, 1982). Thus 
`doing' culture in terms of boundary-work is constitutive of the organisation itself (Wright, 
1994). 
Another example of how police realities are kept current by privileging the truths they 
produce and constituting boundaries comes from a study about the use of anecdotes in 
police discourse (Fletcher, 1991). Anecdotes are a very common feature of police talk 
(Shearing & Ericson, 1991). However, they are not used in conversations with police wives 
and criminals (Fletcher, 1991). The arguments that police officers use for why this is the 
case concern the dangers of unnecessarily upsetting their spouses and potentially giving 
away important information to wrong-doers (Fletcher, 1991). This suggests that anecdotes 
are understood to convey something that only those with police officer identities know. 
This argument is further supported when the use of police anecdotes with other police 
officers and community members are explored. In conversations with officers in similar 
ranks, anecdotes invoke the notion of shared experience. But in talk with non-police, the 
subject position constituted for the audience is used as a device to show just how divorced 
their experience is from (police) reality (Fletcher, 1991). In short, the version forwarded 
and founded in police identity-work is presented as reality; not a police reality, but the 
reality which can only be seen in its totality from the vantage point of the police. 
police see the world and arrange their local understandings rather than showing how they achieve that through specific 
talk. 
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A further discursive example about how police realities may function is provided by 
interrogation studies and concerns notions of gender (Auburn et al, 1995; Wowk, 1984). 
This research is interesting because it demonstrates the mobilisation of gender as a resource 
in the same transactional business of securing a confession. 
Wowk (1984) explores a police interrogation of a man accused of murdering a woman after 
a party. She shows how a police officer draws on common-sense understandings of 
women's sexual manipulation of men and uses this to blame the woman and exculpate the 
man's action. In the common-sense understandings of wider society, negative 
representations of women are frequent (Smart, 1992). Claims for the inferiority of women 
and their difference from men are often grounded in truths about their propensity for sexual 
manipulation (Gough, 1998)9. Thus Wowk's (1984) research illustrates that non-police- 
generated truths, or `outsider knowledges', may be reproduced in police discourse without 
much recontextualisation, if they are useful to the transactional business in hand. 
Auburn et al (1995) analysed a range of police interrogations, some of them domestic 
violence, where men were accused of using violence against other people. This study 
indicates that even within the same discursive work with the same man, female gender 
comes and goes in its usefulness to the particular matter in hand. For example, the notion 
that it is unmanly/un-gentlemanly to hit a woman is used in attempts to secure a 
confession. But once a confession is secured and the police emphasis shifts to building a 
`crime' case of assault, gender is no longer warranted. Consequently, it would seem that 
gender proves a valuable occasional resource at least in the activity of interrogation. 
Collectively, this notion of gender as non-police-generated discourse available to police 
realities as an occasional resource is commensurate with West and Zimmerman's (1987, 
p. 129) account of gender as a "product of social doings". They argue that gender can be 
understood as an omnirelevant resource which can be accomplished and made relevant in 
any activity. Consequently, both the presence and absence of gender discourse may be 
pertinent to gender `doings'. Whether gender is mobilised as an occasional resource in 
other police discourse has not been documented within the academic literature. But 
interrogation studies provide a potential means of moving beyond arguments that police 
9 These same underpinnings are apparent in the discourse of rapists (Godenzi, 1994; Scully & Morolla, 1984,1985) and 
men who beat their women partners (Adams et al, 1995; Cavanagh et al, 2001; Hearn, 1996a, 1996b) when justifying 
their actions in terms of men's rights to have sex with women and women's culpability in bringing that about. 
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sexism is necessarily related and therefore worthy of investigation (e. g. Dobash & Dobash, 
1979; Dunhill, 1989; Southall Black Sisters, 1989) or bifurcated and therefore dismissable 
(e. g. Waddington, 1999). 
Indeed, in keeping with my focus on discursive work on how talk is occassioned rather 
than timeless, I would argue that what is important is to consider what sexism is doing in a 
particular time and place not that all sexism is automatically related (Gelsthorpe, 1986). 
And that would involve both demonstrating the relevance of gender discourse to those who 
produce it (e. g. Williams 2002; and see Chapter 3) and exploring the effects of police 
exercisings of power which invoke gender (Gelsthorpe, 1986). 
In this section I have examined the traditional literature which identifies similar accounts 
of `canteen culture' and the policing of domestic violence but contests how these activities 
are related. They tend to reify police culture and implicate either effects or police 
understandings as crucial to accounting for meaning. I have argued that police cultures are 
best understood as `a verb'. They are ways of knowing truth and `doing the being' of a 
police officer. Their frailty as social realities requires them to risk the disruptive potential 
of challenges in order for them to be reproduced and kept in currency. As exercisings of 
power, through identity-work and boundary-work, they are mobilised to undermine 
competing accounts, privilege police versions of reality and recontextualise competing 
knowledges. But they are not water-tight. Common-sense discourses can pass into police 
realities particularly if they serve the transactional aims of a situation. Gender can be 
shown to have been mobilised in this way as an occasional resource. From this perspective, 
both effects and police understandings are important. However, I, like traditional studies of 
police culture, have focused primarily on the rank and file. Therefore, in the next section I 
consider the implications of Chief Officer police realities and how these might provide a 
useful site for exploring police policy-making activities. 
1.2 Chief Officer police realities and domestic violence policy activities 1990-2000 
Studies of the police do posit a variety of different police cultures for the rank and file. 
These concern differences between an urban/rural divide (Cain, 1973); community 
policing/patrol officers (Fielding, 1995); detectives/non-detectives (Hobbs, 1991); and 
rivalry between police stations (Young, 1991). Some also point to differences between 
managers and non-managers (Chan, 1996; Punch, 1983; Niederhoffer, 1969; Reuss-Ianni 
& Ianni, 1983; Skolnick, 1966). Although these accounts of police managers suggest 
different concerns arising from different positions that they hold within police 
organisations, the main focus for most tends to be about how the rank and file attempt to 
undermine senior managers. It is uncommon for Chief Officers to come under the spotlight 
in their own right (for exceptions see Reiner, 1991b; Savage et al, 2001) or to consider how 
and in what ways their constitution and reproduction of cultures contributes to their 
dealings with the public. And yet, a post-structuralist account of police realities would 
seem to suggest that there is no reason why Chief Officers should not be `doing' cultures 
too; and policy-making can be understood as a policing activity (Patel, 1999). Therefore, in 
this section I explore some possible similarities and differences in the `doing' of Chief 
Officer police realities around domestic violence policy work in the period 1990-2000. 
In Chapter One I argued that `community', `managerialism' and `partnership' might all be 
discourses which government could mobilise as means of governing the police through 
policy as a technology of governance. Appeals to community were likely to encourage the 
police to see communities as under-used police resources (e. g. Goldstein, 1990). 
`Managerialism', although seeking to produce better police managers, might actually 
generate the sole product of Chief Officers self-presenting as good, professional managers 
(de Lint, 1998; Hughes, 1998). Notions of crime `partnership' normally result in an 
empowerment of the police through the constitution of a `professionalised police/ 
responsibilised public' power dynamic (O'Malley, 1997). Therefore, it would seem, 
commensurate with my account of police realities in section 1.1, that governmental 
attempts to steer and guide the police might actually be useful to Chief Officers in 
constituting and reproducing their versions of reality; particularly in identity-work. 
Also in Chapter One I identified some shifts in the concerns of the Conservatives and New 
Labour which might influence attempts to govern the police. And these too may impact on 
Chief Officer `doings' around domestic violence policy activities. Firstly, between the 
early 1990s and 2000, there is likely to be a governmental disjuncture in understandings of 
domestic violence as gender(ed) violence. Although it seems probable that Chief Officer 
police realities will mobilise gender as an occasional resource when useful to the 
transactional business in hand, there may be historical differences in how this is 
accomplished. Secondly, the police have always had a mandate to serve the public. But 
New Labour have re-imagined notions of crime and community, thereby decentralising the 
role of the police (Crawford, 2001; Matthews & Pitts, 2001; Newman, 2001). Therefore, 
there could be changes in the ways Chief Officers manage `the community' in their 
boundary-work. 
Moreover, there is another factor which may impact on both how and where the `doing' of 
Chief Officer police realities is enacted in regard to domestic violence. In England and 
Wales1°, the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) is an organisation which 
represents the interests of all officers above the rank of Chief Superintendent regardless of 
individual service boundaries. As a professional police body, it is a means of collective and 
politicised engagement in public debate (Hatty, 1991; McLaughlin & Murji, 1997; Reiner, 
1992) and often consulted by government in changes to policing and legal processes". 
Therefore, `ACPO' is a potential resource for Chief Officers in warranting their versions of 
reality. 
In regard to domestic violence, representatives of ACPO were invited to submit written and 
oral evidence to the Home Affairs Select Committee on domestic violence in 1992/3 
(HASC 1992/3). And from my thesis perspective, the discourse produced by Chief Officers 
during this `event' has potential for exploring their police realities as resistances to 
governmental exercisings of power around domestic violence during the Conservative 
administrations of the early 1990s. 
However, in 1997, the formal status of ACPO changed (Savage et al, 2001). It became a 
company registered as a `professional organisation' ostensibly because this provided 
ACPO with a more appropriate legal position in terms of the amounts of money it was 
handling (Savage et al, 2001). But it had an additional effect in that it rendered ACPO very 
visible as a body accountable to no-one but it members and this has led in recent years to 
ACPO lowering its profile in `public matters' (Savage et al, 2001). Therefore, it is perhaps 
not surprising that when New Labour was revising domestic violence policy in 2000 
(Home Office 2000a, 2000b) ACPO were consulted but their policy-making activities were 
not conducted in the public domain. 
10 There are also Scottish and Northern Irish versions of ACPO which are not pertinent to this thesis. 
I1 One such example would be the change to allowing juries to bring in a guilty verdict by majority rather than 
unanimous decision in 1966 (Reiner, 1983). 
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By contrast, their `silence' on this issue, at this time, was filled by the Metropolitan Police 
(MPS/the Met). There has long been dissonance between the MPS and ACPO due to the 
sheer number of ACPO-ranked officers in the MPS and the Met's concern with being seen 
as internationally renowned proponents of policing (Savage et al, 2001). Therefore, it is 
interesting that in 2000 the MPS held a domestic violence `Enough is Enough' conference 
(MPS, 2000b). Delegates included national government representatives, the mayor of 
London, academics, service providers, feminists and other police. Their participation 
supported the positioning of the Met as nationally and internationally important in regard 
to domestic violence expertise. Consequently, it was noteworthy that the Met used this 
opportunity to disseminate their current policing domestic violence policy (MPS, 2000a) 
by the boxful. It suggests that Met Chief Officers, at a particular historical point when 
ACPO were keeping a low-profile, were able to formulate a platform for the promotion of 
their versions of reality. 
The implication for my thesis is that Chief Officer discourse about domestic violence in the 
public domain in 2000 was produced by the Met rather than ACPO. Although MPS Chief 
Officers will still have access to `ACPO' as a warrant for truth-telling, there may be 
concerns particular to the Met which impact on their `doing' of police realities. And this is 
discussed further in Chapter 3. 
In this section I have argued that my post-structuralist account of `doing' police realities 
could prove useful in an interrogation of Chief Officer accomplishments around domestic 
violence policy activities from 1990-2000. In the chapter part summary, which follows, I 
consider the implications of this. 
Summary 
In seeking a means to address the absence in governmentalist studies of a viable account of 
`doing' police resistance or exercisings of power, I became troubled by a particular 
feminist debate of the 1970s and 1980s. This perspective, like many others of its time, gave 
a realist account of police culture in the rank and file. But in recent years it had lost favour 
and a new emphasis on senior police officers seemed to have been accompanied by a fall in 
interest about police culture more generally. I was keen to rekindle interest in police culture 
as a way of interrogating the policing of domestic violence; but with a focus on culture as a 
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series of `doings', Chief Officers as `doers' of culture and domestic violence policy- 
making as a policing activity. 
Therefore, in this chapter part I began by making a conceptual move from `police culture' 
to `police realities'. From a post-structuralist position on language, I was able to fashion a 
means for interrogating the `doing' of police realities in the activities of identity-work, 
boundary-work and the mobilisation of gender as an occasional resource. And it seems 
possible to extrapolate this account to Chief Officer `doings' and policy-making as a way 
of policing domestic violence. I went on to identify `community', `managerialism', 
`partnership' and `ACPO' as possible Chief Officer truth-telling resources. In the period 
1990-2000, there are probable shifts in how and where Chief Officers will constitute their 
versions of reality around domestic violence. These include New Labour's re-imaginings 
of what domestic violence, crime and community `are' and the Met's high-profile activity 
at a time when ACPO was keeping a low-profile. Finally, ACPO representatives' discourse 
at HASC 1992/3 and the Met's 2000 domestic violence policy appear to provide viable 
sites of enquiry for tracing some of these shifts. 
In this chapter part I have focused on police realities. In part two I turn my attention to the 
other main possible source of resistances to governmental exercisings of power around 
domestic violence, namely feminisms. 
2. `Doing' Feminisms 1990-2000 
Interrogating feminist participation is a form of activism in its own right (Kelly & 
Humphreys, 2000b). It demands critical feminist engagement (Lennie, 1999; Patel, 1999) 
and is increasingly seen as important in the UK (e. g. Abrar et al, 2000; Coote, 2000; 
Dobash & Dobash, 2000; Kelly, 1999; Patel, 2000; Smart, 1986,1989,1992,1995) and the 
USA (e. g. Gagne, 1996; Jenness, 1999; Schneider, 2000; Scott, 1993). And yet, analyses of 
what feminists actually `do' in policy-making and their work with other agencies seem few 
and far between (for exceptions see Kelly, 1999; Mann, 2000). Indeed, the most common 
site for investigations of the `doing' of feminism is `feminist research' (e. g. Haraway, 
1990; Harding, 1991; Hekman, 1999). But feminisms, like police realities and 
governmental `doings', can be understood as discursive accomplishments. And exploring 
them as such is a viable research area (Bell, 1995,2001,2002). 
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However, my post-structuralist approach leaves me with two problems. Firstly, the two sets 
of data I have selected in regard to `doing' feminism in government policy-making 
comprise: an oral evidence session at HASC 1992/3 where feminists were present; and the 
twelve What Works? memoranda published by the Home Office under New Labour, 
largely authored by feminists12. On each occasion `feminist' was not a government 
requirement for participation; the shift was from `(women) service providers to domestic 
violence victims' to `academic researchers with a domestic violence specialism'. And the 
word `feminist' does not appear in any of these data. Therefore, unlike critique of explicitly 
feminist research (e. g. Hoyle & Sanders, 2000), I do not have a specifically `feminist' 
starting point. To say a priori that some are feminist and some are not negates certain 
possibilities, such as, feminists may not always `do' feminism; non-feminists may 
accomplish feminist `doings'; and even men might `do' feminism. And this leads to my 
second problem, simply, what might `doing' feminism in the government policy-making 
context look like? 
Therefore, the aim of this chapter half is to examine, through my theoretical framework, 
what can be ascertained about `doing' feminisms from the academic literature. The purpose 
is to delineate a viable means of analysing and demonstrating feminist `doings' in the 
government policy arena. In section 2.1 I question what is `feminist' about feminist 
research and reprise from Chapter One some of the ways that successive governments from 
1990-2000 might attempt to govern feminisms. In section 2.2, following Kelly (1999), I 
look at three activities which might be useful in identifying the `doing' of feminisms in 
policy-making, namely; organisational naming, forwarding causes of domestic violence 
and producing subjects of representation. 
2.1 What makes feminist research feminist'? 
If establishing `truth' was simply a case of presenting women's accounts as `speaking for 
themselves', then effectively anyone could do it. For example, the police have access to 
first hand accounts from women in domestic violence situations. But they also have a 
history of countering women's versions of what happens to them (Brown, 1998; Gregory & 
Lees, 1999; Heidensohn, 1992; Martin, 1996; Young, 1991)13. Thus a woman may describe 
12 These are: Crisp & Stanko, 2000; Davidson et al, 2000; Edwards 2000a, 2000b; Hague, 2000; Hanmer & Griffiths, 
2000; Kelly & Humphreys, 2000a; Levison & Harwin, 2000; Mullender, 2000; Mullender & Burton, 2000; Mullender & 
Hague, 2000; Walby & Myhill, 2000. 
13 These are actually all studies which include accounts of how police women's accounts of sexual harassment are 
diluted, countered and explained away at all levels of the police service. 
the same events to a feminist researcher, a non-feminist researcher and a police officer, all 
of whom may claim very different truths to be grounded in that account. This suggests that 
between the telling of an account and the truth-claims arising from it, some kind of 
unexplained process has been undertaken (Kitzinger & Wilkinson, 1996). And this move 
from individual women's accounts of their experiences to `women's experience', as a 
`collective truth' about what they say, is important to research, both feminist and non- 
feminist. Therefore, in this section I consider the differences between feminist and non- 
feminist accounts in order to elucidate what it is that renders feminist research `feminist'. 
Of the many feminisms brought to government policy-making on domestic violence, 
standpoint theory is perhaps the most theoretically sophisticated in its explanation of how 
`women's experience' should be constituted. Here: - 
"All experiences and knowledges are partial but it is only by understanding the 
totality of such insights that we can learn something about the true nature of 
oppression and the need to resist collectively without marginalising or 
compromising other disadvantaged voices or rights. " (Patel, 1999, p. 81) 
The underlying assumption of feminist standpoint theory is that "there is truth to social 
reality that can be known in its totality" (Hekman, 1999, p. 23). This renders all knowledge 
as partial and situated and the standpoints from which these knowledges are produced as 
multiple (Hekman, 1999). 
This raises a contradiction for standpoint as to how all knowledges can be situated and yet 
true (Hekman, 1999). Harding (1991) has attempted to address this question with the 
notion of `strong objectivity'. She sees objectivity as an important concept because it has a 
valuable political history, "a glorious intellectual history" and it promotes good feminist 
practice (Harding, 1991, p. 160). In order to avoid the "fruitless and depressing choice 
between value-neutral objectivity and judgmental relativism" strong objectivity is required 
(1991, p. 142). All knowledges are partial and perverse but it is oppression that allows the 
possibility of objectivity. The greater the oppression, the greater the objectivity. So 
Harding (1991) solves the problem of all knowledges being situated yet true by effectively 
asserting some knowledges as truer than others (Hekman, 1999). Although "Using 
women's lives ... can 
decrease the partialities and distortions in the picture of nature and 
social life" (Harding, 1991, p. 121) "experience itself is shaped by social relations" (p. 123). 
In this way, women's accounts of their experiences in and of themselves provide the 
grounding for `real truth' but may themselves be distorted by the conditions of the 
oppression in which they were produced. Consequently, it is the work of feminist 
standpoint researchers to somehow convert these accounts of experience into the truth 
inherent in them. 
This account of standpoint theory indicates two key features of the `women's experience' 
that feminists are likely to take to policy-making. Firstly, it is a construction of feminism, 
in short a `fiction' (Haraway, 1990). This suggests that "Experience has no inherent 
meaning" (Weedon, 1997, p. 33). Rather it can be understood as a linguistic event that is 
constituted and negotiated in language (Scott, 1992). This is not to deny the suffering of 
women as has been suggested (e. g. Cain, 1993). Theorising an extra- or pre-discursive is 
not the same as denying women's pain. Rather the claim that post-structuralism makes is 
that the retelling of an experience subjects it to change (Scott, 1992; Weedon, 1997). When 
feminists `validate' women's accounts (e. g. Kelly, 1996; Williamson, 2000) that process 
has become a co-constructed version. For example, Wood and Rennie (1994) discuss the 
dilemma they had when women interviewees asked them whether they thought that what 
had happened to them constituted rape. The researchers were worried about imposing their 
interpretations on women or shutting off ways of making meaning. Consequently, what 
emerges as `the truth' from research is likely to have been influenced by the research 
context. 
Secondly, as well as bearing "no natural or inevitable relationship to the experience of the 
members of the group" (Gill, 1998, p. 29), a standpoint is actually a "political position" 
(Gill 1998, p. 30, emphasis in the original). The truth-claims of standpoint feminisms are 
therefore grounded in a negotiated political truth of women's accounts of their experiences. 
Although not problematic in and of itself this does have implications for feminists working 
in the policy-making field. Of most serious concern is the emphasis on the politics of the 
production of this truth in the absence of theorising about what may happen to it once it is 
unleashed into different environments. Specifically, there is a sense that once knowledge 
has been established as `true', it will continue to be `the truth' wherever it is taken (Smart, 
1995). 
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Why this is problematic becomes clear when non-feminist research on `women's 
experience' is considered. For example, Carolyn Hoyle (Hoyle, 1998; Hoyle & Sanders, 
2000) combines a tradition within police studies to watch the police doing police-work 
(e. g. Banton, 1964; Faragher, 1985; Manning, 1977) with a tradition from feminist research 
of generating women's accounts of their experiences. Her specific focus is the policing of 
domestic violence. She is explicitly "not ... 
feminist" (Hoyle, 1998, p. ix) despite 
expressing aims to end violence in women's lives and to empower individual women. 
Indeed, she is highly critical of feminist attempts to change policing practice in the 
collective name of women's interests14, arguing that it is conceited and presumptive to 
claim to know what is best for all women (Hoyle & Sanders, 2000). Certainly Hoyle 
(1998) praises feminists for the domestic violence awareness that they have generated in 
the past. But she implicitly seems to be suggesting that feminism has done its work and is 
perhaps now obsolescent. Although she thanks those who "trusted me with their 
experiences" (Hoyle, 1998, p. x), she also appears to ride roughshod over them. This is 
particularly the case where she talked to women who were resident in a Women's Aid 
refuge. She says: - 
"The data from these conversations were necessarily raw and the opinions 
prejudiced by the women's own experiences and their present environment. It is for 
these reasons that no attempt was made to generalize about abused women from 
this particular data set, but their comments provide some support for other aspects 
of the study. " (Hoyle, 1998, p. 40, my emphasis) 
For me, there are three aspects of Hoyle's account that I find disconcerting. Firstly, she 
singles out the accounts of women in Women's Aid refuges as `less true' than those of 
victims who call the police to their homes. This appears to be suggesting that there is 
something `better' about the truths produced by victims mobilised to call the police than 
those mobilised to seek services from feminist organisations. Secondly, her sense of 
working on women's telling of their experiences in order to extract `truth' from them is, 
politics aside, very similar to Harding's (1991) account of what research should do. 
Thirdly, I am concerned at the ease with which she claims feminist-generated aims 
(women's empowerment and ending violence in their lives), adopts a counter political 
stance (non-feminist) and suggests feminism is no longer relevant. And this is seemingly 
sufficient for de-coupling feminist-generated aims from the politics of their production. 
14 Her distinctions between whether this is some or all feminists working in the field are sometimes unclear. 
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Implicitly she seems to be arguing that feminist politics is not a necessary component for 
mobilising women to seek services or generating truth about women who experience 
domestic violence. 
This comparison of feminist and non-feminist research as ways of knowing truth about 
women seems to indicate that what sets feminist research apart is `the politics of 
knowledge production'. But the example of non-feminist research suggests that this `doing' 
of feminism is not necessarily carried forward once feminist-generated truths pass into the 
mainstream. Further, these same truths, de-coupled from the politics of their production, 
can be used to undermine the very feminisms that produced them in the first place. 
Moreover, there is a sense that once these truths and their history of efficacy in mobilising 
women to seek services are detached from `unnecessary' feminist `doings' they might 
usefully be wedded to more `appropriate' self-responsibilisation activity such as calling the 
police. 
In many ways, this seems commensurate with how successive governments from 1990- 
2000 have understood the usefulness of feminisms. As I argued in Chapter One, feminist- 
generated knowledges with their history of mobilising women to seek services are deemed 
necessary for the governance of `women experiencing domestic violence'; in short, they 
potentially render such `women' governable (Watson, 2000). Both the Conservatives and 
New Labour appear to have made attempts to access the power of these knowledges 
without incurring the `unnecessary' aspects of feminisms. 
For example, each has appropriated feminist-generated ways of `working together' at the 
local level and under the banner of crime. In this way, knowledges or parts of knowledges 
not conducive to crime reduction aims are rendered `inappropriate' (Crawford, 1994). 
Further, participating in working together activities is not commensurate with equality and 
sharing on an equal footing (Coote, 1999; Patel, 1999,2000). Indeed, being invited to take 
part is a useful device for eliding political differences (Newman, 2001). Rather than 
marginalising feminists as potential dissenters, a key government strategy in the 1980s 
(Foley, 1996), they can be brought inside where conditions of participation may be exacted 
(Gillespie, 1996; Scott, 1993; Newman, 2002). New Labour, in particular, can be seen as 
producing "a politics that manages dissent" (Franklin, 2000, p. 17; Coote, 2000). Its 
emphasis on `common-sense', consensus politics and partnership means that it "needs to 
absorb troublesome women into the political mainstream" (Franklin, 2000, p. 21). Thus 
inviting potential dissenters inside where dissent is rendered inappropriate could be an 
effective means of both accessing knowledges and silencing opposition (Patel, 1999, 
2000). 
In this section I have argued that what apparently sets feminist-generated knowledges aside 
from non-feminist truths resides in the politics of production. In non-feminist research and 
governmental activities it would seem that de-coupling feminism from the truth it 
produces, and thereby reformulating its politicised meanings, is readily accomplished. New 
Labour in particular seems adept at managing feminisms through forwarding `working 
together' activities. In the next section I explore, after Kelly (1999), how feminists engaged 
in government policy-making might re-assert the relevance of feminisms. 
2.2 Making feminism relevant to domestic violence policy participation 1990-2000 
Kelly (1999; Kelly & Humphreys, 2000b) argues that a reduction of feminist politics is not 
a necessary outcome of feminist engagement in government policy-making activity. And 
other commentators express some cautious optimism (e. g. Newman, 2000; Perkins, 2000). 
Certainly she understands that inviting feminists to take part implies that participants 
should behave in a particular way (Kelly & Humphreys, 2000b). Indeed, the `f-word' has 
become a dirty word (Kelly, 1999; Perkins, 2000). Also she notes that many feminists do 
capitulate in policy activities (Kelly, 1999). However, she argues that there is no need for 
this to happen. Rather, being heard by policy-makers is not the end of the feminist project 
but a beginning that offers new opportunities for feminist vigilance and activism in regard 
to government (Kelly & Humphreys, 2000b). The government may seem unlikely allies for 
feminists but all alliances need to be explored. Participating in policy-making is therefore 
an opportunity that, with care, could be converted to the benefit of feminisms15. 
In line with what Kelly (1999) argues, I am concerned that feminists who do take part may 
be too ready to capitulate to what they see as `the rules of engagement' because they under- 
estimate both the value of their `expertise' in governmental understandings and the 
15 The counter position is held by Patel(1999,2000). She argues that by remaining outside government policy-making, 
Southall Black Sisters have been able to continue with feminist critique. I agree with her that leaving the arena (Pragna 
Patel was a participant in HASC 1992/3, see Chapter 6) sends a strong message to government. But, it does not place 
feminist expertise beyond the reach of governance. For example, Southall Black Sisters are extensively cited in 
government documents as 'good practice'(Home Office, 2000a; The Women's Unit, 1999); and, more recently, New 
Labour's White Paper on domestic violence states its intention to consult Southall Black Sisters on its proposals (Home 
Office, 2003b). 
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potential for `doing' feminism. Consequently, contra Patel who claims that government- 
generated arenas are proven not conducive to feminisms (1999,2000), I would argue that 
feminism is possibly not currently `done' in government policy-making but may actually 
be `do-able'. 
Kelly (1999) suggests some ways that feminist politics might be accomplished during 
policy-making. Essentially, she is concerned with `making feminism relevant to 
participation'. This would include not shrouding one's status as feminist but justifying it as 
a basis for taking part. Three of the `doings' she forwards surround organisational naming, 
causes and competing feminist accounts. 
2.2.1 Organisational naming 
Kelly (1999) suggests that organisational names might be a way of rendering feminism 
relevant to participation in policy-making activities. For example, `Southall Black Sisters' 
says something very different from `Chiswick Family Rescue'. The former invokes a 
political stance in regard to women. The latter suggests the importance of saving families 
but in the absence of what they are to be rescued from, any political position is unclear. 
Further, government, and New Labour in particular, has shown a tendency to name 
feminist organisations such as `Women's Aid' and `Southall Black Sisters' in its 
documents (e. g. Home Office, 2000a, 2003b; The Women's Unit, 1999). This means that 
organisational naming of this kind is permissible. However, the fact that New Labour do it 
means that the strategy in and of itself is not exclusively feminist, although the ways in 
which organisational names are mobilised may prove useful to feminist aims. What these 
accomplishments might be is absent from the academic literature. 
2.2.2 Causes 
Kelly (1999) further suggests that a key focus for feminists in policy-making should be 
drawing attention to the causes of violence against women. That is, it is important that 
issues such as domestic violence are discussed in terms of how they generate problems for 
women rather than being problems of women. 
In Chapter One I argued that feminist campaigning for women's services and against 
`corrective' interventions for violent men may have contributed to government 
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formulations of women as `the problem' (see also Watson, 2000). I am not suggesting that 
every opportunity needs to be taken to render violent men visible and culpable. But I do 
think that it is important to emphasise the `doer of the deed' and, if gender is mobilised in 
regard to `victims' then a commensurate formulation of gendered `offenders' needs to be 
considered in order to avoid constitutions which are permissive of women blaming. This 
may be particularly important under New Labour as the combination of their strategies to 
wed rights to responsibilities (Lund, 1999) and to generate the discrete policy category of 
`violence against women' (see The Women's Unit, 1999) suggests opportunities to 
increase the responsibility ascribed to women in order to manage their own risks. 
2.2.3 Competing feminist accounts 
The final suggestion that Kelly (1999, p. 96) makes is that feminists occupying competing 
political positions should work together in policy-making activities and "resolve conflicts 
in private". Her focus is multi-agency policy-making at the local level. But I am concerned 
that even a temporary strategy of a united feminist front at the national level, in 
government policy-making, could be detrimental to feminist aims. I have always seen 
feminism's diversity as one of its strengths. Notions of `one true feminism' are problematic 
(Bell, 2002); they risk eliding differences and may `undo' feminism. To explain why that 
may be the case, this section compares two competing accounts of feminism both of which 
have been represented in the government domestic violence policy-making arena. 
'Refuge' 16 and the `Women's Aid Federation' (WAF) were born out of a split in the 
original Women's Aid refuge in the 1970s. They both continue to supply a range of refuge, 
advocacy and support services for women and children. The split occurred due to Erin 
Pizzey's exploration of her own abuse as a child and her increasing reliance on 
understandings of `learned helplessness' to explain violence in the home (Dobash & 
Dobash, 1979). In this formulation, there is an emphasis on how the psychological state of 
the individual contributes to the abuse they receive. The Chief Executive of Refuge, Sandra 
Horley (2002), has attempted to dilute this argument but she still presents an account of 
`battered women' as both damaged and contributing to their situation. Having cited gender 
inequalities in society as `the problem', Horley (2002) presents (albeit reluctantly) criminal 
justice sanctions as the only viable deterrent that can educate women, men, society and the 
next generation. For WAF, domestic violence is seen as rooted in "deep social assumptions 
16 Refuge was formerly called Chiswick Family Rescue. 
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about relationships between men and women" (Harwin, 1999, p. 45). In this account, 
criminal justice is only one of many services that women in domestic violence situations 
may require and select for themselves (Harwin, 2000)". For WAF, women are `survivors' 
never `victims', never complicit and their access to safety and services is paramount' 8. 
Despite the differences between these two practitioner organisations, two similarities stand 
out for me: subscribing to essential notions of gender; and a tendency not to critique each 
other publicly19 
The first similarity between Refuge and Women's Aid concerns their theoretical 
understandings of gender. Both adopt an essentialist and realist approach. Consequently, 
notions of women as women and men as men are taken as largely self-evident and not 
interrogated. One problem with this approach is that representational politics necessarily 
produces a subject of that representation (Butler, 1992). Any feminist aim to produce a 
single coherent account of `women' could inadvertently be "totalizing and imperialistic" 
(Haraway, 1990, p. 199). Those women most likely to be excluded by such a position 
include women of colour (Adams, 1998; Alibhai-Brown, 2000; hooks, 1982; Huda, 2000; 
Snider, 1998; Weis, 2001), lesbian women (Kibblewhite, 2000) and older women 
(Whittaker, 1996). Within feminist literature on domestic violence this criticism of 
exclusion seems to lead to a move to globalism (e. g. Hester, 2000; Radford, 2000), 
presenting accounts of domestic violence in different countries, or what Butler (1990) flags 
up as lists of `etc. ' (race, class and disability) as a way of indicating inclusiveness but not 
engaging with the problem. 
Within current government policy-making, this is potentially dangerous to the `expert' 
status of feminisms. Feminists are present because they generate knowledges which have a 
history of mobilising women to seek services and government is concerned with `women 
17 Although Horley (2000,2002) does make a case for service provision she prioritises criminal justice in a way that 
WAF do not. 
18 Other differences concern the way the organisations themselves are set up. Refuge has a Chief Executive in the person 
of Sandra Horley, it actively courts celebrity of women as diverse as Martine McCutcheon (an actor in a popular soap 
opera) and Cherie Blair (wife of the current prime minister) to the cause and Horley's publications (e. g. 2002) tend to be 
in a somewhat popularist vein. WAF has a National Co-ordinator in the person of Nicola Harwin, it does not seek the 
support of the famous and its publishing record comprises practical guides (eg. The 1999 Gold Book) and academic 
liaison (Binney et al, 1981; Harwin, 1999). WAF does formulate a list of what it considers to be viable research in the 
domestic violence field (HASC, 1993b) but this seems to be born out of a perceived necessity as Harwin herself is 
saddened that research makes people sit up and take notice whilst it is telling women working "at the coal face" what 
they have known for years (Harwin, 2000). 
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experiencing domestic violence' as a problem population in need of governance (see 
Chapter One). However, if feminists taking part in policy activity self-present as 
representing only a `generic woman', they may risk undermining their feminist aims 
(Kelly, 1996). 
For example, feminist and crime discourse may have contributed to the constitution of 
`women experiencing domestic violence' as the population to be governed. But that does 
not mean that the governable population will remain constant. Advocates for lesbian 
women experiencing domestic violence (e. g. Kibblewhite, 2000), women of colour (e. g. 
Huda, 2000) and women with learning difficulties (e. g. Preston & Greig, 2000) are 
increasingly heard. And these advocates could well, in time, be included in policy-making 
activity (Kelly, 1996). They generate specific truth-claims about populations and, where 
they are also service providers, they have demonstrably mobilised women to seek help. 
Therefore, their knowledges are likely to be framed as `expertise' by government. In short, 
feminist truth could be reduced in importance from its current position of `necessary' to 
one of only many voices. And as I argued in Chapter One, New Labour in particular appear 
interested in disrupting the centrality of `female gender' from domestic violence 
understandings. 
I am not suggesting that it would be inappropriate for women of colour or women with 
disablement to represent themselves. Rather, if feminisms do not engage in diversity 
issues, they risk being excluded because they are exclusionary and possibly, ultimately re- 
marginalised (Coote, 2000; Kelly, 1996; Mouffe, 1992). 
A further problem with gender essentialism is the risk of biological determinism 
particularly in regard to motherhood and children (Butler, 1992). Within domestic violence 
studies, the nurturing aspects of motherhood have been valorised and the base level 
vulnerability of women as mothers used as the basis of claims-making (e. g. in Harmer, 
1996). Women are often linked with children but this usage may be inconsistent and used 
in the absence of an explanation about children's mobilisation (e. g. in Radford & Stanko, 
1996). Once these types of cultural feminisms are invoked, all the problems of biological 
19 A third similarity, but one I find less striking for the purposes of this thesis, seems to be `patriarchy' as a way of 
understanding the causes of domestic violence as gendered violence. This too is problematic not least because it offers no 
theory of change (Poliert, 1996). 
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determinism, women's reproductive functioning and `natural' difference are incurred 
(Alcoff, 1988). 
The main danger is that understandings of gender as `natural' difference could reify the 
very inequalities between women and men that feminisms seek to undermine. This is 
because any reliance on sexual difference closes down enquiry about how the category of 
`women' is constructed (Butler, 1990; Riley, 1988; Smart, 1992; West & Zimmerman, 
1987). The constitution of the "essential attributes" of women which formulate them as 
"lacking, marginal and powerless" can inadvertently support particular types of 
intervention (Watson, 2000, p. 74). An emphasis on language keeps sexual difference and 
the subject in question (Squire, 1998). In this way, `women' can be understood not just as 
something that women are at all times but a category that is constituted within discourse 
across specific times and contexts (Riley, 1988). 
For example, as I argued in Chapter One, as well as constituting problems/solutions, policy 
also creates subject positions in regard to domestic violence. Women who experience this 
type of abuse do not simply sit outside of policy waiting to be encompassed within it. 
Rather, the language used literally brings them into being as `women' within the context of 
specific documents (Smart, 1992,1995). In my discussion of crime prevention literature 
for women (Chapter One), I argued that female gender could be used to problematise 
`being women'; and to mobilise subjects gendered as female. 
However, women survivors are not the only subjects who may be gendered as female 
within policy on domestic violence. Women service providers and advocates, including 
feminists, will also be formulated within the text. Therefore, the responsibilisation ascribed 
to these members of the domestic violence policy-making community may also mobilise 
gender as a means of governing them. And New Labour's apparent emphasis on disrupting 
the centrality of `female gender' around domestic violence could prove especially 
pertinent. 
It occurs to me that fear of being negatively gendered as female could be quite a 
compelling reason for feminists working in policy-making to present a united front20. 
Although Refuge and Women's Aid occupy different political positions, they do not 
counter each other in public. Certainly they present differing versions of the `truth' but 
they never mobilise rhetoric about the other's potential `deficiency'. For example, they 
simply do not reference each others work (e. g. Harwin, 1999; Horley, 2002). Also at a 
recent international conference on domestic violence (MPS, 2000b) there was no evidence 
of overt disagreement in the relevant presentations (Harwin, 2000; Horley, 2000) and yet, 
the atmosphere between those working on the promotion stands for Refuge and WAF was 
palpable. Feminist tensions over the `ownership' of domestic violence are not uncommon 
where different understandings of `the problem' and `the solution' are forwarded (Mann, 
2000). But there seems to be a tacit agreement that it is inappropriate to wash this dirty 
linen in public. 
I can understand that feminists do not wish to be framed as `squabbling', `unprofessional' 
or `not knowing their own minds'. But for me one of the great strengths of feminism is its 
diversity and its propensity for questioning itself. Bearing in mind government's tendency 
to pick and choose what suits its aims and what does not, simply forwarding different 
versions could be treated as providing `options'. The presentation of competing accounts 
does not mean that they will be adhered to equally, if at all. Therefore, it could be 
beneficial within government policy-making to air some of the differences in ways that 
problematise `easy options' to govern women experiencing domestic violence. 
To illustrate what I mean about `easy options', it is worth considering what feminists 
demand of the policing of domestic violence. For Horley (2000,2002) the key word is 
`protection' whilst for WAF women's safety and helping them secure it for themselves is 
crucial (Harwin, 1999,2000). The notion of `protection' invokes the sense of something 
inherently vulnerable. Children and certain witnesses are said to need protection. There is 
therefore something about their state that they should not have to or cannot do for 
themselves. Further, it suggests weakness and passivity (Harmer & Stanko, 1985; Stanko, 
1985,1994a, 1995) two things commonly associated with negative formulations of female 
gender. From a New Labour perspective, women ascribed as needing protection could be 
problematic as New Labour is not keen to exempt citizens from their ascribed 
responsibilities (Lund, 1999). It suggests they deserve help and resources without having to 
self-responsibilise. But it could be used to justify quite intrusive, `forcing' rather than 
`responsibilising', criminal justice interventions such as compelling them to give evidence 
20 The other main reason would probably be a concern that their participation is premised on the same `expertise' and 
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or prison sentences for non-compliance. That is, they may be framed as `hopeless cases', 
those who have failed to respond to help to self-actualise (Hindess, 2001). 
The WAF notion of safety and self-help is more in line with the governmental ideal of 
converting `bad citizens' into `good citizens' (see Chapter One) as it suggests that this 
population of women are ready to self-actualise but require some help to formulate and 
exercise choice. The woman of this discourse could be commensurate or at least be 
rendered commensurate with `the responsible woman' of crime prevention literature (see 
Chapter One). Singly, these two formulations of `women experiencing domestic violence' 
are not that helpful to govermnent. But collectively, they provide government with potent 
opportunities to govern their target population. Domestic violence can be constituted as 
both a problem for and a problem of women. Women need help to self-actualise as women. 
But in cases of abject failure to self-responsibilise, the full power of the law can justifiably 
be mobilised against them as `bad citizens'. Therefore, if feminisms do not contest each 
other, they could inadvertently facilitate government's governance of women experiencing 
domestic violence in ways not compatible with their feminist aims. 
Consequently, competing feminist accounts are important to how I understand analysing 
the `doing' of feminism but not strictly in the way Kelly (1999) suggests. I intend to 
explore the subjects of representation produced in HASC 1992/3 and the What Works? 
memoranda, looking at their (in)compatibility with each other and how (if at all) different 
positions and understandings are made relevant within the data. 
In this section I have outlined (following Kelly, 1999) how I intend to interrogate `doing' 
feminism in this thesis. In the chapter part summary I draw together my position from 
sections 2.1 and 2.2. 
Summary 
In this chapter half I have identified the interrogation of feminist activities in the 
government policy-making arena as an important but relatively unexplored site for study. 
My choice of data which comprise both feminist and non-feminist participants meant that I 
needed to consider who `does' feminism beyond the simple assumption that what feminists 
`do' equates to accomplishing feminism. Therefore, I began with a comparison of 
inconsistencies may be thought to undermine its expert status. 
70 
feminist/non-feminist research to establish what makes feminist-generated knowledges 
feminist. The answer would seem to be `the politics of production' but this emphasis on 
`doing' feminism appears to be easily de-coupled from the truths that it produces. 
Therefore, government is well placed to access the knowledges it seeks to govern `women 
experiencing domestic violence' whilst simultaneously rendering `inappropriate' political 
concerns, parts of knowledges and ways of participating which do not suit its aims. 
Kelly (1999) proposes ways of `doing' feminism in policy-making which make feminism 
relevant to participation. Following her, my focus will be on the activities of organisational 
naming, forwarding causes of domestic violence which do not problematise `being women' 
and the production of subjects of representation. Specifically, I am interested in how 
competing (feminist) accounts are managed (or not) and how the different `rules of 
engagement' generated by the Conservatives in 1992/3 and New Labour in 2000 are dealt 
with (or not). Also there is the basis for a comparison between 1992/3 and 2000 whereby 
New Labour have invited feminists inside government policy-making processes and 
apparently seem concerned with increasing their governance of feminist organisations and 
destabilising the centrality of `female gender' to domestic violence understandings. 
In this chapter part I have concentrated on feminist `doings'. In the overall chapter 
conclusion, which follows, I set out how my understandings of `police realities' and 
`doing' feminisms will shape analysis Chapters 5 and 6 respectively. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have looked at two possible sources of resistance to governmental 
exercisings of power around domestic violence; Chief Officers of police and feminists. In 
each case, I was concerned with fashioning a means of accounting for their various 
`doings' in the domestic violence policy context which was commensurate with my post- 
structuralist position. Also I was interested in any differences in these `doings' suggested 
by changes in political government from 1990-2000. The findings from this chapter 
underpin the format of two analysis chapters. 
In Chapter 51 focus on Chief Officer police realities. The data come from an oral evidence 
session at HASC 1992/3 where police representatives were present as witnesses and the 
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Metropolitan Police policy on domestic violence from 2000. The three activities which I 
trace in the accomplishment of their police realities are identity-work, boundary-work and 
the mobilisation of gender as an occasional resource. My expectations of Chief Officer 
police realities are threefold. Firstly, managerialist discourse is permissive to Chief 
Officers to self-present as `good managers'. And the warrant `ACPO' is available to these 
police officers and may be useful for identity-work and truth-claims. Secondly, 
governmental notions of `professionalised police/responsibilised public' are likely to 
influence Chief Officer understandings of non-police knowledge producers. In particular, 
in Conservative and New Labour imaginings of `crime' and `community' could be 
pertinent in boundary-work. Thirdly, New Labour seems to be attempting to disrupt the 
centrality of `female gender' to domestic violence truths. Therefore, there might be an 
accompanying shift in how Chief Officers mobilise gender as a resource. 
In Chapter 6I am concerned with the `doing' (or not) of feminisms. The early 1990s data 
come from an oral evidence session of HASC 1992/3 where the witnesses were all 
representatives of non-statutory service providers which, to a greater or lesser extent, 
counted `victims' of domestic violence in their client group. The 2000 data are a series of 
What Works? memoranda authored by academics and published by the Home Office as 
policy guidance to practitioners at the local level. Although well known feminists took part 
in both, feminism is not a condition of participation. The three activities which I trace 
throughout the data, regardless of any a priori understanding of who `is' or `is not' 
feminist, are organisational naming, forwarding causes of domestic violence and the 
production of subjects of representation. 
There are two things that I would expect to see arising from my analysis. Firstly, the data 
are likely to produce competing (non)feminist accounts particularly around the subject(s) 
of representation. Secondly, it is probable that `doings' of feminism will be different under 
New Labour in terms of the availability of power afforded to the positions from which 
feminists `speak'; an increase in organisational naming commensurate with New Labour's 
approach; and more resistance to New Labour's attempts to de-centralise `female gender' 
in domestic violence understandings, maybe by asserting causes which make the `doer of 
the deed' visible and/or are not permissive of woman blaming. 
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This chapter raises key questions for my analysis in Chapters 5 and 6. How are these 
accounts of `doing' police realities and feminisms viable (or not) for the analytical work I 
wish to undertake? In what ways are notions of police culture and `doing' feminism useful 
for unpacking policy activities? How in actual policy-making talk and text is the potential 
to resist governmental exercisings of power realised (or not)? 
For this thesis, three series of `doings' are important: `doing' government in the activities 
of problem formulation, constituting victims and forwarding working together; `doing' 
Chief Officer police realities in boundary-work, identity-work and mobilising gender as an 
occasional resource; and `doing' feminism through organisational naming, asserting 
domestic violence causes and producing subjects of representation. In Chapters One and 2I 
have identified these `doings' as potentially viable means of enquiry. In the methodology 
chapter I illustrate how I intend to analyse these various `doings' in actual policy-making 
talk and text. 
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Chapter 3: 
`Doing' Discourse Analysis: how, what and why 
Introduction 
In Chapter One I set out my theoretical perspective as broadly Foucauldian in terms of 
discourse, subjectivity, `truth' and exercisings of power/resistance. Also I delineated the 
site of this thesis as an interrogation of how the `doings' of government, the police and 
women's advocates are accomplished in the domestic violence policy-making context from 
1990-2000. Further, I adopted a largely governmentalist approach to understanding the 
`doings' of government. In particular, I identified as important the governmental activities 
of problem formulation, constituting victims and forwarding working together; and New 
Labour disjunctures around imaginings of crime, victims and partnership. In Chapter 2I 
sought ways to interrogate the `doings' of Chief Officers and feminists as potential 
resistances to these governmental exercisings of power around domestic violence. I made a 
conceptual move from police culture to police realities and formulated a means of 
investigating them. This comprised identity-work, boundary-work and the mobilisation of 
gender as an occasional resource. Moreover, following Kelly (1999), I explored ways that 
feminism might be `done'. And in this regard, I identified organisational naming, 
forwarding domestic violence causes which are not permissive of women blaming and 
producing subjects of representation. 
The main questions arising from these chapters concerned how government, police realities 
and feminisms are accomplished as `doings' in policy-making activities. In this chapter I 
detail the data that both formed and informed the analyses in Chapters 4 to 7; I delineate 
my discursive methodology as a synthesis of Foucauldian and Conversation Analytical 
forms; and in a reflexive narrative, I illustrate why this research and this approach is 
important. 
In parts one and two I outline my synthetic approach to discourse analysis. Through 
worked examples of Foucauldian Analysis and Conversation Analysis, I explore issues of 
depth, dialogue and participants' relevance. However, notions of `doing' feminism 
produced different value-laden responses from me as a researcher from those of `doing' 
government or police realities. Consequently, in part three I look at feminist reflexivity and 
how that has been important to what this thesis attempts to accomplish. Compared to the 
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how of `doing' discourse analysis, I explore the what and why of data selection and thesis 
formulation as on-going and iterative processes. 
In conclusion, I reprise my synthetic approach and set out a reader-map, for the chapters 
that follow. 
1. Foucauldian Analysis: issues of depth 
The synthetic analysis used in this thesis is largely indebted to Foucault both in terms of 
what is common to a wide range of discursive analyses and what is specific to a 
Foucauldian approach. Therefore, in this section I begin by reprising the theory from 
Chapter One and setting out the key tenets of Foucauldian Analysis. And I go on to present 
a worked example on an extract of government policy. Moreover, by using analytical 
`levers' from Conversation Analysis and paying closer attention to detail in line with 
Discourse Analysis, I explore how an analysis can be deepened, providing a more accurate 
account of the `doing' of government. 
1.1 What is Foucauldian Analysis? 
As I argued in Chapter One, for Foucault (1976,1980,1982,1988,1991) discourse is 
constitutive of subjects and power relations. All that is meaningful resides within 
discourses as they are historically specific ways of knowing `truth'. It is not that nothing 
exists outside of discourse, rather when we begin to make sense of things we bring them 
into discourse. Further, what is spoken can also be understood in terms of what could be 
said in a particular time and place, but is not (Foucault, 1976). Paradoxically, discourses 
need to be countered in order to thrive as their currency depends on their articulation 
(Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982). And challenges to discourses from counter-truths often 
provide opportunities for them to be reproduced. Thus strategies are often discernible in 
discourse even when contradictions are present. And power and knowledge networks can 
be shown to be operating through discourse in a variety of ways. 
Consequently, it is not surprising that an account of Foucauldian Analysis (FA) 
understands discourse as constitutive and "uneven, contradictory and contested" (Carabine, 
2001, p. 280). Power is seen to circulate and operate at all levels. Formulating knowledge 
within discourse is one exercising of power. But normalising a specific truth is a far more 
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effective deployment of power. Further, what can be said and done with discourse is 
`historically specific'. Therefore, the context in which talk and text is produced is 
paramount. FA looks for what categories are constituted in discourse and what is and is not 
said about them (Carabine, 2001). Through constant re-reading, discursive strategies can be 
identified. And with attention to context, the effects of how discourse, knowledge and 
power are deployed can be analysed. This includes discerning to whom the discourse is 
addressed and why, as all talk and text is assumed to have a presumed audience. The 
primary purpose of discourse is to make meaning. And constituting truth as `true' will be 
contingent on who hears a particular version of reality. This is most important in terms of 
normalisation where the agreement of the audience, or at least the larger part of the 
audience, is necessary for the co-construction of `generally known truth'. 
In terms of data, FA casts its net far and wide. Its focus is generally large bodies of 
qualitative material. These may well be items of government discourse, particularly where 
there is an interest in governance, although that is not necessary. Indeed counters to 
government-formulated truth may also be collected (Carabine, 2001), both to identify 
discourses that attempt to undermine governmental exercisings of power and to explore 
how government takes account (or not) of these counter-truths. 
1.2 Doing Foucauldian Analysis: themes, absences and context 
Much of the data for this thesis comprises vast tracts of qualitative material. Around one 
third is government discourse (Chapters 4 and 6). All four documents are government 
policies on domestic violence; two from the Conservative administrations of the 1990s and 
two from New Labour's first term. Within each pair there is one text on the policing of 
domestic violence and one text on multi-agency working and domestic violence. These 
data lend themselves to a Foucauldian approach as examples of government discourse 
around a matter rendered governable (see Chapter One) about which truths may be 
contested by policy-making partners (see Chapter 2). Therefore, below, I explore what FA 
can bring to this research. 
The analysis that follows is Foucauldian, heavily influenced by Carabine's (2001, p. 281) 
guide. Extract A comes from a New Labour document on domestic violence, first 
published in 1999 (Home Office, 2000c). Its purpose, prior to the production of actual 
policies to replace Conservative ones, seems to be to provide an overview of what 
government generally has done and what this government specifically will do. It was not 
eventually included in the analysis chapters but along with other `possibles' I did analyse it 
in the early stages of this study (see part two, this chapter). 
Extract A: `Government Policy Around Domestic Violence' (Home Office, 2000c) 
1 1.1 The Government is committed to tackling domestic violence on 
2 every front. Domestic violence is unacceptable in itself. It also 
3 damages many areas of the lives of victims - housing, health, 
4 education and the freedom to live their life without fear and in the way 
5 they wish. 
6 1.2 As the Government's strategies on domestic violence and on 
7 violence against women are developed they will take full account of 
8 existing commitments to tackling crime in general, and to promoting 
9 equality and opportunity for women. Other policies, such as those on 
10 health, housing and community safety, will also form part of creating 
11 the conditions for a safer and healthier society. 
a) Themes 
Once a topic' has been selected and the data re-read2 the analysis begins with the 
identification of themes (Carabine, 2001), that is to look for ways that are used to speak 
about domestic violence and how it is formulated as `a problem'. This is not dramatically 
different from many forms of discursive analysis (e. g. Potter & Wetherell, 1987; 
Widdicombe, 1998; Edley, 2001). 
Drawing out what is `speak-able' about domestic violence from Extract A indicates that: - 
domestic violence is ubiquitous ("every front", 1.2) 
" it is bad ("unacceptable", 1.2) 
" it does "damages" (1.3) 
I The first step is to select a topic (Carabine, 2001). As I have detailed above, my topic is `domestic violence' and the 
data has been selected accordingly. 
2 The next step in Foucauldian Analysis is to immerse oneself in the data (Carabine, 2001). It is difficult to convey how 
re-reading leads to any discursive analysis. I think the problem is that anyone who reads is trying to make sense of what 
is written and therefore we have a tendency to read for gist. Getting past that is a bit like learning to drive and not 
understanding how you will ever co-ordinate all the things you need to do. But it is more difficult than that because un- 
learning is required too. To date, the best metaphor that I have come up with concerns typing. It is like having built up a 
proficiency in two-f ingered typing and then trying to learn to type like professionals do. It is frustrating because comfort 
and speed seem to be sacrificed. And when you stop doing it for any length of time, it is easy to revert to old habits. 
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" the damage it does is ubiquitous ("housing, health, education, and ... freedom", 1.3-4) 
" it is a matter "The Government is committed to tackling" (1.1) 
" it is related to but not the same as "violence against women" (1.7) 
" it draws the same government response as crime ("tackling", 1.1 & 8) 
Domestic violence is not the only object constituted in Extract A. There is also "The 
Government", ascribed as actively "committed" and having "policies" and "strategies" on 
"every front" to tackle domestic violence. However, this is not descriptive work. The 
formulations of domestic violence and government literally bring them into being within 
the text. Therefore the categories are constituted and truths are ascribed to them. For 
example, whether or not it is `true' that domestic violence is damaging is not the point. 
What is important to FA is how that `truth' is deployed. In this case, the theme `domestic 
violence does ubiquitous damage' is used to support arguments that domestic violence is 
both rightly a matter of government commitment and that the government response on 
"every front" is appropriate. And this type of discursive effect, as a mobilisation of power 
and knowledge, is important to FA. 
b) Absences 
A key consideration for FA is `absences', that is what could be said but is not (Carabine, 
2001). Such an emphasis would not be compatible with Conversation Analysis (CA) which 
is only concerned with what is present in the data (see section 1.2). Foucauldian analysts 
are careful to identify only those absences that can be shown to be instrumental in 
meaning-making. For example, "equality ... for women" suggests equality on grounds of 
gender, therefore `men' can be said to have been absented. Secondly, the text in Extract A 
suggests a relationship between domestic violence and crime, not just in that they both 
draw a "tackling" approach and commitment from government but also in the constitution 
of "victims". Therefore `perpetrators' of crime and domestic violence can be seen as absent 
too. Further, although crime and domestic violence are linked there is no explicit claim that 
`domestic violence is a crime'. The discursive effects of these absences can be explored 
through an understanding of the context in which they are produced. 
c) Context 
FA places emphasis on the historical context in which discourse is produced. In Chapter 
One I introduced the dual rationality of `doing' goverment as producing `reflexive 
government' and `responsibilised others'. Therefore, what is important is the notion that 
the state recasts its role as "steering and regulating rather than rowing and providing" 
(Rose, 2000, p. 324) whilst simultaneously ascribing responsibilities to others. In order to 
persuade other policy community members of the veracity of its truths, government 
attempts to govern the roles, responsibilities and rules of engagement for policy-making at 
a distance. As such this provides a lens (Carabine, 2001) for understanding what this 
discourse is doing. Conversation analysts tend not to explore exercisings of power even 
though there is no reason why they should not theoretically (Williams, 2002). Context is 
important but only to the transactional business in hand and how participants make them 
relevant (see section 1.2). Therefore, the roles, responsibilities and rules of engagement 
produced in government discourse would be acceptable to CA but using these as an 
analytical lens would be problematic. 
From the FA perspective, the positioning of government in relation to domestic violence is 
important. Policies and strategies seem to be constituted as an effective means of reaching 
domestic violence on "every front". This formulates the "Government" `at a distance' from 
any hands-on `tacklings' of domestic violence, commensurate with a State that steers and 
guides the actions of others. Although "women" and "victims" are not directly 
responsibilised in this extract, they have been located as inactive objects next to 
"opportunity" and "wish" respectively. The neo-liberal ideal for responsible citizens is 
those who self-actualise and self-responsibilise by exercising choice and realising their 
potential. Therefore, it would not be surprising if having formulated women and victims as 
passive, the text then went on either to ascribe responsibility to them or to render them 
appropriate sites for responsibilisation by other policy community members. Indeed, the 
absence of men and perpetrators further suggests that women and victims are to be the 
citizens upon whom domestic violence policy will be enacted. 
Another aspect of context is specific to the activities of policy-making. In Chapter One I 
argued that policy could be understood as a technology of governance (Shore & Wright, 
1997). Within this framework, the notion of policy community members and influencing 
the knowledges they generate is important. Other than "Government", the key participants 
are the police and women's advocates. And their primary concerns are likely to be `crime' 
and `(female) gender'. In Chapter One I also outlined working together as a key 
governmental strategy around domestic violence whereby the knowledges of women's 
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advocates could be harnessed in the service of crime prevention aims. It is apparent in 
Extract A that domestic violence is being linked more closely to crime than female gender, 
especially in terms of government strategies and commitments. But neither connection is 
explicitly formulated. Therefore, government could be understood to be managing the 
potentially conflicting interests of the police and women's advocates. To demonstrate this 
argument fully though, more text would be required. 
In summary, FA employs an approach to discourse, looking for themes and their effects, 
which is common to a variety of discursive analyses. Its emphasis on absences and context 
does set it apart, particularly from CA. From Extract A, the main discursive strategy would 
seem to be generating `the already responsible government'. Government is ascribed 
simultaneously with the responsibility to do something about domestic violence and with 
carrying out that `appropriate' action. The constituted `nature' of domestic violence as 
ubiquitously damaging is reflected in the many fronts on which "Government" attempts to 
tackle it. Further, there is a suggestion that women and victims, formulated as currently 
inactive, may be charged with their responsibilities at some point. Moreover, there is a 
possibility that the diverse interests of the police and women's advocates are being 
managed for the benefit of crime reduction aims. Therefore, instances of `reflexive 
government' and `responsibilised others' that could be interrogated in other data include 
definitions of `the problem'; action that matches the defined problem; objects carrying out 
their responsibilities; objects not carrying out their responsibilities; objects not ascribed 
responsibilities; and attempts to formulate common purpose from competing versions of 
reality. 
1.3 Towards synthesis: close analysis and `doing' government 
So far the account of FA given above, as looking for themes, effects and absences and 
exploring context, is largely how I do analysis. However, although I have distinguished 
some FA tenets, particularly absences and context issues, as not commensurate with CA, 
CA does still have something to add to the synthetic approach that I will be using in this 
thesis. And that concerns depth. The FA above suggests that women and victims might be 
responsibilised later in the text and that the policies/strategies are framed as `appropriate' 
government at a distance activity. Therefore, these are two ways government may delimit 
its responsibilities. I would argue that by incorporating analytic levers, developed within 
CA, and by conducting closer analysis, associated with certain types of discourse analysis, 
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more ways in which government delimits its responsibilities can be identified from Extract 
A. Therefore, in this subsection I set out some of these analytical tools and show what they 
can add to an analysis. 
Analytical `levers' come in varied forms, including extreme case formulations (Pomerantz, 
1986), three-part lists (Jefferson, 1990), category entitlement (see section 2.3), and 
disclaimers (Hewitt & Stokes, 1975). They are mainly, but not exclusively, developed 
within the discipline of CA. What these devices have in common is that they have been 
demonstrated to regularly appear in argumentation as ways of `doing' things with talk such 
as justifying, legitimising and privileging certain versions. CA would only consider talk-in- 
interaction (see section 1.2) but discourse analysts (e. g. Edwards & Potter, 1992) employ 
them on a range of texts, assuming as I do, that all discourse has a presumed audience and 
is therefore interactive. Two of these levers, extreme case formulation (Pomerantz, 1986) 
and three-part lists (Jefferson, 1990) appear in Extract A (and prove particularly common 
in government policy text). 
The first extreme case formulation is at line 2, "every front". `Every' is the extreme case 
because as an absolute it denies the possibility that there is a front on which the 
"Government" is not tackling domestic violence. Therefore, in claims-making it can be 
understood as defending against challenges (presumed or actual) that the "Government" is 
not taking domestic violence seriously enough or does not understand the problem. The 
second extreme case formulation is "unacceptable in itself', also in line 2. `Unacceptable' 
is the absolute that attempts to close down opportunities to formulate anything acceptable 
about domestic violence. But the legitimising strategy is different from the one used on 
"every front". This time the extreme case formulation is used to propose that a 
phenomenon is `in the object', that is, that unacceptability is both an objective assessment 
of domestic violence and an integral quality of domestic violence. 
This is important when considering the impasse that FA met in trying to account for the 
introduction of `crime' and `female gender' in paragraph two. `Female gender' is 
introduced as a way of dealing with domestic violence. Implicitly this suggests that it is 
relevant but there is no sense it is `in the object' of domestic violence. But `female gender' 
is constituted as `in the object' of "violence against women", not through the use of an 
extreme case formulation this time but by formulating "women" as what sets this category 
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of violence aside from other violences. The promotion of "equality and opportunity for 
women" suggests there is a relationship between women's lack of equality (with men) and 
their becoming the sites of violent acts. Therefore, "violence against women" is both a 
problem for and possibly a problem of being "women". Domestic violence and "violence 
against women" are presented as separate but related categories (lines 6/7). And domestic 
violence and "crime" are similarly related through the shared response of "tackling" that 
they draw from government. Consequently, if women were more equal there would be less 
"violence against women", less domestic violence and less crime. And yet, `female gender' 
is not ascribed as `in the object' of domestic violence. 
The main benefit of such a formulation would seem to be disrupting the centrality of 
`female gender' to domestic violence understandings. In this way, the absence of men and 
perpetrators in Extract A can also be seen as delimiting discourse about gender(ed) 
violence. There are no wrong-doers constituted other than domestic violence itself. 
Therefore, the ascription of women as lacking equality and being the sites of violence 
frames female gender, not gender relations, as part of the problem of domestic violence 
without incurring causal understandings of men's violence to women. Consequently, the 
formulation is potentially permissive of women blaming and legitimising interventions 
upon `women' in the name of crime reduction aims. 
The second analytical `lever' that can be used to break open the text is the three-part list 
(Jefferson, 1990). There are two in Extract A. In paragraph one there is "housing (1), health 
(2), education (3) and the freedom to live their life without fear and in the way they wish" 
(lines 3-5). In paragraph two this list is reformulated as "health (1), housing (2) and 
community safety (3)" (line 10). For reasons of brevity, I focus on only the first one. 
Although the first list seems to have four elements it is actually a three-part list with an 
add-on. A three-part list can work in many ways but here is seems to be being used to give 
a `comprehensive' sense of `all' the areas of victims' lives that are damaged by domestic 
violence. That is, "housing, health, (and) education" are employed to argue for the ubiquity 
of domestic violence's damage-doing and government's awareness of its effects. But they 
are also `Government' categories in that health, housing and education are colloquialisms 
for government departments which have ministers and spokespersons. Therefore, they are 
being constituted as different commodities from "freedom", "fear" and "wish". 
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Further, I would argue that this distinction is useful to government for delimiting its 
responsibilities in regard to domestic violence. The FA detailed above indicated that 
government's `appropriate' activity of policies and strategies kept it at a distance from any 
`hands-on' tackling of domestic violence. But I would add that the three-part list of 
housing, health and education is used to separate what a responsible government can and 
should tackle from freedom, fear and wish which, by comparison, are framed as issues for 
which government cannot and should not have sole responsibility. 
Support for this argument also comes from government's stated aim of "creating the 
conditions for a safer and healthier society" (line. 10/11). As with the present participles of 
"tackling" and "promoting", government's role is not formulated as endin domestic 
violence and crime or delivering equality or providing a safe and healthy society. Rather, 
there is a gap constituted between policies/strategies and a better society where victims live 
in freedom from fear, exercising choice and women convert opportunity and avoid 
violence. And this gap both absolves government of the sole responsibility for these 
changes and simultaneously ascribes some responsibility elsewhere. Victims and women 
are not directly responsibilised because although the need for them to self-actualise is 
implied, they are not likely to read a government policy on domestic violence. Therefore, 
the presumed audience to be responsibilised is more likely to be those policy community 
members who provide services to victims and women. 
In this synthesised analysis, I have incorporated the central tenets of FA, the analytical 
levers of CA and attention to the closer analysis of discourse analysis more generally. My 
purpose has been to illustrate how much more discursive work is apparent than from a 
straight FA. FA identified similar themes and exercisings of power but because it lacks 
depth it could not account for how "women" were being linked to domestic violence. Nor 
could it argue, beyond policies and strategies, how government was simultaneously 
ascribing itself as responsible and delimiting its responsibilities. The synthetic discourse 
analysis showed how the legitimising strategy of an extreme case formulation led me to 
question other `in the object' formulations within the text. In this way, I was able to 
demonstrate how female gender was being rendered pertinent to crime reduction. Also the 
three-part-list lever led me to question what the ascribed difference was between the many 
areas of victims' lives damaged by domestic violence. Consequently, I began to interrogate 
the boundaries this `responsible government' was drawing between itself and others. 
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Because it looks at themes, absences and contexts, and is concerned with large bodies of 
qualitative (government) data, FA forms a useful starting point for me. The analytical 
levers of CA help me to delve deeper and pick up on the closer analysis usually associated 
with more general forms of discourse analysis. And this appears appropriate for exploring 
the `doing' of government in terms of `reflexive government' and `responsibilised others'. 
However, not all my data are government policies or even text. Some, particularly the 
police and women's advocate contributions, are talk. Therefore, in the next section, in 
order to further my synthetic approach and to consider some of the differences between 
talk and text, I turn my attention to CA. 
2. Conversation Analysis: issues of relevance 
In the last section I looked at Foucauldian Analysis (FA) synthesised with rhetorical 
devices from Conversation Analysis (CA) and how it was suitable for the types of 
questions I wanted to ask of my government data. Attention to notions of themes, absences 
and context was useful for opening up a broad understanding of the activities of problem 
formulation, constituting victims and forwarding working together, and other exercisings 
of power that were being `done' in regard to `reflexive government' and `responsibilised 
others'. Although CA was instrumental in the analytical levers I used to deepen my 
analysis, I did point out that context, data selection and absences as forwarded by FA did 
present problems for a Conversation Analytical approach. I was also concerned that not all 
my data were government texts. Therefore, in this subsection I engage with some of these 
differences to explore what CA might add to a synthetic approach for analysing police talk. 
2.1 What is Conversation Analysis? 
CA3 stands at the opposite end of the micro/macro scale from FA in relation to the analysis 
of language. Its focus is talk and the flow of interaction as social action. It is concerned 
with how utterances are occasioned by what goes before and why a particular piece of talk 
is made at a specific point within an exchange. For CA, talk-in-interaction is where 
processes of meaning-making are enacted and utterances become consequential. A key 
project of CA is identifying sequences in talk that are both commonly used and display 
speaker competence in assessing an utterance's contextual appropriateness (Heritage, 1984; 
Silverman, 1998; Wooffitt, 2001). 
3 CA was developed as a distinct discipline through the work of Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson (Silverman, 1998). 
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An example would be the three-part list (Jefferson, 1990) exemplified in the last section. In 
talk, lists are normally constituted in three parts. Thus it is no accident that memorable 
lines often take this form, for example, `work, rest and play' or `me, myself, F. Even when 
a speaker can only produce two parts, a third part "generalized list completer" (Jefferson, 
1990, p. 66) such as `and so on' or `and things like that' will often be added. The delivery 
of the third part may indicate that an interactive turn has been completed and the next 
person can begin. Or the other participant with whom the interaction is being conducted 
may finish off the list. What this demonstrates is that both speakers demonstrate sensitivity 
to the normative forms of sequence in everyday talk. 
Everyday talk as data is crucial to CA. This is because of the emphasis on exploring the 
interactional business in hand as demonstrable in how participants make things relevant 
within their talk. Therefore, in terms of data selection, CA rejects researcher-generated 
interviews and looks instead for "naturally occurring interaction" (Wooffitt, 2001, p. 49). 
This has generated a key debate between Discourse Analysis and CA about whether 
participants' relevance can be extracted from the researcher relevance inherent in research 
interviews (Billig, 1999a, 1999b; Schegloff, 1997,1998,1999a, 1999b; Wetherell, 1998). 
Discourse Analysts (i. e. Billig and Wetherell) argue that CA's main concern, `participants' 
relevance', as well as researcher relevance is demonstrable in such data. However, the 
discipline relies heavily on generating interviews (e. g. Frewin & Tuffin, 1998; Wetherell & 
Potter, 1992) and although some interrogate the role of the researcher (e. g. Widdicombe, 
1993,1998), many do not (as noted by Speer, 2002; Williams, 2002). For example, in 
Potter and Wetherell's early work (1987) many of the interviewee responses are presented 
with the researcher's talk absented, giving the impression that these data occur without 
researcher prompts (Bowers, 1988). And this format is largely reproduced in Wetherell and 
Potter (1992) as well (as noted by Williams, 2002). 
CA argues that such interviews can never be free of researcher relevance (Schegloff, 1997). 
That is, the concerns of the researcher will always impact on the interactional talk that is 
produced. Quite simply, had the researcher not been there, that talk would not have been 
produced `naturally' (Potter, 1995). Meaning is constituted in interaction, therefore the 
context in which talk is produced must have relevance for the participants. For example, it 
is hard to see how teenage boys in their school, being interviewed by someone with a tape- 
recorder, who is not a teacher and asking questions such as "What are feminists () what are 
they after" (Edley, 2001, p. 199) could understand this as anything other than a research 
situation4 
I agree with CA that researcher interviews are problematic and I have yet to be convinced 
that DA has solved the conundrum raised for it by CA. This debate became important to 
me when making data selection decisions. There is great pressure on PhD students to 
produce empirical data and consequently there is a temptation to generate interviews or 
focus groups. This is a way of ensuring that one's study has an original component, it 
provides the basis for a methodology chapter and it looks like research. But when I was 
collecting data items I came across police and women's advocates' talk produced in the 
`doing' of policy-making. What CA's position on participants' relevance added to this 
thesis was to convince me that what I already had was more viable than interviews for the 
types of questions I wanted to ask. In particular, `doing' police realities and `doing' 
feminism in the policy arena had more salience than police officers and feminists talking to 
me about what they do in the government policy-making context. 
Further, the synthesised FA that I had begun to apply to text documents did not appear to 
be accounting for all that was happening in police and feminist talk. One specific problem 
was trying to demonstrate police realities in action. I knew these were police officers 
talking and I knew they were `doing' police realities. But I could not seem to argue how 
they were `doing the being' of being a police officer. Therefore, CA seemed to offer me 
something that other approaches did not. 
2.2 Doing Conversation Analysis: sequence, interaction and participants' relevance 
A key feature of CA is the very short pieces of data that are used to illustrate particular 
points. Therefore, I use Extract B to demonstrate the CA concern of sequence in `adjacency 
pairs' (Heritage, 1984) and to explore what the participants are `doing'. Unlike FA, there is 
no preamble to where this talk comes from and I have purposely removed the speakers 
names as for CA everything that is relevant to the interactional business-in-hand is present 
in the produced talk. 
4 Researcher-generated interviews would however constitute viable data for CA if the subject of study was the research 
interview itself. 
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Extract B: A& B5 
1 A: Could we have civilians in DVUsb, trained? 
2 B: In time, I am sure, there will be a place for that. 
3 A: They would be less expensive. 
4 B: Yes. 
This talk is an example of an adjacency pair as it features a sequence of two or more 
utterances that are adjacent, produced by different speakers and ordered as first and second 
parts where the first part requires a particular second part (Heritage, 1984, p. 246). This 
may seem a long description to account for a `question and answer' pairing but it is 
important for understanding what is happening here. 
A's first utterance is a question. It has been transcribed as such ending with a question 
mark which may point to a rise in intonation which indicates to B that an answer is 
required. B complies but then A takes a third turn. From the transcription this is not 
identified as a question and therefore perhaps had falling intonation. But it is clear that B 
understands it requires a response. Therefore, one can say B's first answer does not satisfy 
A. That is, the production of a third turn suggests that whatever A required from B as a 
preferred action was not fulfilled in the first response. However, B's fourth turn ("Yes") 
ends this conversation and this suggests that a simple, unmitigated affirmation of civilians 
working in DVUs was sought even if A had to `settle' for this outcome on grounds of 
costs. 
It is also possible to show that A is sensitive to the fact that "civilians in DVUs" is 
potentially contentious to B. This is because "trained" is uttered after a pause. In this way, 
A demonstrates that lack of training might be an argument within this context that could be 
used to justify saying `no'. Therefore, there is anticipated dissonance for B in connecting 
"civilians" with "DVUs". The defining feature of these people for their presence in DVUs 
5 Transcription conventions are important to CA (Wooffitt, 2001). Their purpose is to convey to the reader as much 
information about the talk as possible. Therefore, pauses, the raising and lowering of intonation, overlapping talk and 
emphases, amongst other features will often be included in the transcription. Ideally, the reader should also have access 
to the original tape-recording. In practice, this is rarely possible. However, it is still apparent from the punctuation here 
that the transcriber has made some attempt to convey meaning. Question marks and commas probably infer rising 
intonation and pauses respectively. The key point about any transcript is that it is always highly stylised (Edwards & 
Potter, 1992) and there is no such thing as a `true' written version. Although the transcription conventions here are 
limited and tend to marshal the talk into complete sentences, it would be a hard-hearted Conversation Analyst who 
would reject these data's appropriateness as talk-in-interaction. 
6 'DVUs' has a specific contextual relevance that is explored in the analysis below. What it `means' outside the context 
of this talk is not relevant at this point. 
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is their civilian status. In terms of a `paired-relational category' (Silverman, 1998, p. 82) the 
opposite of `military' or at least `non civilian in uniform' can be inferred. In this actual 
instance, DVUs are op lice domestic violence units. Consequently, A's acknowledgement 
that civilians in DVUs is contentious to B suggests that B has some vested interest in 
keeping civilians out of police DVUs. 
Another feature of the exchange that is interesting is A's use of "we". Despite 
acknowledging B's vested interest, A is also claiming an interest, particularly in regard to 
cost. The sense that A and B are a "we" is further underpinned by the utterance "DVUs". 
As an acronym it has institutional relevance. This is not to say that A is claiming the same 
interest, although that is possible. Rather, it indicates that A is demonstrating some shared 
knowledge to B which is used to warrant the appropriateness both of asking such a 
question and A's vested interest in the topic. And B capitulates by not challenging A's 
right to ask that question or claim that interest. 
At this point, bearing in mind the nature of this thesis, the context and the participants of 
this talk-in-interaction are becoming clear without it being necessary to know who they 
actually are. A is a Conservative MP and Ba police Chief Superintendent conducting 
government policy-making activity in 1992 when the Conservatives were in power (HASC, 
1993b, p. 161). At this time `civilianisation', a strategy for cutting policing costs by 
assessing posts for civilian suitability, was rife (Loveday, 1993). The `business' being 
conducted concerns a group of MPs examining the oral evidence of a group of police 
officers for the purpose of making recommendations to government about dealing with 
domestic violence7. 
The purpose of speaker anonymity at the start of this analysis was not about some kind of 
indulgent guessing game. I had a methodological point to make. That is, that according to 
CA the topic of civilianisation, the identities of the speakers and context of the exchange 
are all made relevant by the participants in their talk. Certainly there are no explicit police 
officer identity-claims. But the sensitivity displayed to the rules of engagement and the 
management of vested interests around police DVUs invokes the contextual relationship as 
it is understood by the two speakers. They both demonstrate their competence in assuming 
the "discourse identities" (Zimmerman, 1998, p. 91) of questioner-answerer and the 
7 For a fuller discussion of Home Affairs Select Committees, their format and purpose, see section 3.3. 
"situational identities" (Zimmerman, 1998, p. 90) of `government evidence-seeker' and 
`police witness'8 
When I began my primary analysis, I looked at police discourse for patterns that police 
officers use and accounts of seeing realities that only someone occupying the subject 
position of `police officer' would be likely to make. I had, in fact, missed the very point 
that I am making here. Just because they `are' police officers does not mean that what 
comes out of their mouths is automatically `police realities'. A discursive approach allows 
an opportunity to ask different questions. If I wanted to show what police culture was or 
explain why they do it, I could have adopted the realist accounts that I critiqued in Chapter 
2. Therefore, by asking what police officers `do' I had ignored the analytical relevance of 
how police officers accomplish the `doing of being' police officers as an integral part of 
constituting police realities. But CA insists on the application of that insight. 
2.3 Towards synthesis: identity-work and `doing' police realities 
In Chapter 2I argued that `doing' police realities was likely to privilege police accounts of 
social reality through identity-work, boundary-work and mobilising gender as an 
occasional resource. Obviously with nearly 400 pages of analysis to conduct for this thesis, 
it would take too long to do CA9. However, a heavily CA inspired form of Discourse 
Analysis (Widdicombe, 1993,1998) with an emphasis on participants' orientation to 
membership categorisation proved immensely useful. In this account, the competence that 
participants display is sensitivity to the inference rich nature of `categories'. And as will 
become apparent, much of the `doing' of police realities seems to be grounded in identity- 
work of this kind. 
The following extract comes from the same source as Extract B but the analysis that 
follows focuses solely on the identity-work done around the category `police officer'. 
8 After selecting and analysing this extract, I consulted my notes on the MP participants only to find that John 
Greenway, MP for Ryedale, lists one of his former occupations as `policeman' (The Guardian, 2001a). What is 
interesting is that he does not invoke this identity for himself as a warranting device. Many of the MP participants (e. g. 
Edward Gamier, Donald Anderson, Mike O'Brien) have backgrounds as QCs, advocates and lawyers. And they do 
invoke these as relevant to their understandings. What this seems to indicate is that the situational identities of 
`government evidence-seeker' and `police witness' somehow makes irrelevant Greenway's previous police status as an 
appropriate warranting identity. 
9 Also CA would not condone many of my data choices. The transcripts of the Home Affairs Committee, see Appendix 
5, would probably be acceptable because they are talk and interactive. However, policies are not only not talk but in CA 
terms they are not deemed interactive. Unlike FA, CA does not assume a presumed audience. 
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Extract C: (HASC, 1993b, p. 161) 
1 Mr Anderson: We have seen that most officers, in terms of career 
2 formation, should ideally have some personal contact at some stage in 
3 their career, with the domestic violence units? 
4 Ch. Supt. Thornton: That is not totally necessary but, as my 
5 colleague here has said several times, the whole service and the whole 
6 society we live in is going through these great changes. We are 
7 picking up on it as a police service. Just to take that a step further, in 
8 my force we have gone down the road of setting up these units and we 
9 are now finding, because of setting up the units, that we are 
10 unearthing the iceberg and seeing a lot of what is below. 
Mr Anderson invokes the category `police officer' in "most officers". His claim that 
contact with DVUs is an ideal in terms of "career formation" is warranted on what he and 
others ("We") have seen. Therefore he grounds his assertion in observational evidence that 
is agreed across witnesses10 and does not invoke the category `police officer' for himself. 
However, he does ascribe `police officer' with certain negative connotations. By 
constituting DVU contact as `ideal' he uses an extreme case formulation to legitimise his 
argument that hands-on experience ("personal contact") in a work capacity ("their career") 
is the only way that a `police officer' can fulfil their professional requirements ("career 
formation"). Consequently, the implicit suggestion is that a normative feature of being a 
`police officer' comprises not dealing with or understanding domestic violence properly. 
And that is `the problem'. 
This reading is supported by Thornton's response. He begins by disclaiming the absolutist 
nature of Anderson's `ideal' with an extreme case formulation of his own ("totally"). And 
he reformulates the problem of ineffective police officers by transforming the category of 
`police officer' in a variety of ways. Firstly, by invoking "my colleague", a fellow senior 
officer, as a warrant for his version, it would seem that he is attempting to trump 
Anderson's observational evidence. This is not simply on the basis of what another witness 
10 This is a common way of `truth' telling, to invoke other people who share a view. It ascribes the speaker's account as 
not just a lone case but something that others can corroborate (Edwards & Potter, 1992). 
has said but also suggests category entitlement" as a `senior police officer'. Secondly, he 
formulates "the whole service" as a pair with "the whole society we live in". In this way, 
an integral feature of `police officer' is furnished as members of society going through 
"great changes" like anyone else. So at this point he has undermined Anderson's view as 
faulty and his focus on `police officers' having problems with domestic violence as unfair. 
Thirdly, he invokes "We ... as a police service" and 
"in my force". Thus building on 
previous usage of `senior officers' and `the police as members of society', he demonstrates 
the flexibility of the category `police officer' by constituting another variant of how it can 
be considered, in this case, as `my police service'. Using discourses which suggest 
responsible police engagement with domestic violence ("picking up on it", "gone down the 
road") he ascribes domestic violence itself as the problem, not those who police it. So, for 
him "most officers", `fellow senior officers', "the whole service" or "my force" are not at 
fault. Rather, the trouble is that when the police picked up domestic violence it turned out 
to be bigger than anyone expected ("iceberg"). Therefore, he has reformulated `a problem 
of the police' into `a problem for the police' 12. 
Extract C exemplifies a high concentration of identity-work around the category `police 
officer'. Primarily this indicates that `police officer' is an `appropriate' participant identity 
in this context. That is, because it forms the basis of why Thornton is present, he is able to 
use it as a warranting device. Another identity-category he invokes for himself as 
unproblematic is `member of society'. As well as identity-work, `police officer' is also 
used for boundary-work. Thornton transforms the category across rank, all police and one 
force thereby displaying its flexible potential in this setting. And he uses rhetorical devices 
such as agreement across witnesses and category entitlement to privilege police versions of 
reality. Although gender understandings are not invoked in this extract, exploring 
sensitivity to category membership does appear to form a basis for the `doing' of police 
realities. And this is explored further in Chapter 5. 
11 'Category entitlement' (Edwards & Potter, 1992, p. 160) is another 'truth' telling device. As it is used to warrant 
accounts based on some specialism, expert knowledge or skill that is formulated as restricted to members of a particular 
category. 
12 A common refrain from the police officers present is the theme 'if you (the government) want us to do more, we (the 
police) need more resources'. This is actually named twice by the MPs present (paragraphs: 195,214). Although, this is 
not demonstrable from this extract, it is interesting that the Chairman intervened and changed the subject immediately 
after Thornton had spoken. 
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In this section, overall, I considered what CA had to offer to my synthetic approach. The 
FA from section 1.1 had been deepened by importing CA's analytical levers but it still 
presented problems for me when interrogating those items of my data which constituted 
talk rather than text. CA offered the opportunity to account for `doings' specific to the talk- 
in-interaction context and to justify why police talk generated in the `doing' of government 
policy-making was viable data in its own right. Further, CA and its insistence on 
participants' relevance helped me to move beyond considering police realities as what 
happens when police officers speak. Rather, it showed that the constitutive nature of 
interactive talk produced identities. Using Widdicombe's (1998) CA inspired Discourse 
Analysis, I explored how identity-work which attunes to categories can be a useful starting 
point for unpacking the `doing' of police realities. Identity-work was made instrumental in 
boundary-work and truth claims. And this provided a sound basis for exploring police 
realities within this thesis. 
Although FA and CA have both been major contributors to the synthetic analysis to be 
used in this study, neither address a further key analytical consideration of mine. In 
interrogating women's advocates' discourse, I found different considerations from 
exploring police talk. In particular, as a feminist, I was not comfortable with the idea of 
judging what was or was not `doing' feminism. Rather than ignore these feelings, I decided 
to question them and use the products to inform my research methodology. Therefore, in 
the next section I turn to Discourse Analysis as it has a history of `reflexivity' in order to 
explore the notion of researcher values. 
3. Discourse Analysis: issues of researcher values 
In sections one and 2I set out a synthetic approach to discourse analysis. I demonstrated 
how I use Foucauldian understandings of discourse, themes, absences, dialogues and 
context as a broad analytical basis. And I illustrated how CA has contributed analytical 
levers, notions of consequential talk, ideas about participants' relevance and 
understandings of identity-work. Thus how I do my analysis has been fully explicated. But 
the what and why of this thesis is still in flux. Therefore, in this section I turn to Discourse 
Analysis (DA) and analytical forms which are neither strictly FA nor CA, but which have a 
tradition of examining (feminist) `reflexivity'. 
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3.1 What are Discourse Analysis and reflexivity? 
If FA and CA can be understood as holding up opposite ends of the macro/micro analytic 
spectrum, DA can be seen to occupy the terrain in between. But unlike FA and CA this is a 
very vast landscape. Some discourse analysts occupy a position very close to the CA 
boundary (e. g. Speer & Potter, 2000; Widdicombe, 1998). Others are more centrally placed 
(e. g. Wetherell, 1998; Edley, 2001). Sociology is represented (e. g. Gill, 1993,1995b, 
1998). And psychology, ranging from social psychology (e. g. Edwards & Potter, 1992; 
Wetherell & Potter, 1992) to more psychodynamic versions (e. g. Hollway, 1996), is too. 
And many Discourse Analysts evolve their position as they progress (e. g. Edley & 
Wetherell, 2001; van Dijk, 2001). But they do have commonalties. And what sets them 
apart from other researchers who `analyse discourse' generally (e. g. Brown & Heidensohn, 
2000; Savage et al, 2001) is the way that their theoretical understandings of discourse are 
essential to their methodology. Thus Discourse Analysis is both a theory and a method. 
From this body of work feminism has been rendered apposite in two ways. Firstly, how 
`the feminist' is constituted in talk has been an analytical focus (Edley, 2001; Edley & 
Wetherell, 2001). However, as `feminist' does not appear as a constitution in any of my 
data this is not a viable line of enquiry for this thesis. Secondly, there is an emphasis on 
feminist reflexivity as an on-going consideration throughout the research process (Gill, 
1995a, 1998; Speer, 2002; Wilkinson, 1988). This concerns interrogating reasons for 
making methodological choices and data selections, as well as questioning personal 
`feelings' about the analysis and using that to inform my work. 
3.2 Doing feminist reflexivity 
I realised that I needed to address reflexivity when it became apparent to me that `doing' 
feminism was proving difficult to define and producing contradictions. As a feminist, I felt 
torn by the competing accounts of women's advocates in policy-making talk and text. I 
found myself `doing' identity-work, boundary-work and mobilising gender as an 
occasional resource. I got frustrated that I could not work out how I and others 
accomplished `doing' feminism. It was even tempting to collapse the thesis down to just 
government and police discourse and hope that it continued to look `whole'. But 
eventually, I went back to the most basic of feminist principles. The reason I was doing this 
research as a feminist was to take my concern for women's lives and my desire to shed 
light on how knowledges and truths about them are used to found claims in their interests. I 
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was concerned that government and the police might appropriate feminist-generated 
knowledges, so long important in the lives of women, and use them to render feminism 
redundant and as a means of blaming women who cannot or chose not to help themselves 
through the criminal justice system. Therefore, re-armed and re-focused, I began to work 
through issues of reflexivity. 
Perhaps my key concern was who from my data, which were not government or police 
produced, were or were not feminist. Similar to the problem I met with police discourse, I 
started from the erroneous assumptions that only feminists `do' feminism and that those 
who `are' feminist accomplish feminism by generating talk and text. Following Kelly 
(1999), I had identified that `doing' feminism was likely to be demonstrable in terms of 
organisational naming, forwarding causes of domestic violence and producing certain 
subjects of representation. My non-statutory data comprised an oral evidence session of 
`non-statutory service providers' from the Home Affairs Select Committee on domestic 
violence (HASC, 1993b) and twelve What Works? in reducing domestic violence 
memoranda published by the Home Office in 2000 (see Chapter 2), authored by `academic 
researchers'. Although in each case the majority of these participants were feminist, `being 
feminist' was not made explicit as grounds for taking part. Therefore, rather than making a 
priori decisions about whose discourse to analyse, I analysed all of the data. From this 
perspective, I was able to show who was and was not `doing' feminism; that `doing' 
feminism was not necessarily a consistent accomplishment; and that not only feminists 
`do' feminism (see Chapters 6& 7). 
3.3 Towards synthesis: thesis formulation and data selection 
In the previous `Towards synthesis' subsections I have demonstrated worked pieces of 
analysis. As sections one and 2 already cover how I approach my analysis, this subsection 
focuses on the what and why of data selection and thesis arrangement. 
Within DA, data selection and thesis formulation are on-going, iterative processes (Meyer, 
2001). In my case, my initial interest was policing domestic violence. But commensurate 
with my theoretical and methodological position, I needed data where the police were 
`doing' the policing of domestic violence. As a Met Police civil staff employee at the time, 
I had the luxury of securing access through research proposals on several occasions only to 
miss out on funding and consequently the opportunity to pursue the access. I then 
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considered interrogating how the policing of domestic violence was contested between 
feminist and pro-police academic literature. DA has a long tradition of critiquing the way 
research is conducted (Condor, 1988; Gilbert & Mulkay, 1980,1984; Squire, 1990; 
Woolgar, 1988). And `doing' research about the policing of domestic violence was 
therefore a viable site of enquiry. 
Having analysed a few texts and whilst considering how I could use them both as literature 
and data, I had one of those rare moments of luck. I was accompanying a colleague to the 
New Scotland Yard library where I found both volumes of the 1992/3 Home Affairs Select 
Committee on domestic violence. I was aware of them as they are often referenced and had 
made it onto one of my `references to pursue' lists. But here, in these pages, I saw 
transcripts of feminists and police officers acting as witnesses in oral evidence sessions. I 
discovered memoranda from various police, government and voluntary organisations. In 
short, I had police and feminist talk and text in a government-generated space, in the 
interactional business of doing policy-making. The turning point was not just that I had 
found more interesting data but with the discovery of this discourse, texts were no longer a 
compensation for what might have been. 
Since 1979, there have been 16 Select Committees in the UK. Their purpose is "to examine 
the expenditure, administration and policy" of "specified government departments and 
associated public bodies" (House of Commons, 1998, p. 20). Therefore, they are restricted 
in how they investigate a topic by the relevance of `the problem' to the possible remedies a 
department (e. g. Home Office, Foreign Office) can offer. Committee members tend to be 
back-benchers as they cannot be opposition spokespersons or hold government or 
parliamentary posts. The Committees report to government who are expected to reply 
within two months. And the report and the reply are normally debated in the House of 
Commons. Examination in oral evidence sessions of ministers and officials is normal 
practice and the Committee has the power to direct the relevant Minister of State to attend 
(House of Commons, 1998). Therefore, although Select Committees are policy-making 
arenas, they do not produce policies per se. Rather, they generate a topic for policy reform 
and the axes around which consequent debate should revolve. 
The Home Affairs Select Committee (HASC) of 1992/3 focused on domestic violence. The 
issue was chosen due to the publication of two reports: The Law Commission's 1992 
review of and proposals for injunctive legislation; and Victim Support's 1992 report on 
inter-agency working. Memoranda were submitted by groups as diverse as Southall Black 
Sisters and Families Need Fathers. Oral evidence sessions included the Home Office, the 
police and `victim' service providers. The memos preceded and informed the oral evidence 
sessions13. And the oral transcripts were sent to participants for review 14. The Committee 
itself comprised eleven members at any one time (13 in all) of whom six were 
Conservative and five Labour15. The report was responded to by the Conservative 
government in June 1993 (Home Office, 1993) and debated in the Commons on 21 ' July 
1993 (Hansard, 1993). 
As a policy-making process, HASC sat between the production of two government policies 
on domestic violence: Home Office Circular (HOC) 60/90, for policing, and HOC 19/2000, 
for inter-agency working. Getting hold of these documents proved near impossible16 as 
they had been superseded by, respectively, New Labour's HOC 19/2000 and Multi-Agency 
Guidance (MAG 2000) which in comparison, were widely available through the Internet 
along with numerous other data items. In all, I collected and worked on 387 pages of 
discourse. Although this primary analysis informed the research findings, I had to make 
decisions about justifiable comparisons. 
I realised that the grounding for these decisions should attune to policy and policy-making 
dialogues. The most obvious were the revisions of the Conservative Home Office Circulars 
by New Labour. Not only would these documents `speak' to a target audience but the 
revisions were also likely to generate dialogue with their predecessors. Three of my key 
critiques of governmentalist academic literature concerned how changes in political 
government, domestic violence as a governable matter and (female) gender tend to be 
overlooked (see Chapter One). Therefore, in terms of exploring the governmental activities 
of problem formulation and constituting victims (Chapter 4) and forwarding working 
13 It was apparent that initial memos were distributed to other memo senders as Southall Black Sisters submitted a 
supplementary memo in response to matters arising in the Home Office submission (HASC, 1993b). Also, it would seem 
that before the oral evidence sessions, Select Committee members did apply in writing to clarify certain points raised in 
initial memos which in turn generated secondary memos (HASC, 1993b). 
14 Southall Black Sisters used this mechanism for linking the evidence of their memoranda to the arguments made in the 
oral sessions (e. g. HASC, 1993b, p. 136 & p. 140). One of the senior police officers used this opportunity to clarify the 
number of domestic violence refuges in his area (HASC, 1993b, p. 163). 
15 The Conservatives in particular had some older members who have since retired (e. g. Hartley Booth, Dame Jill 
Knight) and Labour some younger members who went on to greater things under New Labour's first term (e. g. Mike 
O'Brien (junior minister in the Home Office), Barbara Roche (Minister of State, Home Office) (The Guardian, 2001b, 
2001c). 
16 1 am indebted to `Mary' at the Home Office who worked hard to find discarded copies of these for me. 
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together (Chapter 7), 1 was able to make final data selections for two of my analysis 
chapters" 
The remaining chapters on police realities (Chapter 5) and feminisms (Chapter 6) were 
important to me as explorations of potential resistances to exercisings of governmental 
power; another common absence from governmentalist studies. In regard to police realities, 
I had become interested in how police culture had slipped from currency as a viable site of 
academic critique on the policing of domestic violence (see Chapter 2). Having secured 
police talk from HASC and adopted a discursive approach, I had the basis for exploring 
how police realities were accomplished and why they might be relevant to domestic 
violence policy-making as a policing activity; questions not previously asked of police 
discourse on domestic violence. From other discursive studies of the police, I had 
identified identity-work, boundary-work and the mobilisation of gender as an occasional 
resource as potentially apposite to `doing' police cultures (see Chapter 2). Chief Officers, 
specifically, became the focus, partly because of space restrictions. But it also opened up 
an area not regularly investigated and proved useful in selecting police data from the year 
2000. 
I could find no Chief Officer discourse in government policy-making activities in that time 
period. However, this did not appear to deter Chief Officers from the Met making their 
own versions of domestic violence public. At their domestic violence `Enough is Enough' 
conference (MPS, 2000b), copies of their domestic violence policy (MPS, 2000a) were 
widely distributed to government personnel, service providers and academics. Thus 
although the document has a primary audience of lower ranks, this exercising of power 
through distribution generated further dialogues with its recipients. As such, it was made 
relevant to mainstream understandings and I incorporated it as a key data item along with 
the HASC police oral evidence session in Chapter 5 '$. 
The other potential source of resistance to governmental exercisings of power was 
feminisms (Chapter 6). The HASC's `victim' service provider oral evidence session 
17 Other documents primarily analysed were: the Home Office oral evidence session at HASC and the Home Office 
memos submitted to HASC (HASC, 1993a & b); the Government reply to HASC (Home Office, 1993); the New Labour 
general policy on domestic violence (Home Office, 1999b); and, Living Without Fear (The Women's Unit, 1999). 
18 I also primarily analysed the Police Federation's participation at HASC, in both oral and written form (HASC, 
1993b). However, because police data from 2000 was difficult to secure and the police were not my only concern in this 
thesis, the comparisons between low and high ranked officers were not used in this study. Because of the richness of this 
particular data I have noted this as a viable area for future research in my overall conclusion. 
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produced immediate dialogues between feminists, non-feminists and MPs. Following Kelly 
(1999), I had identified organisational naming, forwarding causes of domestic violence 
which were not permissive of women blaming and constituting certain subjects of 
representation as ways that feminism might be accomplished. And these data, combined 
with a discursive approach, provided the opportunity to explore `doing' feminism in 
policy-making in a way not previously addressed. 
However, by 2000, feminist participants were repositioned in the category `academic 
researchers' as authors of What Works? in reducing the crime of domestic violence 
memoranda, published by the Home Office. Primary dialogues were now likely to be with 
local crime reduction initiatives to whom the memoranda were addressed and feminists 
were positioned where they could access governmental power. Seemingly, feminism had 
become `respectable' and mainstream. But ever aware that power relationships work in 
mysterious ways, I was concerned with the implications of this participation both to 
feminisms and to the crucial knowledges that they have generated about women's lives. 
Therefore, although the oral evidence session and the memoranda were different 
opportunities for `doing' feminisms, as key data items they provided comparison 
opportunities for feminist comment in Chapter 619. 
In this section, overall, I have considered the issues of reflexivity, researcher values and 
methodological/theoretical integrity raised by Discourse Analysis to explain the what and 
why of this research. This has included a reflexive account of my understandings of `doing' 
feminism and a reflexive narrative of how my values were important in data selection and 
thesis formulation as on-going and iterative processes. In the chapter conclusion I reprise 
my methodological approach and provide a reader-map of key data items and analytical 
concerns, for clarity. 
Conclusion 
Commensurate with my Foucauldian and post-structuralist perspectives, I have selected 
and synthesised a methodology that is grounded in my theoretical position and affords 
opportunities to ask questions not previously addressed in academic research. Specifically, 
19 Items of primary analysis, which informed this thesis but were not included as key data items comprised: five HASC 
memoranda from women's service providers (HASC, 1993b) and Hanmer et al's (1999) Home Office research on the 
policing of domestic violence. 
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these involve how `government' and the potential resistances of `police realities' and 
`feminisms' are `done' in domestic violence policy activities. Governmentalist studies 
provide a means for understanding `doings' of government as exercisings of power. And 
FA with its emphasis on discourse, dialogue, truth and themes is apposite for exploring 
governmental `doings' around `reflexive government'/`responsibilised others' formulations 
in activities such as problem formulation, constituting victims and forwarding working 
together. Analytical levers, developed mainly within CA, assist FA to a deeper level. CA 
also insists that participants' relevance is taken seriously and this had led to my adopting a 
CA inspired form of DA to interrogate the identity-work, boundary-work and mobilisation 
of gender as an occasional resource in the `doing' of Chief Officer police realities. Further, 
DA, with an emphasis on reflexivity and theoretical/methodological integrity, has 
contributed to my being self-reflexive in terms of what I wanted to achieve, how I have 
selected my data and why my thesis is formulated as it is. 
The analysis chapters are arranged as follows: - 
" Chapter 4 focuses on the `doing' of government in successive government policies on 
the policing of domestic violence. The primary dialogue, in each case is with Chief 
Officers of police and I examine responsibilisation strategies and the activities of 
problem formulation and constituting victims. But I am also concerned in the dialogue 
that HOC 19/2000 has with its predecessor. 
" Chapter 5 interrogates Chief Officer discourse from the HASC in 1992 and a Met Police 
domestic violence policy document from 2000. As a pair with Chapter 4, I investigate 
how this talk and text might be understood as resistance to exercisings of governmental 
power. I am also interested in the differences of `doing' police realities in talk and text; 
how the context and readership dialogues might impact on meaning-making; and the 
activities of identity-work, boundary-work and the mobilisation of gender as an 
occasional resource. 
" In Chapter 6I turn my attention to `doing' feminisms as organisational naming, 
forwarding causes of domestic violence which are not permissive of women blaming 
and producing certain subjects of representation. Feminist policy-making in the 
government policy arena necessarily precedes the publication of the actual policies. 
Therefore, the investigation of resistances concerns how non-statutory participants 
interact with the `rules of engagement'. The HASC non-statutory service providers' oral 
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evidence session from 1992 and the What Works? memoranda from 2000 provide 
opportunities for exploring differences in talk and text, and producing feminist comment 
on what participation may mean. 
" Finally, Chapter 7 returns to government discourse, this time in the activity of 
forwarding working together. The documents used are HOC 1995 and MAG 2000 on 
cross-agency working. As a pair with Chapter 6, the emphasis on governmental 
exercisings of power is on the constitution of obligations to `work together' and 
formulations of Women's Aid. 
In this chapter I have focused on methodological concerns. The next chapter, Chapter 4, 
marks the beginning of the research findings. 
Chapter 4: 
`Doing Government' around the Policing of Domestic Violence in 1990 
and 2000: problem formulation and constituting victims 
Introduction 
In the last chapter I delineated the methodology and the texts that would generate my 
analysis chapters. The method chosen was a synthesis between Foucauldian Analysis, 
`analytical levers' from a range of discursive techniques, a Conversation Analysis inspired 
approach to identity and a feminist stance on reflexivity. Foucauldian understandings of 
discourse, truth and power were commensurate with my theoretical position overall and the 
elements from other discursive disciplines which I incorporated in my synthetic approach. 
Further, the analytical framework arising from this provided me with the means to explore 
both the themes and processes within data; regardless of whether this comprised talk or text 
and across explorations of `doing' government, police realities and feminisms. 
This chapter marks the beginning of the research findings. It focuses on two key 
documents: Home Office Circular number 60 of 1990 (HOC 60/90) and Home Office 
Circular number 19 of 2000 (HOC 19/2000), both for the policing of domestic violence. 
HOC 60/90 was the first government missive to the police on this topic. HOC 19/2000 is 
New Labour's revision of it. These two texts form the site where I investigate the shifts 
between the Conservatives and New Labour in the `doing' of government around domestic 
violence; in particular the governmental activities of problem formulation and constituting 
victims. 
Initially, I reprise my account of `doing' government, what that might comprise and how 
Conservative and New Labour domestic violence crime policies might be expected to 
differ. The main body of the chapter forms two parts. In Part One, I consider HOC 60/90. 
Section one explores problem formulation, identifies the discourses of "public concern", 
`crime' and "Research" and shows how these themes are used to found truth-claims 
including responsibilisations. Section 2 looks at constituting victims. In this activity, the 
themes of "support" and "protection" produce different women victims and opportunities 
for promoting interventions that delimit and/or override their choices. In Part Two, I 
consider HOC 19/2000. Section 3 focuses on problem formulation where the discrete 
categories of "domestic violence", "violence against women" and "crime" are constituted. 
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Collectively these are used to relocate gender outside the policing of domestic violence; 
and to problematise `being women' by de-gendering `the problem' and re-gendering the 
blame (Berns, 2001). In section 4, `Constituting Victims', I demonstrate how "needs" and 
"safety" are used to frame non-gendered but ethnically and sexually diverse victims with 
choices and rights. And in the discussion, I examine the key points of differentiation and 
continuation as well as summarising what is to be taken forward to other chapters. 
Raising Questions for Analysis 
The texts for analysis in this chapter are both government policy documents. From a 
governmentalist perspective, policy is a `technology of governance' (Shore & Wright, 
1997). That is, it is a means by which government can extend its exercisings of power over 
a variety of non-governmental activities through "steering and regulating" whilst remaining 
`at a distance' (Rose, 2000, p. 324; 1996). In recent times, this form of `hands-off 
governance has been conceptualised as `good' and `appropriate' government (e. g. Rose, 
1993,1999a, 1999b). Thus policy is likely to be a site where government discourse is used 
to produce various `doings' of government, such as problematising activities which 
constitute a particular version of reality and what is required to correct it (Rose & Miller, 
1992; Rose, 1993); constituting policy community members to be governed by the policy, 
including government itself (Rose & Miller, 1992; Shore & Wright, 1997); and 
formulating an inter-relationship dynamic between `reflexive government' (Dean, 1999) 
and `responsibilised others' (Rose & Miller, 1992). 
Commensurate with the ethos that `less is more' in the `doing' of `good' government 
(Rose, 1996), government policy of the period 1990-2000 is likely to rally others to its 
causes "by seeking to invest the individual with subjectivity" (Miller, 1986, p. 29, my 
emphasis). Consequently, rather than forcing others to comply to policy's bidding, it is 
probable that non-government policy community members will be offered subject 
positions which enable them to `choose' the `right' course of action; in short, policy aims 
to achieve its effects through "persuasions inherent in its truths" (Rose, 1999a, p. 10) and 
by influencing "the way people construct themselves, their conduct and their social 
relations as free individuals" (Shore & Wright, 1997, p. 5). 
The people most likely to be responsibilised by government policy for the policing of 
domestic violence are the police and victims of crime. This is because `crime' falls within 
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the professional remit of the police and `domestic violence as crime' has been a useful 
formulation for both the Conservatives and New Labour (see Chapter One, section 3.1). 
Further, Home Office research, through notions of `situational crime prevention' and 
`repeat victimisation' (e. g. Clarke, 1997; Farrell et at, 2000), has influenced a victim 
intervention focus in reducing crime generally. Thus policy persuasions to the police may 
work on their understandings of professionalism and legitimacy; such as doing their job 
properly and serving the public. And policy persuasions for victims are likely to encourage 
the police to help victims to be `good citizens'; that is to self-responsibilise and self- 
actualise by managing their own risk (Rose, 1999a, 2000), possibly through using criminal 
justice processes `appropriately'. 
However HOC 60/90 and HOC 19/2000 were produced by different political governments. 
Attending to shifts between the Conservatives and New Labour is a key focus of this thesis 
and one that is often overlooked in governmentalist studies (as noted by McLaughlin & 
Murji, 2001; Newman, 2001). Therefore, in Chapter One I explored some of the 
similarities and differences that might be expected between these administrations in regard 
to the governmental activities of problem formulation and constituting victims around 
domestic violence. 
For both governments, problem formulation is likely to revolve around meanings ascribed 
to domestic violence, crime and gender. The Conservatives with their understandings of 
crime as the problem of individuals (Matthews & Pitts, 2001) and domestic violence being 
governable as crime (after Sherman & Berk, 1984; Berk & Newton, 1985), may well place 
emphasis on encouraging victims to use the criminal justice system and persuading the 
police to do their job properly. Feminist analyses of crime prevention literature from this 
period also indicates that there was precedence for invoking gender discourse to mobilise 
women victims of crime (e. g. Stanko, 1995,1996,1997). For New Labour, re-imaginings 
of the relationship between crime and community (Matthews & Pitts, 2001; Newman, 
2001; and see Chapter One, section 3.1) may lead to a less central role for the police in 
dealing with domestic violence and an increased emphasis on citizen involvement. 
Additionally, the new category of `violence against women' (e. g. The Women's Unit, 
1999), might indicate that attempts are being made to manage (female) gender out of 
domestic violence formulations. 
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In the governmental activity of constituting victims, it is probable that both governments 
will deal with (female) gender and notions of responsibility. The Conservatives, as argued 
above, already had a history of mobilising women as crime victims. But their inability to 
wed rights and responsibilities together fully may allow for formulations which exempt 
some victims from the responsibility to self-actualise (Lund, 1999). In contrast, New 
Labour are unlikely to allow anyone such an exemption (Lund, 1999). In addition, it is 
possible that alternative victim voices, such as those of minority ethic women (e. g. 
Alibhai-Brown, 2000; hooks, 2000; Huda, 2000; Mama, 2000) and lesbian women and gay 
men (e. g. Haymes, 2000; Kibblewhite, 2000), may be invoked to help manage notions of 
gender(ed) violence and family violence out of `appropriate' domestic violence 
understandings. 
However, this is a macro level analysis based on over-arching shifts within government 
rationalities. In this analysis chapter, by interrogating actual domestic violence policies, I 
hope to demonstrate the `doing' of government around domestic violence problem 
formulation and victim constitution. This is important because, traditionally, 
governmentalist have overlooked domestic violence as a distinct governable matter, the 
salience of gender, analyses of power and changes in political government. Therefore, the 
questions raised for my data are these: How can governments be seen to `do' government 
in attempts to problematise and ascribe responsibilities for, domestic violence? What kinds 
of victims are constituted and to what effect? In what ways is gender made relevant in the 
governmental activities of problem formulation and constituting victims? What are the 
continuities and disjunctures between successive government policies on policing domestic 
violence? 
Part One: Home Office Circular No 60 of 1990 
In this chapter part, using extracts from HOC 60/90, I explore the `doings' of government 
around the policing of domestic violence. This comprises problem formulation and 
constituting victims with an emphasis on how the ascription of `reflexive government' and 
`responsibilised others' is accomplished. 
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1. Problem Formulation: constituting and gendering the problem 
This section aims to explore how the Conservative government of 1990 attempted to 
problematise and correct the policing of domestic violence. Therefore, I am interested in 
how truths, including responsibility ascription, are constituted and warranted in policy text. 
1.1 Constituting the problem: "public concern " and 'crime' 
Extract One is the opening paragraph of HOC 60/90. As such it can be understood as stall- 
setting. Opening lines tend to highlight the main concerns of the author and set out what 
will be noteworthy in the rest of the document. The analysis below demonstrates how 
"public concern" and `crime' are used to found truth-claims about domestic violence. 
Extract 1 [HOC 60/90 (Opening paragraph)']: 
1 Dear Chief Officer 
2 Chief Officers of Police will be aware of public concern about 
3 the incidence of domestic violence and the need to ensure the 
4 proper protection of victims from physical attacks which take 
5 place in the home. This concern has been reflected increasingly 
6 by the police themselves, in the establishment of force policies 
7 and, in some cases, special units to deal with domestic violence. 
8 The Home Secretary regards a violent assault or brutal and 
9 threatening behaviour over a period of time by a person to whom 
10 the victim is married, or with whom the victim lives or has 
11 lived, as seriously as a violent assault by a stranger. The 
12 Government's view has been made clear in Parliament and the 
13 purpose of this circular, which has been agreed with the 
14 Association of Chief Police Officers, is to offer guidance to the 
15 police on their response to the problem of domestic violence and 
16 to encourage the development and publicising of force policy 
17 statements and strategies to deal with it. 
In the opening sentence, "public concern" (1.2) is formulated as rendering domestic 
violence a matter for the police. This is both in terms of its definition, as common 
("incidence") and comprising "physical attacks ... in the home", and the "proper protection 
1 See Appendix 2 for extract conventions. 
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of victims" as its prescription of what needs to be done about it. By being positioned as 
"aware" of this "public concern", "Chief Officers of Police" are framed as acknowledging 
the veracity of the claims that domestic violence is police business and that the public are 
justified in voicing their expectations about the policing of domestic violence. A denial of 
the former would entail arguing that "physical attacks" are the concern of some other 
agency. A denial of the latter would involve argumentation around the police mandate as 
public servants. 
However, these potential challenges to the government account are closed down as options 
in the next sentence. Here, "the police themselves" (1.6) are constituted as having already 
reacted to "This concern" suggesting that, like Chief Officers, they too are aware that 
domestic violence is a police matter and that the police have a responsibility to respond to 
"public concern". Although this police-work is furnished with details, it would appear that 
the response is neither complete ("reflected increasingly") nor consistent across forces ("in 
some cases"). Therefore, there is a sense that "public concern" is not translating directly 
into action that ensures the "proper protection of victims" when the police act on their own 
volition. 
It is at this point that a definition of domestic violence as `crime', attributed to the Home 
Secretary, is given. And, this is used to reformulate the "public concern" definition of 
domestic violence from "physical attacks which take place in the home" to the crime 
categories of "assault" and "threatening behaviour" (1.9). This renders domestic violence a 
police matter on the grounds that it is crime, both physical and non-physical `offences 
against the person'. And this implies that naming `crime' as `crime' is the responsibility of 
government not "public concern" and more importantly, not the police'. 
Moreover, "take place in the home" (1.4-5), is both peopled and expanded using a rhetorical 
device. The three-part list (Jefferson, 1990)3 of "by a person to whom the victim is married 
(1) ... lives (with) (2)... has lived (with) (3)" (1.9-11) is used to reconstitute what is 
"domestic" about "domestic violence" from the physical locale of the crimes to the 
intimate relationship of two adults. The list attempts to cover all eventualities of partner 
2 Further, the frequency of domestic violence is identified as "over a period of time" suggesting that the commonality of 
its occurrence can also be attributed to repeated crimes between the same people. The notion of `repeat victimisation' is 
in its infancy in HOC 60/90 but is a key concern of HOC 19/2000. However, because of the many issues already covered 
in this chapter, `repeat victimisation' had to be cut to keep the chapter within length. 
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violence, such as marriage, cohabiting and no longer living together. Although neither the 
"person" nor the "victim" are gendered, "married" suggests a heterosexual dynamic to the 
intimate partnerships where domestic violence occurs. Certainly in this current time the list 
may be understood to infer same-sex partners who cannot legally be married. However, the 
historical context of HOC 60/90 is such that government's previous attempt to address 
domestic violence concerned `Violence in Marriage' (see MPS, 1975). That, added to the 
fact that same-sex relationships are not formulated in HOC 60/90, supports my reading of 
this list as relocating domestic violence in intimate personal relationships, not the "home" 
per se. 
Finally, the Home Secretary's definition of domestic violence is concluded with a stance 
that seems to have a moral character. The formulation regarding domestic violence "as 
seriously as a violent assault by a stranger" (1.11, my emphasis) appears to suggest that 
someone does not take domestic violence as crime seriously enough. This is a government 
view, so government is not implicated. `Public concern' formulated domestic violence as a 
police matter rather than crime specifically, therefore it is unlikely that the public are 
implicated. That leaves the police, already ascribed as providing an incomplete and uneven 
response to "public concern" and not having the responsibility to define crime. Therefore, 
they are the most likely target of this implied criticism. And yet, no direct blame is 
apportioned to them. 
This raises questions about what the government definition of domestic violence is doing at 
this point in the text. Firstly, it can be understood as the simultaneous ascription and 
fulfilment of a government responsibility to respond to "public concern". It expands each 
point made in the "public concern" definition, indicating that each is taken seriously but 
does not go far enough. It neither challenges the public right to name a police matter nor its 
expectation that the police should ensure the "proper protection of victims". But it does 
exercise its responsibility to define `crime' and make it relevant to domestic violence. 
Secondly, it implies that the incomplete police response to "public concern" is premised on 
the incomplete understandings of domestic violence forwarded by the "public concern" 
definition. Thus the fact that the police response to the "proper protection of victims" is 
framed as uneven could be suggesting that some of them are taking it upon themselves to 
define crime. 
3 The three-part list (Jefferson, 1990), is a very common rhetorical device in government documents. See Chapter 3, 
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Therefore, the purpose of the Home Secretary's definition seems to be a way of persuading 
the police that although trying, some police are currently not fulfilling their responsibilities 
because they have not quite understood them properly. And, at the same time, it introduces 
a government which is ascribed as already meeting its own responsibilities, adept at 
identifying why the police response is askew and offering to help all police to ensure "the 
proper protection of victims". In this context, any direct blame might well undermine the 
persuasive process by generating challenges from the audience. Therefore, this can be seen 
as a shrewd rhetorical device. 
In the final sentence (1.11-17), the proposed relationship between government and the 
police is made overt. "The Government's view has been made clear in Parliament" refers to 
the Home Secretary's definition and stance on domestic violence. It is also continues the 
theme of an appropriate government response to "public concern". It would seem that it is 
not sufficient to simply respond to the public. Rather, it is necessary, through the 
appropriate channels, to inform the public what one's response has been. This reading is 
supported by government's persuasion to the police that they should be "publicising ... 
force policy statements and strategies" (my emphasis). Further, the "purpose" of HOC 
60/90 is stated as "to offer guidance" and "to encourage" the police in their responsibilities 
of "response" and "publicising". There is no sense of forcing or directing. Rather the 
emphasis is on helping them achieve what they should be doing. Moreover, a Chief Officer 
of Police audience could not accuse this government of having plucked solutions out of 
nowhere. Not only have they been made aware of their responsibilities arising from "public 
concern" and `crime', but also HOC 60/90 has been "agreed with the Association of Chief 
Police Officers", the collective, representative body of senior officers. 
In summary, "public concern" and `crime' are used to counter potential challenges to 
government truths. Their purpose seems to be to seek the same agreement from individual 
Chief Officers as HOC 60/90 has apparently secured from ACPO. Thus they underpin 
moves, such as positioning Chief Officers as already aware of the same truths as 
government; persuading for future action rather than direct blaming for past action; 
formulating government and ACPO as of one mind; and the self-presentation of 
government as the body that can help the police meet their responsibilities. These themes 
are also invoked to ascribe responsibilities to both the police and government. The police 
sections 1.3 and 2.1 for full explications of, and credits to, Jefferson's work in this area. 
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are credited with a response but one which is framed as incomplete, uneven and 
unpublicised. By contrast, the government is constituted as fulfilling all of its 
responsibilities, such as defining `crime', responding to "public concern" and helping the 
police to do their job. The "public concern" aim for the policing of domestic violence as 
the "proper protection of victims" is not reformulated by government and may be assumed 
to be integral to the guidance that government will offer the police. Thus government has 
harnessed those aspects of "public concern" that render domestic violence governable as 
`crime' and reformulated those that do not. 
1.2 Gendering the problem: `crime' and "Research" 
Like "public concern" and `crime', "Research" is an important theme for formulating truth- 
claims about domestic violence. Extract 2 is the second paragraph in HOC 60/90 and 
follows directly on from the Extract One where Chief Officers on the individual force level 
were encouraged to accept government's account. Here, building on the ascription of 
government as an appropriate definer of `crime' and reasonable provider of police help, 
"Research" seems to be used to blend understandings of domestic violence as `crime' with 
understandings of gendered violence. 
Extract 2 [HOC 60/90 (2: Nature and Extent of Problem)]: 
18 Chief officers will be aware of the wide range of abuse which 
19 is covered by the term `domestic violence'. It encompasses all 
20 aspects of physical, sexual and emotional abuse, ranging from 
21 threatening behaviour and minor assaults which lead to cuts and 
22 bruises to serious injury, and sometimes even death. (In about 
23 44% of homicide cases where the victim is a female the suspect 
24 is or was married to or lived with her. ) Research has shown that, 
25 although the severity of the abuse varies, incidents of domestic 
26 violence have several common characteristics. They are rarely 
27 isolated occurrences. They tend to be repeated over a period of 
28 time, often increasing in their severity, and are particularly 
29 common during the woman's pregnancy. They often extend beyond 
30 the woman to children living within the home. The offender is 
31 likely to come from a family in which violence was used against 
32 women, but he may be in any stratum of society; domestic violence 
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33 occurs across the whole social spectrum. 
This paragraph can be understood to have two distinct sections. The first, from "Chief 
officers will be aware" to the end of the parenthesis at line 24, is concerned with working 
on knowledges about domestic violence that are already within Chief Officers' realm of 
understanding. The second section, from "Research has shown" (1.24) to the end, claims 
truths largely grounded in gendered understandings of domestic violence and, presumably, 
not generally associated with things Chief Officers might be expected to be aware of. 
Extract 2 opens with "Chief officers will be aware". This is the same formulation used 
earlier in HOC 60/90 (see Extract One) and similarly it positions Chief Officers as already 
knowing the truths which follow; which in itself is a useful device for neutralising potential 
dissent. Three truths about domestic violence of which Chief Officers will "be aware" are 
forwarded, each in the form of a three-part list: "physical, sexual and emotional abuse" 
(1.20); "threatening behaviour ... minor assaults" 
(1.21) and "homicide" (1.23); "cuts and 
bruises" (1.21-2), "serious injury" (1.22), "even death" (1.22). 
The first truth, framing domestic violence as "abuse", seems to be understood as not 
contentious. `Domestic violence' is presented as all encompassing ("encompasses all") 
"abuse"; neither a legal category of crime nor something that is necessarily visible. The 
three parts, "physical, sexual and emotional" are also positioned next to each other. The 
second and third truths, of domestic violence as crime and (visible) physical harm, are by 
contrast woven together. Consequently, this suggests that there may be some contention 
associated with government ascribing categories of crime and harm. However, in the 
previous extract it was clear that government claimed the responsibility for defining crime. 
Therefore, what appears to be happening here is a persuasion; one that does not contend 
notions of abuse but one which asserts physical harms as commensurate with crimes. Thus 
it is argued that despite encompassing a range of visible/non-visible abuse, domestic 
violence is crime and that is apparent in the injuries that it produces. Further, Chief 
Officers are credited with already knowing these facts. And as such the argument has a ring 
of `you already know it makes sense'. 
Another `fact' which Chief Officers are positioned as already knowing about is the female 
gender relevance of domestic violence. The third part of the list of physical harm is 
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"death". Whilst the third part of the list of crime categories is "homicide". In lines 22-24, 
death as both physical harm and crime is gendered as female. But there is also a 
formulation, albeit reluctant, of the suspect as male. `Married' (1.24) renders the suspect 
male in instances of women's domestic violence fatality. And although with contemporary 
knowledge "lived with her" could also indicate same sex partnerships, that is not a theme 
of HOC 60/90 overall. Thus it is more likely to be a response to feminist claims that 
`marriage' per se is not a pre-requisite of male against female gender relational domestic 
violence (e. g. Dobash & Dobash, 1979; Smith, 1989). 
Having argued that Chief Officers are aware that domestic violence is crime with gender 
relevance, HOC 60/90 then moves to what "Research has shown" (1.24). Unsurprisingly, 
this introduces `facts' from "Research". What is most apparent is that the research truths 
about domestic violence have been influential in government's earlier formulations of 
`abuse' and `physical harm'. Constitutions such as "the severity of the abuse varies" (1.25), 
"rarely isolated occurrences" (1.26-7) and "increasing in their severity" (1.28) can be seen to 
reflect discursive work in formulations of what Chief Officers already know4. For example, 
the three-part list of "cuts and bruises (1) to serious injury (2), and sometimes even 
death(3)" (1.21-2) can now additionally be understood as incremental. Therefore, the 
knowledges produced by domestic violence research can be shown to have extensively 
informed government's understandings of the issue. And this can be seen as a device by 
which the meanings of what Chief Officers already know can be reformulated. 
At line 29, female gender is introduced in regard to "Research" truths with the phrase 
"particularly common during the woman's pregnancy" (1.29). In Extract One and above, I 
argued that heterosexual intimate partners was a key determinant in government's 
definition of domestic violence. The emphasis here on "pregnancy" (1.29), "children" (1.30) 
and "family" (1.31) suggests that this was a correct reading. But it also indicates that work 
is being done to frame women as worthy victims. Female gender is only mobilised when 
women are formulated as dead, pregnant, sharing their home with children or in a family. 
As the main responsibilisation strategy of HOC 60/90 so far appears to be to persuade the 
police to change their understandings of domestic violence, this implicitly suggests that 
they are not perceived as sympathetic to women victims. 
4 And the notion that abuse is "repeated over a period of time" (1.27-8), reprises the earlier ascription of domestic 
violence as repeat crime (see Extract One and footnote 2). 
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The gendering of men as offenders is less consistent than the gendering of victims as 
women and this is apparent in the male/female imbalance in the pairings of doer and done 
to. These are "suspect ... married to ... 
her" (1.23-4)/"female" "victim" (1.23) and "The 
offender" (1.30)/"the woman" (1.30). Covertly, these relational pairings do gender the 
offender as male but "he" is not overtly gendered until social class is disclaimed (Hewitt & 
Stokes, 1975) as a domestic violence determinant at line 32. Further, there seems to be a 
readiness, almost an eagerness to gender victims as female and an accompanying 
reluctance to overtly gender offenders as male. The gendering of men as offenders is also 
implicitly suggested in the formulation of a heterosexual "family" where children are born 
and live and where the offender was raised. It is not possible to say why this reluctance to 
gender offenders as male is here other than to suggest that it may be to do with a primary 
focus on the "proper protection of victims" and the ascribed relevance of gender to 
`victimhood' in particular. 
However, it is possible to consider the implications of the overtly gendered victim as 
female and the partially gendered offender as male. Firstly, gendering women as worthy on 
the basis of their potential as mothers is always problematic (Butler, 1992; Smart, 1992, 
1995); as is, founding worth in death. It allows for a hierarchy of worthiness with `dead 
mothers' at the top and other women victims as less deserving. Secondly, gendering 
victims as women leads to a focus on their bodies as the sites where crimes are committed 
(Smart, 1992). And although no direct blame formulations are presented here, such blame 
is sanctioned (Hanmer & Stanko, 1985). HOC 60/90 frames women's deaths as arising 
from domestic violence; heterosexual women's partners as the people who commit 
domestic violence; and seeing violence against women in childhood as the reason why 
domestic violence is committed in adulthood (by men). Therefore, `being women' is 
implicated in why domestic violence occurs and may go on to be implicated in how it is to 
be policed. Thirdly, despite expectations to the contrary (e. g. Dobash & Dobash, 2000; 
Itzin, 2000), violent men are rendered partially visible as men. But it is unclear whether or 
not their gender will be made relevant to what the police are asked to do about domestic 
violence. 
In summary, "Research" can be shown to have informed government's understandings of 
domestic violence, particularly in definitions of domestic violence as incrementally serious 
5 This is an assertion that is highly contentious (Morley & Mullender, 1994). 
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and producing women victims. The "Research" truths are also demonstrable in how 
government has attempted to ascribe different meanings to the `facts' about which Chief 
Officers are already aware. Further, these knowledges are invoked to render women as 
worthy victims of police attention and to frame domestic violence as male against female 
gendered violence. But this is done in a way that allows for a hierarchy of female worth 
and constitutes women's bodies as the sites where crimes are committed. Further, it is not 
clear how the eagerness to gender victims as female and the reluctance to gender offenders 
as male might impact on government guidance for specific policing activities around 
domestic violence. Therefore, in the next section I turn my attention to how victims are 
constituted. 
2. Constituting Victims: "support" and "protection" 
In the previous section I showed that the "proper protection of victims" was legitimised as 
the aim of policing domestic violence. Also female gender was readily ascribed as integral 
to domestic violence victims, but although offenders are gendered as male, there seemed to 
be reluctance to press this point. I suggested that this may be attributable to a primary 
concern with responding to women victims. Therefore, in this section I consider how 
gender is used (or not) to constitute victims and government's attempts to shape how they 
are policed. The two themes that came to fore in this regard were "support" and 
"protection". 
2.1 "support" 
Extracts 3 to 5 are all concerned with the police "support" of women victims. 
Extract 3 [HOC 60/90 (10: Role of the Police and Other Agencies)]: 
116 (... ) In some forces dedicated domestic violence units with 
117 specially trained officers have been established which are able 
118 to perform a more active role in supporting and reassuring the 
119 victim and helping her to make reasoned decisions (... ) 
Extract 4 [HOC 60/90 (18: Action after the incident)]: 
248 (... ) Many women will be in a state of shock when the 
249 police first arrive, and unable to contemplate the prospect of 
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250 a court case. With proper support, however, they may gain in 
251 confidence and, following discussion of all the aspects of their 
252 case, they may well come to recognise that prosecution is in 
253 their own interest. (... ) 
Extract 5 [HOC 60/90 (24: Withdrawal of victim's complaint)]: 
343 (... ) This underlines the need to give 
344 close support to the victim during the pre-trial period, so that 
345 she will feel sufficiently self-confident to give evidence. 
Collectively, these extracts ascribe the aim and `nature' of police "support". The aim is 
constituted as getting the victims to understand that "prosecution is in their own interest" 
(1.252-3) and "to give evidence" (1.345). The `nature' of police "support" is formulated as 
time-consuming and on-going. It requires "supporti ... reassurnn ... and 
helping" 
(1.118-9, my emphases), "discussion of all aspects of their case" (1.251-2, my emphasis) 
and to be carried on "during the pre-trial period" (1.344, my emphasis). Therefore, 
"support" is framed as something which the police need to do continuously and thoroughly 
in order to get the victim to court. Consequently, HOC 60/90 responsibilises the police for 
the presence of the victim at trial. 
However, the victim is consistently gendered as female. Before the police application of 
"support" she is constituted as "in a state of shock" (1.248), unable "to make reasoned 
decisions" (1.119), not knowing what is in her "own interest" (1.253) and not "sufficiently 
self-confident" (1.345). Not knowing one's own mind and lacking confidence are 
commonly formulated negative representations of women (Smart, 1992; Williams, 2002). 
Therefore, what she is ascribed as temporarily unable to do for herself is being attributed 
not to her positioning as a victim but as a woman victim. Thus female gender is made 
relevant to the policing "support" activities of helping domestic violence victims. 
Further, this appears to be a classic neo-liberal formulation of help and citizenship. Police 
"support" work is encouraged to reconstruct her will so that she herself, with that `expert' 
help, can overcome her lack of self-confidence and reason to act in her own interest. In 
short, at least until the court case, she is to be autonomised by the police to help her to help 
herself to "active citizenship" (Rose, 2000, p. 329). In this way, she is constituted as a 
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temporarily "failed", or at least failing, citizen (Rose, 2000, p. 331). There is a key 
implication here. The police are responsibilised to provide "proper support", but they are 
also positioned to undermine any account from a woman victim who expresses a choice not 
to go to court. Consequently, a woman choosing not to pursue prosecution may find that 
the police treat her version of the truth as unreasoned. 
In summary, the victim and the `appropriate' policing of domestic violence produced by 
discourses of police "support" are both overtly and covertly gendered as female. The 
purpose of "support" is to help the victim to overcome the problems of her female 
victimhood and to self-actualise as a responsible citizen by going to court. Although the 
police are charged with the responsibility to "support" women victims properly, this 
formulation still allows opportunities for the police to ascribe failure to her if she chooses 
not to go to court. 
2.2 "protection " 
However, "support" is not the only theme associated with the constitution of victims. 
Extracts 6 and 7 exemplify how "protection" produces a different subject position for 
understanding the victim. And as I argued in section one, HOC 60/90 legitimises the 
"proper protection of victims" as a primary policing domestic violence aim. 
Extract 6 [HOC 60/90 (8: Role of the Police and Other Agencies)]: 
92 It is the immediate duty of police officers who are called 
93 to a domestic violence incident to secure the protection of the 
94 victim and any children from further abuse and then to consider 
95 what action should be taken against the offender. The immediate 
96 protection of the victim may involve the police in referring or 
97 taking her to a shelter or in liaising with statutory or 
98 voluntary agencies who can supply longer-term help and support. 
99 Such agencies include (... ) 
Extract 7 [HOC 60/90 (30: Summary)]: 
381 Chief officers are asked to ensure that all police officers 
382 involved in the investigation of cases of domestic violence 
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383 regard as their overriding priority the protection of the victim 
384 and the apprehension of the offender. 
387 In particular, 
388 chief officers are invited to: 
389 (i) liaise with other agencies and voluntary bodies 
390 to establish arrangements for referring victims 
391 to sources of long-term support (... ) 
Although "protection" is not the only "immediate duty" (1.92)/"overriding priority" (1.383) 
with which the police are responsibilisedb, it is consistently positioned before action on the 
"offender" (1.95 & 384). And there is also an explicit sense ("and then", 1.94, my emphasis) 
that "protection" comes first'. It is hard to account from the text why this should be the 
case. But my feeling is that it is related to the police's `new' duties of victim intervention. 
The police have always had responsibility for dealing with domestic violence offenders, 
regardless of how poorly that might have been carried out (e. g. Buzawa & Buzawa, 1993; 
Southall Black Sisters, 1989; Wright, 1995). A new policy, which normally marks changes, 
is therefore likely to position first that which it seeks to draw particular attention to. 
However, an argument that can be made from these extracts is that gender is not rendered 
relevant to the policing of domestic violence offenders. Thus "action" (1.95) and 
"apprehension" (1.384) do not overtly formulate a male offender. Nor do they covertly 
suggest gendering activity. By contrast, the victims produced by discourses of "protection", 
although not consistently gendered overtly, are covertly gendered as female. Women's 
overriding need to be protected (often along with their children) is a commonly reproduced 
negative femininity ascription (Ahmed, 1995). And this, like the `self-confidence' and 
`reason' response encouraged with "support", implicitly genders domestic violence police- 
work with female victims. Therefore, it is not just victimhood that the police are being 
asked to deal with but specifically women victims. 
6 In Extract 6, what the police should do with offenders is formulated in vague terms: "consider what action should be 
taken against the offender" (1.94-5). Vagary is a way of avoiding rebuttal (Edwards & Potter, 1992, p. 162). Therefore, 
one can assume that the use of "apprehension" (1.384) at this stage would be perceived as drawing forth a challenge from 
a police audience. The vague formulation renders some thought about the offender as necessary. But at this stage police 
discretion is not delimited any further. 
7 Putting victims before offenders is consistent with HOC 60/90 as a whole where the first appearance of "victims" is at 
line three and the first "offender" is constituted at line thirty (see Extracts One and 2). 
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But there are also differences in the victims constituted by "support" and "protection". In 
regard to "support", the woman victim is formulated as having an active, if constrained, 
role in her self-actualisation. Here the victim is framed as passive; a common occurrence 
when "protection" is encouraged (Harmer & Stanko, 1985; Stanko, 1985,1994a, 1995). 
Therefore, whilst "support" is ascribed as something the police do with women victims, 
"protection" is presented as something the police do to women victims. The implications of 
such a victim formulation are twofold. Whilst the police are being responsibilised to take 
the "proper protection of victims" seriously, they are also positioned to override any 
choices that the victim may make. Yet, as many feminists have argued (e. g. Stanko, 
1994a), a woman may have insight into what keeps her safe. And this potential resource is 
not legitimised by HOC 60/90. Consequently, any move from "support" to "protection" 
can be understood as commensurate with a lessening of ascribed active person-hood. 
This reading is supported by what police are responsibilised to do once "immediate duty" 
(1.92)/"overriding priority" (1.383) have been attended to. This is formulated as "referring" 
(1.96 & 390) or "taking" (1.97) the victim to "other agencies" (1.389), both statutory and 
voluntary, for "long(er)-term (help and) support" (1.98 & 391). This suggests two things. 
Firstly, she is rendered a non-person, almost a commodity to be transferred from one place 
of safe-keeping to another. Secondly, it inscribes the police responsibilities of "support" 
and "protection" as `short-term'. Consequently, this passing of the victim to other agencies 
formulates boundaries of police responsibilities. Certainly the suggestion is made to 
"liaise" and "to establish arrangements" (1.389-391) with others for this transfer. But this is 
advised rather than required ("invited to", 1.388). HOC 60/90 predates government's 
forwarding of inter-agency working around domestic violence, therefore, the purposes 
ascribed to other agencies are likely to be limited. The implication of this, is that other 
agencies can be understood either as a `resource' for the police to ensure "the proper 
protection of victims" or as a repository for victims once police responsibilities to them are 
terminated. Either way, there is a sense that some boundary-work between the police and 
other agencies is being attempted. 
In summary, "protection" is formulated as one of the police's overriding duties which 
possibly takes precedence over action with the offender. What is clear, is that "protection", 
like "support", genders the policing of domestic violence victims in the absence of 
gendering police-work with offenders. Unlike "support", "protection" constitutes a passive 
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woman with no responsibilities and no role to play, upon whom the police can act 
accordingly. Her "protection" therefore is ascribed as outweighing all other concerns. The 
main implication of this is that the police are positioned to overrule her choices and any 
account she may offer in regard to her own safety. When she is passed over to others for 
safe-keeping, the responsibility for her "protection" crosses a notional boundary from the 
police to other agencies. Thus like a commodity, her removal from place to place is 
sanctioned. 
The main implications of this constituting victims activity are considered in the chapter 
part conclusion below. 
Part One Conclusion 
This analysis of extracts from HOC 60/90 demonstrates that policy is being used as a 
technology of governance to exercise power over the police. Firstly, a particular version of 
truth about domestic violence is constituted and privileged over competing accounts. 
"Research", "public concern" and police knowledges are harnessed and delimited into the 
service of `crime' formulations. Thus the veracity of `domestic violence', as a subset of 
crime committed against women by their former or current partners, is founded in the 
ascribed inappropriateness of other ways of knowing about it. The persuasion for accepting 
this truth is the promise of achieving the policing aim of "the proper protection of victims"; 
offering the rewards of moral worthiness to those police who embrace government's 
definition and follow its guidance. This problematising activity, presenting a version of 
reality which needs correcting in a specific way is what, from a governmentalist 
perspective (e. g. Rose & Miller, 1992; Rose, 1993), one might have predicted. 
Secondly, the dynamic of `reflexive government' and `responsibilised others' is apparent in 
formulations of policy community members to be governed. The former is accomplished 
by self-presentation as a government which has analysed the problem of policing domestic 
violence and taken appropriate steps to remedy it. This concerns responding appropriately 
to "public concern", sifting through relevant knowledges and, with the agreement of 
ACPO, guiding and steering the police through the HOC 60/90 policy document. The 
effect of this is that government is framed as `already responsible', having identified and 
met all its responsibilities, leaving it nothing more to do. However, this accomplishment is 
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also dependent on formulating the police as `responsibilised others'. This is founded on the 
dual truth-claims that some police already respond appropriately to government guidance 
and that "the proper protection of victims" is not currently being achieved. The effect of 
this is that the responsibility for all remaining action to secure victim protection is ascribed 
to the police. 
Thus the `doing' of government in terms of problem formulation can be seen as 
undermining competing versions of the problem and producing responsibility claims and 
ascription around formulations of `reflexive government' and `responsibilised others'; 
again this is in line with a governmentalist account. And it also produces an emphasis on 
the police policing domestic violence `properly'; a likely focus of Conservative crime 
policy which I identified in Chapter One. 
Thirdly, in regard to constituting victims, there does seem to be a victim intervention focus. 
The themes of "protection" and "support" make female gender relevant to the policing of 
domestic victims and problematise `being women'. By contrast, men as offenders are only 
partially made visible as gendered subjects and gender does not seem to be mobilised in 
persuasions to the police to act upon them. Neither of these findings would surprise 
feminists who have critiqued government crime prevention literature from this period (e. g. 
Stanko, 1995,1996,1997). Although "support" produces a woman victim as a citizen in 
need of help to self-actualise and self-responsibilise, "protection" generates a woman 
victim with no responsibilities. The effect of "support" is to delimit victims' rights to going 
to court. The effect of "protection" is to claim a victim's overriding right to protection, at 
the expense of other rights, including whether or not protection is wanted. 
Consequently, the `doing' of government in the activity of constituting victims can be seen 
as framing `women experiencing domestic violence' as the population to be governed. And 
this is commensurate with what one might have expected from a Conservative government 
of this time. That is, not wedding rights and responsibilities thoroughly has enabled 
formulations of victims exempted from self-actualisation (Lund, 1999). 
The main implication arising from this analysis is that the `doing' of government around 
the policing of domestic violence seems to be quite accomplished in reformulating truths, 
ascribing responsibility and pitching persuasion at a level that might well be appropriate to 
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police understandings. Whether Chief Officers respond to this guidance `accordingly' is 
explored in Chapter 5. Another key implication is that HOC 60/90's formulations of 
women victims generate opportunities to blame women for what happens to them and to 
justify action with them and upon them that overrides their rights and choices. 
In Part One, I have focused on HOC 60/90. In Part Two, I explore the activities of problem 
formulation and constituting victims in HOC 19/2000 in order to facilitate a continuities 
and disjunctures discussion. 
Part Two: Home Office Circular No 19 of 2000 
In this chapter part, using extracts from HOC 19/2000, I explore the `doings' of 
government around the policing of domestic violence. This comprises problem formulation 
and constituting victims with a focus on how `reflexive government' and `responsibilised 
others' are accomplished. 
3. Problem Formulation: de-gendering the problem and re-gendering the blame 
In this section I explore how the New Labour government of 2000 attempted to 
problematise the policing of domestic violence in HOC 19/2000. 
3.1 De-gendering the problem: "violence against women ", "crime" and "domestic 
violence " 
Extract 8 provides the opening three paragraphs from the covering memo of HOC 19/2000. 
As opening lines, a great deal of definition work is being undertaken to formulate 
categories and ascribe meaning to them. 
Extract 8 [HOC 19/2000 (Covering Memo paragraphs 1-3)]$: 
1 Dear Colleague 
2 In March 2000, the Deputy Home Secretary, the Rt Hon Paul Boateng 
3 MP, launched the Multi-agency Guidance for Addressing Domestic 
4 Violence (file size 331 Kb), as part of the Government's 
5 "Living Without Fear" campaign to tackle violence against women. 
8 See Appendix 2 for extract conventions. 
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6 In this country, two women a week are killed by a current or former 
7 partner, around 25% of women experience domestic violence at some 
8 point in their lives; and domestic violence is the most common single 
9 type of violence against women, accounting for about a quarter of all 
10 recorded violent crime. 
11 The Government is clear that one's home should be a place of safety 
12 and that domestic violence therefore involves a serious breach of trust. 
13 Domestic violence involves crimes of violence which are serious in 
14 themselves, but they are often aggravated further by that serious 
15 breach of trust. That is why the Government is taking such strong 
16 action against them. It must not be forgotten that exactly the same 
17 considerations apply when women are the perpetrators and men the 
18 victims, and in same sex relationships. 
The key to understanding these categories and the work being done here can be seen in the 
moves between paragraphs. Thus in paragraph one the emphasis is on "Domestic Violence" 
(1.3/4) and "violence against women" (1.5). In paragraph two, the concern is "domestic 
violence" (1.7 & 8), "violence against women" (1.9) and "crime" (1.10). In paragraph three, 
the focus is "domestic violence" (1.12 & 13) and "crime" (1.13). Therefore, even before a 
deeper analysis is presented below, there is a sense from the outset that government is 
managing the category of "domestic violence", particularly around understandings of 
"violence against women" and "crime". 
The first paragraph ascribes a relationship between "domestic violence" and "violence 
against women". What the government is formulated as having done about "domestic 
violence" is " ap rt of' (1.4, my emphasis) an existing "campaign to tackle violence against 
women" (1.5). This suggests that there is "violence against women" that is not "domestic 
violence" but that "violence against women" is relevant to this government's strategies. 
Further, it indicates that women's "Fear" (1.5) is understood as what binds the category 
"violence against women". 
Another accomplishment of this paragraph concerns the self-presentation of government. 
Collectively, the verbs "launched" (1.3), "Addressing" (1.3) and "tackle" (1.5) imply a busy 
121 
government actively engaged in dealing with the problem. The details of action already 
taken are very specific: the date of the launch; the minister responsible; his name; a 
gateway to the full text of the Multi-Agency Guidance (MAG); and how this fits into an 
existing campaign, the name of that campaign and what it is for are all provided. And I 
think that this is attempting two moves. The first concerns constituting government's 
actions as strategic. This government knows what it is doing and how its work is 
integrated. The second appears to be dealing with `openness'. The reader is given truths 
about what MAG is and what it is for as well as the means of accessing it. It is almost as if 
the reader is being invited to check the veracity of the government's truth-claims. The 
overall sense is that government is not simply active and organised but also open, truthful 
and, probably, responsible. 
The second paragraph opens with "In this country" (1.6). The implication is that the truth- 
claims that follow are not about a foreign country or some uncivilised part of the world but 
what is happening on `our' doorstep. In this way, government is setting up a justification 
for why it is taking the action it is. And it is making an appeal to the audience that this 
problem concerns them too. 
The second paragraph as a whole is actually a three-part list, with the third part marking a 
shift of topic from "violence against women" to "crime". The first part of the list comprises 
"two women a week are killed by a current or former partner" (1.6-7) and suggests an 
example where "domestic violence" and "violence against women" overlap. There is no 
crime discourse in this phrase; no `homicide' or `murder', words that would indicate these 
women's deaths as being understood as crime. But "women" "killed" suggests "violence 
against women". And the incidence as "two ... a week" and the violence-doer formulation 
of "current or former partner" can be understood to pertain to the category of "domestic 
violence". Consequently, in the absence of a gendered violence-doer, "violence against 
women" is simply that; acts of violence bound by the gender of those to whom violence is 
done. And "domestic violence" is framed as common, inter-partner violence whilst notions 
of "crime" are played down. 
However, category definition is not the only discursive work being done here. As an 
extreme case "killed" is being legitimised in the text as something that cannot, physically, 
and should not, morally, be denied; a classic `death and furniture' argument (Edwards et al, 
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1995). It would seem therefore that it is being presented as a bottom line argument, a truth- 
claim building on "In this country" as justification for why government and the perceived 
audience should not ignore it. 
The second part of the list comprises "around 25% of women experience domestic violence 
at some point in their lives" (1.7-8) as another example of when "domestic violence" and 
"violence against women" overlap. By contrast with the first part, "around" and "at some 
point" render this a systematically vague formulation. And vagary too is a means by which 
potential challenges to the veracity of truth-claims can be undermined (Edwards & Potter, 
1992). Therefore, albeit differently, there is persuasion being undertaken for the reader to 
accept this part of the account as true. 
The third part of the list marks the change of topic to crime and comprises "domestic 
violence is the most common single type of violence against women, accounting for a 
quarter of all recorded violent crime" (1.8-10). Once again an ascription is made whereby 
"domestic violence" and "violence against women" overlap. However, the extreme case 
formulation "most common single type" is not simply arguing that the two can manifest in 
the same action. Rather, it is additionally countering potential claims that "domestic 
violence" and "violence against women" are one and the same thing. Therefore, although 
in all three parts of the list "domestic violence" is constituted as often being "violence 
against women" as well, "domestic violence" is not "violence against women" per se. 
The final claim that "domestic violence" accounts for "about a quarter of all recorded 
violent crime" denotes the topic shift. This time the extreme case formulation (Pomerantz, 
1986)9, "all recorded violent crime" (my emphasis), is used to suggest that "crime", unlike 
"violence against women", is `in the object' of "domestic violence". That is, "crime" is 
framed as the appropriate way for understanding "domestic violence" and certain instances 
of "violence against women". Initially this seems to contradict government's stance in 
paragraph one where "violence against women" was positioned as the primary concern for 
publishing the Multi-Agency Guidance. However, the shift of topic from "violence against 
women" to "crime" accomplished by the third part of the list implies that both are 
important and the emphasis is determined by the specific matter in hand. The suggestion is 
therefore that the government has two chief concerns, "violence against women" and 
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"crime". The implication is that in some instances, "violence against women" will be the 
`appropriate way' to understand and deal with domestic violence. But when the focus is on 
police-work, the `appropriate way' to understand domestic violence truth is through 
"crime". Consequently, whilst the government is and the police should be aware of, 
"violence against women", for the purposes of policing, the primary concern is "crime". 
This reading is supported by paragraph three where "violence against women" is absent 
and notions of gendered and heterosexual partner violence are undermined. By stating that 
"The Government is clear that one's home should be a place of safety and that domestic 
violence involves a serious breach of trust" (1.11-12), government presents its stance as 
open and straightforward ("is clear"). It also provides a moral tone which combines the 
notion of the adage that `an Englishman's home is his castle' with a sense that personal 
relationships are near-sacred and under threat from "a serious breach of trust". The 
morality associated with `seriousness' is extended into the next two sentences: "Domestic 
violence involves crimes of violence which are serious in themselves, but they are often 
aggravated further by that serious breach of trust. That is why the Government is taking 
such strong action against them" (1.13-16). Although "crimes of violence" are framed as 
serious, this is disclaimed ("but") as the only source of seriousness in "domestic violence". 
And this seriousness is used to justify ("That is why") government's stance and legitimise 
"taking such strong action" as the moral high-ground. 
In the final sentence, notions of (gendered) "violence against women" are undermined: "It 
must not be forgotten that exactly the same considerations apply when women are the 
perpetrators and the men the victims, and in same sex relationships" (1.16-18). The first 
thing that is interesting about this formulation is that there is an imperative ("must") rather 
than persuasion. This imperative is part of a bottom line argument (Edwards et al, 1995), 
suggesting it cannot, physically, and should not, morally, be denied that "exactly the same 
considerations apply" (my emphasis), regardless of gender. 
The ascription of "women ... (as) ... perpetrators" is important because despite discourse 
about "domestic violence", "crime" and "violence against women" in the extract, this is the 
only time that the term used for the violence-doer encompasses the meaning of wrong- 
doing. Further, the constitution of "men ... (as) ... victims" is remarkable as it is the only 
9 Extreme case formulations (Pomerantz, 1986) are very common, therefore for full explication and credit see Chapter 3 
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place in the whole of HOC 19/2000 where victims are directly gendered. Moreover, "same 
sex relationships", framed as a place where "domestic violence" also occurs, undermines 
any remaining notion that "domestic violence" is gendered, male against female, violence. 
Therefore, the "crime" and the "breach of trust" involved in "domestic violence" and which 
render it serious are framed as in no way founded in gender. And this supports my 
argument that the government is primarily concerned with organising understandings of 
"domestic violence" around "crime" for the purposes of its policing. 
In summary, the opening lines of HOC 19/2000 constitute two ways of understanding and 
addressing "domestic violence". `Violence against women' is framed as acts of violence, 
often "domestic violence" and sometimes "crime" where the common feature is the female 
gender of the recipient. There are also suggestions that women's fear is integral to what 
happens to them and that "violence against women" could be `an appropriate way' for 
organising action in some unnamed context. But "crime" is framed as serious and a matter 
for the police. Although it may arise from "domestic violence", some of which will also be 
"violence against women", it is ultimately a gender-free concept. When the context of 
action to address "domestic violence" concerns its policing, "crime" is formulated as `the 
more appropriate way' of understanding domestic violence and steering government and 
police action accordingly. "Domestic violence" itself is framed as frequently occurring 
inter-partner violence, regardless of gender, which is serious by virtue of involving crimes 
of violence and serious breaches of trust. 
The first implication arising from these formulations concerns what types of victims will 
be constituted if female gender is managed out of the "domestic violence" category. And 
that is addressed in section 4. The second implication involves the way that "violence 
against women" is separated off from "crime" and policing matters. Although it is framed 
here as a potentially `appropriate way' of addressing domestic violence in some context, 
the only other named context here is multi-agency working and those forums too tend to be 
engaged in reducing crime (Crawford, 1994). Therefore, whether or not "violence against 




A further key feature of HOC 19/2000's opening lines is the way the themes of "violence 
against women" and "crime" are used to ascribe responsibilities and constitute government 
as already responsible. Firstly, the detail provided to formulate the relationship between 
"violence against women" and "domestic violence" founds claims that government is 
responsible, strategic and organised. Secondly, in separating "violence against women" 
from "crime" and "domestic violence", government claims the moral high-ground for 
itself. 
Thirdly, the justifications for separating out the various categories are quite aggressive. 
Instead of using simple extreme cases to fend off potential challenges it forms bottom line 
arguments. Thus it directly challenges the reader to deny the veracity of dead women on 
their doorstep and "domestic violence" that is not gendered male to female violence. The 
implication of this is that this government is not simply engaged in artful persuasion. 
Rather, it is prepared to pull out `bigger guns' where necessary and bring considerable 
pressure to bear. New Labour self-presents as a lean, mean fighting machine that should 
not and does not wait for stragglers. But this is still persuasion, perhaps `with attitude', 
because the rewards for compliance (e. g. being aligned with the responsible government 
and sharing its moral high-ground) are inherent in the truths which it formulates. 
3.2 Re-gendering the blame: "women are more likely ... " 
In the last subsection I argued that "crime" as a theme is framed as `the appropriate way' of 
understanding "domestic violence" for the purposes of its policing. And I suggested that 
the category "violence against women" was useful for delimiting truths about gendered 
violence, including notions of dead women. In Extract 9 below, I pursue these two 
arguments further, looking for how the disproportionate instances of male against female 
partner-violence are accounted for. 
Extract 9 [HOC 19/2000 (Nature & Extent of Problem: 6`h paragraph)]: 
83 A quarter of all reported violent crime is domestic violence. However, 
84 there is still a large amount of under reporting of this type of crime to 
85 the police. Domestic violence occurs regardless of the victim's class, 
86 religion, sexual orientation or ethnicity. It is experienced by both 
87 women and men. The majority of violent and repetitive assaults are 
88 however perpetrated by men against their female partners. By 
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89 comparison with men, women are more likely to suffer domestic 
90 violence over a lifetime, more likely to suffer repeat victimisation, 
91 more likely to be injured and seek medical help, more likely to receive 
92 frightening threats and more likely to be frightened and upset. (... ) 
The extract begins by repeating a formulation presented in HOC 19/2000's opening lines 
(see Extract 8). That is, through the extreme case formulation of "all" (1.83), "crime" is 
constituted as `in the object' of "domestic violence". The ascription that it is only "A 
quarter" is disclaimed by suggesting there is more "crime" which is currently under- 
reported ("However"). This is an important constitution because it frames "crime" as pre- 
existing any police intervention. And this is counter to police understandings that it is they 
who, for all practical purposes, define crime at the point of investigation (Waddington, 
1993,1999). 
The next line also contains a disclaimer (Hewitt & Stokes, 1975). The employment of 
"regardless" (1.85) undermines understandings of "domestic violence" that do not 
accommodate "the victim's class, religion, sexual orientation or ethnicity (1.85-6)". The 
key category here is "sexual orientation", as it specifically disclaims formulations that rely 
on notions of gendered violence. And that move is repeated in the next line where, "It is 
experienced by both women and men" (1.86-7); although the positioning of "women" 
before "men", an ordering which jars for fluent English speakers, may be understood to be 
making a concession to "The majority of violent and repetitive assaults" (1.87). Indeed, the 
shared experience of women and men is disclaimed ("however") in favour of "perpetrated 
by men against their female partners" (1.88). 
What is pertinent to my argument about separating gender off from understandings of 
"crime" is clear here. The primary classification of "domestic violence" as "crime" for 
policing purposes is not undermined; neither, is the list of possible differences between 
people, including "sexual orientation". Therefore, notions of "domestic violence" as 
gendered violence have already been undermined before the shared experience of women 
and men is disclaimed. Consequently, the theme of "violence against women" in the 
context of heterosexual relationships is being discussed only once "crime" and "domestic 
violence" have been fenced off as separate categories. 
127 
In subsection 3.1 I argued that the feature highlighted as binding together incidents of 
"violence against women" was the gender of the recipient, not who was doing the violence, 
not how serious the violence was and not where it was occurring. In addition, the 
government campaign for tackling "violence against women" was called "Living Without 
Fear". And I suggested that women's fear was being framed as somehow integral to 
violences committed against them. The list arising from what "women are more likely" to 
experience infers that it is more than just fear that is being ascribed as rendering them the 
sites where violences are enacted. It includes, "to suffer domestic violence over a lifetime" 
(1.89-90), "to suffer repeat victimisation" (1.90), "to be injured" (1.91), to "seek medical 
help" (1.91), "to receive frightening threats" (1.91-2), and "to be frightened and upset" 
(1.92). 
Representations of women as physically inferior to men and as having heightened 
fearfulness and emotionality are very common and pervasive discourses of negative 
femininity (Marcus, 1992; Smart, 1992,1995). Therefore, this extract is re-inscribing 
derogatory understandings of women. And by implicating `being women' as a means for 
accounting for why violence is carried out upon them they are implicitly being blamed for 
what happens to them. 
In summary, the category of "violence against women" is not just a way of delimiting 
understandings of "domestic violence" which are inconvenient to "crime" formulations. 
Rather, as the theme "women are more likely" illustrates, it provides opportunities to de- 
gender the problem and re-gender the blame (Berns, 2001). The main implication of this is 
that female gender becomes a separate consideration from "domestic violence" victimhood. 
This is likely to be reflected in how the policing of "domestic violence" is guided and any 
role or responsibilities ascribed to the victim. And this is further explored in section 4. 
4. Constituting Victims 
In this section I explore how victims are constituted in HOC 19/2000. In section 3, by way 
of discourses such as "crime" and "women are more likely", HOC 19/2000 ushered the 
gender of women victims of domestic violence into a discrete category of "violence against 
women". Therefore, although it was deemed that "women were more likely" to be the sites 
of violence that was accounted for in terms of their `womanhood' rather than domestic 
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violence. In particular `fearfulness' was constituted as a feature of `womanhood'. 
Moreover, the only direct gendering of domestic violence victims was as male and `sexual 
orientation' was invoked to challenge the moral high-ground position of those 
understanding domestic violence as gendered violence. Therefore, it is unlikely that HOC 
19/2000 will constitute domestic violence victims as female. The key themes arising from 
victim constitutions within HOC 19/2000 were "needs" and "safety". 
4.1 "needs " 
Extract 10 exemplifies how "needs" are formulated in HOC 19/2000. 
Extract 10 [HOC 19/2000 (Nature & Extent of Problem: 15 `h paragraph)]: 
151 (... ) Even when there is enough evidence to 
152 charge a person, the victim has many needs. These may include: 
153 access to safe temporary and permanent housing; arranging a change 
154 of schooling; financial assistance; obtaining civil injunctions; and, 
155 having people to share their fears/problems with. Where the alleged 
156 offender is not charged, these needs may be greater. 
The first point of note is that the "victim" (1.152) is not explicitly gendered. Certainly it 
could be said to have a `gender flavour' as "safe ... housing; ... schooling ... (and) ... 
financial assistance" (1.153-4) as victims' needs can be read as inferring women's 
vulnerability, economic dependence and childcare responsibilities. But gender is not made 
overtly relevant. Moreover, "fears" (1.155) reproduces a discourse about what `women' are, 
that is prevalent in HOC 19/2000 (see Extracts 8& 9). And this could be seen as the a 
further implicit gendering of victims in Extract 10. But the way it is presented, as 
"fears/problems" (1.155), undoes that potential. `Fears' as something women have are 
qualified with `problems', something not ascribed gender relevance. Consequently, the 
suggestion is that "needs" per se are varied but not necessarily gender relevant. 
Secondly, the police are ascribed some responsibility in regard to "needs". The list of 
possible victim needs is sandwiched between police `charging' (1.152 & 156) activities. 
And it is claimed that whether or not the police charge offenders, "needs" do not go away 
and in some cases may actually increase. Therefore, it is argued that charging offenders 
does not fulfil police responsibilities in regard to victims' "needs". This would be 
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commensurate with a victim interventions focus. However, it is unlikely that the police are 
being persuaded to meet all of these "needs" themselves. They could reasonably be asked 
to help with "access to" safe housing, help with "injunctions" and maybe even, listening to 
problems and fears. But financial assistance and changes of schooling are outside their 
remit. In this way, the police responsibility is positioned somewhere between doing 
nothing about "needs" and meeting all of them. Thus what I think is being accomplished 
here is a blurring of the boundaries of responsibility for "needs". 
So victims' "needs" are formulated as varied and multiple, possibly with occasional female 
gender relevance and within the responsibility remit ascribed to the police. And these truth- 
claims about "needs" are reproduced when minority status is invoked around victims. 
Extract 11 [HOC 19/2000 (Support for the Victim: 6`n-8ht paragraphs]: 
419 Minority Groups 
420 All victims of crime should be treated according to their individual 
421 needs. Investigating officers should avoid making assumptions 
422 regarding the nature of those needs. 
423 Minority ethnic and religious groups 
430 There are a number of voluntary organisations that have specific 
431 expertise in dealing with domestic violence in particular communities. 
432 Officers should consider this resource when investigating such 
433 offences. 
(... ) (... ) 
436 Gay and Lesbian Relationships 
437 When dealing with domestic incidents involving people in same sex 
438 relationships, it is important that the police investigate the allegation 
439 without making any stereotypical assumptions regarding the 
440 relationship. 
(... ) 
The most notable feature concerns the relationship framed between victims and their 
"individual needs" (1.420-1). "All victims" (1.420, my emphasis) is an extreme case 
formulation. As such, victims are constituted as `in the object' of their "individual needs". 
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Therefore, the suggestion is that all victims should be understood through the sum of their 
individual needs not through "assumptions" about need founded in a `generic victim' who 
is white and heterosexual. This has two effects. The victim is not undermined as `needy' in 
a pejorative sense, therefore, it is not victims but the police response to them and their 
needs which is problematised. Also "victims of crime" (1.420) locates victims in the police 
domain. Thus prioritising "needs" as the way to understand victims, particularly where the 
variety of those needs cannot be met by the police, allows for formulations of shared 
responsibilities between agencies. 
The police are responsibilised to see individual victims in terms of their needs, treat those 
needs as `real' and not try to reformulate them on the basis of assumptions. This is 
exemplified in two ways in Extract 11. Firstly, in regard to minority ethnicity, the notion of 
"specific expertise" (1.430-1) suggests the possibility of erroneous assumptions due to a 
lack of knowledges about "particular communities" (1.431). But it is also implied 
("Officers should consider", 1.432) that this "specific expertise" will not be appropriate in 
all cases. Therefore, commensurate with formulations of victims as the sum of their 
individual needs, "specific expertise" is forwarded as a relevant option rather than an 
imperative. And once again, there is a sense that "needs" cannot and should not be met by 
the police alone. Secondly, in regard to sexual orientation, "stereotypical assumptions" 
(1.439) names the possibility of the police prejudging the "relationship" (1.440). In this 
case, a focus on the sum of the victim's individual needs would detract from trying to fit 
the victim into any generic understanding of, perhaps worthy, victimhood. Thus the police 
are responsibilised to respect individuality arising from "needs" by accepting the value of 
non-police expertise and not falling prey to any prejudices they may have. 
In summary, the theme "needs" produces victims of whom the majority are white and 
heterosexual. These victims can only be understood in the sum of their individual needs, 
which are `real' and may be shaped by minority group membership and, to a lesser extent, 
female gender. The problems for policing come from not considering the impact of police- 
work on "needs" and erroneous assumptions about victims and what they need. The police 
are ascribed the responsibility not to ride roughshod over victims' "needs" but the 
responsibility to meet the multiplicity of those "needs" seems to transcend the boundaries 
of separate agencies. 
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4.2 "safety " 
Another theme given primacy in the HOC 19/2000 text on victims is "safety" which is 
ascribed as "paramount". 
Extract 12 [HOC 19/2000 (Problem Solving: only paragraph)]: 
508 The safety of the victim is paramount. Every effort should be made to 
509 ensure that the victim is not subjected to further abuse. (... ) 
Extract 13 [HOC 19/2000 (Summary: ls` paragraph)]: 
536 (... ) The safety of the victim is of paramount importance 
537 but officers should not lose sight of their responsibility to investigate 
538 the matter thoroughly. (... ) 
The police are charged with orientating to the "paramount" concern of victim safety. They 
are responsibilised with doing all that they can ("Every effort") rather than actually 
securing it. But it is disclaimed ("but", 1.537) as a substitute for other aspects of policing; 
concerns for the safety of the victim should not override a thorough investigation. The 
victim is neither explicitly nor implicitly gendered. `Safety' does not invoke gender 
relevance. And ensuring "the victim is not subjected to further abuse" and investigating 
"the matter thoroughly" do not gender the policing of domestic violence. 
However, working towards victim "safety" is not framed as a police monopoly. The victim 
too is ascribed an interest in the matter. 
Extract 14 [HOC 19/2000 (Reports to the Crown Prosecution Service: is` paragraph)]: 
350 (... ) Information that is of 
351 use includes: 
(... ) 
363 " victims' views on their own and their children's personal safety 
364 if a prosecution does/does not follow. 
Even though "victim's views" are positioned last on the list of information to go into 
reports to the Crown Prosecution Service, it is still framed as "of use". This suggests that 
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their understandings of their "safety" have at least some value in, and something to add to, 
the prosecution decision-making process. And it frames the victim as capable of producing 
an account that could be relevant. 
Another instance, where victims are constituted as having a stake in their "safety" concerns 
police action `at the scene': - 
Extract 15 [HOC 19/2000 (Action at the Scene: 4" paragraph)]: 
783 If it is not possible to secure the safety of victims in their home, 
784 consideration should be given to removing them to a place of safety 
785 with their consent (eg a refuge or relatives). 
However, this time rights discourse appears to be interacting with "safety" discourse. I 
have already argued that it is a police responsibility to do all they can to ensure victim 
"safety" rather than actually achieve it. The potential barrier to victim "safety" formulated 
here is "their consent". But their right to choose non-safety and relieve the police of their 
responsibility is not contested. No role is presented for the victim; no responsibility is 
being ascribed to them; and, no blame is being apportioned either. Therefore, the victim is 
being constituted as a functioning person with the right to remove themselves from police 
interventions, regardless of any consequences. The main implication of this is that the 
police are not licensed to act upon victims as if they were non-persons or commodities. 
`Safety' may be "paramount" but it does not override victims' choices. 
Moreover, the victim is consistently not gendered. Within the UK, "refuge" (1.785) does 
imply a place where women escaping domestic violence may go. But "refuge" is qualified 
by "or relatives", and this disrupts any sense that victims, in general, are women1°. 
In summary, "safety" produces victims who are not gendered, have something to contribute 
to prosecution decisions and whose choices must be respected. Consequently, female 
gender is not made relevant to the policing of domestic violence and the police are ascribed 
a responsibility to listen to victims. Victim "safety" is of paramount importance to 
policing. But it is not a substitute for other police duties. Neither, does it override victim's 
10 This is similar to the "fears/problems" formulation in Extract 10. 
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rights to choose. `Safety' is, therefore, difficult to ensure, partly because victims are under 
no obligation to attain or accept it. 
The implications arising from "safety" and "needs" discourse are considered in the chapter 
part conclusion below. 
Part Two Conclusion 
The analysis of extracts from HOC 19/2000 indicates that policy is being employed as a 
technology of governance to exercise power over the police. Firstly, the truth of "crime" as 
`the appropriate way' for governing the policing of "domestic violence" is founded at the 
expense of understandings of gender(ed) violence. `Violence against women' is formulated 
as a separate, although overlapping issue, which through the discourse "women are more 
likely", implicates the `nature' of `being women' in the harm that is done to them and the 
reason why it should not be a police matter per se. Thus de-gendering the problem and re- 
gendering the blame (Berns, 2001), founds the persuasion to accept the veracity of this 
account; namely that there is a share in the moral high-ground for those accepting the 
seriousness of non-gendered domestic violences. In this way, part of the governmental 
problematising activity includes undermining competing versions of reality where 
domestic violence and gender(ed) violence are more closely associated. This is 
commensurate with a governmentalist perspective on `doing government' (e. g. Rose & 
Miller, 1992) and my predictions for New Labour's problem formulation around domestic 
violence. 
Secondly, as also might have been expected from a governmentalist account, the dual 
rationality of `reflexive government' and `responsibilised others' is demonstrable in 
discourse which formulates those to be governed (Rose & Miller, 1992). This government 
self-presents as dynamic, busy and strategic. It is ascribed as looking at problems, sorting 
out their relatedness and rallying others to the cause. Implicitly there is a suggestion that 
this work is never done but there do not appear to be any gaps in government's 
responsibilities that it has not already fulfilled through the publication of HOC 19/2000 and 
other policy documents. Thus New Labour is framed as an `already responsible' 
government. 
However, `responsibilised others' is more discreetly accomplished. There are no direct 
responsibilisations of the police or anyone else in the opening paragraphs but a dialogue 
with others is suggested by the amount of persuasion. This implies that readers who 
understand domestic violence as gender(ed) violence and do not take crime involving 
serious breaches of trust seriously are not very responsible. And this would appear to be in 
line with New Labour's re-imaginings of crime and community (Matthews & Pitts, 2001; 
Newman, 2001). That is, even though this is a policing domestic violence policy, the first 
audience appears wider than `just' the police; implicitly suggesting a less central role for 
the police in the overall management of domestic violence. 
In regard to the activity of constituting victims, many of the findings are commensurate 
with what one might have expected. Firstly, "needs" and "safety" formulations suggest that 
their importance transcends occupational boundaries; again suggesting a less central role 
for the police. Secondly, the themes of "needs" and "safety" produce victims of diverse 
ethnicity and sexuality who have rights and choices. And this is accompanied by a 
minimisation of the relevance of female gender to domestic violence victimhood which is 
accomplished through "violence against women" and "women are more likely". Thus there 
is a sense that female gender is being managed out of domestic violence formulations. 
However, after Lund (1999), I had expected that New Labour's thorough wedding of rights 
and responsibilities would manifest in an increase of victim mobilisation discourse. But 
domestic violence victims in HOC 19/2000 are ascribed rights without responsibilities. 
Also there is no sense that it is a police responsibility to mobilise victims to self-actualise. 
The first implication arising from this analysis is that the `doing' of government around the 
issue of policing domestic violence seems most accomplished in promoting `crime' 
understandings of domestic violence by undermining gendered understandings of domestic 
violence. The amount of activity undertaken to relocate gender relevance outside policing 
issues is important. On the face of it, the primary dialogue of this document is with police 
officers. But as a revision of HOC 60/90, it can also be read as a dialogue with its 
predecessor. There, domestic violence was framed as a subset of crime with women 
victims. Here, definition work can be seen to be directly reformulating and undermining 
those claims. And this also has implications for feminists working in the field. Certainly 
no-one would argue that being inclusive around issues of ethnicity and sexuality is 
problematic in and of itself. However, truths about ethnic and sexual diversity within HOC 
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19/2000 are founded at the expense of `just women' discourse. As argued by feminists 
(Coote, 2000; Kelly, 1996; Mouffe, 1992), this was always a danger for those feminists 
who did not engage effectively with difference. But, and perhaps most worryingly, in HOC 
19/2000 the notion of `not just women' appears to problematise and implicate `being 
women' in occurrences of violence. 
Secondly, HOC 19/2000 apparently misses an opportunity to mobilise victims or, at least, 
have them mobilised. Whether this responsibility has been displaced and multi-agency 
partnerships or other agencies are implicated is explored in Chapter 7. 
In the chapter's discussion I summarise the key continuities and disjunctures between HOC 
60/90 and HOC 19/2000 in regard to problem formulation and constituting victims. And I 
identify the implications arising from these shifts and indicate those that are to be taken 
forward to other chapters. 
Chapter Discussion 
In this chapter I have explored two aspects of `doing' government in policy for the policing 
of domestic violence. These were problem formulation and constituting victims with an 
additional concern of how responsibilisations for policy community members, specifically 
`reflexive government' and `responsibilised others', were accomplished. 
A comparison between HOC 60/90 and HOC 19/2000 produces three key continuities 
across the decade. Firstly, both governments produce and manage competing ways of 
understanding domestic violence in order to produce a definition for the purposes of its 
policing. HOC 60/90 blends "public concern", `crime' and `research' to argue what 
domestic violence is. HOC 19/2000 juxtaposes "crime" and "violence against women" to 
argue what "domestic violence" is and is not. Secondly, both implicate `being women' in 
why violence occurs. HOC 60/90 does this mainly through its readiness to gender victims 
as female and its reluctance to gender perpetrators as men. HOC 19/2000 accomplishes this 
by ushering female gender into the discrete category of "violence against women" and 
making the ascription that "women are likely" to experience domestic violence; thus it de- 
genders the problem and re-genders the blame (Berns, 2001). 
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Thirdly, each government ascribes itself as already fulfilling its responsibilities. Thus the 
`already responsible' government is left no more to do by these policies. HOC 60/90 self- 
presents as responding to "public concern", defining domestic violence appropriately and 
helping the police to do their job. HOC 19/2000 constitutes itself as strategic, 
straightforward and actively engaged in tackling the moral and criminal wrongs of 
domestic violence. 
The main implication arising from these similarities is that competing versions of reality 
about domestic violence appear to provide fodder to HOC formulations. That is counter- 
truths are either cannibalised and/or framed as inappropriate to found government truth- 
claims. This suggests that the `already responsible' government is quite a formidable and 
accomplished opponent, particularly when it self-presents as beyond reproach. Also it is 
rather depressing that changing how domestic violence is understood has not disrupted 
notions of `women' as problematic and blameworthy. The idea that `womanhood' needs 
correcting is still dominant. 
A contrast also identifies four main disjunctures. Firstly, the relationship between "crime" 
and domestic violence is formulated differently. For HOC 60/90, domestic violence is a 
subset of "crime". For HOC 19/2000, "crime", as a separate category, overlaps with 
domestic violence. But it is `the more appropriate way' for understanding domestic 
violence and taking action against it in the context of policing even where this reduces the 
centrality afforded to the police role. Secondly, the inter-relatedness of gender and 
domestic violence is contested, particularly around definition-work and constitutions of 
victims. In HOC 60/90, domestic violence is gender(ed) violence commensurate with 
violence against women. Female gender is made relevant to victims and the policing they 
receive through the themes of "support" and "protection". In HOC 19/2000, domestic 
violence is not gendered. `Violence against women' is legitimised as a viable way of 
understanding domestic violence but one that is inappropriate in the context of policing. 
The themes of "needs" and "safety" are further used to negate the relevance of gender to 
victims. And a wider spectrum of victims, in terms of ethnicity and sexual orientation, are 
produced. 
Thirdly, persuasion is accomplished through very different styles. In HOC 60/90's 
definition-work, Chief Officers are positioned as being already aware of truths and 
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responsibilities. These understandings are then exposed as incomplete and reworked in line 
with government's account of domestic violence. Additionally, "public concern" invokes 
the police public servant mandate and the proper "protection" of victims is framed as the 
aim and the reward of policing. In HOC 19/2000's definition-work, the police are absent. 
The discursive work on "violence against women" and "crime" as incompatible 
understandings of domestic violence seems to indicate a dialogue with HOC 60/90 as its 
predecessor or possibly any reader embracing gender understandings of domestic violence. 
The reward for accepting "crime" as the `more appropriate way' of understanding domestic 
violence in the context of policing is a share of the moral high-ground where domestic 
violence is not seen as about `just women'. 
Finally, the roles and responsibilisations formulated around victims have shifted. In HOC 
60/90, "support" frames a victim with an active role in her self-actualisation as a woman 
who will go to court. And the police are to work with her. `Protection' overrides victims' 
autonomy and exempts them from responsibilities by generating a non-person woman 
victim whom the police are to work upon. And in the long-term, the responsibility for her 
"protection" is to be passed across notional organisational boundaries to other agencies. In 
HOC 19/2000, the victims appear to have no responsibilities although "safety" produces a 
fully functioning person with choices and rights. Further, "safety", although paramount, is 
not a substitute for other police duties and does not sanction them to override victims' 
wishes. Likewise, individual victims' "needs" are defended from the police, specifically 
from assumptions founded in ignorance and generalising prejudice. Moreover, there is a 
sense that "needs" blur and possibly transcend occupational boundaries. 
The main implication arising from these shifts seems to be that gender(ed) understandings 
of domestic violence have been relegated from a key position in government 
understandings of domestic violence. In the formulation of diverse victims, New Labour 
appear to have attuned to claims from diverse populations about how domestic violence 
should be policed (e. g. Haymes, 2000; Kibblewhite, 2000; Mama, 2000). But there is also 
a sense in the way that gender has apparently been managed out of the domestic violence 
category, that gender politics, including those traditionally forwarded by feminists, have 
become "yesterday's politics" (Coote, 2000, p. 3). Whilst this was always a threat for 
feminisms which failed to take full account of diversity (as noted by Kelly, 1996; Mouffe, 
1992), it seems problematic to found truths about the rights and needs of diverse 
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populations in the ascribed inadequacies of `being women'. How these government- 
generated truths are managed in discourse around working together, where feminist 
organisations are likely to be constituted, is pursued in Chapter 7. 
A further implication is that from a governmentalist perspective, victims ascribed as having 
rights and choices are being constituted as ripe for responsibilisation. However, where that 
mobilisation takes place and who is positioned as appropriate for doing it is not apparent in 
HOC 19/2000. This seems dissonant for a New Labour government concerned with 
wedding rights and responsibilities (Lund, 1999) and increasing its emphasis on 
`responsibilised citizenry' (Matthews & Pitts, 2001; Newman, 2001). These aspects are 
also pursued in Chapter 7. 
Overall, the implications for the police are that they are responsibilised to accept 
government's definition of domestic violence for the purposes of policing and treat it 
seriously. This includes both how they understand the problem, their role with victims and 
the boundaries of their responsibilities. Consequently, in the next chapter I focus on Chief 
Officer policy discourse to explore how, as subjected to HOC 60/90 and HOC 19/2000, 
Chief Officers resist (or not) the truth-claims therein. 
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Chapter 5: 
Reformulating Government Truth-Claims for Policing Domestic 
Violence: Chief Officer `police realities' in 1992 and 2000 
Introduction 
In the last chapter I contrasted a government policy for the policing of domestic violence 
with its revision from a decade later. HOC 60/90 presented an account of domestic 
violence as crime committed upon heterosexual women by their current or former partners. 
It ascribed Government as fulfilling its responsibilities in regard to this problem and 
suggested that the police might take it more seriously as crime. The text produced two 
victims, both gendered as female. One was formulated as a classic neo-liberal failing 
citizen needing help to self-actualise although this was delimited to the activity of her 
going to court. The other was framed as inactive with no responsibilities and this was used 
to legitimise her being moved across notional organisational (and responsibility) 
boundaries. By contrast, HOC 19/2000 presented an account of crime as the most 
`appropriate' way of understanding domestic violence which simultaneously ushered 
female gender into a separate category. The high instance of women experiencing domestic 
violence was attributed to their physical inferiority and heightened emotionality compared 
to men. And ethnically and sexually diverse victims of domestic violence were produced. 
Thus the problem was de-gendered and the blame re-gendered as female. Discursive work 
was also done to defend victims' individuality, choices and rights from police 
interventions. 
In this chapter I explore Chief Officer policy talk and text on domestic violence in 1992 
and 2000, that is at times when each Home Office Circular was in currency. My purpose is 
to investigate how, if at all, Chief Officers orient to the guidance by which they have each 
been made subject. The data for HOC 60/90 are an oral evidence session from 1992 which 
formed part of the Home Affairs Select Committee on domestic violence (HASC, 1993a, 
1993b). This event set in motion a Parliamentary process which led to the publication of an 
inter-agency policy on domestic violence in 1995 (Home Office, 1995, see Chapter 6). The 
"witnesses" on 22"d November 1992 were all representatives of formal police associations. 
With an emphasis on Chief Officers, I focus on the talk of ACPO' ranked officers. The data 
for HOC 19/2000 are a Metropolitan Police policy text published in July 2000 (MPS, 
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2000a). This document is attributed to an ACPO ranked officer. And as part of an 
international conference in 2000 (MPS, 2000b) it was widely distributed to other police, 
practitioners and academics. The choices underpinning the selection of these two very 
different sources of discourse are discussed in `Raising Questions for Analysis' below. 
Initially, I reprise arguments from Chapter 2 by presenting an account of the `doing' of 
police realities. From Chapter One, I summarise Foucauldian understandings of resistance. 
And from Chapter 3, I note the methodological implications for exploring exercisings of 
power in the talk and text items I have selected. The main body of the chapter is divided 
into two parts. In the first part, I present extracts from the oral evidence in 1992 (HASC, 
1993b). And I argue that the `doing' of police realities in dialogue is very clear. One 
participant can be seen to be orienting to truth-claims forwarded by HOC 60/90. But in the 
main, the knowledges that are reformulated to support a Chief Officer account of reality 
have a more immediate source in that they are produced in the local interaction. 
In the second part, I present extracts from the Metropolitan Police policy document for the 
investigation of racist, domestic violence and homophobic incidents (MPS, 2000a). Here 
the `doing' of police realities and the dialogue are less clear. And yet, identity-work, 
boundary-work and the mobilisation of gender as an occasional resource which support 
Chief Officer accounts of reality are accomplished. HOC 19/2000 is invoked in terms of 
rendering female gender irrelevant to the policing of domestic violence. However, there is 
evidence that wider understandings are being managed and attuned to. In the chapter 
discussion I draw together the key differences for analysing Chief Officer police realities 
talk rather than text. Further, I consider the implications for government guidance on the 
policing of domestic violence arising from the `doing' of Chief Officer pölice realities at 
the policy level. 
Raising Questions for Analysis 
In 1970s and 1980s, the `canteen culture' of the rank and file was considered an important 
site for research in understanding the policing of domestic violence (e. g. Dobash & 
Dobash, 1979; Dunhill, 1989; Southall Black Sisters, 1989). But more recently, 
commentators have placed a greater emphasis on attempting to change the structures in 
which police culture operates by lobbying for legal and policy changes (e. g. Ganapathy, 
I Association of Chief Police Officers. 
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2002; Stanko, 1994b). And this has seemingly led to police culture slipping from academic 
currency. I do see realist accounts of `canteen culture' as problematic (see also Manning 
1977; Holdaway, 1983; Waddington, 1999); but I am also concerned that opportunities are 
being missed to critique the policing of domestic violence by focusing on Chief Officers' 
police cultural accomplishments. 
Post-structuralist accounts of language understand talk as action and the site where social 
realities and subjectivities are accomplished (Weedon, 1997). But discourse is 
contradictory and produces "competing ways of giving meaning to the world" (Weedon, 
1997, p. 21). Therefore, struggles to accomplish and maintain versions of reality, including 
identities, are constant. Also discourse is historically and geographically specific and so 
delimits what can be spoken in a particular time and place (Ramazanoglu, 1993). Thus 
`ways of knowing' and `ways of being' that suggest `ways of doing' are further 
circumscribed by historical context and the subject positions available to a particular 
officer (Shearing & Ericson, 1991). From this perspective, the `doing of being a police 
officer' is neither the preserve of junior officers nor restricted to street level police-work. 
And there is no reason why Chief Officers should not `do' police cultures whilst engaged 
in policy-making; or that interrogations of police culture at this level should not prove as 
viable a site of enquiry as `canteen culture' did in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Moreover, organisational `culture' can be seen as a `verb' (Street, 1993); a `doing' that is 
repeatedly produced, reproduced and kept current through a range of processes (Wright, 
1994). Such processes include constituting the boundaries of the organisation itself 
(Foucault, 1982; Wright, 1994) and `recontextualising' non-police knowledges that come 
into that domain (Agar, 1985; Linell, 1998). Indeed, there is evidence that the police are 
adept at reformulating non-police understandings to privilege police versions of reality 
(McNulty, 1994; Tracey & Anderson, 1999; Whalen & Zimmerman, 1990), particularly 
around identity-work (Fletcher, 1991). However, this is not to say that `police realities', as 
I have termed them, rely exclusively on internal systems of meaning-making. Certain wider 
discourses, specifically negative representations of women, may be useful in certain 
transactional business (see Auburn et al, 1995; Wowk, 1984). In these instances, truths 
appear to be `allowed' through organisational boundaries with little or no reformulation. 
Thus the `doing' of police realities, as identity-work, boundary-work and invoking female 
gender as an occasional resource should be discernible in Chief Officer policy discourse. 
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Exercisings of power around the formulation and countering of truths are a key concern of 
Foucauldian Analysis (Carabine, 2001). Power and resistance are equally important as the 
tensions between the two is how truth is produced and kept current. But it is also the site of 
struggle that can lead to new or counter truths becoming dominant (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 
1982; Foucault, 1976,1980). When governmentalists, notably Rose (1993,1996,1999a, 
1999b, 2000), interrogate the `doing' of government, they tend to overlook the role played 
by resistances (Kemshall & Maguire, 2001; Miller, 2001; Stenson, 2000). There is 
therefore, an erroneous sense that power moves unilaterally. Consequently, considering the 
production of Chief Officer police realities as potential resistances to government 
responsibilisations could be important. 
However, methodologically, this generates a problem of its own. For Conversation 
Analysts, talk-in-interaction, that is the local and immediate production of discourse, is all 
that can be considered in claiming that the constitution of a truth is consequential upon 
another truth. (e. g. Heritage, 1984; Silverman, 1998; Wooffitt, 2001). But Foucauldian 
Analysis allows for the consideration of historically specific counter-discourse, provided 
that the claims founded on it are careful and well-considered (Carabine, 2001). Therefore, 
in the analysis of talk, resistances and reformulations should be readily identifiable. And in 
text, one needs to be more circumspect about drawing conclusions of inter-relatedness. 
As well as one being talk and one being text, the two documents selected for comparison 
analysis seem a dissonant match. But they reflect the differences in the roles played by 
Chief Officers in domestic violence policy activity in 1992 and 2000. The HASC on 
domestic violence (1993a, 1993b) involved ACPO ranked officers in a government policy- 
making process. The police oral evidence session was conducted in the public domain and 
as such ACPO was positioned as a representative, policy appropriate and professional 
police body. However, since 1997, ACPO's mandate for operation has changed in that it 
has become a company (Savage et al, 2001). This means that it can still lobby but it also 
highlights accountability issues. Other than its membership, ACPO is accountable to no- 
one. And there has been a move in recent years to play down the lobbyist role, thereby 
giving ACPO a lower public profile in order to retain its privileged position and not draw 
too much attention to its accountability anomalies (Savage et al, 2001). Thus it is perhaps 
not surprising that by 2000 ACPO is not performing as a representative body in the public 
domain as it was in 1992. 
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However, ACPO has another contradiction and that is the Metropolitan Police (Savage et 
al, 2001). As the largest police force in the country, the Met has more representatives in 
ACPO than any other police service. But within ACPO, Met Police members tend to carve 
their own role. There has always been a sense that the Met is separate and it has often 
positioned itself as cutting edge and the pioneer of changes to policing. Therefore, at a time 
when ACPO is busy lowering its profile, the Met, through their `Enough is Enough' 
domestic violence conference in 2000 were raising theirs (MPS, 2000b). Additionally, they 
took the opportunity that had been generated to distribute their current domestic violence 
policy (MPS, 2000a) to a range of national and international government personnel, 
practitioners and academics. Consequently, the Chief Officer discourse in the domestic 
violence public domain in 2000 was actually Met Police Chief Officer discourse. Certainly 
the primary audience for this policy text was junior Met officers. But the exercising of 
power in promoting this version of reality produces a secondary and wider readership. As 
such, a comparison with Chief Officer talk from HASC in 1992 is viable as an 
interrogation of the dominant Chief Officer police realities in the public domain for the two 
periods. 
Much literature on the police frames `police culture' as a rank and file activity. But this 
raises questions about Chief Officers' `doings' of police realities that may be pertinent to 
policy activities around domestic violence. Governmentalist research tends to overlook the 
potential of such resistances to exercisings of governance. Although resistance is likely to 
be readily apparent in talk, different considerations need to be made in interrogating text. 
Therefore, the questions that guide the analysis in this chapter are: How can Chief Officers 
be seen to be `doing' policies realities in terms of identity-work, boundary-work and the 
mobilisation of gender as an occasional resource? In what ways do they invoke and resist 
Home Office guidance? How do they manage other non-police-generated knowledges and 
to what effect? What are the similarities and differences in Chief Officer police realities 
produced in talk rather than text? 
Part One: Home Affairs Select Committee 1992/3 
The Conservative government policy for the policing of domestic violence which was in 
currency in 1992/3 was HOC 60/90 (see Chapter 4). This document defined domestic 
violence for the purposes of policing as crime committed upon heterosexual women by 
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their former or current partners. Within the text Government claimed to be fulfilling all of 
its responsibilities in regard to domestic violence, including framing itself as the 
appropriate body to guide police to the proper protection of victims. HOC 60/90 suggested 
that not all police were taking domestic violence or their duty to "public concern" 
seriously. And it worked on Chief Officers' understandings of crime; claiming that the 
`facts' already known to them meant something different when "Research" was considered; 
and arguing that it was Government who defined `crime'. Further, the victims and the 
policing they should receive were gendered as female. In the activity of "support", the 
police were to work on the woman's will in order to help her to help herself and get to 
court. But the overriding duty of the police, outweighing women's autonomy, was 
"protection". 
Within this chapter part I consider the `doing' of Chief Officer police realities in their 
historical context through extracts from HASC 1992/3. 
1. Formulating barriers to fulfilling responsibilities 
The police speaker in all of the extracts that follow is Mr Pacey, the then Chief Constable 
of Gloucestershire. He was one of two ACPO representatives at HASC but the other officer 
spoke only once. Other participants were from the Police Federation and the 
Superintendents' Association. Although I do not present their talk, for the purposes of 
analysis it is necessary to know that they were there with potentially different interests. 
Within this section Mr Pacey's talk is used to demonstrate how he formulates barriers to 
fulfilling responsibilities. 
1.1 ` public expectation" 
The conversation leading up to Extract One has concerned what resources Mr Pacey has 
given to domestic violence and, if he treats it as a priority, how he has redistributed his 
resources accordingly. The Metropolitan Police (the Met) have been forwarded as an 
example of where priority and resource reallocation has led to the establishment of 
domestic violence units (DVUs). Mrs Roche has just asked Mr Pacey exactly what he, 
himself, has done and he has fudged around notions of domestic violence liaison officers 
and ordinary patrol duties. Perhaps unsatisfied with that answer, Mrs Roche pursues the 
issue. 
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Extract 1 [HASC 1993b: 191]2: 
236 Mrs Roche: So you are saying, Mr Pacey, that you 
237 would like to have the additional resources to 
238 complement those liaison officers? 
239 Mr Pacey: That is the answer. If domestic 
240 violence units are the answer, then yes, we need 
241 additional officers for that purpose. But every Chief 
242 Constable in this country needs additional officers 
243 for a whole range of different purposes. We are 
244 talking about domestic violence today, tomorrow I 
245 will be talking about drugs and people saying `Why 
246 do you not give more police officers to this problem 
247 of drugs', because that also is an iceberg with its tip 
248 above the water. I could put a lot more resources 
249 into the fight against the drug problem, as an 
250 example. The same applies with the burglary 
251 problem -I could put more resources into that. So 
252 for Chief Constables there are always competing 
253 demands of trying to balance out what you want to 
254 do, having regard to priorities, pressures, and trying 
255 to keep in touch with what the public expect. There 
256 is a growing public expectation at present, certainly, 
257 in respect of domestic violence, and a willingness on 
258 our part to try to do something about it. 
She frames Mr Pacey's previous answer as a plea for resources so that he can assign them 
to domestic violence. Initially, he affirms but he qualifies his response by reformulating 
two aspects of Mrs Roche's question3. Firstly, his affirmation is made contingent on "If 
domestic violence units are the answer" (my emphasis). This suggests that the wrong 
question is being asked. That is, those forwarding the idea of DVUs have a faulty 
understanding of the resource problem as "domestic violence". This reading is supported 
by Mr Pacey's disclaimer ("But", 1.241) of domestic violence in favour of "a whole range 
of different purposes" and his second reformulation. Mrs Roche has specifically asked 
2 See Appendix 2 for extract conventions. 
what "you", Mr Pacey, "would like". But he recontextualises this as "every Chief 
Constable in this country"4. The extreme case formulation (Pomerantz, 1986) ("every") 
legitimises a claim that his circumstances are no different from all his peers. Thus he 
invokes the category of "Chief Constable" to counter the veracity of domestic violence as 
the resource problem and to disrupt personal criticism in a move from the particular 
(himself) to the general (Chief Constables everywhere). 
However, he then goes on to make a move back from the general ("We", 1.243) to the 
particular ("I", 1.244,248 & 251). This suggests that having aligned himself with the 
category Chief Constable he is now speaking on their behalf with examples from his own 
experience which exemplify the `real' problem. There are two facets to his problem 
formulation; the "people" (1.245) who make demands on the police and the "iceberg" 
(1.247) `nature' of what he faces. There is a sense that these "people" are fickle in their 
demands as "today, tomorrow" (1.244) implies that they cannot make up their minds from 
one day to the next about what they want the police to treat as the priority. What is 
challenged is their unrealistic expectation not their right to expect. By comparison, Mr 
Pacey self-presents as seeing the bigger and truer picture. As a Chief Constable, he 
understands the problems of drugs and burglary, and implicitly domestic violence, beyond 
`the tip of their icebergs'. The suggestion is therefore, that "people" found their 
inconsistent and unrealistic demands on the police on the perception of `iceberg tips' which 
they perceive as the whole problem. And this also implies that domestic violence might not 
feature large on Mr Pacey's own priorities for resource allocation. 
At line 252, Mr Pacey shifts back to the general category of "Chief Constables" by way of 
a reiterative summary of what he has just claimed ("So", 1.25 1). In this way, having argued 
what he sees as important, that is drugs and burglary, he draws once again on the category 
of Chief Constable as a collective agreement across witnesses. That is, he takes what he, as 
a Chief Constable, `knows' and warrants it as what all Chief Constables `know'. At this 
point the full effect of this move is not clear. What is clearer is the work of the extreme 
case "there are always competing demands of trying to balance out what you want to do" 
(1.252-4, my emphasis). It can be seen as legitimising claims that the Chief Constables' 
role encompasses the unenviable and ongoing task of balancing "priorities" and 
3 Also for Mr Pacey, "resources" is commensurate with "additional"/"more police officers". 
4 This also undermines the Met's DVU `panacea' as the Met is only one of two police services in England and Wales 
that has a Commissioner rather than a Chief Constable. 
"pressures", regardless of public expectation and regardless of domestic violence as a 
`problem of the moment'. 
At the beginning of his talk, Mr Pacey framed `domestic violence' as the wrong question. 
The right question for Chief Constables was warranted as "a whole range of different" 
resource allocation possibilities. For Mr Pacey, that meant drugs and burglary. Here, it is 
suggested that other Chief Constables would agree that setting priorities within resources is 
difficult enough without the added complication of "public expectation" about domestic 
violence. And this is repeated in the closing sentence (1.255-8). `Public expectation' in 
respect of domestic violence is undermined as "growing" and "at present". This explicitly 
acknowledges domestic violence as a police priority arising from "public expectation". 
And it simultaneously undermines domestic violence as a `problem of the moment'. But 
the right of the public to expect is legitimised as something Chief Constables need to heed. 
They must try "to keep in touch" with it and have consequently displayed "a willingness on 
our part to try to do something about it". In this way, "public expectation", regardless of 
how faulty it may be, is ascribed as something that Chief Constables should and do take 
into consideration; although, it is implied, that if Mr Pacey and others were left to their 
own devices, they might well not prioritise domestic violence. 
In summary, Mr Pacey formulates "public expectation", possibly including that of HASC, 
as problematic to the `real' Chief Officer responsibilities of balancing priorities and 
allocating resources. He accomplishes the doing of police realities in several ways. All his 
warrants are founded on category membership as a Chief Constable. He recontextualises 
Mrs Roche's question and the HASC's support of DVUs to a Chief Constable perspective 
thus privileging claims that domestic violence is the wrong question when considering the 
allocation of police resources. He ascribes drugs, burglary and domestic violence as 
`iceberg problems' for Chief Constables, eating away at resources but he relegates 
domestic violence to an `of the moment' "public expectation". And he undermines, as 
inconsistent and unrealistic, the way that the public exercise their right to expectation. By 
comparison, Chief Constables are framed as seeing the bigger picture and having a difficult 
job, made more difficult by meeting their responsibility to respond to the public. 
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1.2 "attitudes" and "organisations " 
Two paragraphs later the topic has moved on a little. Mr Greenway, whose question was 
two lines longer than the response it generated, is speaking. He has apparently come to Mr 
Pacey's defence, suggesting that domestic violence units (DVUs) are not viable for "rural" 
areas. And he has attempted to claim common ground with Mr Pacey by saying that he too 
represents a "rural" domain. The alternative to DVUs that he offers in order to ensure that 
domestic violence is policed properly is "training": - 
Extract 2 [HASC 1993b: 193]: 
Mr Greenway: (... ) 
297 Is not training of all officers in rural forces really the 
298 key to this? 
299 Mr Pacey: I agree with that. We have made 
300 enormous progress in that respect. It is included in 
301 the probationer training programme but that of 
302 course needs time to feed through. But most 
303 organisations take their time from the top and if the 
304 top man shows it as a priority, and I can only speak 
305 for my own police force, but I establish priority 
306 objectives every year and domestic violence is one of 
307 them - so the officers have to report back to me and 
308 to my policy group on their progress on domestic 
309 violence. So that trickles down through the 
310 organisation, whereby people in the organisation 
311 recognise that the top part of the body expects the 
312 problem of domestic violence to be addressed: we 
313 address it as best we can through training and 
314 attitude training too. Attitudes do, of course take 
315 time to change, and there has been substantial 
316 change in the police forces around the country in 
317 that respect. 
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Mr Greenway's question is almost rhetorical, in that he appears to understand that he has 
`solved' the problem himself. It contains two extreme case formulations; "all officers" (my 
emphasis) and "key". Collectively they are framed to discourage challenges that training, 
in this instance, is a panacea. 
Initially, Mr Pacey affirms and realises the opportunity provided by "training" to make 
claims of "enormous progress" for "We", the Gloucestershire police. By furnishing this 
with "probationer training programme", he invokes a form of training that currently 
reaches all (new) officers and is already in place thereby not requiring any further action by 
his police force. However, this appears to present a difficulty for him as he immediately 
disclaims this with "but that of course needs time to feed through" (my emphasis). 
Therefore, the trouble with his initial answer seems to be that in terms of progress he had 
claimed that Gloucestershire had addressed the policing domestic violence problem for 
which Mr Greenway is offering a panacea. That might have left him open to contradiction 
as the disclaimer retains the truth-claim that the training issue has been addressed but 
undermines the `nature' of training on the grounds that it takes time to feed through. 
Consequently, he wards off potential challenges that more training allocation is required in 
order to ensure that domestic violence is policed properly. 
But in turn that undermines "training" as a panacea, potentially leaving him open to 
suggestions of other non-training remedies. Therefore, he has made and takes the 
opportunity to disclaim his disclaimer about "training" and instead he re-ascribes the 
problem of "needs time to feed through" to the `nature' of organisations. This provides a 
further opportunity, this time to make explicit claims about how training provision is 
founded in Mr Pacey's own responsible acts. The identity-work he does here concerns 
positioning himself in the category of rational "top man" showing and establishing 
priorities. But again he produces a double disclaimer. "I can only speak for my own police 
force" (1.304-5, my emphasis) disclaims his category entitlement to `Chief Constable'. And 
yet he immediately disclaims that with "but I establish priority objectives every year and 
domestic violence is one of them" (1.305-7, my emphasis). I think what he is doing is 
positioning himself as `a Chief Constable' without invoking the warrant that he is speaking 
for all `Chief Constables'. Therefore, having already argued that his force is making 
"enormous progress" (1.300) he claims that as being consequential ("so", 1.307; "So", 
1.309) of his personally being a responsible "top man". 
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From lines 309-312, having ascribed the slowness of training to the nature of organisations 
and the "enormous progress" of Gloucestershire to himself, he repeats the argument. But 
this time he has absented himself from it. From the text, it is not clear why. It could be that 
it facilitates another police category shift at line 312: "we address it as best we can through 
training and attitude training too" (my emphasis). So far, his moves in this regard have 
been "We", Gloucestershire Constabulary; "I", the top man; and "I"/"me", a Chief 
Constable. By contrast, the "we" at line 312 is very vague. It could be `Gloucestershire', 
`me and my policy group', `Chief Constables' or even `police forces around the country'. 
But it is used to found three truth-claims. Firstly, whoever "we" are, we are addressing the 
problem of domestic violence "as best we can" (1.313, my emphasis). The extreme case 
formulation fends off potential challenges that anything more can be done. And this seems 
to reflect Mr Pacey's earlier attempts to close the matter down without requiring any 
further action from Gloucestershire. Although as a representative of ACPO, he could be 
claiming for that whole category what he has already claimed for himself. Secondly, the 
`nature' of "attitudes", like organisations, is ascribed as taking "time to change" (1.315). 
This is warranted on "of course" suggesting that this is something that everyone knows. 
Thirdly, the truth-claim is made that attitudes in "police forces around the country" have 
undergone "substantial change". This substantial truth would be unsubstantiated if it were 
not warranted on the "we" who are doing the best we can. Therefore, I think that Mr Pacey 
is probably reformulating his police category membership to `police forces around the 
country'. And this demonstrates the flexibility of police category membership in this 
context. 
In summary, the barriers to the fulfilment of the responsibility to police domestic violence 
appropriately are formulated as the respective `natures' of "organisations" and "attitudes". 
Whether he might have blamed the rank and file for their attitudes, had their 
representatives not been present, cannot be argued from the talk. Mr Pacey, `does' police 
realities in a variety of ways. He reformulates his police category membership through 
Gloucestershire Constabulary, a Chief Constable and police forces around the country. He 
also invokes a non-police category entitlement as `the responsible top man' of an 
organisation. And he warrants truth-claims on these identities to support the arguments that 
the police, and especially himself, are doing all they can to address the problem of 
domestic violence. The only opportunities for challenges from outsider knowledges to this 
account come from his own talk which he opens and closes with double disclaimers. 
In general, in regard to formulating barriers to fulfilling responsibilities, Mr Pacey ascribes 
"public expectation", "organisations" and "attitudes" as problematic. He accomplishes 
police realities through identity-work around the membership category of police officer, 
particularly as `Chief Constable'. Although he does render other categories relevant at 
times, his main identity activity seems to be constituting himself and others in his group as 
seeing the bigger picture, being realistic and meeting responsibilities. The implications 
arising from sections 1.1 and 1.2 are discussed in the main chapter part summary. 
2. Constituting responsibility boundaries 
In this section I explore more of Mr Pacey's HASC 1992/3 talk. In particular, I am 
interested in how boundary-work and the mobilisation of gender as an occasional resource 
are accomplished in his constitution of police realities. Therefore, I now consider the theme 
of "other agencies" that he generates, including the specific discourse "a matter for them" 
as it has the added benefit of producing victim formulations. 
2.1 "other agencies" 
In Extract 3, the questioner is Mrs Roche. The Chairman has just handed her the floor to 
introduce a new topic for discussion, hence her opening acknowledgement to him. 
Extract 3 [HASC 1993b: 240]: 
1212 Mrs Roche: Yes, thank you. Paragraph 16 of the 
1213 evidence we have had from the Metropolitan Police 
1214 refers to psychological abuse and mental cruelty as 
1215 examples of domestic violence. Everybody would 
1216 agree that such behaviour is reprehensible, but what 
1217 role does or should the police have in its prevention? 
1218 Mr Pacey: This is a very difficult area indeed, if 
1219 1 may say so, because trying to identify 
1220 psychological abuse is not easy. How does one 
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1221 identify the symptoms of it? I do not know. A 
1222 policeman goes to a domestic violence dispute, as we 
1223 often seem to call them, and finds a traumatic 
1224 situation. There is heightened tension there: how can 
1225 he be expected to be able to discover whether or not 
1226 the woman is suffering from psychological abuse? 
1227 The police would find that very difficult indeed. It is 
1228 other agencies to whom the case should be referred 
1229 who can see the woman in the cold grey light of day 
1230 and make that kind of judgment (sic) later. People who 
1231 do that need to be able to identify the symptoms of 
1232 psychological abuse. 
Mrs Roche presents her question in a syllogistic rhetorical argument. In the first part, she 
presents a police truth, referring to written evidence submitted to the HASC committee by 
the Metropolitan Police in advance of the oral evidence sessions. In the second part, she 
frames an outsider knowledge but it is in the form of a universal truth-claim: "Everyone 
would agree that such behaviour is reprehensible" (my emphasis). As such it is hard to 
undermine. In the third part, in which one would normally rationalise the conclusion from 
the first two parts, she actually disclaims ("but") their compatibility by ascribing the police 
role as the "prevention" of domestic violence. The implicit suggestion is therefore, that the 
Met's formulation of "psychological abuse and mental cruelty" is incompatible with, and 
perhaps not being accomplished by, the Met's policing of domestic violence. 
From lines 1218-21, there is a sense that this question is a troubling ones. Mr Pacey 
acknowledges the veracity of the conundrum Mrs Roche has produced ("This is a very 
difficult area indeed", my emphasis); then apparently seeks permission to present that 
opinion ("if I may say so", my emphasis); before naming the problem as "identify" and 
reformulating Mrs Roche's "psychological abuse and mental cruelty" as "psychological 
abuse". He then asks, "How does one identify the symptoms of it? ", which renders 
"symptoms" relevant to the identification of "psychological abuse". But it is also a 
5 Part of Mr Pacey's `trouble' with this question may be attributable, although not demonstrably so, to the tensions 
between the Met Police and ACPO (see Savage et al, 2001). As an ACPO officer he is present as a representative of all 
Chief Officers. But the Met has a history of ploughing its own furrow and claiming to be ground-breaking. Thus Mr 
Pacey could be understood to be managing the contradiction generated by the Met position without undermining his 
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rhetorical question, one that does not require an answer. Therefore, its meaning is not to 
seek information but to ascribe "one", a depersonalised and all-encompassing `someone', 
as somebody who does not and should not be expected to know about symptoms. Thus 
when he answers this rhetorical question, ("I do not know"), he is producing himself as 
"one" whom no reasonable person would expect to be able to identify symptoms. 
Notably, the identity-work Mr Pacey engages in does not directly invoke police category 
membership. And I think this is the point. By re-framing the problem as identifying the 
"symptoms" of "psychological abuse", he appears to have constituted a realm of medical 
understanding. Therefore, his apparent permission seeking and his self-presentation as 
someone who could not and should not be asked to identify symptoms, frames him as `not 
a medical expert' but `an objective police commentator'. This `non-police' police identity 
is suggested as it is needed to substantiate the truth-claims about what happens at a 
domestic violence incident, which follows on in the talk. 
In the narrative about the police perspective of attending the scene (1.1221-26), Mr Pacey 
juxtaposes a policeman with a woman possibly "suffering from psychological abuse" in "a 
traumatic situation" where "There is heightened tension". And this is a fine example of 
sexist talk as the gendering binary of male/female is not necessary for founding the claim 
that police officers are not medical experts. But it is clear that Mr Pacey understands this 
gendering activity as supporting his case. Negative representations of women as highly 
emotional compared to men circulate commonly in wider discourse (Smart, 1992). 
Therefore, discovering if a woman "is suffering from psychological abuse" (my emphases) 
may suggest that such a distinction is made more difficult by her gender. Positive 
representations of men as logical and dispassionate also circulate widely in mainstream 
discourse (Smart, 1992). Therefore, a police officer gendered as male may indicate a truth- 
claim that he is `naturally' rational. Consequently, the rhetorical question; "how can he be 
expected to be able to discover whether or not the woman is suffering from psychological 
abuse? " (1.1224-26, my emphases), formulates `a reasonable man' in an extreme situation 
being asked to diagnose whether a woman's (hysterical? ) trauma is `normal' or a mental 
health problem. 
position to speak for all Chief Officers. This may account, in part, for why he locates his argument at the level of patrol 
work. 
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The sexism of this talk is also thrown into sharp relief by Mr Pacey's disclaimer of the 
term "domestic violence dispute" (1.1222). By qualifying this with "as we often seem to 
call them" he indicates that "dispute" may be understood as contentious by his audience 
and challenged as an inappropriate term. However, he does not problematise the gendering 
of "policeman" and the consequent normalising of the gender of police officers as male at 
all. 
In the final section of his talk (1.1227-32), Mr Pacey invokes the category "The police" in a 
move from the specific "policeman" to the general case. Therefore, the truth-claim that this 
is "very difficult indeed" (my emphasis) is that this policeman's experience is common to 
all police. And this marks the beginning of explicit boundary-work between "The police" 
and "other agencies". `Other agencies' are framed as the appropriate repositories for such 
cases ("should be referred", my emphasis). The "woman in the cold light of day" is a 
contrast with `the woman in trauma in a tense situation'. Therefore, it is not that "other 
agencies" should be at the domestic violence incident instead of the police. Rather, the 
`appropriate' time for other agencies' judgement is "later", when the tension and trauma 
have receded. This would still leave opportunities to claim that once the incident has 
abated, the police might be able to discover "psychological abuse". But this `option' is 
closed down by "People who do that need to be able to identify the symptoms of 
psychological abuse"; which once again alludes to the professional medical expertise of 
other agencies. 
In summary, "other agencies", as a theme, constitutes professional expertise which is 
ascribed as lying outside what the police can reasonably be expected to do. And this is 
accomplished by identity-work and boundary-work. In terms of police realities, the 
formulations are a generic "policeman" and a general "The police". There is no sense that 
Mr Pacey is a Chief Officer. Rather, he is framed as `a non-medical specialist' and an 
`objective commentator on policing'. The boundary-work is founded on the reformulation 
of "psychological abuse and mental cruelty" as a mental health matter particularly in regard 
to women. And this supports the argument that (specialist) medical, perhaps even 
psychiatric, expertise is necessary to unpack the problem. The mobilisation of gender as an 
occasional resource to accomplish specific transactional business is also apparent. The 
gendering of the police officer as `male' forms a contrast with "the woman" which renders 
masculine gender relevant to reason and female gender relevant to emotionality. This is 
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then used to absolve the police officer from making certain judgements and to position the 
woman in the domain of mental health. 
2.2 "a matter for them" 
The theme "other agencies" intersected with gendering activity. My argument is that 
gender is invoked as an occasional resource when useful to specific transactional business. 
Therefore in Extract 4, I explore Chief Officer talk which resists the invocation of gender. 
The discourse which is exemplified, "a matter for them", comes under the rubric of the 
theme "other agencies". The talk itself comes towards the end of a discussion of 
`difficulties' in mounting prosecutions attributed to the ACPO written evidence submitted 
before the oral evidence session. Mr Anderson has taken up the case: - 
Extract 4 [HASC 1993b: 237]: 
1172 Mr Anderson: There is another possibility where a woman 
1173 who might fear repercussions might be protected. If 
1174 there are cases where (1) one has the medical 
1175 evidence of the injury, and (2) one has sufficient 
1176 corroborative evidence of the assault from cogent 
1177 witnesses, would it be your policy, or would you 
1178 favour in such circumstances, proceeding without 
1179 the victim? 
1180 Mr Pacey: It depends how much evidence there 
1181 is, but it would be a possibility. In the courts it is a 
1182 very unusual case which succeeds without the victim 
1183 giving evidence. It can be done and Parliament has 
1184 allowed for it in allowing evidence to be read and so 
1185 on. It could be done, but the final decision is one for 
1186 the Crown Prosecution Service and not for the 
1187 police. We would be very content to present the 
1188 papers and the file with all the circumstances. I am 
1189 quite certain there would be a long consideration 
1190 and perhaps a discussion about it, but whether or 
1191 not they would take it would be a matter for them. 
Mr Anderson's question formulates the police role as the `protection' of "a woman" in 
"fear" by "proceeding" to court. Heightened fear and the need for protection are widely 
available discourses of negative femininity (Ahmed, 1995; Marcus, 1992; Smart, 1992). 
And as such, they render `womanhood' problematic and seemingly negate the necessity to 
found this claim in evidential truths. The account of getting cases to trial is, by comparison, 
ungendered and evidentially founded. The first condition of evidence is "medical 
evidence", suggesting an unquestionable and non-police truth. The second condition is 
constituted as witness evidence of crime, although the quality ("sufficient" & 
"corroborative evidence of assault") of the testimony and the competence ("cogent") of the 
witness are all qualified. The suggestion is that he is fending off potential challenges from 
a listener who may question these aspects of the evidence. But the talk demonstrates no 
anticipated challenges around the fearful "woman" to "be protected". And because of that, 
the sense is that the notion of women in need of protection is being used as a warrant to 
claim that the police are duty or honour bound to protect women any way they can. 
Further, Mr Anderson makes a move from the general case ("one", 1.1174 & 1175) to the 
particular ("your" & "you", 1.1177). This is also a shift from the implicit invocation of the 
general group category `the police' (protecting women, having "evidence") to the specific 
case of "you", as a Chief Officer (having "policy"). Moreover, the qualifier, "or would you 
favour in such circumstances", implies that "policy" is somehow inappropriate. My feeling 
is that "policy" is understood as ambiguous in the context of Chief Officer because 
"favour" personalises the question. Mr Pacey is not being asked what his (formal) "policy" 
is, as the question is presented in terms of the hypothetical ("possibility", 1.1172; "If', 
1.1173; "would", 1.1177; "in such circumstances", 1.1178). Rather, the inquiry is whether or 
not Mr Pacey supports the idea of "proceeding without the victim" (1.1178-79) where the 
evidence is unquestionable and "sufficient". 
The first notable feature of Mr Pacey's response is that it does not gender the victim nor 
engage in talk about protecting women by proceeding to trial without her. The transactional 
business seems to be more concerned with undermining Mr Anderson's and Parliament's 
hypotheticals with `reality'; ascribing the responsibility for proceeding to trial without the 
victim to the Crown Prosecution Service; and presenting the police as not responsible for 
such decisions. Therefore, it can be argued that female gender ascription is not useful to the 
work being done and consequently, it is not made relevant. 
Mr Pacey begins by undermining Mr Anderson's `evidence' formulation not on its medical 
expertise, its quality nor the competence of the witness, but on grounds of "how much" 
(1.1180) evidence there is. But he immediately disclaims the whole scenario ("but") as 
hypothetical ("possibility"). This reading is supported by his next utterance: "In the courts 
it is a very unusual case which succeeds without the victim giving evidence" (1.1181-83). 
The "it is" is a reality claim which counters the relevance of possibility. And "succeeds" 
frames the reason of going to court as `winning'. Therefore, the suggestion is that there is 
not much point going to court if the case cannot be won. 
This version of reality is then put to further use. Mr Pacey produces a three-part list of why 
proceeding without the victim "can be done": "Parliament has allowed for it (1) in allowing 
evidence to be read (2) and so on (3)". The third part ("and so on") is a `generalised list 
completer' suggesting other numerous `mentionables' in this regard (Jefferson, 1990). The 
overall effect seems to be twofold. Parliament is ascribed as responsible (and possibly 
blamed) for generating this `no win' situation and Mr Pacey is framed as understanding all 
that Parliament has allowed. Consequently, both Mr Anderson and Parliament are framed 
as supporting a hypothetical ideal which does not work in reality. And Mr Pacey is 
constituted as knowing the truth. 
At line 1185, proceeding without the victim is once again presented as a possibility: "It 
could be done". This time, however, it is undermined as not a matter "for the police". "It 
could be done" is disclaimed ("but", 1.1185) in favour of "the final decision" (my 
emphasis). This is an extreme case formulation that does multiple work. Firstly, it has an 
`end of the day' quality about it. This implies that whatever might be possible, the truth of 
the matter is overriding. Secondly, in terms of boundary-work, the responsibility for 
transforming the hypothetical ideal to the real is ascribed to the Crown Prosecution Service 
(CPS). Thirdly, in terms of boundary-work and identity-work, the group category "police" 
is absolved from responsibility. 
At this point, Mr Pacey, positions himself in the group category membership of "the 
police": "We would be very content to present the papers and the file with all the 
circumstances" (1.1187-88, my emphasis). There is also a sense that Mr Anderson's 
question is now being ridiculed. Mr Pacey's formulation is hypothetical ("would"). It 
reformulates "would you (as a Chief Officer) favour" (1.1177-78) as "We" (the police) 
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"would be very content". And having ascribed the decision to proceed to court without the 
victim as a CPS responsibility, the police role is framed as presenting "papers and the file 
with all the circumstances" (my emphasis). The extreme case of "all" further suggests that 
"We" the police would do our job thoroughly. 
This trivialising of Mr Anderson's question continues in the last sentence: "I am quite 
certain there would be a long consideration and perhaps a discussion about it" (1.1188- 
1190). Mr Pacey shifts his group category identification from "We" to "I". This move from 
the general to the specific allows another opportunity to repeat arguments already made but 
on a different warrant. There is a juxtaposition of a truth-claim ("I am quite certain") with a 
hypothetical ("would be"/"perhaps"). But the identity-work done with "I", as a police 
officer hypothesising about what the CPS would do, is rendered ironic by the disclaimer 
that follows: "but whether or not they would take it would be a matter for them" (1.1190- 
91, my emphasis). Consequently, Mr Pacey's opinion is rendered irrelevant to what the 
CPS, in exercising their responsibility, decide to do. 
In summary, the "other agencies" theme of Mr Pacey's talk is produced in Extract 4 as the 
discourse "a matter for them". As such it constitutes expertise and responsibility outside 
the remit of the police through a variety of identity-work and boundary-work. In terms of 
police realities, the majority of Mr Pacey's talk is not directly warranted. The truth-claims 
about what happens in court, what Parliament has allowed and who has the final decision 
are therefore presented as `reality' that anyone can see, not the view of a Chief Officer. A 
general police identity is invoked to reformulate the police role and present them as doing 
their job properly. A specific police identity is mobilised to accomplish boundary-work 
around who should answer for and be responsible for CPS duties. The questioner makes 
female gender relevant to `victimhood'. But commensurate with my understanding of 
police realities mobilising gender relevance as an occasional resource to do specific 
transactional business, the opportunity is resisted as it is not integral to the matter in hand. 
The implications arising from the analysis in section 2 are discussed in the chapter part 
conclusion which follows. 
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Part One Conclusion 
The primary purpose of this chapter part was to demonstrate the `doing' of Chief Officer 
police realities in government policy-making talk. Police realities was understood as 
identity-work, boundary-work, the mobilisation of gender as an occasional resource and the 
recontextualising of non-police knowledges. Identity-work is apparent in the invocation of 
the group category membership of `police officer'. This proves to be a very flexible 
category: a Chief Constable/all Chief Constables; a police force/all police forces; 
policeman/the police; and `the police' as We/I. And it is notable that these formulations 
always appear in pairs whether their use is to claim `being responsible'; render an 
individual example relevant to the whole; warrant the whole as relevant to the individual; 
or, to generate another opportunity to repeat the same argument. In general though, `police 
officer' warrants are used to support versions of the truth which claim what the police 
should do and how they do it. By comparison, boundary-work is mainly accomplished 
through `non-policed' category identity-work. Formulations of `top man' and `non-medical 
specialist' are used to normalise what happens in police organisations and separate off 
responsibilities for action. `The objective commentator' is used to found claims that what 
lies outside the police remit is `the truth', plain for all to see. 
Female gender is mobilised as an occasional resource when it is useful to the transactional 
business being undertaken. Thus associations of negative femininity are useful for 
rendering women's mental health difficult to identify but not useful in the matter of 
ascribing responsibility to the Crown Prosecution Service. The recontextualisation of 
knowledges is more varied. Domestic violence is framed as the wrong starting point from 
which Chief Constables should allocate resources; the police responsibility to "public 
expectation" is mediated by the unrealistic and capricious `nature' ascribed to that 
expectation; the slow impact of training is attributed to the `nature' of "attitudes" and 
"organisations"; and the difficulty of policing non-physical domestic violence is 
repackaged as a problem of `women' for mental health professionals. The implication 
arising from all of these, is that Chief Officer police realities are constituted in ways that 
make them extremely difficult to undermine. 
Taking this idea further, my other concern was to consider if it were possible to understand 
Chief Officer police realities in terms of resistance to the context of 1992, from both HOC 
60/90 and more general government strategies that were in currency. The most important 
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point here is that nothing in the Chief Officer's talk is unaccountable from the local 
context. That is, it could be argued that constitutions of women as highly emotional is 
common to both Chief Officer talk and HOC 60/90. But this is a widely available discourse 
and it is not possible to demonstrate that one is consequent upon the other. That said, one 
of the questions asked by an HASC committee member framed the protection of women 
victims as integral to police-work and used it to warrant what the police should be doing. 
Again it is not directly demonstrable that Mr Anderson (see Extract 4) is orienting to HOC 
60/90 but it is likely that he is. 
Other examples of being careful about grounding claims for the analysis arising from 
historical context concern `the public', `inter-agency' and `good managers'. Firstly, in 
HOC 60/90, "public concern" was framed as an occasional resource to ascribe 
responsibilities and found claims of fulfilling them. Chief Officer talk at HASC put "public 
expectation" to much the same work. What this indicates is a general orientation to the 
police's `public servant' mandate and that `the public' can be a rather useful notion for 
warranting responsibility discourse for both government and the police. But I do not see 
using the public as a warrant as commensurate with positioning `community' as an under- 
used police resource. That ethos (see Goldstein, 1990) requires that the public be allowed 
to influence police priorities. By contrast, Mr Pacey founds his claims in the ascribed 
ignorance of "public expectation". Thus he invokes a common police discourse that "We, 
the police, are `in the know'; the rest, the public, are not in touch with reality" (Adlam, 
2002, p. 29). And there is also a sense in Extract 4 that Mr Anderson and Parliament are 
similar subjects of disdain. 
Secondly, in HOC 60/90, notional boundaries between the police and other agencies were 
formulated in discourse about victims. In HASC, Chief Officer talk engages in explicit 
boundary-work. Therefore, `inter-agency' working does not appear to be a concern of 
either. Certainly these data pre-date government attempts to forward working together 
around domestic violence. But in the context of Mr Pacey's talk here, the police are being 
examined as witnesses. As such there may be, in line with the British legal system, an 
adversarial atmosphere which impacts on attempts to build boundaries around the police as 
a single agency. 
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Finally, HOC 60/90 presented Government as `already responsible' and challenged the 
police to take domestic violence seriously. And in HASC, the discursive work of Chief 
Officer talk seems largely engaged in producing `responsible police', particularly Chief 
Constables, and disclaiming that any additional action is necessary. Consequently, `the 
already responsible self' seems to be a common formulation around domestic violence 
policy. But there is no sense that the `good manager' Mr Pacey constitutes for himself is 
drawing directly on managerialist discourse. 
However, the implications from Chief Officer talk are the danger that `good management' 
becomes the objective of policing in itself is not disrupted; Chief Officers appear adept at, 
and accustomed to, mobilising `the public' as a police realities resource; and Chief Officers 
seem experienced at ascribing domestic violence responsibilities to other agencies. 
In this chapter part I have focused on police realities in Chief Officer policy-making talk in 
the public realm at a time when HOC 60/90 was current. In the second chapter part I 
explore Chief Officer policy text in the public realm, but this time, when HOC 19/2000 
was in currency. 
Part Two: Metropolitan Police Policy Document 2000 
The New Labour government policy for the policing of domestic violence which was in 
currency when MPS 2000a was published was HOC 19/2000 (see Chapter 4). This 
document formulated `crime' as the most appropriate way of understanding domestic 
violence in the context of policing. Loosely, domestic violence was defined as violence 
between intimates in the home. And the major concern seemed to be to relocate gender 
relevance into a separate category of `violence against women'. Indeed, much discursive 
work was done to negate the relevance of (female) gender to domestic violence. HOC 
19/2000 produced gender-free victims as diverse in terms of ethnicity and sexual 
orientation. `Safety' was framed as paramount but not at the expense of victims' rights and 
the police doing their job properly. `Needs' was forwarded as a means for understanding 
victims as individuals and defending them from police assumptions grounded on ignorance 
or prejudice. 
Within this chapter part I consider the `doing' of Chief Officer police realities in this 
historical context through extracts from MPS 2000a. The authorship of this document is 
credited to Ian Blair, the then Deputy Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police. 
3. Reformulating the problem: "hate crime" and "domestic violence" 
One of my key concerns in this chapter is to explore the potential of police realities as 
resistances to responsibilisations from government guidance. HOC 19/2000 constituted 
separate but related categories of "domestic violence", "violence against women" and 
"crime". Therefore, perhaps the most notable feature of MPS 2000a is that "hate crime" 
and "domestic violence" are constituted as the important considerations: - 
Extract 5 [MPS 2000a (Initial investigation: p. 6,2°' paragraph)]6: 
(... ) Hate crime and domestic violence victims and their families may 
experience a terrifying and traumatic effect. (... ) 
Extract 6 [MPS 2000a (Community Safety Units: p. 14,1 S` paragraph)]: 
" (... ) The CAD' is checked daily for any incidents involving hate 
crime/domestic violence (... ) 
Extract 7 [MPS 2000a (Performance management: p. 16,2 °d paragraph)]: 
(... ) 
" clear up rates for hate/domestic crimes; 
" hate/domestic arrests; 
(... ) 
But it is not until Annex A (pages 22-4) that the distinction between the two is explicitly 
furnished. The document as a whole covers `The investigation of racist, domestic violence 
and homophobic incidents' (MPS, 2000a). And it would seem that domestic violence is not 
understood as a hate crime. 
The title "Hate crime" and the opening phrase "Hate crime is" (my emphasis) are 
important because they formulate "hate crime" as a real entity in its own right. And yet, 
there is no legal crime category with such a name (see Savage & Nash, 2001). The Crime 
6 See Appendix 2 for extract conventions. 
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and Disorder Act 1998 does constitute new crimes of `racially aggravated' assault and 
criminal damage but `hate crime' is not a truth in legal discourse. Therefore, particularly as 
there is a preponderance for coining the term in police discourse (e. g. ACPO, 2000; Avon 
& Somerset Constabulary, 2003; Cheshire Police, 2003; Humberside Police, 2003) it can 
be assumed that its production is understood as advantageous to police versions of reality. 
Extract 8 [MPS 2000a (Annex A: opening paragraph)]: 
1/1 Hate crimes 
1/2 Hate crime is where the perpetrator's prejudice against any 
1/3 identifiable group of people is a factor in determining who is 
1/4 victimised. 
1/5 This is a broad and exclusive definition developed by ACPO. It is 
1/6 worth noting that a victim of hate crime does not have to be either a 
1/7 member of a minority or someone who is generally considered to be a 
1/8 `vulnerable' person. For example, the friends of a visible minority 
1/9 ethnic person, lesbian or refugee may be victimised because of their 
1/10 association. In other cases a person entirely unconnected with the hate 
1/11 motivation may be victimised if the perpetrator is mistaken in 
1/12 perceiving an association. So, there are circumstances where anyone 
1/13 can be a victim of a hate crime. 
From this extract it is clear that the conditions of "hate crime" are as follows: (1) "the 
perpetrator's prejudice"/"hate motivation", (2) grounded in understandings of 
"identifiable group"/"perceiving an association" which (3) leads to members of certain 
categories and their (perceived) associates being "victimised". But although ethnicity, 
sexuality and emigre status are named as groups, gender as a means for founding prejudice 
and victimisation is notable by its absence. 
The absence of gender is commensurate with the document as a whole. There are only four 
instances in MPS 2000a where gender is rendered explicitly apposite to victims and all of 
these concern sexual orientation. Thus "lesbian" although indexing female gender does so 
only in terms of its intersection with sexuality. And this would appear to be a similar 
formulation to one in gay/lesbian identity politics, whereby gender and sexuality issues are 
7 Computer Aided Dispatch: a computerised system for recording 999 calls and police responses to them 
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often elided (see Cooper, 1992/3). Further, "identifiable group" reifies visibility as the 
basis for group category membership. And again this highlights the absence of `women' 
who are likely to be `identifiable' and who have been subject to `group' attacks grounded 
in misogyny (see Eglin, 2002). 
In addition, there is a phrase in Extract 8 that may be a euphemism for female gender: 
"someone who is generally considered to be a `vulnerable' person" but is not a "member of 
a minority" (1.1/7-8). Women are not a numerical minority in the UK as they make up 51% 
of the population (although politically they are `minoritised'). And `vulnerability' in 
mainstream discourse is commonly associated with negative femininity ascription (e. g. 
Ahmed, 1995; Marcus, 1992; Smart, 1992). Therefore, women may well be implied in this 
definition but they are not made overtly relevant. Indeed if gender is understood as an 
`omnirelevance' (West & Zimmerman, 1987), one that is essentially hard to avoid, then its 
`absence' here in supporting the claim that "anyone can be a victim of hate crime" (1.1/12- 
3), seems particularly problematic. 
This brings me back to what the category of "hate crime" is accomplishing in this version 
of police reality. And that necessitates some contextual understanding. The Met's domestic 
violence units (DVUs) of the 1980s (see Sheptycki, 1993) were reformulated as 
Community Safety Units (CSUs) for the investigation of hate crime and domestic violence 
after the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry. Therefore, although this document is addressed to all 
police staff, it probably has particular resonance for those officers once working in DVUs 
but now in CSUs. As such, "hate crime" can be seen as instrumental in how racist and 
homophobic crime are being talked up, albeit at the possible expense of gender(ed) 
understandings. This becomes more apparent in Extract 9 which follows directly on: - 
Extract 9 [MPS 2000a (Annex A: 2 °d and 3' paragraphs)]: 
2/1 Racist incident 
2/2 Any incident, which is perceived to be racist by the victim or any 
2/3 other person. 
2/4 (Definition adopted from the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry Report, 
2/5 Recommendation 12). 
8 The emboldened text in Extracts 8-10 is reproduced from the original. 
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3/1 Homophobic incident 
3/2 Any incident, which is perceived to be homophobic by the victim 
3/3 or any other person. 
3/4 (That is, directed to impact upon those perceived to be lesbians, gay 
3/5 men, and bisexual or transgender people). 
In Extract 8, the "hate crime" definition was warranted on "ACPO". In Extract 9, the racist 
incident definition is warranted on the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry Report. And the 
definition of a homophobic incident is warranted through its similarity in formulation to 
the definition which proceeds it. 
These warrants are interesting because despite apparent dissonance between ACPO and the 
Chief Officers of the Met (Savage et al, 2001), ACPO seems to be the warrant of warrants. 
That is, it stands almost as the extreme case formulation as the highest authority by which 
such truths can be told. Of course this does not mean that Met Chief Officers necessarily 
see ACPO that way, but it does demonstrate understanding of the potential authority of 
ACPO to a police audience. Therefore, it can be seen as an occasional resource, mobilised 
when useful and absent when it is not. This is particularly the case where the ACPO 
definition of hate crime (which has no ethnicity or sexual orientation in it) is used to found 
extrapolated claims that racist and homophobic incidents are justifiable matters for the Met 
Police. 
It is likely, but not demonstrable, that lobbying from lesbian and gay pressure groups both 
from inside (through LAGPA) and outside (e. g. Haymes, 2001; Kibblewhite, 2001) the 
police have resulted in these policy inclusions. Whilst this is laudable, I am still 
disconcerted by how gender, particularly female gender, relevance is delimited. Extract 9 
produces a list; "lesbians, gay men, and bisexual or transgender people" (3/4-5). Most lists 
in discourse are actually three-part lists (Jefferson, 1990). Therefore "lesbians, gay men" 
can be seen as comprising the first part of such a list. And what this highlights is that each 
item in the list formulates gender as a binary. Thus "lesbians, gay men" underlines 
female/male; "bisexual" indexes two genders; and "transgender people" implies movement 
in both directions across the gender divide. But this is accomplished without naming 
`women'. Certainly "lesbians" means women but it is not a commensurate term with "gay 
9 Lesbian and Gay Police Association. 
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men"; that would have been `gays'. Consequently, whilst "gay men" renders both sexual 
orientation and gendered person-hood overtly relevantly relevant, "lesbians", in this usage, 
seems to collapse the two. 
Although "hate crime" is used as a constitution to support arguments that crime 
underpinned by understandings of ethnicity and sexual orientation are Met Police matters, 
it is also used to absent the relevance of (female) gender to policing. And that becomes 
eminently clear in the final definition. Extract 10, follows directly on. 
Extract 10 [MPS 2000a (Annex A: 4`h paragraph)]: 
4/1 Domestic violence 
4/2 Domestic violence is any incident of threatening behaviour, 
4/3 violence or abuse (psychological, physical, sexual, financial or 
4/4 emotional) between adults who are or have been intimate partners 
4/5 or family members, regardless of gender 
4/6 (ACPO definition) 
Like `hate crime', `domestic violence' is not a legal category of crime. However, unlike 
`hate crime' it has been subject to specific government policies (see Chapter 4). Therefore, 
there is a sense that the Met Police have not made it their `own' in quite the same way. And 
that may be indicative of how succinct and relatively unqualified the domestic violence 
definition is. 
Although only four lines in length, the definition itself comprises an extreme case 
formulation, three lists (two of them three-part lists) and a disclaimer. Firstly, "any" seems 
to be the extreme case in these MPS 2000a definitions which renders the category `broad'. 
And this is demonstrated in the list "threatening behaviour, violence or abuse". 
However, this list can be seen to change the topic from `threatening behaviour' (a legal 
category of crime) to `abuse'. In turn, `abuse' is credited with five possible variations. The 
effect of this is to blur distinctions between crime ascription and the manifestations of 
domestic violence. The suggestion is, therefore, that domestic violence is a `mixed-bag' of 
harm but there is some crime in there. The final list of those `who are' (1), `have been 
intimate partners' (2) or `family members' (3) suggests breadth again. But this time the 
delimitation made relevant comprises `adulthood' and `close personal relationship'. 
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However, the two most interesting facets for me are in the last two lines. Firstly, 
"regardless of gender" is a disclaimer. It explicitly counters gender relevance as integral 
to domestic violence for the purposes of its policing. This suggests that someone reading 
this document may find that contentious. Even if "intimate partners" assumes 
heterosexual relationships no direction to the violence has been claimed. Also "family 
members" does not invoke gender meanings at all. Therefore, "regardless of gender" 
makes no sense unless a competing account of domestic violence that pays regard to the 
`normality' of gender-relational violence in a particular direction is assumed. Therefore, in 
the business of defining domestic violence, MPS 2000a can be understood to be actively 
de-gendering. Secondly, this definition, like the one for hate crime, is warranted on the 
membership group category of Chief Officer ("ACPO definition"). This time the authority 
afforded to ACPO is not expanded. It is literally left `to speak for itself. This suggests that 
in this instance, it is understood as a sufficient warrant to counter non-police or junior 
police understandings. 
In summary, "hate crime" seems to be formulated as a means for founding claims about the 
importance of racist and homophobic incidents to the Met Police. Collectively these 
emphasise the perceptions of doers, `done-tos' and witnesses. And they work to render 
female gender irrelevant as a police matter. `Domestic violence' is ascribed as a wide 
variety of harms occurring in the context of a current or former close personal relationship, 
some of which are crimes. Any suggestion that gender might be relevant is explicitly 
disclaimed. In terms of police realities some category entitlement founded on the group 
membership of ACPO is apparent. This implies that these definitions are appropriate for 
the purposes of policing because they have been produced by Chief Officers. There is also 
an example of the recontextualisation of knowledges in that understandings of domestic 
violence as gender(ed) violence are invoked and disclaimed within a definition for the 
purpose of policing. And this may also be working at a local level where employees find 
themselves in CSUs rather than DVUs. Finally, there are instances where gender is 
mobilised as an occasional resource for specific transactional aims. The category `lesbian' 
is invoked in a way that renders female gender relevant to "hate crime" only where it is 
elided with sexual orientation. 
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4. Constituting responsibility boundaries: "needs" 
A key theme produced in MPS 2000a, particularly around text constituting victims, is 
"needs". And it frequently underpins a responsibility ascription. 
Extract 11 [MPS 2000a (Initial investigation: p. 6,2 °d paragraph)]: 
(... ) All staff must be sensitive to their individual needs at this 
time. (... ) 
Extract 12 [MPS 2000a (Initial investigation: p. 8,4`" paragraph)]: 
Staff must consider referral to other agencies to support victims 
according to their needs. (... ) 
Extract 13 [MPS 2000a (Crime Manager: p. 18,1st paragraph)]: 
(... ) At every contact with the victim, their needs and risks should be 
reassessed to give the appropriate level of support. 
As might be expected from section 3, victims are consistently not gendered. However, 
there is an interesting facet to the responsibilisations arising from "needs" discourse. 
Although Extracts 11-13 are directed at specific staff for particular duties, the Foreword 
produces distinctions between police group category memberships that appear to underpin 
the `doing' of police realities. Extract 14 forms the concluding paragraphs of the 
Foreword: - 
Extract 14 [MPS 2000a (Foreword paragraphs 8/9)]: 
8/1 This policy ensures that all Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) staff 
8/2 are accountable to victims, communities, colleagues and supervisors. 
8/3 It has a series of common supportive strategies that run throughout 
8/4 such as community intelligence, incisive investigation, family liaison 
8/5 and sensitivity to victims (sic) needs. 
9/1 1 maintain the view that society will be judged on how it treats its 
9/2 most vulnerable and isolated citizens. This Special Notice will help 
9/3 lead and direct all our staff accordingly. 
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9/4 Ian Blair 
9/5 Deputy Commissioner 
The extract opens with a truth-claim about the efficacy of "This policy". It frames this 
policy as reaching "all" staff and rendering each one "accountable" to a whole range of 
others. The extreme case formulation ("all") and the list ("victims" to "supervisors") 
support the argument that "This policy" is comprehensive as well as efficacious. The 
policy is also presented as coherent and strategic having "common ... strategies that run 
throughout" (my emphasis). Again, the extreme case infers that there is no part of this 
policy that can be challenged on the grounds that it falls short. And again, a list is used to 
suggest the comprehensive reach of the document. But this time it is a three-part list: 
"community intelligence, incisive investigation, family liaison". These three items differ 
from "sensitivity to victims needs" in that the MPS has local intelligence officers, 
investigating officers and family liaison officers. There is no victims' sensitivity officer. 
Therefore, I think "sensitivity to victims needs" is being forwarded as either relevant to all 
the items on the three-part list; or relevant to police-work not encapsulated by the list; or 
both. Regardless, it is framed as having a wide applicability. 
Thus "This policy" is presented as most efficacious in every way. And it is almost as if the 
policy is being personified. It is the only actor in paragraph 8 and no-one is ascribed as 
having authored it at this point. Importantly, the suggestion is that its very existence and its 
comprehensive `nature' are sufficient to render all staff accountable. For example, this is 
not simply a case of being responsibilised with the job of being sensitive to victims' needs. 
Rather, the sense is that all staff will have to answer to their fulfilment (or not) of that 
responsibility on a range on levels. And Ian Blair gives his answer now. 
Paragraph 9 opens with "I", as "Ian Blair, Deputy Commissioner". So a contrast with "all 
... MPS staff' 
is made. And this founds Mr Blair's claims for himself as an 
exemplification of `being accountable' and `being sensitive'. The phrase "maintain the 
view" suggests that this view, "that society will be judged on how it treats its most 
vulnerable and isolated citizens" (1.9/1-2), is `real', pre-existing Mr Blair's holding of it 
and therefore shared by others. This has advantages over claiming `I believe' which does 
not invoke an agreement across (implicit) witnesses and could be undermined as a personal 
flight of fancy. Also "society will be judged" (my emphasis), places this view outside 
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police versions of reality. Therefore, by invoking it, Mr Blair is positioned as a Chief 
Officer seeing `the bigger picture' and the MPS are positioned as integral to the judgement 
of society. The sense is that the MPS in its treatment of society's "most vulnerable and 
isolated citizens" has the opportunity to render the whole of society subject to favourable 
judgement. These "vulnerable and isolated citizens" are framed as worthy if unfortunate, 
consequently, it is unlikely that the meaning extends to perpetrators. Thus it would seem 
that the treatment of victims is being constituted as a key for, and integral to, MPS police- 
work. 
This sense of the potential moral worth of policing10 is carried forward to the next sentence: 
"This Special Notice will help lead and direct all our staff accordingly" (1.9/2-3, my 
emphasis). At this point, Mr Blair claims a relationship between "I" and "This Special 
Notice" and a distinction between "I" and "all our staff'. Thus the moral good the police 
could do, outlined in the view Mr Blair maintains, is linked to the ascribed effects of "This 
Special Notice". And Mr Blair is separated from "all our staff' whom the Notice helps to 
"lead and direct". Consequently, it is Mr Blair who is positioned as helping to lead and 
direct staff accordingly through the Special Notice. The word "help" is ambiguous. As 
"This policy" has already been formulated as beyond reproach, the suggestion is that "This 
Special Notice" is only one of the ways in which all staff are led and directed. Also it could 
imply the difference between being rendered `accountable' and fulfilling that 
`responsibility'. That is, the Special Notice is framed as doing everything that could be 
expected of it in regard to rendering staff accountable. But whether or not all staff respond 
accordingly is down to them. Either way, the implication is that Mr Blair, through this 
policy, stands accountable in the moral high-ground and has fulfilled his responsibility to 
lead and direct staff appropriately. 
In summary, "needs", especially those ascribed to victims, are used to found responsibility 
claims and ascription. Sensitivity to those "needs" is further framed as an important 
policing matter, one that potentially affords the MPS the moral high-ground. In terms of 
police realities, two group membership categories around police officer are invoked, `all 
staff and `I, the Deputy Commissioner'. The contrasts between these two are used to 
ascribe the Chief Officer as already fulfilling his responsibilities through the production of 
policy. And as such, all staff are positioned as provided with the opportunity to fulfil theirs. 
10 It is a common police discourse that the police should be seen as moral crusaders (Adlam, 2002). 
171 
There is also a claim to have recontextualised an outsider knowledge in the form of a view 
of society from a non-police perspective. However, the transactional business of this 
discourse is to frame the Chief Officer as competent. Therefore, rather than a 
recontextualisation per se, I see this as further identity-work but constituting `one who sees 
the bigger picture' rather than a police identity. 
The implications of this analysis are considered in the overall chapter part conclusion. 
Part Two Conclusion 
My main aim in analysing extracts of MPS 2000a was to explore how Chief Officers `do' 
police realities in policy text for the policing of domestic violence where police realities 
was understood as identity-work, boundary-work and invocation of gender as an occasional 
resource. Firstly, the group category membership of `police officer' was mobilised in two 
ways. There was category entitlement warranting on `ACPO' as an appropriate body for 
defining issues for the purposes of their policing, in terms of countering both non-police 
and junior police potential truths. And further, an identity pair was produced in `I, Deputy 
Commissioner/all staff). This was used to form contrasts and draw boundaries between 
who was and who was not fulfilling their responsibilities. Further, there was one instance 
of a non-police identity used to found a truth-claim that the Deputy Commissioner could 
see `the bigger picture'. Secondly, gender was mobilised in ways that could be understood 
as persuading both CSU staff and a wider audience that female gender is not relevant to 
policing. There was a strong sense that gender, particularly gender(ed) understandings of 
domestic violence and prejudice, needed to be managed. 
My secondary concern was to consider how responsibilisations and truths arising from 
HOC 19/2000 were reformulated. In MPS 2000a, there are two possibilities; the 
management of gender, especially female gender; and how `individual needs' came to be 
such a key concern of police-work. And broadly, these are commensurate with what might 
have been expected in terms of the impact of New Labour's re-imaginings of domestic 
violence; and the crime/community relationship (Crawford, 2001; Newman, 2001). 
Firstly, the victims of hate crime were delimited to group classifications on the basis of 
ethnicity, sexual orientation and emigre status. And gender relevance was explicitly 
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disclaimed in the context of domestic violence. This is reminiscent of HOC 19/2000's 
approach to the category `violence against women' whereby female gender was disclaimed 
as relevant and steered into its own category. Therefore, it would seem that MPS 2000a is 
orienting to the guidance in HOC 19/2000; although de-gendering the problem is not, in 
this instance, accompanied by a re-gendering of the blame (see Berns, 2001). However, it 
would be problematic to claim that the Met uses de-gendering simply because New Labour 
does. Rather, it is important to consider the usefulness of these formulations to MPS police 
realities at this time. Here, the emphasis appears to be on undermining gender 
understandings in order to promote ethnicity and sexual orientation. And this may well 
have more to do with justifying the reformulation of DVUs into CSUs in the wake of the 
Stephen Lawrence Inquiry. Thus New Labour's position is permissive of de-gendered 
domestic violence ascription and the Met can be seen to have mobilised this as a resource 
to support their own transactional business. 
Secondly, MPS 2000a formulates `needs' as the primary issue for governing police work. 
This is different from HOC 19/2000 where `safety' was rendered paramount although 
"needs" were constituted as in danger from police assumptions. But this still does not 
explain how `needs' became so important in MPS 2000a. Therefore, it is worth considering 
how and in what ways "needs" might be useful to the MPS in this historical context. Most 
obviously, the attention to "needs" claimed in MPS 2000a seems to undermine HOC 
19/2000's subject positions for the police as ignorant/prejudiced if they do not consider 
"needs". Again, there is resonance from the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry where the Met's 
generalised assumptions about people of colour were implicated. 
In addition, HOC 19/2000 suggested that "safety" was not a police monopoly; victims 
were afforded a role (although no responsibilities) in managing their own risk. I think that 
weakens any potential police claim to govern safety. By contrast, it has been suggested that 
"needs" is an insidious discourse which can be manipulated to problematise the `riskiness' 
of individuals and therefore be mobilised as a means of governing them (Hannah-Moffat, 
1999 quoted in Matthews & Pitts, 2001)". Thus the choice enacted in placing emphasis on 
"needs" rather than "safety" could be seen as the Met selectively tapping the resources 
provided by HOC 19/2000. 
11 There may also be Human Rights' implications (HRA, 1998, section 6) around the onus it puts on public servants to 
preserve individual freedoms. But again, this could probably be accounted for as a potentially useful occasional resource. 
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The implications arising from Chief Officer policy text are that Chief Officer police 
realities appear to be quite formidable; they can produce responsible `good managers', 
anticipate and ward off potential challenges; and government guidance is apparently a 
resource from which the useful can be warranted and the un-useful reformulated or 
discarded. 
In the chapter discussion I compare the findings of this chapter part with the `doing' of 
Chief Officer police realities in the 1992 policy-making talk. 
Chapter Discussion 
Chief Officer talk and text in the policy arena both `do' police realities. But there are key 
differences which can be accounted for in terms of the transactional business in hand 
and/or the `nature' of the spoken and written word. The majority of the `doings' of Chief 
Officer police realities is accomplished through identity-work. In terms of invoking group 
category memberships around `police officer', identity pairs are mobilised to produce 
truth-claims of `being responsible'. In policy-making talk, this is most apparent in shifts 
from the general to the particular or vice versa. In policy text, it can be seen as boundary- 
work between police groups. These differences can be understood as due to the business in 
hand. That is, in HASC the context comprises immediate challenges and outsider 
knowledges that are managed as they arise. Whilst, in MPS 2000a, the primary dialogue is 
between a Chief Officer and other ranks. Further, both types of discourse produce non- 
police identities. In 1992, these `do' organisational boundary-work. In 2000, they found a 
truth-claim that the Chief Officer sees `the bigger picture'. Again, these disjunctures can be 
attributed to dialogic differences 12. 
Both sets of discourse accomplish resistances. However, Chief Officer talk produces many 
that are local in that they are explicable as immediate. In HASC, there is nothing in the 
Chief Officer talk in terms of reformulations that cannot be accounted for by local 
resistances. By contrast, in Chief Officer text, they are few and require wider context 
understandings in order to make sense; such as prioritising victims' "needs" over "safety" 
and undermining understandings of domestic violence as gender(ed) violence. This is 
12 MPS 2000a does engage in some boundary-work between the police and `the public' and `other agencies'. But it did 
not produce a key theme or priority. Therefore, these extracts were not used in the analysis. 
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indicative of the different `natures' of spoken and written discourse. Thus talk is immediate 
and text is more `considered', often subjected to redrafting and corrections. But neither 
formulation of Chief Officer discourse demonstrably engages with the HOC guidance as a 
l steer of their understandings. 
A similar assessment can be made of the way that both HASC and MPS 2000a mobilise 
gender as an occasional resource. Certainly gendering as female was `allowed' by HOC 
60/90. But in 1992 talk, the mobilisation supports a specific piece of organisational 
boundary-work. By contrast, HOC 19/2000 worked hard to de-gender domestic violence. 
And in MPS 2000a, de-gendering activity appears to be part of a wider `strategy' to 
manage the irrelevance of (female) gender which in turn supports the reformulation of 
DVUs to CSUs. Thus in both Chief Officer talk and text, the usefulness of available 
government-generated truths about domestic violence is drawn upon to facilitate context- 
specific transactional business. 
In conclusion Chief Officer police realities prove to be formidable, flexible and persuasive 
around the topic of policing domestic violence. They variably accommodate, reformulate 
and undermine non-police-generated knowledges, putting them to work as resources to 
produce and reproduce police versions of reality. Home Office guidance is therefore, 
treated as just that, guidance. The implication is that Chief Officers are strongly positioned 
to counter missives emanating from government. And I believe this undoubtedly indicates 
that interrogating `police culture/realities' at the level of Chief Officers is as viable a site of 
domestic violence research as `canteen culture' was in the 70s and 80s. 
Taken together Chapter 4 and this chapter, Chapter 5, explored `doing' government and 
`doing' Chief Officer police realities around the policing of domestic violence. Chapters 6 
and 7 also form a pair, but this time to focus on exercisings of power by government and 
women's advocates in the area of agencies `working together'. 
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Chapter 6: 
`Doing' Feminism in Government Domestic Violence Policy-Making in 
1992 and 2000: naming organisations, forwarding causes and 
formulating subjects of representation 
Introduction 
In the last chapter I interrogated the `doing' of Chief Officer police realities within their 
1992 and 2000 policy discourse with an emphasis on identity-work, boundary-work and 
the mobilisation of gender as an occasional resource. A key feature of these `doings' was 
the formulation of identity-pairs invoking the group membership category of `police 
officer'; for example `I, the Chief Constable/all Chief Constables'. This was used for a 
variety of accomplishments, but mainly responsibility claiming and ascription; and 
boundary-work between police/non-police, senior officers/junior officers. Also gender was 
mobilised as an occasional resource when it was useful to specific transactional aims such 
as problematising women's mental health and negating the relevance of gender to police- 
work. There were differences between the ways police realities were sustained in talk and 
text. Specifically, in policy-making talk, resistances could be accounted for locally. Whilst 
in text, the versions of reality being countered required some understanding of wider 
discourses in order to make sense. Overall, Chief Officer accounts of police reality proved 
formidable means of truth-telling. And Home Office circulars on the policing of domestic 
violence did not appear to be the primary steer to their truth-claims. 
In this chapter I interrogate the `doing' of feminism in the government policy-making 
context. I look at multiple versions of women's advocates' truth-telling around domestic 
violence. The data for 1992 are an oral evidence session from the Home Affairs Select 
Committee (HASC, 1993a, 1993b). Four witnesses were present, each of whom 
represented a service provider whose client group included those experiencing domestic 
violence. Two agencies, Women's Aid and Southall Black Sisters, are explicitly feminist 
whereas Victim Support is a general victim charity. Chiswick Family Rescue' is an agency 
for women and children which sees domestic violence as arising from societal gender 
inequalities but its position on feminism is not explicit (Horley, 2002). The data for 2000 
mark a shift in participants from practitioners to academic researchers. The texts analysed 
I Chiswick Family Rescue has since reformulated as `Refuge' (Refuge, undated). 
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are twelve What Works? in reducing domestic violence memoranda cited as literature 
reviews and produced as part of government guidance to local crime reduction projects 
(Home Office, 2000d-f). Most are authored by well-known feminists specialising in this 
areal. My emphasis is not on what feminists do in policy-making but how feminism is 
accomplished and by whom. The chosen texts present the basis of a comparison between 
the `doings' of feminism in policy activities under the Conservatives and New Labour. 
Initially, I reprise arguments from Chapter 2 by presenting an account of how `doing 
feminism' might be accomplished and analysed. Also from Chapter One, I consider 
Foucauldian understandings of truth/power and resistance that might be pertinent to how 
women's advocates formulate truth and guidance. The main body of the chapter is set out 
in two parts. In the first, I use extracts from the oral evidence in 1992 (HASC, 1993b) 
arguing that the `doing' of feminism in dialogue is eminently demonstrable as 
organisational naming, forwarding causes and producing a subject of representation. Truths 
about domestic violence are contested between participants. And some aspects of 
warranting truth-claims are rendered inappropriate by committee members. In the second 
part, I present extracts from the What Works? memoranda (see footnote 2). The multiple 
authorship of these renders the `doing' of different kinds of feminism quite clear. There are 
also apparent attempts to govern statutory agencies commensurate with the `government 
guidance' status of these documents. 
In the chapter discussion I draw together the continuities and disjunctures of `doing' 
feminism from different policy-making positions and through different discursive media. 
And I consider their implications. 
Raising questions for analysis 
Many accounts of `doing' feminism concern the research context (e. g. Harding, 1991; 
Kelly, 1996; Williamson, 2000). There is an emphasis on finding the truths inherent in the 
spoken experiences of women and enabling these to be heard by a wider audience. Thus 
the `women's experience' forwarded by feminists constitutes a version of reality (Haraway, 
1990; Kitzinger & Wilkinson, 1996). But that in itself does not constitute feminism. Non- 
feminists, and even anti-feminists, have a history of founding truth-claims in the accounts 
2 The full list of these memos is: Crisp & Stanko, 2000; Davidson et at, 2000; Edwards 2000a, 2000b; Hague, 2000; 
Hanmer & Griffiths, 2000; Kelly & Humphreys, 2000a; Levison & Harwin, 2000; Mullender, 2000; Mullender & 
Burton, 2000; Mullender & Hague, 2000; Walby & Myhill, 2000. 
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of women research participants who have experienced domestic violence (e. g. Bourlet, 
1990; Lloyd et al, 1994; Hoyle, 1998). Therefore, what renders feminist research 
qualitatively different is the political stance that underpins the way those truths are created 
(Gill, 1998). 
However, the notion of these truth-claims as political knowledges is often obscured (Gill, 
1998). This is problematic because an important part of what they `are' may be lost. And it 
makes assumptions about the `nature' of truth, namely that what is true will remain true 
regardless of the context (Smart, 1995). This has specific implications when the context of 
`doing' feminism is policy-making rather than research activities. In this arena, it has been 
noted that feminists tend to underplay the political significance of their positionings (Abrar 
et al, 2000; Kelly, 1999). Indeed, in engagements with the government/the law, feminists 
regularly seem to underestimate the power relationships therein (Dobash & Dobash, 2000; 
Patel, 1999; Smart, 1989,1995). 
From a post-structuralist perspective, `truth' and power relations are inextricably linked 
(Foucault, 1976,1980,1982). To be heard as `true', knowledges are dependent on the 
power that they and those who forward them can mobilise. Foucault (1976) describes 
truth/power networks as capillary in form. Thus they spread out in a multitude of ways and 
the locations of power are not always obvious. Also power is not something that is held. 
Rather, there are positions within networks that afford more opportunities to access it. One 
of the key ways that power is mobilised and truths kept current is through resistance. 
Dominant discourses need resistance from competing versions in order to be reiterated and 
retain their currency. But although such encounters may reinforce what is already 
understood as true, they also expose truth to the possibility of being undermined. Thus in 
the context of government policy-making there is a dilemma for feminists. Certainly 
Government has more obvious access to power and `does' truth in a particular way. And 
feminists, producing non-dominant discourses can be seen as a source of potential 
resistance. The question is therefore, whether to avoid `feeding' government truths or 
attempt to realise the potential to reformulate them. 
Patel (1999) and Kelly (1999) are not post-structuralists but they formulate feminist 
participation in government policy-making in terms of exercisings of power. For Patel 
(1999) government has demonstrated usages of feminist knowledges that devalue them and 
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put them in the service of aims counter to feminisms. Therefore, the exercising of power 
she forwards involves leaving the arena. By contrast, Kelly (1999; Kelly & Humphreys, 
2000b) recognises these dangers but she also sees opportunities. She argues that when 
feminists take part they often do not fulfil the potential of feminism. Her suggestions are 
that feminism is made relevant to participation in a way that links politics to the business in 
hand. This would include naming organisations, both literally and in choosing names that 
invoke the stance of the participants. For example, `Southall Black Sisters' conveys 
political meaning that is not apparent in `Victim Support'. Also she argues that causes of 
domestic violence, important to feminists, are too readily absented from multi-agency 
forums. Re-asserting causes potentially renders the doer of the deed visible; keeps talk 
about gender relational violence on the agenda; and resists formulations which are 
permissive of women blaming. Finally, she encourages feminists to resolve their 
differences in private. 
Whilst I see organisational naming and keeping `causes' current as potentially beneficial to 
`doing' feminism, I am less convinced by the emphasis on the united front. I understand 
that Kelly is talking about the local level and there is always a danger that theoretical 
differences between feminist groups may be understood as women squabbling (Mann, 
2000). However, those deemed appropriate women's advocates at the national level might 
not be feminist. Therefore, notions of disagreement around service provision are not 
exclusively a feminist concern and competing versions may still be produced. Further, for 
me, one of feminisms great strengths is its diversity. And hiding that in public is 
problematic because it renders `feminism' a single body of knowledge. As such, it is 
potentially easier to undermine. Moreover, different and irreconcilable `subjects of 
representation' may be produced (Butler, 1992). Inadvertently then, in regard to a united 
feminist front, Kelly might be encouraging the type of lowest common denominator 
politics that she seeks to undermine (Kelly, 1999). Consequently, my focus for the analysis 
of `doing' feminism will incorporate naming organisations and forwarding causes. But the 
third part of my analysis will be interrogating the `subject of representation'. 
Another factor that seems important is the shift in context of feminist participation in 
government policy-making from 1992 to 2000. In 1992, feminist practitioners were 
"witnesses" at a Home Affairs Select Committee on domestic violence (HASC, 1993a & 
b). In 2000, feminist academics comprised the majority of authors in Home Office 
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memoranda to guide local crime reduction initiatives (see footnote 2). Thus the grounds, 
positioning and access to power of feminists, have changed quite dramatically. Once again, 
post-structuralist theory is useful for conceptualising what this might mean. 
Policy can be understood as constitutive of problems, solutions and policy community 
members (Shore & Wright, 1997). That is, it generates a realm of reality which delimits 
understandings of people and things that can be deemed appropriate and true. A key 
component to the efficacy and economy of policy is "indigenous knowledge" (Shore & 
Wright, 1997, p. 15). These comprise the truths and expertise of local people or voluntary 
groups, those who do not usually come under the remit of, or have value ascribed to them 
by, government. These knowledges are important because they are understood as the 
means by which `problem populations' can be mobilised to self-actualise thereby requiring 
less input of government resources. The notion is that in exchange for validation, 
government anticipates that non-statutory bodies will `police' local issues in line with 
government aims; either by doing work themselves or informing those charged with 
statutory responsibilities. However, such knowledges have temporal relevance (Shore & 
Wright, 1997). The idea is that once `official' agencies can manage their new 
responsibilities, indigenous knowledges become less relevant. 
The positioning of feminists giving evidence at HASC can be understood in this way. 
HASC is a strange way of `doing government' (see Chapter 3). Committee members 
choose a topic for policy amendment, invite written submissions, select witnesses and 
write recommendations for government. Government responds and the response is debated 
in Parliament. Eventually, through a further committee process policy is produced. 
Therefore, the distance between feminist witnesses and the policy product is quite vast. 
Also the committee's own agenda delimits the truths that will be heard. Patel's (1999) 
criticism of the HOC 1995 arising from HASC is that it ignores important feminist 
knowledges about funding, service provision and changes to the civil law. But perhaps this 
was unsurprising as the HASC's chief concern was how far criminal law could go to solve 
problems of domestic violence (HASC, 1993b). Thus as policy community members, 
feminist practitioners could present a variety of truths, but the committee only `heard as 
true' those which supported its aims. 
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However, those with indigenous knowledges about domestic violence populations were 
still deemed relevant in 2000; to the extent that they were promoted from mere policy 
community members to `government guidance-givers'. It is clear that some attempts were 
made to steer these published truths as each memorandum is subtitled `What Works? in 
reducing domestic violence'; they were published under the `Policing and Crime 
Reduction' unit; and all the documents are roughly the same length (averaging three to four 
pages with references). But government's stated purpose for these texts is that they are 
`literature reviews' which should be used as guidance by those working to reduce crime at 
the local level (Home Office, 2000d-f). Therefore, feminists engaged in this activity, 
potentially have access to more power, even if this is in the short term. That is, the 
government endorsement, and possibly ownership, of these knowledges positions feminists 
where they can attempt to govern the conduct of statutory agencies. Consequently, the 
"problematizing activity" of governance (Rose & Miller, 1992, p. 181) falls, albeit 
temporarily and circumscribed, to feminists. 
It has been claimed that as feminists are afforded a more central position in government 
policy-making, feminism itself slips into abeyance (Bagguley, 2002). That is, feminists 
reduce the activisms with which they are generally associated. However, with an 
understanding of `doing' feminism as naming organisations, rendering causes relevant and 
producing subjects of representation, I believe that the government policy-making context 
does present opportunities to `do' feminism. Therefore, in the absence of academic 
literature which addresses these concerns, this chapter raises certain questions: How and to 
what effect can feminisms be seen to be `done' in women's advocates' policy-making talk 
and text? And what are the methodological implications of investigating these activities? 
When positioned as government guidance-givers, what attempts are made to govern 
statutory agencies? What are the differences and similarities between talk produced under 
the Conservatives and text produced under New Labour? 
Part One: Home Affairs Select Committee 1992/3 
This chapter part is divided into two sections, each containing one extended run of data. 
The purpose of this is to present `a feel' for the exchanges within the talk. In the first 
section I consider how three of the four participants warrant their knowledges and how 
these accounts contest or support one another. In the second, I focus on a committee 
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member's question, the response of two women participants and his assessment of the 
answers he receives. The four women's service providers are: Nicola Harwin from 
Women's Aid; Sandra Horley, from Chiswick Family Rescue; Pragna Patel from Southall 
Black Sisters; and Anne Viney from Victim Support. I interrogate how each one does, or 
does not, `do' feminism in terms of organisational naming, rendering causes relevant and 
producing subjects of representation. And I look at warrants, truth-claims and 
responsibilisations. 
1. Competing accounts: "research", "women working in refuges and shelters" and 
"our experience" 
Extracts 1-4 present a continuous piece of talk which occurs quite early in the evidence 
session. The Chair, Mrs Viney and Mrs Horley have spoken at some length (text not 
included). Ms Harwin and Miss Patel have yet to speak. Mrs Horley made her stance clear, 
particularly around the issue of the compellability of women who report domestic violence 
to the police. As the extract opens, Mr Butler is questioning the efficacy of compellability. 
Extract 1 [HASC (4)]': 
207 Mr Butler: (... ) In other words, instead of 
208 making a complaint but subsequently thinking 
209 perhaps not, the victim will not make the complaint 
210 in the first place and therefore the whole problem 
211 will be driven even further underground than it is at 
212 present? 
213 Mrs Horley: They have the same anxiety in 
214 Canada but the research does not bear that out. 
Mr Butler presents a contrast. In the first part, the "victim" makes a complaint and 
subsequently `thinks better of it'. `Thinking perhaps not' suggests choice on the part of the 
victim, a direct contrast with `compellability'. In the second part, an extreme case 
formulation (Pomerantz, 1986) is used: "in the first place". This legitimises his claim that 
compellability will lead to `no choice' for victims. The consequence of this is framed as 
"the whole problem will be driven even further underground than it is at present" (1.210- 
3 See Appendix 2 for extract conventions. 
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12). And the extreme case "whole problem" is a further claim for the absolutist nature of 
the outcome. The contrast, "even further underground than it is at present" acknowledges 
that the current situation is not perfect. But it frames the distinctiveness of enforcing 
compellability as qualitatively worse. Thus Mr Butler's question is rhetorical in that it 
answers itself: compellability eradicates victims' choices, disables criminal justice 
solutions and makes matters very much worse. 
Mrs, Horley's response is to ascribe Mr Butler's `factual' fait accompli as an "anxiety" 
(1.213) and one that "They" "in Canada" also have. Thus his position is simultaneously 
acknowledged as not unusual and reformulated as worry. The veracity of that position is 
disclaimed ("but") in favour of a truth-claim founded in "research" which "does not bear 
that out". Therefore, Mr Butler's rhetorical truth is undermined as not based in reality. In 
this way, she constitutes "research" as something that produces facts that are not readily 
apparent. Although her argument appears to be effective in closing Mr Butler down, it also 
provides an opportunity for Ms Harwin, who undeterred by "research" and "Canada" 
truths, positions herself in disagreement with Mrs Horley. 
Extract 2 [HASC (4)]: 
215 Ms Harwin: I would disagree on that 
216 because I have had some communication from 
217 women working in refuges and shelters in Canada 
218 that they do believe that in areas, specifically where 
219 there is no adequate support and particularly 
220 adequate shelters, there is some evidence that 
221 women there are failing to report. I think there is a 
222 problem and there certainly is a problem in this 
223 country at the current time when there is not enough 
224 support available to women that the time that it 
225 takes to go to court often leaves some women very 
226 vulnerable. Often it is not always possible to get bail 
227 conditions attached which means that men will have 
228 to leave the house. We are in a situation here where 
229 if we pursue proper arrest and prosecution policies 
230 without adequately putting in place all the 
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231 provisions which need to be made to support 
232 women, then we may put women at further risk. 
Ms Harwin counters Mrs Horley's version of reality with "some evidence that women are 
failing to report" (1.220-1) "in Canada" (1.217). This claim is founded in "some 
communication" she has had with "women working in refuges and shelters in Canada" 
(1.217). `Some evidence' and "some communication" are vague formulations and therefore 
difficult to undermine. What is not vague are the category entitlements she is affording 
"women working in refuges and shelters" to supply appropriate evidence for herself to 
represent their truths. Thus implicitly she aligns herself to them but without explicitly 
invoking that identity for herself. Further, she shifts the axis of the topic of debate. Mr 
Butler and Mrs Horley were engaged in contesting compellability and criminal justice 
processes. Ms Harwin retains criminal justice ("failing to report", 1.221) but sets it in 
relation to "adequate support" (1.219) and "adequate shelters" (1.220). This too is justified 
on the grounds of what "women working in refuges and shelters" believe. 
Ms Harwin's apparent reluctance to directly invoke the organisation she represents is 
demonstrated in the next sentence. She begins with "I think there is a problem and there 
certainly is a problem in this country at the current time" (1.221-3). It is almost as if she is 
correcting herself in that what "I think" is framed as not an adequate warrant for the 
veracity of her account. So, "there certainly is a problem" works as a reality-claim that 
founds what she thinks. And having used "Canada" to formulate "no adequate support" 
(1.219) as the problem, she relocates the relevance of "not enough support available to 
women" (1.223-4) in the UK and in the present. She also reproduces her support/criminal 
justice relation by juxtaposing "support available" (1.224) with "the time that it takes to go 
to court" (1.224-5). The suggestion is that, at the current time, in the UK, support and 
justice are out of kilter because they leave "some women very vulnerable" (1.225-6). 
This gender constitution does not render women inevitably or innately vulnerable, as it is 
not ascribed to all women. However, there is a sense that it is not a favourable production 
of "women" as the next sentence (1.226-8) qualifies the source of that vulnerability as 
"men" in "the house". And the argument about the support and crime interventions 
relationship is furthered. The time taken to get to court and the elusiveness of "bail 
conditions" position women in the home with the men that they have made complaints 
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against. Consequently, the criminal justice system is ascribed as generating the need for 
support. 
In the final sentence, this support/crime inter-relatedness is repeated and used to found a 
responsibility ascription: "We are in a situation here where if we pursue proper arrest and 
prosecution policies without adequately putting in place all the provisions which need to be 
made to support women, then we may put women at further risk" (1.228-232). "We" infers 
criminal justice policy-makers and providers of women's support services. But the use of 
"we" blurs the boundaries of where one responsibility begins and the other ends. Therefore, 
the joint responsibilisation not to put women at further risk founds claims for adequate 
support, alignment of crime and support services and working together. Consequently, Ms 
Harwin accomplishes, by the narrowest of margins, a category entitlement for herself as a 
women's service provider. 
In terms of `doing' feminism, there seems to be reluctance in Ms Harwin's account to 
explicitly warrant an identity for herself as a woman who works in refuges and shelters. 
Mrs Horley generated the opportunity to talk about "Canada" and Ms Harwin used this to 
found truths about "women working in refuges and shelters" in Canada. But she still 
problematises what "I think" and only finally claims a category entitlement tentatively. The 
causes of domestic violence are not made explicit but a gender relation of men rendering 
women vulnerable and at risk is formulated. Therefore, again implicitly, potential causes 
are suggested which render men visible as doers of the deed and are not permissive of 
women blaming. The main subject of representation is "women working in refuges and 
shelters". This is interesting for two reasons. Firstly, it makes gender relevant to service 
providers. Secondly, it formulates women service providers as viable truth-tellers. 
The truths Ms Harwin presents are picked up and reformulated by Mrs Horley. She attunes 
to the women focus, the support/criminal justice system relationship and `we' as service 
provides and crime policy-makers. 
Extract 3 [HOAC (4)]: 
233 Mrs Horley: This was precisely my point that 
234 they have to have support. Compellability is a last 
235 resort, but I feel we have to deliver a strong public 
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236 message that assaulting a woman in the home is a 
237 criminal offence. If victims are allowed not to give 
238 evidence then the abuser walks out of the court scot 
239 free. 
Mrs Horley's first move seems to be to claim Ms Harwin's position as her own through the 
extreme case "precisely my point". Like Ms Harwin she formulates a "support" and 
criminal justice relation ("Compellability", "assaulting", "criminal offence"). But unlike, 
Ms Harwin she prioritises crime responses over support provision. She frames 
compellability as a "last resort". This is an extreme case, and I think this is an attempt to 
fend off challenges that she is in disagreement with Ms Harwin. However, there is an 
immediate disclaimer ("but") that delimiting the importance of compellability should also 
delimit the importance of criminal justice interventions. Thus "we have to deliver a strong 
public message that assaulting a woman in the home is a criminal offence" (1.235-7) stands 
as a bottom line argument. Regardless of the need for support and the potential benefits of 
compellability, the key issue is stopping the violence happening in the first place. And as 
she understands it, that can be accomplished through using the criminal law to tell the 
public it is wrong and will be punished. The "we" (1.235) seems to be a replication of Ms 
Harwin's framing of women service providers and crime policy-makers. Thus it could be 
read as a plea to all present to see and accept this view. 
Despite having initially rendered "Compel lability" less relevant, in the final sentence she 
once again ascribes it value. The negative and passive form of "If victims are allowed not 
to give evidence" (1.237-8) suggests that compellability is understood as contentious. And 
the outcome of allowing this to happen is constituted as "the abuser walks out of the court 
scot free" (1.238-9). This is interesting for three reasons. Firstly, "scot free" is another 
extreme case which within an understanding of the law's capacity to stop violence by 
saying it is wrong, is being framed as the `worst case scenario'. Secondly, she has made a 
shift from "woman" to "victims". Thus at the point that she justifies acting upon "victims" 
again their will, she renders their gender irrelevant. Thirdly, gender is not made apposite to 
the "abuser". And this suggests either that she sees domestic violence as violence against 
women not gendered violence; or, for the purposes of this argument a gendered abuser is 
not deemed useful. I think it is the latter because Mrs Horley displays a tendency to make 
violent men visible (see Extract 6). Accordingly, the advantages of not gendering here are 
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to de-personalise the "victims" to be compelled; and to argue for the potential of the 
ungendered criminal law deterrent for correcting gender(ed) moral wrongs. 
There appears to be little evidence from Extracts one and 3 that Mrs Horley is `doing' 
feminism in this piece of talk. With "we" (1.235) she very obliquely positions herself in the 
gamut of women's service providers and crime policy-makers. But it is unclear where she 
locates herself within that claim. Secondly, the `causes' formulations in Mrs Horley's 
account are problematic. Certainly she makes the doer of the deed visible with "abuser". 
But in making female gender relevant to compellability she constitutes a justification 
which is permissive of women blaming. Further, her subject of representation is unclear. 
She formulates "women" needing support but she argues for their autonomy to be 
sacrificed. Therefore, I think her representative politics are to be found in her bottom line 
argument. That is, the primary necessity of "a strong public message" (1.235-6) implies that 
it is society as a whole which is at fault and needs correcting through the state's 
mobilisation of the law. Interestingly, she is calling for a united front but one that requires 
overriding victims' choices and freedoms in favour of `the greater good'. 
Extract 4 follows straight on. And here Miss Patel speaks for the first time. She opens with 
a direct claim to represent "My organisation's view" (1.240) which produces the warrant 
"our experience" (1.243) which in turn is threaded throughout her account (1.247,254,264). 
Extract 4 [HOAC (4)]: 
240 Miss Patel: My organisation's view is that we 
241 need to find a balance in how the criminal justice 
242 system deals with the issue of domestic violence. Our 
243 problem is, and certainly from our experience what 
244 we find is that the police are not doing enough to 
245 encourage women to use the criminal justice system 
246 as a way of dealing with domestic violence. Certainly 
247 in our experience what we find is that the police are 
248 deterring women by, for example, adopting delaying 
249 tactics, by suggesting that the Crown Prosecution 
250 Service is unlikely to take their complaint seriously 
251 and in doing that they are deterring women from 
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252 using the criminal justice system. We do not think 
253 that blanket arrests are appropriate in all cases, but 
254 our experience shows that the police and the Crown 
255 Prosecution Service are not doing enough to 
256 encourage women to use the criminal justice system 
257 as a way of dealing with domestic violence. We also 
258 feel that all the initiatives that have been taken on 
259 domestic violence by the police have tended to 
260 distract from the focus on the criminal justice system 
261 to what other agencies and other procedures can be 
262 followed by women to deal with domestic violence 
263 rather than focus on the criminal justice system 
264 itself. That has been our experience. 
Miss Patel positions Southall Black Sisters as promoting "balance in how the criminal 
justice system deals with the issue of domestic violence" (1.241-2). This suggests that 
balance is not currently accomplished and it can be understood as a counter-claim to Mrs 
Horley's version about the importance of legal measures. Although Miss Patel does not 
name her organisation she does invoke it and justifies "our experience" (my emphasis) as a 
way of telling truths. This justification is founded in what "we find" (1.244 & 247). Again, 
this can be seen as countering Mrs Horley's "research" truths and greater good assertions. 
The phrase "the police are not doing enough to encourage women to use the criminal 
justice system as a way of dealing with domestic violence" (1.244-6) is interesting for 
several reasons. Firstly, Ms Harwin problematised the criminal justice system and Mrs 
Horley questioned society and the state's position on criminal justice. By contrast, Miss 
Patel focuses on the police as responsible for their own wrong doing. Secondly, she 
formulates their role as facilitating "use (of) the criminal justice system". Therefore by "not 
doing enough" they are presented as failing in their duty. Thirdly, "women" are constituted 
as a gender distinct group who are currently disadvantaged by poor police practice. In 
addition the formulation "a way of dealing with domestic violence" frames these women as 
capable of choosing how they deal with domestic violence and criminal justice as 
something they should have a right to choose. Consequently, what marks these women is 
not that they are experiencing domestic violence but they are actively dealing with it and 
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their choices are being circumscribed by the police. This is quite a powerful 
responsibilisation. 
Moreover, she takes this further by naming what the police do as "deterring women" (1.248 
& 251). Again, she founds this "in our experience what we find" (1.247). And again their 
gender is made relevant to what the police do to them. Miss Patel exemplifies this with 
"adopting delaying tactics by suggesting that the Crown Prosecution service is unlikely to 
take their complaint seriously" (1.248-250). The "adopting delaying tactics" reformulates 
something Ms Harwin said earlier. In Extract 2, she implicates "the time that it takes to go 
to court" (1.224-5) in rendering women vulnerable. She made no ascription as to why the 
time-scale was so long. Here, Miss Patel is explicit about who is responsible and directly 
blames the police. Not only do they adopt delaying tactics but they also formulate the 
Crown Prosecution Service as `the problem'. And the repetition of "deterring" (1.251) is 
possibly another reference to Mrs Horley's account. She understands the mandatory arrest 
of offenders as a deterrent. Miss Patel sees the deterrent effect in the police treatment of 
those offended against. Implicitly, the police are being framed as sexist. 
At line 252, Miss Patel again undermines Mrs Horley's account. "We do not think blanket 
arrests are appropriate in all cases" (my emphases) contains two extreme case formulations. 
And I think this double absolute works to delimit the importance of an `arrest at all costs 
focus' such as the one forwarded by Mrs Horley. Thus it is not that Southall Black Sisters 
are against arrest per se, indeed there is a strong sense that criminal justice is important. 
Rather, it is how the criminal justice system as "a way of dealing with domestic violence" 
is accessed, or not, that is problematised. Thus mandatory versus non-mandatory arrest is 
disclaimed as the key issue when "the police and the Crown Prosecution Service are not 
doing enough to encourage women" (1.254-6). This suggests that women entering criminal 
justice processes need encouragement to stay there. But it also suggests that women should 
still have choices. Consequently, not taking complaints seriously and compellability are 
implied as the two ends of poor police practice. Each delimits women's choices and does 
not facilitate their usage of the criminal justice system. 
At line 257, in a further example of this deterrence/lack of encouragement, Miss Patel 
claims that the police response to domestic violence has been to try and do other agencies' 
work rather than their own. The "focus on the criminal justice system" (1.260 & 263) is 
framed as what the police should be doing. But "all the initiatives" they are doing concern 
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"what other agencies and other procedures can be followed by women to deal with 
domestic violence" (1.261-2). Therefore, Southall Black Sisters are positioned as 
unimpressed with a police response to domestic violence that side-steps criminal justice 
issues. The claim is that they should do their job and do it properly. And this is again 
founded in "our experience" (1.264). 
In terms of `doing' feminism, Miss Patel's strongest move is framing herself as an 
organisational representative, invoking Southall Black Sisters and rendering "our 
experience" as a viable way of telling truths. This is because each time she warrants an 
argument, she renders the politics of ethnicity and gender relevant to the process of giving 
evidence as an expert witness. Her subject of representation is very clearly the 
organisation. But she does formulate a population of women as active, choosing and 
dealing with domestic violence. However, female gender is rendered apposite to the police 
practice of delimiting women's criminal justice options in a way which implies that police 
treatment of these women is underpinned by sexism. Miss Patel does not invoke causes of 
domestic violence per se but in this account police practice is formulated as `the problem'. 
Thus the doers of the deed whom she renders visible are the police. And although only 
gendering women she accomplishes police blaming which is not permissive of the 
reallocation of that blame. In terms of interacting with competing accounts, she actively 
undermines Mrs Horley's account as extreme, out of balance and missing the key point. By 
contrast, Ms Harwin's version is used to found a responsibility ascription about criminal 
justice time-scales and delaying tactics. 
In summary, Miss Patel and Ms Harwin, to a much lesser extent, can be seen to be `doing' 
feminism in terms of organisational warranting. Both produce their respective agency as 
the main subject of representation. The effects of this include rendering gender and `race' 
relevant and claiming a `working together' role with crime policy-makers. Mrs Horley does 
not `do' feminism here as she founds claims in "research" veracity and argues for the 
greater good of society at the expense of individual women. Ms Harwin and Mrs Horley 
constitute passive women, although Ms Harwin does gender assailants as male and is not 
permissive of women blaming. Miss Patel frames active women attempting to deal with 
domestic violence and makes their gender relevant to police sexism. Methodologically, it 
seems advantageous to present long extracts of talk as the moves that are consequential 
upon each other become clearer. 
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In this section I was concerned primarily with `doing' and not `doing' feminism. This 
necessitated using an extract with different voices. As such, women practitioners are 
demonstrated as attuning to each other. Therefore, in the next section I focus on talk where 
interaction with a Committee member is more explicit. 
2. Delimiting truth: the rules of engagement 
Extracts 5-7 comprise a question from Mr Booth about "police attitudes", answers from 
Mrs Viney and Mrs Honey and a further prompt from Mr Booth. Immediately prior to 
Extract 5, the Chair has halted discussion on the preceding topic and handed the floor to 
Mr Booth. He explicitly chooses Mrs Viney from Victim Support to answer his question 
(text not included); and after an exchange with her (text not included) claims "some links" 
(1.391) with her organisation. 
Extract 5 [HASC (13-14)]: 
391 Mr Booth: I have some links with that. Can you tell 
392 the Committee whether in your view police attitudes 
393 are either improved or have they become worse? 
394 What is the position with police attitudes towards 
395 domestic violence and bringing of prosecutions? 
396 Mrs Viney: As you will have seen from our 
397 report, the Association of Chief Police officers was 
398 represented on our working party. There was a great 
399 deal of frankness among all the practitioners about 
400 difficulties in respective agencies. There was no 
401 quarrel with the fact that historically domestic 
402 violence has been regarded as not being quite a 
403 crime, that police have been reluctant to intervene in 
404 what they have seen as domestic disputes. Gradually 
405 there has been a change of attitudes. There has been 
406 a change of policy that has culminated in 
407 circular 60/90, where police are encouraged to 
408 regard it very much as a crime. From a broad 
409 victim's point of view we would like all criminal 
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410 justice personnel to have training in victim 
411 awareness and in domestic violence particularly. 
412 That is not just the police. I do not think they should 
413 be singled out in this respect. That would go through 
414 the police, the CPS, magistrates, judges and lawyers. 
Mr Booth sets up a relation between himself having links with Victim Support, "the 
Committee" and "in your view". And this positioning potentially relegates any answer he 
may receive to a personal opinion before it is uttered. The question he formulates is a 
`forced choice' one. That is, he delimits possible appropriate answers to whether "police 
attitudes" have "improved" or "become worse". A police responsibility around domestic 
violence is constituted as the "bringing of prosecutions". Therefore, "police attitudes" are 
being ascribed as the potential facilitation of, or barrier to, the fulfilment of police duties. 
It seems possible that Mrs Viney has understood "in your view" as detrimental to her 
account as she engages in warranting activity. She begins by warranting "our report" 
(1.396-7) and the presence of "the Association of Chief Police officers" (ACPO, 1.397) at 
"our working party" (1.398). Through "our", she accomplishes an agreement across 
witnesses which frames her as representing a collective endeavour rather than her own 
interests. And possibly, this is also an attempt to disrupt Mr Booth's claim to links with 
Victim Support. The report she refers to has been cited in the Chair's opening address as 
one of the key reasons that HASC is being held at all (paragraph 1, text not included). So, 
she is invoking a category entitlement for her organisation which has been founded in the 
talk of the Chairman of "the Committee". Further, ACPO can be seen as working as 
another warrant. ACPO represents the most senior police officers in the UK. Therefore, 
constituting them here is part of the truth-claim that legitimises her as someone who can 
answer Mr Booth's question with justifiable authority on the subject. 
She goes on to say that there "was a great deal of frankness among all the practitioners" 
(1.398-9). The extreme case "all" seems to render "frankness" as an integral feature of the 
working party discussions. But it could also be suggesting that the police were no 
exception. Either way, her argument is that she knows the truth about "difficulties in 
respective agencies" (1.400) from `the horse's mouth'. 
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Mrs Viney then presents a three-part list (Jefferson, 1990) which changes the subject from 
`attitudes' to "a change of (government) policy" (1.406). In the first part, she argues that 
"There was no quarrel with the fact that historically domestic violence has been regarded 
as being not quite a crime, that the police have been reluctant to intervene in what they 
have seen as domestic disputes" (1.400-4). The warrant for the veracity of this statement 
draws on the frankness of the working party participants who had "no quarrel" with the 
claim she is about to make. Within this sentence, she makes a move from the general to the 
particular case of the police. The formulation of the police being "reluctant to intervene" 
and viewing domestic violence negatively as "domestic disputes" invokes Mr Booth's 
constitutions of police responsibility and police attitudes. But Mrs Viney's general case 
does not name the police. Indeed, regarding domestic violence "as not quite a crime" is not 
ascribed an actor. Consequently, this suggests that a wider understanding of domestic 
violence's status, not just a police one, was "historically" important. Thus she attunes to 
Mr Booth's `truth' but repositions it in a wider context. 
In the second part, the time frame has been brought forward: "Gradually there has been a 
change in attitudes" (1.404-5). The suggestion from "Gradually" is that change has taken 
some time. And the passive form, "has been", again implies that attitudes are not the sole 
preserve of the police. In the third part, Mrs Viney asserts that "There has been a change in 
policy that has culminated in circular 60/90, where police are encouraged to regard it very 
much as a crime" (1.405-8). Therefore, she formulates "a change in policy" as a significant 
measure of a change in attitudes. But "circular 60/90" is a government policy and 
consequently the important change in attitudes is ascribed to government. Whilst she 
endorses Mr Booth's constitution of domestic violence as a police matter ("very much a 
crime"), and police attitudes as a potential barrier to the execution of their duty, her 
responsibility ascription is to government to direct the police. 
Overall, the effect of this topic-changing list formation is to set the problem that Mr Booth 
has formulated into a wider context of the government/police relationship. Thus she has 
undermined his question and the way it was asked, but simultaneously she has engaged 
directly with the points he has made. Also she has presented government as responsible for 
attitudes whilst repositioning the police away from the single focus of possible blame. And 
she continues in this vein. 
193 
At line 408 she introduces a new dimension to her Victim Support category entitlement. 
The warrant "From a broad victim's point of view" is used to found a request of what "we 
would like" (from government) (1.408-9). And the object of this request is "training" "for 
all criminal justice personnel" (1.409-10). As might have been expected from an 
organisation which represents a range of victims, this training is framed as for "victim 
awareness" (1.410-1) generally and "domestic violence particularly" (1.411). This move 
from the general to the specific positions domestic violence as important to, but not the 
starting point of, Victim Support's concerns. Further, the extreme case "all" (1.409) 
criminal justice personnel is an attempt to legitimise the argument that it is "not just the 
police" (1.412) who need it. This is additionally supported in the closing lines with a claim 
that they should not "be singled out in this respect" (1.413) and a comprehensive five-part 
list of appropriate criminal justice personnel (1.414). 
It is clear in this extract that Mrs Viney is not `doing' feminism. Her subjects of 
representation are `Victim Support', which although invoking an organisation does not 
convey any feminist politics, and a "broad victim". There is no gender in her formulations, 
no sense of causes and no doer of the deed is made visible. However, she does do some 
interesting discursive work to undermine the question she was asked and the way it was 
asked. She positions herself as a viable opinion-giver, founding this in notions of Victim 
Support's status as a valued `knower of truths' in this context and a bona fide 
representative of victims generally. Also she ascribes responsibility to government for 
police attitudes as part of the means for asking for training for all criminal justice 
personnel. Thus she has conformed to the rules of engagement whilst simultaneously 
subverting the circumscription of the question asked. 
Extract 6 follows directly on with Mrs Horley interjecting: - 
Extract 6 [HASC (13)]: 
415 Mrs Horley: I just wanted to try to get back to 
416 the main point here, which is that this is an issue of 
417 basic human rights, an issue of social justice and the 
418 costs of domestic violence are very, very high. We 
419 should not be treating it differently from any other 
420 crime of violence. The costs are high in terms of the 
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421 children's needs, in terms of physical, psychological 
422 and emotional abuse, as well as the quality of 
423 women's lives. It is not uncommon for women who 
424 have suffered frequent assaults over a number of 
425 years to result (sic) to alcohol, drugs or even suicide. A 
426 significant number of women are murdered by their 
427 partners. It is also recognised by the Canadian 
428 Government that women who are abused represent 
429 a significant loss to the work force. There are other 
430 costs: more repeated calls for the police, women on 
431 social security, women going into casualty wards. It 
432 is a drain on housing and social services. In the long 
433 term it is in the public interest to arrest and charge 
434 violent men because we know it acts as a deterrent. 
The main warrant for the veracity of her account is forwarded as "costs" (1.418,420 & 
430). This is framed as "the main point" (1.416) and furnished in a three-part list. The list 
"basic human rights, an issue of social justice and the costs of domestic violence" (1.417-8) 
is comprehensive. But that only becomes apparent as the paragraph unfolds. That is, 
"costs" are presented as financial but also as exacting a price from "basic human rights" 
and "social justice". Therefore, she is mobilising both a moral and practical argument 
around "costs". Morality is invoked in "We should" (1.418-9) which suggests moral 
obligation. "We" seems to refer to `we, as a society' as the persuasion is to accept "crime 
of violence" (1.420) as `in the object' of domestic violence. This is accomplished through 
the extreme case formulation "any other" (1.419). 
At line 420, Mrs Horley makes explicit claims about "costs". She juxtaposes "children's 
needs" (1.421) in terms of "abuse" with "the quality of women's lives" (1.422-3). Therefore, 
the "costs" paid by children and women are framed as socially unjust costs to their basic 
human rights. Further, the three-part list of "physical, psychological and emotional abuse" 
(1.421-2) to children works as an emotive descriptor. Children are often positioned as the 
ultimate example of innocence. Thus locating them here next to women can be understood 
as an attempt to ascribe moral worthiness to both the children and the women who pay the 
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costs of domestic violence with their basic human rights. This reading is supported by her 
move to specific costs to women and the disappearance of children. 
Women are constituted as often resorting to "alcohol, drugs or even suicide" (1.425). This 
is an ascending three-part list implying escalating costs to women and culminating in the 
extreme case "suicide", as the ultimate cost one can exact from oneself. However, the 
effect is not to blame women as self-harming. Rather, within the framework of society's 
responsibility to address "the main point", "suffered frequent assaults over a number of 
years" (1.424-5) again mobilises understandings of basic human rights and social injustice. 
At line 425, she asserts that "A significant number of women are murdered by their 
partners". This is interesting for a number of reasons. Firstly, "significant number" implies 
statistical truth but no `research' or specific warrant is made explicit in support of this 
claim. Secondly, "murdered" is an extreme case. As such, it fits the "main point" 
framework as the ultimate cost exacted by another, a social injustice and contravening the 
most basic of human rights, the right to life. Thirdly, the constitutions "women" and 
"partners" are unequal. Thus she is formulating violence against women rather than 
gendered violence. 
At this point, she introduces a further warrant in the form of "It is also recognised by the 
Canadian Government that women who are abused represent a significant loss to the work 
force" (1.427-9). And I think the move she is making here is to do with ascribing a direct 
responsibility. Back at line 418 there was an invocation "We" as a society with a moral 
duty. But here, she makes a Government, and perhaps more appositely `the state', relevant 
to financial costs incurred by organisations. I read this as a responsibilisation of the UK 
Government. The sense is that the Canadian Government have seen domestic violence in 
this way, therefore there is precedence for the UK Government to follow suit. 
From line 429, Mrs Horley formulates further costs: "more repeated calls to the police, 
women on social security, women going into casualty wards". And she frames domestic 
violence as "a drain on housing and social services" (1.432). I see these two formations as a 
three-part list changing the topic from organisational costs, through costs for women, to 
costs for society. Therefore, it would seem that by means of organisational costs, the 
responsibility of `the state' is still being implicated. 
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In the final sentence, Mrs Horley claims "In the long term it is in the public interest to 
arrest and charge violent men because we know it acts as a deterrent" (1.432-4). There is 
much to unpack here. Firstly, with "in the public interest to arrest and charge" she renders 
domestic violence a matter of crime and criminal justice as the appropriate means of 
dealing with it. `Public interest' also invokes a responsibility of the establishment to act on 
society's behalf. Secondly, "violent men" names the doers of the deeds and makes male 
gender relevant. Therefore, in addition to her production of women as morally worthy 
(1.420-27), she implicitly constitutes domestic violence as a gender relational problem and 
men as generating all these costs. Thirdly, "deterrent" suggests that domestic violence can 
be stopped quite easily. Put simply, this is a `what works' discourse. Interestingly, despite 
having mobilised "research" to make the same argument earlier (see Extract One), she does 
not realise that opportunity here. And I think this is because "deterrent" for Mrs Horley is 
the bottom line argument. That is, it is the truth of all truths, something "we (all) know". 
Overall, the sense of the paragraph becomes clearest in that final word. Society has a moral 
duty to recognise the crime of domestic violence which exacts costs from the economy, 
social justice and human rights. Women (and children) pay most of these costs. Employers 
and society pay financial costs. Men commit this crime (against women) and the criminal 
justice system can stop them. Therefore, like the Canadian Government before it, the UK 
Government needs to recognise society's moral duty and act in its interests. In relation to 
Mr Booth's question about "police attitudes", her suggestion is that they are irrelevant and 
this could be seen as implicitly forwarding the notion that arrest should be mandatory, 
therefore bypassing any need to engage with police attitudes. 
In terms of `doing' feminism, there seems to be a strong case in regard to `causes' for 
arguing that Mrs Horley is accomplishing just that. She doesn't name the organisation she 
represents or found any claims in the status that that may afford her in this context. Rather, 
there is a sense that she is an objective social commentator presenting facts that are plain 
for all to see; a voice of reason. And this impacts on the subject of representation she does 
formulate. Certainly she constitutes morally worthy women who pay the bulk of the costs 
arising from domestic violence caused by violent men; subjects conducive to many 
feminisms. But commensurate with her talk in Extract 3, her more direct subject of 
representation appears to be `the greater good' of society. And that potentially subverts the 
grounds on which she is present, as a practitioner of women's service provision. Finally, 
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and most importantly, she names "violent men" as the cause of domestic violence and 
renders it a gender relational matter. Therefore, although inconsistent in her genderings, 
she does not capitulate to a victim intervention focus which can render domestic violence a 
problem of women. In addition, she accomplishes a responsibilisation of government (and 
perhaps of society as well) for allowing the conditions that support domestic violence. 
However, despite Mrs Horley taking more liberties with the rules of engagement than Mrs 
Viney and generating opportunities to `do' feminism, her account suffers a similar fate. In 
Extract 7, Mr Booth, the initial questioner, responds to what both have said. His utterance 
is presented in its entirety. 
Extract 7 [HASC (14)]: 
435 Mr Booth: You very helpfully said in answer to my 
436 question that you think perhaps police training 
437 could be improved. Are there any other suggestions 
438 that any of you have that would improve police 
439 attitudes and contact in this area? 
Mr Booth's talk can be read as an attempt to reassert the rules of engagement which frame 
the committee members as the appropriate parties to set the agenda. Mrs Viney undermined 
his question and the way he asked it. Here, he reasserts "my question" about "police 
attitudes" (twice) and summarises her argument as "you think perhaps police training could 
be improved" (1.436-7). This renders irrelevant her responsibilisation of government and 
her request for training for all criminal justice personnel not just the police. But also, 
through "perhaps", he introduces some vagary to the training that is needed which might be 
an attempt to hide his rudeness at ignoring her. Indeed, "very helpfully" suggests that he is 
positioning himself as grateful for her contribution despite undermining her account. If 
anything, Mrs Horley fares worse; it is as if she has not even spoken. In his final sentence 
Mr Booth uses the extreme case "any" twice. `Any other suggestions that gLny of you have' 
(1.437-8) is used to legitimise his claim that the improvement of police training is the only 
(appropriate) suggestion he has received and that Mrs Viney is the only person to forward a 
suggestion. Thus Mrs Horley, her `doing' of feminism and her claim of `what works' in 
reducing domestic violence are made invisible. 
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In summary, what Mr Booth hears as true is delimited by his rules of engagement in terms 
of the question he has asked. Both Mrs Viney and Mrs Horley attempt to undermine his 
question and pay similar prices for doing so. Mrs Viney does not `do' feminism. She works 
hard to present her category entitlement to speak and to relocate the relevance of his 
question about police attitudes into the wider context of a government/police dynamic. And 
she founds claims for training for all criminal justice personnel not just the police. 
Therefore, despite attuning to the rules of engagement, her version is delimited in its 
ascribed relevance to "police training". By contrast, Mrs Horley `does' feminism and pays 
little heed to the rules of engagement. Like Mrs Viney she formulates an indirect 
responsibilisation of government and positions her account in regard to criminal justice. 
But in so doing, she renders "police attitudes", and therefore Mr Booth's question, 
irrelevant. Mr Booth treats her version as if it has never been uttered. 
The upshot of this is that regardless of whether or not feminism is `done' in government 
policy-making, whoever is positioned to influence the rules of engagement, in this case 
committee members, has more immediate access to power. But that is not commensurate 
with arguing that `doing' feminism in this context is always doomed before it begins. 
Rather, it indicates that, in this instance, the `doing' of feminism was enacted inside the 
policy arena but outside the rules of engagement. Therefore, it was neither an external 
critique nor a realisation of the opportunities generated and circumscribed by the event. 
The implications of this analysis are considered in the chapter part conclusion. 
Part One Conclusion 
In this chapter part I have interrogated the talk of the four service providers at HASC. The 
aim was to identify the `doing' of feminism in terms of organisational naming, invoking 
causes and producing a subject of representation, and how that was used to found truth- 
claims and responsibilisations. 
Invoking organisational names was one way in which `doing' feminism is accomplished. 
Miss Patel particularly, through the discourse of "our experience", renders the ethnic and 
gender politics encapsulated in `Southall Black Sisters' relevant to her opening truth- 
claims. By contrast, there is an apparent reluctance in the other two participants who `do' 
feminism to invoke their organisations directly. Ms Harwin claims an indirect allegiance to 
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"women working in refuges and shelters" and implicitly responsibilises crime policy- 
makers to work together with them. Mrs Horley founds her arguments in "research" and 
the `facts' of moral/legal obligations, directly responsibilising those in a position to change 
society. Mrs Viney, who does not `do' feminism at all, does invoke her organisation to 
responsibilise government to provide criminal justice training. But `Victim Support' does 
not convey political meaning. Consequently, organisational naming per se does not 
constitute `doing' feminism but invoking a politicised agency name, or to a lesser extent 
rendering female gender relevant to service providers, can be seen as such. 
The causes of domestic violence are invoked by Ms Harwin who frames women's risk and 
vulnerability as emanating from men in the home. And they are rendered explicit by Mrs 
Horley who constitutes a society where assaulting women is not seen as criminal and 
names "violent men" as the people who do domestic violence. Mrs Viney does not 
formulate causes. One of the problems of constituting `violence against women' in the 
absence of a gendered perpetrator is that, potentially, it can make gender relevant to 
interventions only and it can be used to support women blaming (see Chapter 4). Miss 
Patel avoids that dilemma by rendering female gender relevant to sexism in police service 
provision. Thus she positions gendered power relations in domestic violence's career path 
and `names and shames' the responsible parties. Consequently, forwarding causes of 
domestic violence is not the only way that gender relations can be implicated in the policy- 
making arena. 
Mrs Viney constitutes "a broad victim" as her subject of representation. By contrast, Miss 
Patel positions herself as representing Southall Black Sisters; for Ms Harwin it is "women 
working in refuges and shelters"; and for Mrs Horley it is "research" and `the greater good' 
of society. Consequently, for the three women who `do' feminism, the subject of 
representation does not comprise those who experience domestic violence. However, it is 
hard to see how those who `do' feminism could present a united feminist front. Mrs Horley 
constitutes essentially passive women who incur the costs of domestic violence. And at the 
point of criminal justice interventions they become de-personalised and de-gendered 
"victims" upon whom others should act for the greater good. Ms Harwin too formulates 
passive women in need of support. Miss Patel generates a potentially active, choosing 
woman attempting to deal with domestic violence who is being discriminated against, and 
having her choices limited, by the police. Only Mrs Horley makes an appeal for a united 
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stance and Miss Patel undermines that version as out of balance, wrongly focused and 
extreme. 
Methodologically there are limitations to this analysis. Firstly, it is difficult to account for 
why Miss Patel readily founds claims in Southall Black Sisters and Ms Harwin seems 
reluctant to invoke Women's Aid. This could be seen as the former understanding the rules 
of engagement to ascribe value to practitioners' views. But it can also be read as an 
enactment of standpoint feminism. From that perspective, The Truth is made up of partial 
and interested truths (Patel, 1999). Mainstream understandings are incomplete because they 
do not incorporate the truths of marginalised groups (e. g. Harding, 1991). So, the 
standpoint feminist project is making these accounts known more widely and 
organisational warranting is a viable way of truth-telling, regardless of the context. 
Secondly, whether or not truths are heard as true can only be assessed from the immediate 
context. Thus Mrs Viney's appeal for criminal justice training appears to fall on deaf ears, 
despite the fact she works hard to conform to the rules of engagement. Also Miss Patel's 
responsibilisation of the Crown Prosecution Service brings forth no response. And yet, in 
the Government's reply to HASC, the Crown Prosecution Service is abjectly criticised and 
rendered in need of training (Home Office, 1993). 
The implications arising from what can be analysed are as follows. Some participants, 
notably Miss Patel, `do' more feminism than others. That is, they render politics and 
gendered power relationships relevant in the context of government policy-making. Also 
`doing' feminism in a way that contravenes the rules of engagement, such as Mrs Horley 
does, can result in whole arguments being immediately dismissed as irrelevant. Moreover, 
the participants whom government deems appropriate to take part may have different 
political positions. And this can be used, as it is to some extent by Ms Harwin and Miss 
Patel, to problematise points of differentiation. 
In this chapter part I have concentrated on `doing' feminism in practitioners' talk in the 
government policy-making context. In the next chapter part I focus on `doing' feminism in 
researchers' texts in government policy-making guidance in order to facilitate the basis of a 
comparison. 
4 Also more recently, formulations of costs/causes similar to those Mrs Horley forwards here, seem to have found favour 
with New Labour (see Home Office, 2003b). 
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Part Two: What Works? Memoranda 2000 
The twelve What Works? in reducing domestic violence memoranda, authored in the main 
by key feminists working around domestic violence and published under the Home 
Office's Policing and Reducing Crime Unit, form the data for this chapter part (see 
footnote 2). Their ascribed purpose is to be literature reviews to inform and guide local 
crime reduction projects (Home Office, 2000d-f). As might be expected from such a 
government policy-making activity, there is a strong emphasis on `research' veracity. And 
the appropriateness of the participants is founded in their status as academic researchers. 
The purpose of this chapter part is to demonstrate the `doing' of feminism in this context. 
But I am also interested, given the positioning of these texts, in attempts to govern the 
conduct of statutory agencies. In section 3I consider the warrant `research' and how it is 
used to found claims about what women say and to ascribe relevance to the causes of 
domestic violence. In section 4I explore some usages to which the organisational naming 
of "Women's Aid" is put. 
3. Warranting `research' 
As might have been expected, all twelve What Works? memoranda warrant "research" as a 
way of telling truths. Ten of the documents found truth-claims about women's accounts in 
the warrant of `research' veracity. For example: - 
Extract 8 [What Works? Health (Davidson et al, 2000)]5: 
64 (... ) Women's 
65 expectations and views of health care have been 
66 described and some studies of the attitudes of care- 
67 givers are also available. (... ) 
Extract 9 [What Works? Perpetrator Programmes (Mullender & Burton, 2000)]: 
117 (... ) Most women respondents felt 
118 better off and safer; (... ) 
But even in just these few lines, it would appear that something different is being 
accomplished in the two documents. In Extract 8, the reporting of `research' does not 
frame the research participants ("Women" and "care-givers") as active meaning-makers. 
5 See Appendix 2 for extract conventions. 
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Their "expectations and views" are "described" and their "attitudes" are "available". Thus 
implicitly, `research' is constituted as the truth-teller. By contrast, in Extract 9, "women 
respondents" are formulated as the producers of knowledges. What they feel is ascribed 
value. So the difference is between presenting `women' as the objects or meaning-makers 
of research. Certainly research can be manipulated in the production and presentation of its 
truths (Condor, 1988). I am not arguing that this use of research is a `doing' of feminism as 
there is no indication that this is feminist research; no causes of domestic violence are 
invoked; and because of the brevity of the extracts there is no sense of the claims these 
warrants are used to found and no clear subject of representation. Rather, across the twelve 
What Works? memoranda those who `do' feminism tend to formulate research participants 
and not the research per se as truth-tellers. Although not exclusively a feminist preserve, 
that is consistent with a feminist approach (e. g. Kelly, 1996; Williamson, 2000). 
Extracts 10 and 11 demonstrate another, but related, difference between the ways that 
research warrants are mobilised: how and to what effect subjects of representation are 
constituted. Extract 10, comes from the What Works? on Civil Law memorandum. The 
whole document is set up as a piece of research in its own right (1.42-56, text not included). 
Therefore, all the claims are founded in research veracity. The text presented below comes 
from the `Conclusions and recommendations'. 
Extract 10 [What Works? Civil Law (Edwards (2000b)J: 
179 " The police and courts are making good use of the 
180 FLA. The intervention of the civil law in providing 
181 injunctive protection and exclusion order protection 
182 for both women and children could provide an 
183 important deterrent to abusers, providing early 
184 intervention in domestic violence and reinforcing 
185 the message that domestic violence will not be 
186 tolerated. 
This bullet point presents an account of the features of injunctions which are ascribed 
positive value. The first sentence forms praise for "The police and courts" in the way they 
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use "FLA"6. The remainder formulates civil law's provision potential in a three-part list of: 
"providing" "protection" for "women and children"; "could provide' a "deterrent to 
abusers"; "providing early intervention" (my emphases). And an extra benefit is formulated 
as "reinforcing the message that domestic violence will not be tolerated". 
In the first part of the list (1.180-2), the appropriate intervention is framed as "protection" 
and its objects as "women and children". This relational pairing infers that the "women" 
are the mothers of these children (Sacks, 1974). And mothers coupled with children forms 
an emotive descriptor to support the argument that they need "protection". Women's need 
to be protected (often with their children) is a commonly produced negative femininity 
ascription (Ahmed, 1995). And such formulations are often accompanied by framing the 
recipient of protection as passive (Harmer & Stanko, 1985). And this appears to be the 
case here. Also founding claims for women's worthiness in their motherhood status is 
always problematic. It allows for hierarchies of women's worth to be forwarded and it 
provides additional discursive opportunities to ascribe blame (Butler, 1992; Smart, 1992, 
1995). But in terms of `doing' feminism it potentially infers causes of domestic violence as 
the relational dynamic of `mother and child' implies the absence of a father. Protection is 
not sought for him, neither is he responsibilised to protect. Therefore, in the context of 
research on `family law' ("FLA"), this could be read as implicating gendered violence. 
However, in the second part (1.182-3), gender is not made relevant to "abusers". Thus the 
opportunity generated by "women and children" to render the gender of abusers apposite is 
not capitalised. And this means that `doing' feminism is not really accomplished. The other 
interesting point about this part of the list is the conditional form of "could provide" (my 
emphasis). This suggests that the outcome of "deterrent" is less of a certainty than 
"protection". It can be seen as the author demonstrating understanding that this claim might 
be contentious to the readership and thereby invokes competing accounts. In the third part 
(1.183-6), there is no named object of the "early intervention". But if the three-part list is 
read as comprehensive the discursive work of this third part is to reprise the two previous 
parts. Thus the objects of "early intervention" are "women and children" and "abusers". 
And "intervention" is framed as a dual movement of "protection" and "deterrent". 
6 The "FLA" referred to is the Family Law Act 1996, which was developed by the Conservatives and enacted under New 
Labour. Section IV, which involved consultation with Women's Aid, encompasses civil legislation about non- 
molestation and occupation orders to keep violent persons away from those they have abused and out of their homes if 
that has been the site of their violences (Harwin & Barron, 2000). 
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Consequently, the argument founded in research veracity is that "civil law" facilitates a 
complete response to domestic violence. 
The subject of representation is not obvious. Certainly "women and children" are 
positioned as benefiting from "protection" and the "deterrent" of the abuser. But they are 
framed as passive objects of intervention arising from "civil law". Therefore, it is the "civil 
law" which is constituted as the actor, "The police and courts" as its agents and women, 
children and abusers as its current `participants'. And "reinforcing the message that 
domestic violence will not be tolerated" is not framed as an intervention per se. Rather, it is 
an add-on to the ascribed comprehensive reach of "civil law". Thus the subject of 
representation is the "civil law" which delivers a complete response to domestic violence 
including sending a message to its other objects, that is, to the wider society. 
By contrast, it is "Women" as "service users" in Extract 11, who are forwarded as the 
subject of representation. "DVM" refers to the pilot research study `Domestic violence 
matters' (Kelly et al, 1999). Therefore, the bullet point here is part of a summary of those 
research findings. 
Extract 11 [What Works? Policing (Harmer & Griffiths, 2000]: 
114 3. DVM 
115 " Following up calls for police assistance within 24 
116 hours was effective with service users at the time. 
117 Women valued: the practical support; the emotional 
118 support; the legal advice; the assurance that the 
119 violence was not the women's fault; the emphasis 
120 on women's right to something better; the naming 
121 of the men's behaviour as violence; and the 
122 referrals to other agencies. 
The two sentences in this extract form a move from the general to the particular. In the 
general case, there is vagary and ambiguity. What "Following up calls" entailed is not 
detailed. Nor is the measure used for "effective" made clear. Further, "at the time" is 
ambiguous. It could mean that efficacy was only measured at the time the follow up calls 
were made. It could mean that this practice no longer persists. Or it could mean that 
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subsequent service users do not share the same view. As is usual with vague and 
ambiguous formulations, these truths are hard to undermine because what is being claimed 
is hard to pin down. Or rather, in this case the claim for the importance of service users' 
assessment of services is clear, but the truths on which this is founded are obscure. So, this 
can be read as an attempt to counter potential challenges that service user evaluation is the 
key measure of service provision. Consequently, the subject of representation is "service 
users" in general and "Women" in particular. 
At line 117, a specific case of what "Women valued" is presented. At first glance it looks 
like a seven part list indicating that women valued a wide variety of outcomes from the 
follow up calls. This could be read as a straight endorsement of the follow up calls. 
However, on closer inspection more discursive work is afoot. The items in the list fit one of 
two categories, "practical support" or "emotional support". Thus "legal advice" and 
"referrals to other agencies" can be seen as two examples of "practical support" 
sandwiched around a three-part list of "emotional support". Consequently, issues of 
practical and emotional support can be seen to be intrinsically linked as part of the whole 
that women, as service users, value. 
The three-part list changes the topic from "women's fault" to "men's" "violence" through 
rights discourse ("women's right"). This frames domestic violence as men contravening 
women's rights with their violence. Thus it `does' feminism by invoking causes and 
repositioning blame. 
However, feminism is also potentially `undone'. `Emotional support' is made relevant to 
"Women" service users. Heightened emotionality in women is a widely circulating 
negative femininity discourse (Marcus 1992; Smart, 1992,1995). Even though it is used 
here in the `doing' of feminism, it re-inscribes a mainstream understanding which is 
unlikely to be so easily disrupted or reformulated. Therefore, despite attempts to guard 
against challenges for the veracity of what "Women value", women themselves are 
undermined. 
In summary, interrogating `research' in the `doing' of feminism appears to suggest certain 
things. There is a danger of warranting `research' itself as the truth-teller rather than those 
whose accounts the study purports to represent. Although forming women subjects of 
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representation does not in and of itself constitute `doing' feminism, it is more likely to do 
so than producing inanimate subjects such as the "civil law". Formulating `women and 
children' as a pair is also problematic. It could be argued that this is a `doing' of feminism 
because it implies men. But if that is the case it justifies rendering violent men invisible 
and it is hard to see how that benefits feminism. Generating and realising opportunities to 
make the gender of abusers relevant can, however, make for powerful arguments. Finally, 
the risk from mainstream discourses of negative femininity is omnipresent. And it is easy 
to slip into everyday usages which can serve to undermine the `doing' of feminism. 
In the next section I consider a further aspect of `doing' feminism within the 2000 What 
Works? Memoranda, specifically organisational naming. 
4. Naming "Women's Aid" 
Across the 12 memoranda, five name "Women's Aid". As organisational naming is an 
important part of how I, following Kelly (1999), understand feminism to be accomplished, 
I use this section to explore how and to what ends "Women's Aid" is mobilised. "Women's 
Aid", like `Women's Institute' and `WRVS', suggests the gender of those who take part in 
its activities. And like `Woman's Realm' and `Wellwoman', it implies a female gendered 
target population. Therefore, it can be seen to do double gendering work. 
Extract 12 comes from the `Conclusions and recommendations' section of the 
memorandum on multi-agency working, under the sub-heading `Difficulties of multi- 
agency working'. The bullet points that follow have been set up as what local initiatives 
need to do to counter "power differences between agencies" (1.191-2, text not included), 
particularly in terms of the "more objectively powerful agencies such as the police and 
local authority" (1.202-4, text not included). 
Extract 12 [What Works? Multi-Agency Fora (Hague, 2000)]: 
207 " Women's Aid is accepted as the lead national 
208 agency for women and children experiencing 
209 domestic violence. A variety of initiatives have built 
210 creative and profitable relations between other 
211 agencies and refuges, and, in some areas, 
207 
212 Women's Aid takes a leading role in inter-agency 
213 initiatives (sometimes, however, at the expense of 
214 other parts of their workload). Recommended ways 
215 forward include Women's Aid and women's 
216 services always being consulted, taking the chair, 
217 or occupying a reserved position on the 
218 management of the initiative. 
Extract 12 begins with an agreement across witnesses, "is accepted" (1.207), and an 
extreme case formulation, "lead national agency" (1.207-8), both of which serve to 
legitimise the claims made on behalf of "Women's Aid". The sense is that Women's Aid's 
ascribed status "for women and children experiencing domestic violence" (1.208-9) is 
agreed and incontestable. The next sentence offers the readership rewards in terms of 
"profitable relations between other agencies and refuges" (1.210-11). These are framed as 
having been accomplished by "A variety of initiatives" (1.209) already, suggesting they are 
achievable. But they are framed as "built" (1.209) and "creative" (1.210). This implies, 
therefore, that a lot of work and thought is required by local initiatives in order to secure 
these rewards. 
There is then a move from the general case of "A variety of initiatives" (1.209) to the 
specific case of what happens "in inter-agency initiatives" (1.212) "in some areas" (1.211). 
There, "Women's Aid takes a leading role" (1.212). The repetition of "lead" re-inscribes 
Women's Aid's standing. And I think the implication is that "profitable relations" can be 
even more profitable where "the lead national agency" is "leading". But this situation is 
disclaimed ("however") as sometimes detrimental to "other parts of their workload" 
(1.214). Initially, I thought that the argument was to present Women's Aid as selfless or to 
formulate Women's Aid as the lead agency but inter-agency working as not their main 
task. On reflection, within the context of a persuasion to address power differentials, I can 
see a different reading. That is, "Women's Aid takes a leading role" (my emphasis), frames 
the agency as choosing and autonomous. Thus the disclaimer works to undermine potential 
counter-claims that Women's Aid as the national leader and catalyst for more profitable 
relations has an obligation to always take the lead. 
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This reading is supported by the final sentence which lists "Recommended ways forward" 
(1.214-5). These are presented as a three-part list: "Women's Aid and women's services (1) 
always being consulted, (2) taking the chair, or (3) occupying a reserved position on the 
management of the initiative" (1.215-8). The list both ascends and descends. It ascends in 
terms of `consultation' and `chairing' being less integrated in power structures than "a 
reserved position" in management. But it descends in that "always being consulted" (my 
emphasis) is an extreme case formulation. This positions consultation with "Women's Aid 
and women's services" as in the object of "ways forward". That is, there is no progress 
without this action. Thus taking "a leading role" is not essential. The formulation 
"Women's Aid and women's services" prioritises Women's Aid commensurate with its 
status as "lead national agency" but it also frames them as only one of the appropriate 
"women's services" to be consulted. Therefore, it is female gender in service providers and 
service users, in line with the population "women and children experiencing domestic 
violence" (1.208-9) which is being made relevant to appropriate consultation. 
This extract demonstrates a `doing' of feminism. In terms of organisational naming, 
"Women's Aid" is used to found claims for the importance of that agency, the potential 
rewards of acting upon that importance and the essentiality of women's service provision 
(users and providers) in progressive inter-agency working arrangements. But it is also 
mobilised to defend against challenges that Women's Aid has an obligation to lead inter- 
agency initiatives. Therefore, its usage attempts to influence power relations between 
Women's Aid and other women's services and local initiatives. In the context of Crime and 
Disorder partnerships (CDA, 1998, section 5) whereby the police and local authorities have 
to consult local groups, this formulation of Women's Aid can be seen as invoking that 
responsibility, steering it in terms of women's service providers but retaining an autonomy 
for those voluntary bodies. Thus because this document speaks from its positioning within 
Home Office guidance, governance is exercised on statutory organisations but not on 
voluntary agencies. 
In regard to causes, "women and children" indirectly implies the absence of a male parent. 
As I argued in section 3 above, there are problems in grounding cause claims in this 
formulation. The subject of representation is clearly "Women's Aid" itself and other 
women's services. 
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In Extract 13, the transactional business is different but the subject of representation is the 
same. The memorandum as a whole is concerned with highlighting the importance of 
outreach and advocacy services in the response to domestic violence. Here, the topic is 
"Helplines". 
Extract 13 [What Works? Outreach and Advocacy (Kelly & Humphreys, 2000a)]: 
195 Helplines 
196 These are proving to be a key outreach initiative and the 
197 high level of demand exceeds currently available 
198 resources. These are currently provided by Women's 
199 Aid National Domestic Violence Crisis Line, Refuge 24 
200 Hour National Crisis Line, Victim Supportline and 
201 Childline, and local helplines such as South Devon 
202 Women's Aid. 
Helplines are framed as "proving to be a key outreach initiative" (1.196). The notion of 
"proving" suggests that there is evidence that this is the case. But that evidence is not 
presented, so the vagary of "proving" makes this claim difficult to undermine. And as an 
extreme case formulation, "key" counters potential challenges that helplines are not useful 
and justifies the argument for more "resources". The other warrant for founding the 
resource claim is "the high level of demand" (1.197). Thus service users are mobilised to 
support the critique of helpline service provision as under-resourced. 
Current service providers are framed in a three-part list: (1) "Women's Aid", (2) "Refuge" 
and (3) "Victim Supportline and Childline" (1.198-201). Had the text stopped at this point, 
this list would probably be readable as comprehensive; that is covering a full range of 
helpline services. However, there is an add-on in the form of "local helplines such as South 
Devon Women's Aid" (1.201-2). This is not part of the list per se because it is presented as 
qualitatively different in terms of a local/national divide. But it has the effect of 
sandwiching non-Women's Aid services between Women's Aid helplines and making 
female gender apposite to this type of service provision. Thus the three-part list can be 
understood as descending. The names "Victim" and "Childline" do not mobilise gender. 
"Refuge" may imply gender indirectly if considered in the context of what refuge provision 
means within the UK. But explicitly "Women's Aid" is afforded poll-position and this is 
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founded in the ascribed relevance of female gender to service providers and the service 
user population. 
In terms of `doing' feminism, the organisational naming of "Women's Aid" is mobilised to 
make distinctions between the relevance of helpline service providers. Thus the claim for 
more resources is underpinned by the persuasion that "Women's Aid" best meets the 
population producing "high levels of demand". Although children are invoked they are 
positioned at a distance from women. The effect is to disrupt the job-lot of `women and 
children' but if read as invoking causes it still incurs the penalties of invoking motherhood 
(see section 3). The subject of representation, is once again "Women's Aid" and as such, 
this organisation is rendered most apposite in this type of service provision and most 
worthy of additional resources. 
The summary of this analysis is presented in the chapter part conclusion. 
Part Two Conclusion 
In this chapter part I have investigated text from six of the 2000 What Works? memoranda 
with an analysis informed by all twelve documents. The purpose was to demonstrate the 
`doing' of feminism in terms of organisational naming, invoking causes and producing a 
subject of representation, and how that was used to found truth-claims and 
responsibilisations. 
In terms of organisational naming, "Women's Aid" is formulated as a viable warrant 
within the context of the What Works? memoranda. It is used to found claims for resources 
and to ascribe responsibility to statutory agencies. It is used to promote the relevance of 
female gender in general and the agency of "Women's Aid" in particular to domestic 
violence service users. As such, this type of `doing' feminism combines organisational 
naming and the formulation of a subject of representation. The downside of these 
constitutions is that their veracity is dependent on the context. Certainly an attempt to 
govern statutory agencies (and possibly government resource allocation) is exercised. But 
this opportunity is dependent on participation which in turn is governed by rules of 
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engagement. And that may well impact on why Women's Aid is never directly named as a 
`feminist' organisation or explicitly named as a `by women for women' agency7. 
Warrants of `research' and "Women's Aid" both produced the formulation `women and 
children'. Whilst this might be understood to invoke the causes of domestic violence, I 
have argued that it can be seen as a justification for rendering violent men invisible. And 
mobilising `children' does not seem to be separable from the disadvantages of framing 
women as mothers. Therefore, as it generates additional opportunities to reproduce 
negative femininity discourse, I see it as `undoing' feminism. There are other ways of 
making causes relevant to how domestic violence is understood without resorting to 
`children'. Through a `research' warrant, Harmer and Griffiths (2000, Extract 11) frame a 
very strong argument for the gender relational dynamics of domestic violence which 
ascribes blame to men. 
The subjects of representation vary widely in the What Works? memoranda. As detailed 
above "Women's Aid" is one such subject used to accomplish the `doing' of feminism. But 
`research' also facilitates claims to represent `research' itself and the "civil law". These 
constitutions produce passive women and found claims to act upon them in their own (and 
possibly society's) interests. Even when `research' is used to position women as active 
truth-tellers, the `doing' of feminism is not secured. The uses to which these moves are put 
and the implications of slippage into the everyday language of negative femininity 
ascription need to be explored. 
Methodologically, there is an apposite point here. The What Works? memoranda produced 
twelve accounts of domestic violence. Although there were similarities and differences 
between them, each was engaged in slightly different transactional business by subject 
topic. Thus as part of a comparison, which necessarily restricts the space available, only a 
small percentage of what was analysed could be presented in a chapter of this kind. 
In the chapter discussion I draw together the findings from HASC and the What Works? 
memoranda. This is in order to explore the differences in `doing' feminism in government 
policy-making activity between 1992 and 2000 and to consider the implications of these 
changes. 
7 How "Women's Aid" is presented in government discourse is a key concern of Chapter 7. 
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Chapter Discussion 
The aim of this chapter has been to explore the `doing' of feminism in government policy- 
making activities. Interrogating not `doing' and `undoing' feminism has also been a viable 
means for unpacking the activities of naming organisations, invoking the causes of 
domestic violence and forwarding subjects of representation. The purpose of this 
discussion is to consider similarities and differences between the doing of feminism in 
policy-making talk in 1992 and policy-making text in 2000. 
Organisational naming does not appear to be a feminist preserve but it has been key to the 
`doing' of feminism in both 1992 and 2000. At HASC, Miss Patel invoked Southall Black 
Sisters to ascribe responsibility to the police, make gender relevant to their (sexist) service 
provision and to found claims (to government) that non-policing police tasks were 
inappropriate. In the What Works? memoranda, "Women's Aid" is directly named to 
support arguments for resource funding (from government), ascribe responsibility to 
statutory agencies about possible abuses of power and to promote the relevance of female 
gender to service provision. Consequently, this `doing' of feminism has not fundamentally 
changed. What is different is naming a feminist organisation rather than just invoking it 
and the power available to the account afforded by the position from which it is delivered. 
Thus, as might have been expected under New Labour, it would seem that warranting 
organisations, at least Women's Aid, has become an appropriate means of telling truths; 
and that a version of reality founded in the warrant "Women's Aid" can be understood as 
more authoritative with a status of government guidance rather than a witness testimony in 
a policy-making process. 
Further, Women's Aid allows for an additional comparison. In 1992, Ms Harwin was 
present at HASC as a representative of Women's Aid. In 2000, Women's Aid was 
frequently used as a warrant. Ms Harwin produces "women working in refuges and 
shelters" as her subject of representation. Through this she rendered female gender relevant 
to both service users and service providers. In the What Works? memoranda, Women's Aid 
was formulated as a subject of representation in its own right. Again this points to a 
difference in the appropriateness of naming organisations in 2000, particularly if that 
agency is Women's Aid. 
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However, other changes have occurred. Firstly, although female gender is rendered 
explicitly apposite to service provision, the relevance of female gender to service providers 
seems to have become implicit through organisational naming. It may be that those 
formulating Women's Aid understand that they provide services `by women for women'. 
But that meaning, like `Women's Institute', is politically indeterminate. Unlike `Southall 
Black Sisters' where the political emphasis on gendering and racialisation is overt, 
`Women's Aid' could be read as just `women who aid other women'. Alternatively, it 
could be seen as a capitulation to the rules of engagement. Women's Aid is not named as a 
feminist organisation in 2000 and that could be pertinent. Secondly, Women's Aid is 
framed as the lead agency of its kind. Certainly that affords them access to more power. 
But it might incur resistances from other women's service providers. And it seems to 
necessitate defending Women's Aid against potential counter-challenges to its status. 
Interestingly, organisational naming is not commonly produced at the same time as 
`research' warrants. Indeed, in both 1992 and 2000, it is sometimes rendered the subject of 
representation in accounts where feminism is not `done'. Thus `research' discourse is not a 
feminist preserve. But it appears to have become, in 2000, a key means of supporting 
arguments. The difference between feminist and non-feminist accounting is whether or not 
it is used to position "women" as the truth-tellers. The main implication, unsurprisingly in 
government literature reviews, is that `research' has become an appropriate knowledge 
producer. The potential downside for feminisms is that this extends the privilege of viable 
meaning-making to a wider population than service providers or feminists. Also although 
producing women research participants as subjects of representation currently seems to be 
a reliable indicator of feminist accounts, it is not necessarily an option restricted to feminist 
practice. 
Invoking the causes of domestic violence is another aspect of `doing' feminism that was 
explored. The main way this was accomplished in both 1992 and 2000 was through 
implicitly or explicitly framing gender relational dynamics between those who commit and 
those who experience domestic violence. In 1992, there were overt constitutions of violent 
men. One encouraged crime policy-makers to work together with women working in 
refuges and shelters; the other positioned criminal justice as the primary intervention of a 
responsible government. Although these are very different usages, both constitute `doing' 
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feminism. The implication of this, is that affording criminal justice a poll-position is not a 
point of differentiation between `doing' and not `doing' feminism. 
In 2000, the formulation `women and children' was common to both feminist and non- 
feminist versions. It was used to frame "civil law" as a subject of representation and to 
frame the client population of Women's Aid services. I argued that this was more likely to 
be an `undoing' of feminism rather than a feminist accomplishment. Despite implying an 
absent male parent, it works as a justification to render men invisible which, in turn, could 
be permissive of women blaming. And through invoking motherhood, it sanctions the use 
of more negative femininity discourse. It is possible to `do' feminism by constituting 
gendered power relations as relevant to domestic violence (Miss Patel with police sexism 
and Hanmer & Griffiths in repositioning blame from women to men). Therefore, there are 
suitable alternatives to `women and children'. But there seems to be a perennial problem 
for mobilising `children' around Women's Aid as it is likely to invoke `motherhood' and 
all that entails. 
The subjects of representation produced at HASC and in the What Works? memoranda are 
varied. In 1992, they comprise research, women in refuges and shelters, Southall Black 
Sisters and the `greater good' of society (governed by law). In 2000, they comprise 
research, civil law (possibly society), women research participants and Women's Aid. 
Therefore, the basic categories of representation have not changed although there are 
differences in their ascribed importance as discussed above. Another way of investigating 
the `doing' of feminism is to consider how those experiencing domestic violence are 
presented. In 1992 and 2000, there were constitutions of both active and passive women. 
However, contrary to what might have been expected this does not mark a divide between 
`doing' and not `doing' feminism. Rather, passive women were a feature of both feminist 
and non-feminist accounting. The differentiation came in the uses to which these 
formulations were put. In feminist versions, passive women were mobilised to support 
arguments framed as in their interests. In non-feminist accounting, passive women were 
used to justify interventions being acted out upon them. 
The implications are twofold. Firstly, I think it is problematic for feminisms to encourage 
the founding of claims in formulations of passive women. It seems a short step to 
sanctioning the passivity of women. Secondly, slippage into mainstream discourse about 
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women is an omnipresent danger. Even where active women were constituted, the 
arguments made were threatened by the use of the discourse "emotional" and thus the 
negative femininity ascription that that entails. Thus `being' a feminist or `doing' some 
feminist accounting does not ensure that feminism will consistently be accomplished. 
From the analysis as a whole the main indicators of `doing' feminism were formulating 
feminist organisations as the subject of representation; using `research' to found claims of 
women as truth-tellers; explicit constitutions of violent men and women who experience 
the enactment of that violence; making female gender relevant to service providers; and 
invoking power relations such as police sexism. Features of talk and text which might have 
been expected to mark boundaries between `doing' and not `doing' feminism but which, in 
practice, did not, comprised formulations of `women and children'; promoting the primacy 
of criminal justice interventions; and generating passive women. 
There are also some similarities and differences between 1992 and 2000 that are 
methodologically relevant. One continuity is that the accomplishment or failure to achieve 
`feminism' is delimited to the discourse in which it is produced. That is, it cannot be 
argued that a `doing' of feminism in the government policy-making context ensures that 
that version of reality will be heard and acted upon. Also the space in a comparison chapter 
of this kind cannot give a full picture of what happens. The disjuncture is that the activities 
of talk are qualitatively different from those of text. With text, I can juxtapose extracts to 
demonstrate points of differentiation. But within talk, those types of arguments are 
produced as resistances and reformulations at the point at which the discourse is uttered. 
So, whilst talk allows opportunities for accounts to be immediately undermined, it also has 
benefits for `doing' feminism. That is, what is contested between competing accounts is 
made relevant within the encounter and the argumentation. And that could be a way of 
`doing' feminism not currently realised in feminist policy-making text. 
In this chapter I have focused on the `doing' of feminism in different government policy- 
making contexts. HASC and the What Works? memoranda were generated and published 
as policy-making processes and guidance prior to the production of government policies on 
cross-agency working. In the next chapter I interrogate Home Office Circular 1995 on the 
Inter-Agency approach to domestic violence and the Multi-Agency Guidance from 2000. 
Points of particular interest arising from the findings here include how Women's Aid is 
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formulated, how gender is made relevant to service providers and what power relationships 
are constituted between potential participants. 
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Chapter 7: 
`Working Together' on Domestic Violence in 1995 and 2000: shifts in 
government policy discourse on `local crime' and "Women's Aid" 
Introduction 
In the last chapter I considered the `doing' of feminism in the government policy-making 
context where this is understood as organisational naming, forwarding causes of domestic 
violence and constituting a subject of representation. I argued that between 1992 and 2000 
there was a shift in grounds for participation from practitioners of services for women to 
researchers. The medium for policy-making had also shifted from an HASC to a series of 
twelve What Works? in reducing domestic violence memoranda. This appeared to have 
some impact on the `doing' of feminism particularly in terms of warranting `research' and 
attempts to govern statutory agencies. But `causes' formulations and subjects of 
representation per se were fairly constant. The key difference appeared to be naming 
organisations rather than just invoking them. This seems to indicate that naming "Women's 
Aid" especially has become an appropriate way of telling truths in this context. 
In this chapter I interrogate `local crime' formulations and persuasions invoking voluntary 
sector practitioners in successive government policies. Whilst Chapter 4 was concerned 
with the governmental activities of problem formulation and constituting victims, the 
primary focus here is `working together'. The Home Office Circular of 1995 (HOC 1995) 
was the first government missive on domestic violence and inter-agency working. In 2000, 
this document was revised and replaced by New Labour's Multi-Agency Guidance (MAG, 
2000). As a `pair', they form the basis for exploring shifts in governing `at a distance' and 
the management of service providers, particularly Women's Aid. 
Initially, I reprise arguments from Chapters One, 2 and 4 concerning the governmentality 
thesis and feminist participation in government policy-making on domestic violence. The 
main body of the chapter is divided into two parts. Firstly, I focus on HOC 1995 and argue 
that notions of "crime" and "local" are used to forward working together as a logical, moral 
obligation. "Women's Aid" is constituted as the exemplar of the voluntary organisation. 
But their relevance is heavily circumscribed. Secondly, MAG 2000 is the site of enquiry. 
Here, notions of `crime', "local" and "partnership" are woven through with truths about 
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legal obligation. This is accompanied by multiple attempts to govern "Women's Aid"; all 
of which mobilise organisational status, crime/law and the target population in this regard. 
In the chapter discussion I consider the implications of these findings, specifically, that 
despite mobilising the power of the law, New Labour still engages in what is essentially 
persuasion; and that both New Labour and the Conservatives, to a lesser extent, seem to 
have appropriated and reformulated certain `doings' of feminism. 
Raising Questions forAnalysis 
For governmentalists, the `doing' of government concerns formulating `problems' and 
setting out what those who govern should do in regard to these problem formulations (Rose 
& Miller, 1992; Rose, 1993). Therefore, government discourse constitutes a version of 
reality to be analysed and corrected. From the Home Office Circulars on the policing of 
domestic violence (HOC 60/90, HOC 19/2000), it is apparent that the problem of domestic 
violence is framed as one of `crime'. And the strategies presented to correct this trouble 
involve government, the police and relevant others taking it seriously as crime. This 
illustrates another aspect of governing, namely generating an account of those to be 
governed in terms of roles and responsibilities ascribed to them (Rose & Miller, 1992). 
`The Government' itself is not exempt from such responsibilisations. Indeed presentations 
of `reflexive government' as playing a "steering and regulating" role are common in 
government discourse (Dean, 1999; Rose, 2000, p. 323). And a major accomplishment of 
`doing' government in this way is the constitution of an `already responsible government' 
as having no responsibilities left to fulfil. 
A key medium for channelling government responsibility ascription is policy. As a 
`technology of governance', policy is highly suitable for governing at a distance (Shore & 
Wright, 1997). It constitutes policy community members, rendering who and what they are 
`real' within the problematised version of reality being presented. And it achieves its 
greatest impact by positioning `responsibilised others' next to `the right choice' but leaves 
them to make that `choice' (Shore & Wright, 1997). The rewards for `doing the right thing' 
may range from being seen to do one's job properly (HOC 60/90) to achieving a share in 
the moral high-ground (HOC 19/2000). 
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One government activity that has not been explored yet in this thesis concerns the 
forwarding of working together as part of the solution to the problem of domestic violence. 
Working together has been a theme in the governance of domestic violence since the mid- 
nineties. The premise is that clients' services often overlap and a collaborative approach by 
service providers means that those working in similar areas can avoid counteracting each 
other and provide the best for their shared client group (Hughes, 1998). Even radical 
thinkers support the basic idea (e. g. Patel, 1999). And there have been lauded feminist 
success stories, specifically in Leeds and Hammersmith & Fulham (Abrar et at, 2000; 
Kelly, 1999). The key difference between how John Major's administration and New 
Labour's first term approached multi-agency working around domestic violence concerns 
the Crime and Disorder Act (CDA 1998); whereby New Labour made police and local 
authority partnerships with local groups mandatory. 
In terms of using the law to underpin government policy guidance, there is debate between 
governmentalists (e. g. Rose & Valverde, 1998) and David Garland (1996,2001). Both 
subscribe to the responsibilisation thesis. For governmentalists (e. g. Barry et al, 1993; 
Rose, 1999a), responsibilisation indicates a shift in the form of power being exercised; 
governmental power works on individuals' understandings of themselves having replaced 
the primacy of sovereign power as a means of governance. Sovereign power has not 
actually gone anywhere, but remains a potential resource to be tapped (Foucault, 1980; 
Rose & Valverde, 1998). Thus mobilisations of `the law', such as New Labour with CDA 
1998, can be understood in this way. For Garland (1996,2001), sovereign power has 
always been the key mode of government operations. From this perspective, 
responsibilisation is simply a strategy which when it fails to accomplish its aims leads to 
overt legal muscle-flexing by government and reveals the `true' source of all the power 
being exercised. But neither Rose nor Garland interrogate New Labour discourse where 
`the law' is invoked to `encourage' working together. 
My second analytical concern in this chapter revolves around how feminist organisations 
as voluntary sector participants are positioned in government policies promoting working 
together. In particular Women's Aid, is the most frequently cited feminist voluntary agency 
in both HOC 1995 and MAG 2000. As a non-statutory organisation, it is unlikely to be a 
direct addressee of such policy. But Women's Aid may well be positioned in a 
`professionalised police and responsibilised public' dynamic which ascribes it a lesser 
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standing (O'Malley, 1997). Also working together founded in primary understandings of 
`domestic violence as crime' could lead to the undermining of non-crime knowledges 
(Crawford, 1994). And there is a danger that "indigenous knowledge", the truths and 
expertise of non-statutory agencies, is likely to be valued only insofar as it is useful to the 
aims of statutory agencies (Shore & Wright, 1997, p. 33). Therefore, in governance terms, 
voluntary agencies with knowledges that government wants become part of the problem. 
That is, they are likely to be problematised in ways that attempt to extract `the truths' that 
are useful and delimit the potential influence of those that are not. 
In terms of potential political shifts, the Conservatives have a precedence for mobilising 
managerialist discourse in order to exercise control over feminist organisations (see Foley, 
1996). And through HOC 1995, they can be understood to have attempted to formalise 
feminist-generated inter-agency working practices (Patel, 1999). In Chapter One I argued 
that New Labour had apparently generated more means by which to govern feminist 
organisations, particularly around diversity issues (as demonstrated in Chapter 4); by 
locating feminist working practices firmly in the `responsibilised public' domain through 
lauding them as `good citizenry' success stories (see Newman, 2001); and maximising the 
potential of `partnership' discourse as a means of governance (Crawford, 2001; Newman, 
2001). Thus it would seem that there are dangers to Women's Aid, but, to date, how these 
are constituted within specific domestic violence policies has not been explored. 
Consequently, this raises questions for my analysis: How, and to what effect, do successive 
governments render domestic violence a local crime issue in multi-agency policies? How is 
Women's Aid and its role constituted? In what ways is gender made relevant to service 
provision? And what attempts are made to persuade the audience of Women's Aid's 
ascribed value? What are the continuities and disjunctures between Conservative and New 
Labour formulations and responsibilisations? 
Part One: Home Office Circular 1995 
In this chapter part I focus on the Home Office Circular for inter-agency working around 
domestic violence from 1995 (HOC 1995). This document was a product of the HASC 
1992/3 and the first policy of its kind in regard to domestic violence. In HOC 60/90, the 
then current policy for the policing of domestic violence, notions of working with other 
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agencies were used primarily for drawing boundaries around police responsibilities. 
Victims were consistently gendered as female which was used to found claims about their 
need for protection and ways in which they could and should be mobilised (see Chapter 4). 
As HOC 60/90 was not repealed with the publication of HOC 1995, some continuities of 
organisational boundary-work and gendering might well be expected. 
Chapter 4 also demonstrated some aspects of governing domestic violence at a distance as 
`crime'. Government was repeatedly presented as already fulfilling all of its responsibilities 
at the same time as the target audience was implied as falling short of its ascribed 
`appropriate' role. Therefore, I am interested in how persuasions and responsibilisations for 
working together are formulated around notions of `crime'; including the role of the 
`reflexive government' and `responsibilised others'. My specific focus is on non-police 
organisations, particularly Women's Aid as a voluntary sector feminist agency. Thus I am 
concerned with what HOC 1995 offers feminists. 
1. Governing at a distance: the logic of moral obligation 
The first extract is from section 4 of HOC 1995 entitled `The Government's Approach'. 
Perhaps its most important aspect is its overall three-part list (Jefferson, 1990) structure 
which shifts the focus from "Government"/"crime" to "local preventative strategies". 
Extract 1 [HOC 1995 (4): "The Government's Approach"]': 
235 4.2 The Government's approach is based on the 
236 premise that domestic violence is a serious crime 
237 which must not be tolerated. The priority must be to 
238 stop the violence occurring and services should be 
239 provided on that basis. Effective action undoubtedly 
240 requires the commitment and involvement of local 
241 agencies, working together to provide help and 
242 support to those experiencing domestic violence, 
243 and to develop local preventative strategies. 
In the first part, "The Government's approach" (1.235) is framed as having a rationale. This 
"premise" that domestic violence is a "serious" crime is used to support the argument that 
I See Appendix 2 for extract conventions. 
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it "must not be tolerated" (1.237). `Must not be tolerated' is an imperative and as such it is 
an extreme case formulation (Pomerantz, 1986) which closes down the possibility that 
there are any circumstances under which serious crime is tolerable. Thus intolerability is 
being framed as `in the object' of serious crime. And the government's stance is therefore 
presented as rational, appropriate and, possibly, moral. 
In the second part, another imperative is used. Here, "The priority must be to stop the 
violence occurring" (1.237-8, my emphasis) claims that `stopping violence' is in the object 
of not tolerating domestic violence. And this gives rise to services which "should" be 
provided on the basis of this priority. `Should' is not an imperative but it does suggest duty 
and moral obligation. Therefore, government is formulated as taking a clear and absolute 
stand, including flagging up the moral responsibilities of service providers. 
In the third part, what renders practitioner action "Effective" (1.239) for stopping domestic 
violence is constituted as "the commitment and involvement of local agencies" (1.240-1). 
This is founded in another extreme case formulation, "undoubtedly", which fends off 
potential counter claims that there are other more effective ways to stop violence. The 
pairing of "commitment and involvement" suggests that commitment alone is not sufficient 
at the local level. And this contrasts with government's moral stance and persuasions, 
rendering them appropriate at the national level. The "local agencies" are distanced from 
central government as the `right thing' for them to do, both morally and logically, is 
framed as "working together" (1.241); not with government but with each other. 
The ascribed purpose of this collaboration is formulated in an ascending three-part list: "to 
provide help (1) and support (2) to those experiencing domestic violence, and to develop 
(3) local preventative strategies" (1.241-3). The list is ascending because the business it is 
engaged in is the same as the paragraph as a whole. That is, both list formations culminate 
in "local preventative strategies" in moves from government's rational and moral position 
at the national level and from the helping and supporting they already do with those 
experiencing domestic violence. 
In interim summary, the extract demonstrates a `reflexive government' and `responsibilised 
others' pairing. As might be expected (see Chapter 4), government is presented as already 
fulfilling its responsibilities. In this case, these comprise taking a rational and moral stance 
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on domestic violence at the national level and persuading local service providers to show 
their committed involvement by working together and engaging in the new responsibility 
of "local preventative strategies". The two discourses that facilitate the argument of 
"working together" are "crime" and "local". `Crime' is framed as why domestic violence 
must be taken seriously. And "local" founds claims both of where responsibilities are 
currently not being met and what is the appropriate level for intervention. 
Discourses of `working together' organised around understandings of `crime' and `local' 
continue in section 5 of HOC 1995, "Inter-Agency Co-ordination to Enhance the Local 
Response to Domestic Violence". Extracts 2 and 3 follow directly on from one another 
within the same paragraph, providing a contrast between what is ascribed as having 
happened "For some time" (Extract 2,1.295) with "More recent initiatives" (Extract 3, 
1.301). 
Extract 2 [HOC 1995 (5): "Inter-Agency Co-ordination to Enhance the Local Response to 
Domestic Violence"]: 
295 5.1 For some time, agencies coming into contact 
296 with women who experience domestic violence 
297 have liaised to improve the services they provide. 
298 But often this liaison has been piecemeal and has 
299 not been able to overcome the fragmentation 
300 of services. No one agency can meet the needs 
301 of those who experience domestic violence. (... ) 
The key descriptor of the "agencies" being formulated here is their "coming into contact 
with women who experience domestic violence" (1.295-6, my emphasis). Certainly this 
gendering activity could be suggesting that those who experience domestic violence are 
"women" and thereby implicating all agencies who come into contact with them. But I 
think specific organisations may be being implied. `Agencies' is not qualified by `many' or 
`most' or `a variety'. All that designates them is their contact with women. Therefore, it 
could be that agencies which only deal with women are being constituted. The sense is that 
these agencies understand both the need for liaison and "to improve the services they 
provide". However this "liaison" is disclaimed ("But", 1.298), and consequently 
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undermined, as both "piecemeal" and failing "to overcome the fragmentation of services" 
(1.299-300). In short, it is ascribed as insufficient and ineffective. 
"No one agency can meet the needs of those who experience domestic violence" (1.300-1) 
is a bottom line argument. Two aspects of it are important. Firstly, "No one agency" 
undermines understandings of "liaison" as `working together'. As such it frames "liaison" 
as little more than `a bit of contact' which does not disrupt notions of a single agency 
attempting to meet the needs of their client group. Secondly, "women who experience 
domestic violence" (1.296) has been reformulated here as "those who experience domestic 
violence" (1.301). The de-gendering of who experiences domestic violence lends support to 
my argument that it is agencies which only deal with women who are being constituted and 
undermined. The suggestion is that women are not the only people who experience 
domestic violence and that those agencies defined by their contact with `just' women 
cannot, by definition, be `the agency' to meet everyone's needs. 
The historical context of this text is also persuasive of this reading. Prior to HOC 1995, 
there were many informal working arrangements between the police and local refuge 
groups (Abrar et al, 2000). These were developed on the initiative of women's service 
providers and were, in the main, instigated specifically by feminists under feminist aims 
(Kelly, 1999). Therefore the acknowledgement of what has been happening "For some 
time" combined with the undermining of `just' women agency liaison with others can be 
understood as rendering feminist approaches problematic. 
Further evidence that "liaison" is being framed as inappropriate comes in Extract 3 which 
follows on directly from Extract 2. Here, notions of `crime' (implied by "the police", 1.303) 
and "local" (1.303 & 312) are woven with discourses of `working together' (appropriately): 
"co-ordination" (1.303); "inter-agency work" (1.305); and "integrated approach" (1.307). 
Extract 3 [HOC 1995 (5): "Inter-Agency Co-ordination to Enhance the Local Response to 
Domestic Violence"]: 
301 (... ) More 
302 recent initiatives, particularly those involving 
303 co-ordination between the police, local authorities 
304 and voluntary agencies point to the importance of 
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305 inter-agency work as potentially a more effective 
306 way of addressing domestic violence through an 
307 integrated approach, focused on the provision of 
308 direct services. The assessment of whether 
309 current liaison arrangements are satisfactory in 
310 maintaining women and children's safety, and 
311 where they need to be extended is a matter for 
312 local decision. (... ) 
The opening line, "More recent initiatives" sets up what follows as a contrast with what has 
been happening "For some time". There, "liaison" was presented as "piecemeal" and not 
able "to overcome the fragmentation of services". Here, "inter-agency work" is framed as 
potentially "more effective" because of its "integrated approach" (1.307) and being 
"focused on the provision of direct services" (1.307-8). As such, it is forwarded as having 
the means to overcome the deficiencies of what has happened "For some time". An 
exemplar ("particularly", 1.302) of inter-agency work's potential is formulated as "co- 
ordination between the police, local authorities and voluntary agencies" (1.303-4). This 
appears to be a descending three-part list. What apparently marked the agencies failing to 
work together appropriately was their exclusive female client group. I have argued above 
that this implied feminist voluntary agencies. What marks the success potential for working 
together appropriately in this example is `crime' ("the police") and "local". Therefore, if 
this list is understood as descending and part of the contrast, then success is being premised 
on models of working together that place "voluntary agencies" last, not first. 
The final sentence of Extract 3 invokes the role of government at a national level and at a 
distance from local inter-agency working. Having already undermined "liaison" in favour 
of "an integrated approach", HOC 1995 now renders the responsibility to assess "current 
liaison arrangements" (1.309) as "a matter for local decision" (1.311-2). The use of 
"satisfactory" (1.309) seems to weaken any viability ascribed to voluntary-led liaison. A 
second gendering activity is also enacted here. The purpose of working together 
appropriately is formulated as "maintaining women and children's safety" (1.310). This 
constitution of "women and children" can be seen as an emotive descriptor as in the adage 
`women and children first'. It suggests innate vulnerability and moral duty to protect. 
Consequently, "satisfactory" is rather disingenuous. And those who would forward liaison 
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as appropriate are further discredited. Government may be seen to be passing the 
responsibility to assess current practices to police and local authority-led initiatives. But 
simultaneously it makes its understandings of the lesser worth of voluntary agency-led 
liaison (most probably feminist) quite clear. Thus it potentially empowers those charged 
with local crime responsibilities to undermine the voluntary sector. 
In summary, this section illustrates how discourses of working together, woven with 
understandings of domestic violence as a "local" "crime" issue, are used in HOC 1995 to 
formulate `the problem' and ascribe responsibility for solutions. Government is positioned 
at a national level identifying the moral worthiness of, and new, rational strategies for 
dealing with trouble. As such it is presented as a `reflexive government' fulfilling its 
responsibilities at a distance from local initiatives. The `responsibilised others' of this 
pairing are local agencies who are guided and persuaded to follow government's bidding in 
the local context and work together. However, the proposed participants of these 
collaborations are not framed to be of equal worth. Liaison led by voluntary, women only 
service providers is deemed inappropriate and possibly impeding the safety of women and 
children. The best potential for success is forwarded as police and local authority-led inter- 
agency co-ordinations. The main implication of this is that the police are empowered to 
override current informal working practices; which were traditionally instigated by 
feminists for feminist aims (Abrar et al, 2000; Kelly, 1999). 
Gendering those experiencing domestic violence as female was used to two specific ends. 
Firstly, agencies providing services solely to women as the client group were undermined 
in their lack of potential to meet the needs of all those who experience domestic violence. 
Secondly, "women and children's safety" was employed as an emotive descriptor to found 
claims of the moral worthiness of addressing domestic violence effectively and to weaken 
the case for modes of working together ascribed as inferior to government's ideal. 
Collectively, it would seem that these formulations indicate that `women's agencies' are 
being problematised. Therefore, in the next section I focus specifically on formulations of 
"Women's Aid". 
2. Formulating "Women's Aid": as an exemplar of a voluntary organisation 
The conclusion of HOC 1995 comes in its sixth section. But it still has a further twenty- 
two pages of annexes. Annex A is titled `The roles and responsibilities of statutory and 
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voluntary agencies'. Section 8 deals with `Voluntary Agencies'. And it opens with a 
substantial account of Women's Aid which is nearly two pages long. 
Extract 4 [HOC 1995 (8): "Voluntary Agencies"]: 
1162 8.1 Women's Aid 
1163 8.1.1 Women's Aid is a key voluntary agency for 
1164 women (and their children) who experience 
1165 physical, emotional, and sexual violence and abuse. 
1166 Women's Aid groups provide emergency and 
1167 temporary accommodation, advice, information and 
1168 support. (... )2 
In the first paragraph about Women's Aid, it is apparent that value is being ascribed to the 
organisation. It is framed as "a key voluntary agency" (1.1163). Although this is not an 
extreme case of `the key' agency, what follows furnishes why Women's Aid is being 
afforded some status. The client group is constituted as "women (and their children)"3. And 
Women's Aid's alignment with this group is being made relevant. Also these people are 
formulated as representative of domestic violence populations by way of a three-part list of 
the violence and abuse they experience: "physical, emotional, and sexual" (1.1165). 
Further, the services that Women's Aid provides are rendered comprehensive by the use of 
another list: "emergency and temporary accommodation, advice, information and support"4 
(1.1166-8). Thus claims for Women's Aid's "key" position are founded in the scope of their 
`appropriate' client group and the range of services they provide. 
In the next paragraph, the "four main principles" (1.1173-4) ascribed as the basis of 
"Women's Aid services" are constituted. 
2 Five lines on the history of the separate Women's Aid national bodies omitted for reasons of brevity. 
3I think that "children" are placed in parenthesis here for a reason. The list of "physical, emotional and sexual violence" 
(my emphases) could place what happens to `children' outside the remit of `domestic violence'. By bracketing the 
children, HOC 1995 retains the `job lot' population of `women and children' that it seeks to govern whilst attempting to 
avoid invocations of `child abuse' as a separate category. 
4 Jefferson (1990) argues that most lists are of the three-part variety despite initial appearances to the contrary. The 
formulation "emergency and temporary accommodation, advice, information and support" can be understood in this 
way. `Accommodation' can be seen as a different commodity from "advice, information and support". Thus "emergency 
and temporary accommodation" can be read as a pairing that precedes the rhetorical device of a three-part list which is 
accomplishing the sense of `comprehensive services'. 
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Extract 5 [HOC 1995 (8): "Voluntary Agencies"]: 
1173 8.1.2 Women's Aid services are based on four 
1174 main principles: 
1175 " the central importance of the abused 
1176 woman's perspective in the provision of 
1177 support services 
1178 " the need to empower women and enable 
1179 them to regain control of their own lives - 
1180 Women's Aid services are provided by 
1181 women and for women 
1182 " the value of the mutual support of other 
1183 women who have similar experiences 
1184 "a commitment to caring for the emotional, 
1185 developmental and educational needs of 
1186 children affected by domestic violence. 
One of the ways that HOC 1995 undermined informal inter-agency working practices and 
problematised `women only services' was to point to the target population's `needs' not 
being met (see Extract 2). Therefore, "the abused woman's perspective in the provision of 
support services" (1.1175-7) can be understood as an ascription of value. That is, a 
sensitivity to clients' views is being presented as a positive principle. The second bullet 
point appears to formulate an active woman. The "need to empower women and enable 
them to regain control of their lives" (1.1178-9) seems to produce a classic neo-liberal self- 
actualising `good citizen'. Here, the `good citizen' is one who, with the help of experts, can 
take responsibility for their own safety and maximise their potential (Rose, 2000). 
Therefore, praise is being ascribed to the practice of mobilising women to help themselves. 
And implicitly Women's Aid seems to be being afforded a level of expert status. 
However, the phrase "Women's Aid services are provided by women for women" (1.1180- 
1) is notable because it is the only instance that I have found in the four government 
policies on domestic violence. "Women's Aid", like `Women's Institute' and `WRVS', 
suggests the gender of those who take part in its activities, despite its political ambiguity 
(see Chapter 6). And like `Woman's Realm' and `Wellwoman', it implies a female 
gendered target population. Here, "by women for women" makes this dual potential 
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explicit and relevant. That this occurs in a constitution of women helping themselves is 
perhaps no accident. As such, it can be read as an extension of a generic category, or even 
community, of `women' engaging in autonomous self-help. As such, this would undermine 
any ascription of `expert' status for Women's Aid. 
This reading becomes more viable when Extracts 4-6 are viewed as a whole. Despite the 
positive formulations of Women's Aid, there is a distinct absence of terms such as 
`expertise', `proficiency', `professional' and `specialist'. Consequently, it would seem that 
O'Malley's (1997) argument about `responsibilised public' is being demonstrated here. 
That is, although what Women's Aid does and how it does it is subject to praise, this `very 
good' appears to be qualified by `for a voluntary organisation'. 
The third bullet point in Extract 5 continues the theme of women helping themselves. So, it 
makes "the value of the mutual support of other women who have similar experiences" 
(1.1182-3) relevant. The final bullet point reprises "children". It seems pertinent that "a 
commitment to caring for ... children affected 
by domestic violence" (1.1184-6) should be 
placed last in this account of Women's Aid. This is because the first three points have 
framed a `community' of self-helping women. Here, Women's Aid service provision for 
children is presented as comprehensively meeting their needs by way of yet another three- 
part list: "emotional, developmental and educational needs" (1.1184-5). 
Extract 6 follows directly on from Extract 56. Paragraph 8.1.3 formulates how the 
underlying principles of Women's Aid are made relevant to the work that they do. 
Extract 6 [HOC 1995 (8): "Voluntary Agencies"]: 
1187 8.1.3 The work and standards of nearly 200 
1188 Women's Aid groups who affiliate to the four 
1189 Federations are bound by policy statements and 
1190 Codes of Good Practice which encompass these 
1191 principles. 
5 And in keeping with the theme of bracketed children, it would probably have been inappropriate to talk about child 
services any earlier. 
6 There are two additional paragraphs on Women's Aid. One covers locally based autonomous projects and the other 
deals with what they do at the national level. Although this provides further scope for exploring how and why Women's 
Aid are rendered "a key" service provider, for reasons of brevity they have been excluded. 
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This extract lends further support to my argument that Women's Aid is not being presented 
as a professional body. Certainly they are attributed with "work ... standards", 
"policy 
statements" and "Codes of Good Practice" which "encompass" the organisation's 
"principles"; key terms in managerialist discourse (Crawford, 2001; Matthews & Pitts, 
2001). But although there is a sense that this is good and `appropriate' practice for any 
organisation, there is no explicit reference to `professionalism' or `expertise'. Thus I read 
this as Women's Aid being forwarded as an exemplar of good practice for a voluntary 
sector organisation. The context in a government policy document, suggests that the 
general readership is being persuaded of Women's Aid credibility but that its relevance is 
circumscribed. 
One way that the importance of Women's Aid is delimited occurs immediately after the 
organisation has been lauded. Section 8.2 outlines `The role of local women's groups and 
refuges'. There appear to be two important shifts from the preceding transactional business 
of ascribing Women's Aid value: an object of responsibilisation is formulated; and the 
gender relevance of women's service providers gives way to the non-gender specific 
`refuges'. 
Extract 7 [HOC 1995 (8): "Voluntary Agencies"]: 
1254 8.2.1 Inter-agency initiatives on domestic 
1255 violence should recognise the role of local 
1256 women's groups and refuge support services, 
1257 including those which are not affiliated to 
1258 Women's Aid. Local refuge projects, who have 
1259 many years experience of providing advocacy 
1260 and support to abused women and children, 
1261 should be given the opportunity to participate 
1262 fully in such initiatives. 
1263 8.2.2 Refuge-based services have a role to play 
1264 in the provision of independent advocacy and 
1265 support to abused women and children in the 
1266 process of getting free from violence. Refuges are 
1267 primarily hostels, but in addition to 
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1268 accommodation, they offer a comprehensive 
1269 package of emergency support, outreach work, 
1270 aftercare, and work with children, to all women 
1271 whether resident or not, as well as having a public 
1272 awareness role. 
The 90 lines in praise of Women's Aid had no explicit audience and even gave the sense of 
being Women's Aid's own promotional discourse. Here, the section opens with a 
suggestion of moral obligation ("should") for a readership comprising "Inter-agency 
initiatives on domestic violence" (1.1254-5). What they are urged to recognise is "the role" 
of certain service providers. The suggestion is, through a comprehensive three-part list 
(1.1256-8), that "women's groups", "refuge support services" and "Women's Aid" fulfil the 
same single role; regardless of the gender of service providers; and regardless of Women's 
Aid affiliation. Collectively, they are reformulated as "Local refuge projects" (1.1258). 
Therefore, what is rendered apposite to their participation is framed as their `local' 
positioning, their "refuge" status and their "many years experience of providing advocacy 
and support to abused women and children" (1.1259-60). Consequently, the female gender 
of such service providers in general and Women's Aid in particular is rendered not 
relevant. 
As might have been expected from the text on Women's Aid, the key population sought for 
inter-agency initiatives is "women and children" (1.1260 & 1265). In this context they 
appear to be an inseparable `job lot'. Further, local refuge projects are credited with 
"experience" (1.1259) with this group. But this is not `expertise'. Therefore, there is a sense 
that this is what they do, which no-one else has done for many years rather than being 
`experts' per se. What they have done with this group is also made relevant in terms of 
"advocacy and support". Consequently both helping and speaking up for women and 
children are framed as useful for inter-agency initiatives. And local refuge projects are 
positioned as ready made representatives of, and service providers to, the target population. 
However, despite their ascribed suitability, there is no sense that local refuge projects have 
to participate or have to be made to participate. Instead a moral obligation ("should", 
(1.1261)) is placed on inter-agency initiatives to give them "the opportunity" to take part 
"fully". As an extreme case formulation, "fully" (1.1262) renders completeness in the 
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object of participation. That is, taking part is framed as not really participating unless it is 
done in a complete way. Thus inter-agency initiatives are being persuaded of the benefits to 
them of working with these projects and positioned as the appropriate body at the local 
level to generate genuine opportunities. 
The constitution of de-gendered service providers continues in paragraph 8.2.2. There is 
also a series of reformulations: "Refuge-based services" (1.1263) replaces "Local refuge 
projects" (1.1258); "advocacy and support" (1.1259-60) becomes "independent advocacy 
and support" (1.1264-5); and "abused women and children" (1.1260) are qualified with 
being "in the process of getting free from violence" (1.1265-6). Thus there seems to be 
repetition. But the key to these differences is the shift from "the role" (1.1255) to "a role" 
(1.1263). In the previous paragraph inter-agency initiatives were persuaded of the 
appropriateness of these practitioners to take part based on their collective "role". Here, 
similar arguments are made in regard to "a role" they have to play. And as part of the 
ongoing persuasion, I read this as their part in the collective role of inter-agency initiatives 
if they participate fully. 
Consequently, "Refuge-based services" (1.1263) frames refuges as not just 
"accommodation", an important part of the argument that follows. The loss of "Local" can 
be seen as more problematic because inter-agency initiatives are integrally `local' and 
`crime' orientated. Thus the omission of both terms in this context is remarkable. 
Secondly, "independent advocacy and support" (1.1264-5, my emphasis) could be framing 
`refuges' as self-governing and thereby an implicit warning to inter-agency initiatives, 
commensurate with full participation, not to try to override them. Thirdly, "women and 
children in the process of getting free from violence" (1.1265-6) renders them a more viable 
population in governmental terms; as they are already active, `good citizens' seeking help 
to avoid risk (Rose, 2000). Consequently, `refuges', their work and their client population 
are all constituted as even more relevant than they were in paragraph 8.2.1. And this marks 
a shift from what they do now and what inter-agency initiatives should recognise to what 
they could bring to the initiatives themselves. But it also implies that what is supposed to 
happen in inter-agency initiatives might be contentious to someone. 
The following claim that "Refuges are primarily hostels" (1.1266-7) is immediately 
followed by a disclaimer ("but"). But what is being disclaimed is that their only worth is 
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"accommodation". This does not disrupt the sense that at base level they are primarily 
hostels. The reason for this is not clear from this extract (see below). However, the 
accommodation disclaimer is further supported by a comprehensive three-part list 
("emergency support, outreach work, aftercare", 1.1269-70) within another comprehensive 
three-part list ("comprehensive package", "work with children" and "all women resident or 
not", 1.1268-71). And as an add-on, a "public awareness role" (1.1271-2) is made relevant. 
The effect of all of this is to found the truth-claim that the work of "Refuges" goes beyond 
accommodation and their residents and it is why they are important to inter-agency 
working but these functions have been constituted as only additional to the primary 
function as hostels. 
This primacy of refuges as hostels and the further delimiting of Women's Aid's ascribed 
value as gendered service providers becomes more obvious when guidance to individual 
statutory agencies is considered. Extracts 8 and 9 demonstrate the two instances where 
"refuges" are formulated as apposite to non-inter-agency organisational activities; female 
gender is made relevant to the client group but Women's Aid is not named. 
Extract 8 [HOC 1995 (7): "Statutory Agencies"]: 
677 It is the immediate duty of police officers 
678 who are called to a domestic violence incident to 
679 secure the immediate protection of the victim and 
680 any children from further abuse and then to 
681 consider what action should be taken against the 
682 offender. The immediate protection of the victim 
683 may involve the police in referring or taking her 
684 to a refuge or in liaising with statutory or 
685 voluntary agencies who can supply longer-term 
686 help and support. (... ) 
Extract 8 is almost identical to a passage in HOC 60/90 (see Chapter 4, Extract 6). The 
only difference is the additional "immediate" at line 679. Immediacy is an important theme 
in this extract as it forms a contrast with "longer-term" (1.685). And this distinction extends 
to the police and `refuges' on one side and "statutory and voluntary agencies" on the other. 
As such refuges are framed as a short-term, immediate measure. `Protection' (1.679 & 682) 
234 
and "help and support" (1.686) are also made relevant to this divide, with refuges being 
positioned as a means by which the police can secure protection for women. But there is no 
sense that the police should be "liaising" with refuges, here they are constituted as simply 
"referring or taking" (1.683) women there. Consequently, refuges are formulated as a short- 
term protective repository for women. 
Although the gender of the client population is made relevant, gendered service providers 
are not. Arguably, "protection" which is often framed as a negative femininity ascription 
(Ahmed, 1995), genders the `protective' interventions of the police and refuges. But it does 
not make gender relevant to the people who deliver that protection. Neither is the 
gendering within the paragraph consistent. A relation of "victim", "children" and 
"offender" is presented (1.679-82) and then the victim is gendered as female at line 683 
("her"). Thus there is an apparent reluctance to constitute violent men commensurate with 
the female gendered victim focus in HOC 60/90. 
What is important for my argument is that refuges are primarily framed as hostels, albeit a 
protective environment for women. The other work they do in service provision, lauded in 
the inter-agency context, is not made relevant here. Neither is Women's Aid invoked. And 
despite the same client population of women and children experiencing domestic violence, 
the effect is that gender is made apposite to them not those who provide services. The 
persuasion to the police is that refuges are a viable short-term protection repository for 
women. They are framed as a way that the police can meet their immediate duty to protect 
and as a responsibility boundary between the police and others. There is no explicit 
guidance for working together with refuges. 
A different formulation occurs in Extract 9. Here, the addressee is local housing 
authorities. The preceding text has named a document called `Homelessness Code of 
Guidance for Local Authorities'. And the passage opens with reference to that document 
("It", 1.894). 
Extract 9 [HOC 1995 (7): "Statutory Agencies"]: 
(... ) 7.7.2( ... ) 
894 It emphasises that local authorities should be alert 
895 to the need for quick action where household 
896 members are at risk from violence or abuse, and 
897 it encourages local authorities to develop good 
898 links with local refuges. 
899 " authorities should secure, wherever 
900 possible, that accommodation is available 
901 for women without children who have 
902 suffered violence at home or are at risk of 
903 further violence if they return home; 
904 " refuges play an important role in 
905 providing immediate shelter from violence 
906 and local authorities are encouraged to 
907 develop good links with their local 
908 refuges; 
909 " many women will also need, eventually, 
910 to be rehoused into permanent 
911 accommodation. 
A similarity with the police extract is the notion of immediacy ("quick action", 1.895). But 
this is framed as a moral obligation ("should be", 1.894) rather than a duty. And the 
language attributed to the document ("emphasises" and "encourages", 1.894 & 897) 
constitute this as guidance not orders. At this point gender is not made relevant either to 
those "household members (who) are at risk from violence and abuse" (1.895-6) or the 
"local refuges" (1.898) with whom local authorities are encouraged to "develop good links" 
(1.897-8). However, there is a sense that need for quickness in action generated by the 
problem makes refuges apposite to the solution. Consequently, as with the persuasions to 
the police, there is a suggestion that refuges are a viable, short-term, protective 
accommodation measure commensurate with appropriate individual agency responses. 
The first bullet point (1.899-903) continues the notion of guidance infused with moral 
obligation. Thus what authorities "should" do is tempered by "wherever possible". But 
there are two interesting features here. Firstly, domestic violence is not named (anywhere 
in this whole paragraph) as it was in the police extract. This could be because the emphasis 
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is on homeless populations rather than domestic violence populations per se. Thus housing 
authorities are being asked to deal with the problem of homelessness not domestic 
violence. Secondly, this reading is somewhat borne out by the formulation "women 
without children" (1.901). As has been apparent from the other HOC 1995 extracts, the 
target population of domestic violence intervention is `women and children'. Children are 
not framed as the concern of housing authorities. Therefore, the persuasion is for local 
authorities to deal with the problem of homeless women arising from the discrete problem 
of domestic violence. 
However, the second bullet point (1.904-8) whilst making "refuges" relevant to housing 
issues seems reluctant to invoke gender. And I think this is part of the contradiction 
between the populations refuges serve (i. e. `women and children') and the ones served by 
local housing (i. e. adults, including women rendered homeless by domestic violence). 
Again, notions of the immediacy of accommodation ("immediate shelter", 1.905) and 
guidance ("are encouraged to", 1.906) are present. Therefore, refuges are ascribed value to 
housing authorities on the basis of their short-term hostel status. 
In the third bullet point (1.909-10), "women" reappear. Once again there is moral obligation 
rather than duty ("will also need", 1.909); and the sense that refuges are immediate and 
short-term ("eventually" and "permanent accommodation", 1.909 & 910-11). Thus the 
additional usefulness of refuges to local authorities is that they are a viable means of 
deferring organisational obligations to permanently rehouse homeless women. 
Consequently, the key difference between persuasions to the police and to local authorities 
are threefold. Firstly, the duty of the police is to deal with domestic violence whilst for 
local authorities the moral obligation is to deal with homelessness. Secondly, putting 
women in refuges marks the end of an organisational responsibility for the police but for 
housing authorities they provide a temporary deferment of obligation. Thirdly, there is no 
sense that the police need to work together with refuges to secure this arrangement. By 
contrast, local housing authorities are encouraged to "develop good links with (their) local 
refuges". The sense is that their arrangements with refuges are qualitatively different and 
need to be worked at. And this is explicable in terms of the notion of `accommodation'. 
That is, local authorities and refuges are ascribed as being in the same business whereas the 
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police and refuges are not. But ultimately the usefulness of refuges to each of these 
individual agencies is that they are "primarily hostels" for women. 
In summary, much value is ascribed to Women's Aid in terms of the work it does and the 
organised way in which it carries out its work with the key client group of women and 
children. However, Women's Aid is not presented as a professional body and the way it is 
undermined as a community of self-helping women locates it firmly in the realm of key 
agency for a voluntary enterprise. When inter-agency initiatives are persuaded of the 
viability of working with women's services there is still a sense that they are not 
professionals and that their worth is founded in their already doing with the target 
population what inter-agency initiatives should seek to do (i. e. speaking on their behalf and 
serving them). Also, and perhaps more importantly, the relevance of Women's Aid as `by 
women for women' service providers is absented. Thus as an exemplar, it is used to 
warrant how good the voluntary sector can be and once that is accomplished Women's Aid 
is discarded. This suggests that `by women for women' is appropriate to voluntary 
concerns but not in the professional world of inter-agency working. 
Indeed, the gender of service providers is not made apposite on the two occasions that 
individual agencies are persuaded of the usefulness of `refuges'. The populations for police 
and housing interventions both comprise "women". For the police this includes children, 
avoiding formulations of violent men. For local housing authorities, children are absented. 
But this is not commensurate with any argument that female gender is relevant to refuge 
workers. In the context of inter-agency initiatives, refuges are framed as "primarily 
hostels" but the other work they do is rendered appropriate for inter-agency working. But 
this is somewhat oblique as the potentially key terms of `local and `crime' are not made 
explicit. In terms of individual agencies, their benefits are formulated as viable, immediate, 
short-term, safe accommodation for women. And the persuasions to the police and housing 
authorities are to use them in line with their different responsibilities. However, only 
housing providers are directly encouraged to work together with refuges in their individual 
agency capacity. 
The implications of this analysis and the issues arising from section one are discussed in 
the chapter part conclusion which follows. 
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Part One Conclusion 
Within this chapter part I was concerned with interrogating HOC 1995's problem 
formulations and responsibilisations, around the activity of forwarding modes of working 
together. I was interested in general persuasions about `crime' in the `local' context and 
specific constitutions of voluntary sector women's groups, particularly Women's Aid. 
Truth-claims that domestic violence is a local crime issue are founded on notions of moral 
high-ground, logic and moral obligation. Thus government lays claim to the moral high- 
ground by seeing domestic violence as a serious crime that must not be tolerated; logically, 
inter-agency working is already happening at the local level and is thus recognised by local 
agencies as the way forward; but logically, the police should lead local `crime' initiatives 
which work better anyway; and we all have a moral obligation to keep women and children 
safe. There are three effects of this. Firstly, `women only groups' involved in current 
informal inter-agency practices and lone crusades are problematised. Secondly, 
government positions itself in a `reflexive government' and `responsibilised others' 
dynamic whereby it occupies a central role, emanating guidance to the local level. Thus it 
is ascribed as already fulfilling its responsibilities. Thirdly, the voluntary sector are 
positioned in another responsibility dynamic, one of `professionalised police' and 
`responsibilised public' (O'Malley, 1997). Consequently, the most that voluntary groups, 
including feminists, might aspire to is `best practice for non-statutory agencies'. 
The main implication arising from this analysis is that local agencies are 'on their honour' 
to do goverriment's bidding. The rewards for compliance are a share in the moral high- 
ground and being logical. Another implication is that the viability of informal voluntary- 
led working practices already in existence is weakened in favour of new police-led 
initiatives. This directly undermines feminist action and is accomplished through 
dismissing their concerns about 'just women'. A further implication concerns the victim 
intervention focus on 'women and children'. This renders violent men as the perpetrators 
of domestic violence at best peripheral although, commensurate with domestic violence 
formulations in HOC 60/90 (see Chapter 4) it does still, just, allow for violent men to be 
constituted (see Chapter 6). Also it reduces the need to provide additional or extra services 
to children as a separate client group. Moreover, it is always problematic to invoke 
motherhood as it allows for hierarchies of female worth and opportunities to undermine 
mothers who are deemed to have failed in their 'natural' responsibilities (Butler, 1992). 
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Women's Aid is formulated as a key agency as it provides comprehensive services, it has 
underlying principles and codes of practice and it works with and mobilises government's 
target domestic violence population of 'women and children'. However, the notion that it is 
a 'by women for women' organisation is used to undermine it as a self-helping community 
of women in a way that locates it firmly as not professional and in the voluntary sector. 
Praise for Women's Aid is positioned in its own discrete section. But when inter-agency 
initiatives and the individual agencies of the police and housing authorities are addressed, 
the female gender of service providers is absented. Thus "refuges" becomes the preferred 
term. In inter-agency persuasions, the target population is 'women and children' and what 
"refuges" can bring is framed as "experience". In police guidance, the client group is again 
'women and children' and "refuges" can provide a short-term repository for their 
protection which marks the boundaries of police responsibilities. In housing authorities' 
guidance the clientele is 'women' and "refuges" are formulated as a short-term 
accommodation resource to defer long-term organisational responsibility. Unlike 
persuasion to the police, housing authorities are encouraged to work together with 
"refuges" to secure this resource. 
The effects of this are threefold. Firstly, the gender of service providers is not made 
relevant except to undermine Women's Aid as a voluntary organisation. Secondly, working 
together at the individual agency level seems dependent on an overlap of core business; in 
this case, accommodation. Thirdly, what Women's Aid is praised for is not uniformly 
replicated in the usefulness ascribed to "refuges". Consequently, comprehensive services, 
working with the target population and accommodation provision are all made relevant. 
But Women's Aid's underlying principles and codes of practice are not made relevant to 
other "refuges". Thus much of the managerialist talking up of Women's Aid is seemingly 
undermined by `community' notions of self-helping women; and it goes nowhere except 
perhaps to found claims for the credibility of non-gendered "refuges" in general. 
However, the most interesting omission is the mobilisation of self-helping women. And 
that highlights two things about constitutions of inter-agency working: crime is not made 
explicit to these inter-agency initiatives; and the potential contribution of refuges is the 
vague formulation "experience". Thus what these working arrangements are, and should do 
with refuges' experience, is left oblique. 
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The main implication is that Women's Aid is being managed by HOC 1995, indicating that 
it has been problematised. But there is a sense that it is not being managed that well. Praise 
for Women's Aid generates opportunities to invoke their worth around individual and 
collective agency guidance which are not realised. Although that is detrimental to 
Women's Aid, HOC 1995 almost undermines itself by leaving very obvious gaps between 
women service user populations and women service providers' experience with that group. 
A further implication is that what refuges' experience is to be used for is veiled. Thus it 
would seem that the uses to which these knowledges might be put could be understood as 
contentious. 
In this chapter part I have concentrated on HOC 1995. In Part 2,1 turn my attention to New 
Labour's Multi-Agency Guidance (MAG 2000) to form the basis for a continuities and 
disjunctures comparison. 
Part Two: Multi-Agengy Guidance 2000 
In this chapter part I interrogate New Labour's Multi-Agency Guidance for domestic 
violence (MAG 2000). This text was produced as part of a wider government strategy to 
tackle 'violence against women'. And it directly replaced HOC 1995 as its forerunner. It 
predates HOC 19/2000, the policy for the policing of domestic violence, by three months 
(see Chapter 4). HOC 19/2000 worked hard to render female gender irrelevant to 
understandings of crime, although it suggested that 'violence against women' might be an 
appropriate way of understanding domestic violence in some unnamed context. The police 
were not encouraged to mobilise crime victims even though victims were ascribed rights. I 
argued that this seemed dissonant for a government concerned with wedding rights and 
responsibilities. And I speculated about who might be responsibilised to help victims to 
self-actualise in MAG 2000 and whether or not gender would be made relevant to 
victimhood. In more general terms, domestic violence was problematised as 'crime' and a 
6reflexive government' (ascribed as already fulfilling its responsibilities) and 
Gresponsibilised others' dynamic was constituted. As MAG 2000 and HOC 19/2000 are 
products of the same government strategy, it is unlikely that those understandings will 
differ in these respects. 
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There may, however, be a point of differentiation. My analysis of the twelve `What Works? 
in reducing domestic violence' memoranda (see Chapter 6) seemed to indicate that naming 
"Women's Aid" had become an appropriate warrant in government guidance by 2000. 
Consequently, as well as being concerned with how persuasion and responsibility 
ascription for working together are framed around notions of `crime', I am also interested 
in how MAG 2000 positions and problematises women's service providers; especially 
Women's Aid. 
3. Governing at a distance: legal obligations 
Extracts 10 to 12 come from MAG 2000's introduction. They are located in a subsection 
entitled 'This publication and its purpose' and they follow directly on from one another. 
The opening paragraph of this subsection (text not included) has stated that MAG 2000 
replaces HOC 1995 and it lists nine government departments that have had a hand in 
preparing and publishing this text. It also points out that the document relates to England 
and Wales only which, within the UK, implicitly flags legal relevancy. Extract 10 begins 
by formulating this publication's aims. 
Extract 10 [MAG 2000 (1): Introduction, paragraph 1.2]': 
107 The publication aims to raise awareness with all agencies falling within the 
108 policy remit of the Departments concerned. It sets out some of the general 
109 issues that they all should bear in mind along with some of the ways in 
110 which together and individually they might address domestic violence 
111 effectively. It seeks to give a background and framework for carrying out 
112 this work, rather than giving detailed operational guidance. Part 4 of the 
113 publication gives details of some further sources of information. 
The first sentence (1.107-8) constitutes an audience specific purpose. The text claims to be 
trying to "raise awareness". This suggests that the knowledges being forwarded are 
pertinent to "all agencies". `All' is an extreme case formulation which defends against 
potential counter challenges that there are apposite agencies for whom this awareness 
raising is not significant. There is no sense that the publication is forcing them to do 
anything. These agencies are qualified as "falling within the policy remit of the 
Departments concerned". And this frames them as statutory agencies. Certainly there may 
7 See Appendix 2 for extract conventions. 
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be duties and obligations between Departments and agencies but these relationships are not 
being positioned in the forefront here. The emphasis seems to be on persuading the target 
audience that MAG 2000 is helpful and an appropriate teller of truths. And therein lies a 
responsibilisation. The notion of `helping' someone suggests that the one being helped 
already has responsibilities with which they need assistance'. 
This theme of responsibility and the relationship between author and audience is continued 
throughout the paragraph. The truth-claim is made that the document "sets out some of the 
general issues that they all should bear in mind" (1.108-9). It is clear, therefore, that MAG 
2000 is not being framed as the only source of relevant information ("some"). But it is also 
suggested through "should" that agencies are under some moral duty or obligation to "bear 
in mind" the "general issues". Therefore, once again, responsibility is constituted as pre- 
existing the help forthcoming from MAG 2000. In addition, the text claims to set out 
66some of the ways in which together and individually they might address domestic 
violence effectively" (L 109-11). 'Some of the ways' continues the notion that MAG 2000 
is not the sole possible source of help. 'Together and individually' suggests there may be 
times when collaborations are appropriate for addressing domestic violence effectively. 
'They Might' implies ability, possibility and choice. The suggestion is therefore, that these 
agencies are able to address domestic violence effectively but choices need to be made in 
how this is done. What is clear is that regardless of how they choose to do it, agencies 
already have a responsibility to do something about domestic violence. 
Further MAG 2000 self-presents its role as "seeks to give a background and framework for 
carrying out this work, rather than giving detailed operational guidance" (I. II 1- 12). This 
phrase is interesting for a number of reasons. Firstly, "seeks" suggests that giving 
"background and framework" is not as straightforward as simply providing information. 
Secondly, "carrying out this work" reiterates that the responsibility of these agencies to do 
this work pre-exists the publication of MAG 2000. Thirdly, a contrast is drawn ("rather 
than") between "background and framework" and "detailed operational guidance". 
Although both are framed as forms of guidance, the contrast is pitched in terms of general 
versus specific. This is commensurate with the sense that agencies have choices in how 
they do this work but not in terms of whether or not they do it; a key feature of New 
8 The classic example is understandings of men 'helping around the house'. This suggests that it is women who are 
actually responsible for house-work (Grint, 1991). 
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Labour governance (Matthews & Pitts, 2001). And the message is that MAG 2000 can 
help. 
In the final sentence, the readership is directed to "Part 4 of the publication (which) gives 
details of some further sources of information" (1.112-13). This sheds light on the earlier 
formulations that MAG 2000 is not the only source of help and that the giving of 
`guidance' is not accomplished simply by writing it down. Thus it encourages agencies to 
look further afield for information to furnish the choices they do have. And it implies that 
achieving `guidance' is dependent on both guides and the guided. That is, information from 
the truth-teller needs to be realised by its audience. 
In interim summary, a relationship between the author and the readership is constituted. 
This relation comprises an audience framed as already having responsibilities to address 
domestic violence and MAG 2000 as an appropriate guide who can help with how those 
responsibilities are enacted. It is further suggested that `guidance' is always the proper 
mode of address between government policy and statutory agencies; and that to be realised, 
`guidance' requires non-passive recipients. 
Extract 11 follows directly on. It picks up the "together and individually" (1.110) of the 
previous paragraph by naming "Partnership" (1.114). And it introduces a truth-claim format 
that is repeated in extract 12. That is, a `fact' of knowledge is presented as undeniable and 
it is followed by how that `truth' pertains to MAG 2000. 
Extract 11 [MAG 2000 (1): Introduction, paragraph 1.3]: 
114 Partnership working is essential to providing a comprehensive response 
115 to the wide range of needs that domestic violence survivors may have. 
116 This document therefore sets out to encourage and support effective 
117 multi-agency working as well as addressing specific statutory agencies. 
The `fact' that opens paragraph 1.3 concerns the `nature' of "Partnership". `Essential' is an 
extreme case formulation which sites essentiality in the object of "Partnership" for 
"providing a comprehensive response" (1.114). `Comprehensive response' is a further 
absolute. And this one is used to counter potential claims that "the wide range of needs that 
domestic violence survivors may have" demands anything less than a "comprehensive 
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response". It can therefore be assumed, even at this early stage that "Partnership" is a key 
discourse for MAG 2000. 
This truth about "Partnership" is made relevant to "This document" ("therefore") 
forwarding "multi-agency working" (1.116-17). The guidance role of MAG 2000 is 
reiterated in "encourage and support". And the readership of "statutory agencies" is made 
explicit. The use of "addressing" is ambiguous. At first glance it seems to go beyond 
guiding, when "addressing" is understood as 'dealing with'. But there is a rhetorical device 
here that undermines that reading. 'Specific' highlights a move from the general to the 
particular. Here, encouraging and supporting "effective multi-agency working" forms the 
general case. And "addressing specific statutory agencies" is the particular case. Therefore, 
it would seem that "addressing" is being used in the 'talking to' sense. Thus appropriate 
guidance is furnished with different layers, both information that is applicable to all 
circumstances and knowledges that have single agency resonance. 
Extract 12 follows on immediately. Here, the `fact' and MAG 2000 relevance claims 
concern the `nature' of "local circumstances" (1.118-19) and "principles of good practice" 
(1.119). 
Extract 12 [MAG 2000 (1): Introduction, paragraph 1.4]: 
118 The success of any strategy or initiative will be affected by local 
119 circumstances. While over-all principles of good practice remain the same, 
120 what works well in one area may not be so effective somewhere else. 
121 The "good practice" examples in this guidance are not definitive ways of 
122 working. Instead they are examples of current practice where particular 
123 consideration has been given to how best to tackle domestic violence. 
124 They feature as a source of material and ideas for others, who can learn 
125 from their lessons and modify them as appropriate for local conditions. 
Once again, two extreme case formulations are used to argue for the veracity of `facts' 
being presented. Firstly, "local circumstances" are claimed to be in the object of "any" 
successful "strategy or initiatives". Secondly, the fundamental relevance ("over-all") of 
"principles of good practice" is presented as being constant, regardless of location ("one 
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area" versus "somewhere else", 1.120). In this way, "local circumstances" and "principles 
of good practice" are ascribed omni-relevance. 
These truths are rendered pertinent to the "good practice" "examples in this guidance" in 
that they are said to be "not definitive ways of working" (1.121-2). This formulation allows 
for local variation in working practices and complies with MAG 2000's notion of 
'guidance' as not spoon-feeding. The next sentence frames what is deemed laudable about 
these examples. They illustrate "current practice" (1.122) which suggests they are 
practicable. They have arisen from "particular consideration" (1.122-3) which implies that 
thought has been applied to their construction. They have emerged as "how best to tackle 
domestic violence" (1.123). This gives a sense that other possibilities were rejected as 
lesser entities ("best") and that these practices engage head-on with ("tackle") the problem 
of domestic violence. The final sentence demonstrates how MAG 2000 envisages agencies 
using these examples. It is presented as a three-part list which changes the subject from "a 
source of material and ideas" to "modify them as appropriate for local conditions" (L 124- 
5). Therefore, the readership is being responsibilised to "learn from their lessons" and 
actively adapt them in line with their knowledges about "local conditions". Implicitly, the 
reward for compliance is the production of their own examples of "good practice". 
So far, the responsibilisation strategy of MAG 2000 is to self-present as fulfilling the role 
of appropriate guidance giver. It frames responsibilities that statutory agencies already 
have and offers information for the effective execution of those duties. This is 
accomplished through providing relevant `facts' about "Partnership", "local circumstances" 
and "principles of good practice" and pointing to other sources of information and how 
they can be useful. Further, the effective addressing of domestic violence is formulated as 
something that requires action from the readership. "Partnership", "local circumstances" 
and "principles of good practice" cannot be attained or managed by the passive receipt of 
guidance. 
However, in line with how one might have expected this argumentation to develop, there 
seems to be an absence, namely `crime'. Discourse about `crime' does not appear until two 
paragraphs later. And it appears to found the `pre-existent' responsibility ascription to 
statutory agencies to which MAG 2000 has been alluding. 
Extract 13 [MAG 2000 (1): Introduction, paragraph 1.6]: 
134 The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 has placed a requirement on local 
135 authorities and the police to form local crime and disorder reduction 
136 partnerships, and the Government has made it clear that it expects these 
137 to address domestic violence in their local audits and the strategies 
138 derived from them. (... ) 
These data mark the introduction within the main body of MAG 2000 of "crime", "the 
Government" and a stronger tone than informing and guiding. However, although these 
debuts are simultaneous there also seems to be discursive work to render them separate but 
related entities. "The Crime and Disorder Act 1998" (CDA, 1998) is personified. It is CDA 
1998 and not the government which is ascribed as having generated "a requirement on 
local authorities and the police" (1.134-5). Thus CDA 1998 is framed as making demands 
that must be met concerning "local crime and disorder reduction partnerships" (1.135-6), 
"local audits and the strategies derived from them" (1.137-8). By contrast "the 
Government" claims and fulfils responsibility for defining domestic violence as 'crime' 
and locating it within the structures already required by the law. From Extracts 10 and II it 
is apparent that the government is in alignment with CDA 1998's drive to arrange 
strategies around "partnerships" and the "local". But it is almost as if CDA 1998 just 
happened, has to be obeyed and government has realised the opportunity to make a strong 
case for domestic violence9. 
This formulation of government as an object of the law for whom it is appropriate to have 
expectations of statutory agencies' legal responsibilities is repeated in Extract 14. 
Extract 14 [MAG 2000 (1): Guidance to individual agencies, paragraph 2a. I]: 
283 Ministers have made it clear that the Government expects the 
284 partnerships set up under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 to identify 
285 the level of domestic violence in their area and to develop a strategy for 
286 addressing it as part of their wider crime reduction strategy. 
Again, and perhaps more explicitly here, CDA 1998 is presented as that which pre-exists 
Ministers' clarity and government's expectations. What government expects at the local 
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level ("in their area") is framed as domestic violence identification and strategy 
development arising from CDA 1998. There is no sense that government has expressed its 
expectation through CDA 1998. 
This analysis makes a contribution to the academic debate between govemmentalists 
(especially Rose & Valverde, 1998) who claim that mobilising the power of the law can be 
seen as an extension of 'governing at a distance'; and those who claim that government 
resorts to the sovereign power of the law when persuasion alone fails to work (Garland, 
1996,2001). Certainly generating a new law constitutes tapping the sovereign power 
therein. And the responsibilisation MAG 2000 uses on its statutory agency readership is 
made more authoritative when directly founded in the pre-requisites of the law. 
However, despite the fact that this "Government" has generated the CDA 1998, no claim is 
made to that effect in its persuasions. The sense is that laws exist and everyone, including 
government, is made subject to that. Government is presented as meeting its obligations by 
rendering domestic violence as 'crime' and therefore an apposite category for what the law 
requires from local partnerships. Thus MAG 2000 constitutes a 'reflexive government' and 
(responsibilised others' dynamic where the former is ascribed as already fulfilling its 
responsibilities, including steering the latter 'appropriately'. The invocation of the law 
founds a stronger tone of responsibilisation, but they are still formulated as persuasions. 
Consequently, mobilising the law allows central government to extend its reach to the local 
level. But it retains the economy one would associate with 'governing at a distance'. To 
claim that government has simply reverted to exercising sovereign power is, therefore, too 
simplistic an account of what is being accomplished in the 'doing' of government here. 
In summary, the government's position within MAG 2000 is framed as in accord with the 
Crime and Disorder Act 1998 which in turn is not ascribed an author. Through MAG 2000, 
government self-presents as an appropriate giver of guidance to statutory agencies. It 
argues for the 'innate' efficacy potential of "partnerships" and ascribes value to "local 
considerations" although this is delimited by understandings of "principles of good 
practice". Government also suggests that statutory agencies already have a responsibility 
for addressing domestic violence which they can fulfil through converting guidance and 
information into appropriate action. CDA 1998 is credited with understanding similar 
9 CDA 1998 does not make domestic violence partnerships compulsory, but this has been floated for a consultation topic 
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truths about "local considerations" and "partnerships" as organising principles of strategic 
action. But the emphasis is on reducing "crime". Government asserts domestic violence as 
crime and thus locates it within the legal framework demanded by CDA 1998. It does not 
claim any part in the production of CDA 1998. Thus the sense of a `reflexive government' 
and `responsibilised others' dynamic is retained. And despite mobilising the power of the 
law to increase the level of its persuasions, government formulates itself as an object of the 
law, specifically one that is already meeting its own responsibilities. 
In this section I have explored New Labour's attempts to govern at a distance through 
multi-agency policy. It is apparent that the readership being responsibilised is constituted 
as statutory agencies. But I am also concerned with how voluntary agencies, particularly 
feminist ones, are constituted in regard to discourses of working together. Therefore, in the 
next section I focus on "Women's Aid". 
4. Formulating "Women's Aid": around crime/law, victim, population and 
organisational status 
The four extracts in this section appear in the order that they are presented within MAG 
2000. What becomes apparent is that Women's Aid's relevance is framed and delimited 
around notions of crime/law, 'victim' population and organisational status. Between 
extracts this produces some contradictions which are explicable in terms of the 
transactional business in hand. But across extracts, there is a consistency in how "Women's 
Aid" is managed. In Extract 15, the topic and the addressees are Crime and Disorder 
partnerships. 
Extract 15 [MAG 2000 (2a): Statutory CDA Partnerships, paragraph 2a. 5]: 
327 Domestic violence survivors also frequently turn to non-statutory 
328 agencies such as Women's Aid and other refuge services, Victim Support, 
329 and other voluntary sector service providers. In taking forward their 
330 strategies, partnerships will need to work closely and sensitively with 
331 non-statutory groups specialising in this area and to liaise with 
332 representative organisations whose knowledge can be a valuable 
333 resource. This is particularly important with organisations serving and 
334 representing specific groups within the local community, including ethnic 
under the recent White Paper (Home Office, 2003b). 
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335 minority and faith organisations. 
Female gender is only rendered apposite to "Survivors" through "Women's Aid" (1.327-8). 
But implicitly, "turn to" invokes emotionality, a condition often negatively associated with 
women (Marcus, 1992; Smart, 1992,1995). And in the same vein "closely and sensitively" 
(1.330) seems to suggest women. As such, the relevance of female gender to service users 
and providers is reduced as the paragraph progresses, particularly through the use of two 
three-part lists. 
The first of these comprises: "Women's, Aid and other refuge services (1), Victim Support 
(2), and other voluntary sector service providers(3)" (1.328-9). This could be read as 
descending with "Women's Aid" in poll-position leading to "other voluntary sector service 
providers" as a "generalized list completer" (Jefferson, 1990, p. 66) suggesting there are 
many other nameable items. But it can simultaneously be read as a change of topic. In the 
first part, the survivor population is gendered and positioned as seeking refuge. In the 
second part, non-gendered victims of crime needing support are framed. And in the vagary 
of the final part neither gender nor crime are invoked to service users or service providers. 
The notion that there are some survivors who turn to some other voluntary agencies is very 
difficult to undermine because of the vague formulation. Consequently, the relationship 
between survivors and female gender is undermined as 'just women' in terms of its 
possible relevance for partnerships. And "Women's Aid" is used to found a claim that they 
are not the sole service providers of importance in this context. 
The concurrent talking up and delimiting of Women's Aid continues in the second three- 
part list. This is set up as beneficial to "partnerships" in terms of what they "will need" to 
do in order to attain "taking forward their strategies". And it comprises: "to work closely 
(1) and sensitively (2) with non-statutory groups specialising in this area and to liaise (3) 
with representative organisations whose knowledge can be a valuable resource" (1.330-3). 
Again, the list appears to be changing the subject from female gender relevance to the 
detriment of Women's Aid. 'Closely and sensitively' invokes emotionality for the service 
providers and this gives a sense of female gender relevance. But they are framed as 
"groups", which in contrast with "organisations" suggests informal working arrangements, 
possibly even unofficial self-helping women. Further, these "groups" are "specialising in 
this area". There is no suggestion that they are 'specialists'. Rather, the invocation is that 
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"this area" is what they do, indeed, all they do. Consequently, working with Women's Aid 
is formulated as necessary but not the whole picture. 
This 'deficiency' is supplemented by "liaise with representative organisations whose 
knowledge can be a valuable resource" (1.331-3). Uaise' implies qualitatively different 
engagement from that with self-helping women's groups, and one that is not gendered. 
'Representative organisations' suggests more formal, perhaps professional standing. And it 
is they who are credited with the potential to be "a valuable resource" compared to those 
with a circumscribed service population. The general case of "representative organisations" 
then shifts to the particular case of "organisations serving and representing specific groups 
within the local community, including ethnic minority and faith organisations" (1.333-5). 
There is no sense that Women's Aid 'serve and represent'. And "groups" is used to 
indicate non-professional incidences of people. 
Overall, it is clear that representative organisations grounded in ethnicity and religion are 
being talked up as women's groups are being talked down in terms of the limits to their 
service users and their non-professional standing. However, it is not clear that 
representative organisations are being positioned as better or more apposite than women's 
groups including Women's Aid. Rather, the work done to undermine female gender 
suggests that it is already understood by the readership as the key issue. Thus the 
transactional business seems to be to disrupt notions of 'just women' as the only relevance. 
But the effect to Women's Aid is that its ascribed importance is firmly delimited. 
In Extract 16, the addressees are the police as an individual agency. That is, the guidance is 
pitched to them outside of any partnership responsibilities they may have. The roles framed 
here for Women's Aid are as "local voluntary sector support groups" and professional 
knowledge-keepers. At different levels, both mark responsibility boundaries for the police. 
Extract 16 [MAG 2000 (2c): The Police, paragraph 2b. iii. 4]: 
538 It is essential that the work of the DVOs and DVUs1° is properly understood 
539 and supported by the rest of the force. There must be no suggestion 
10 The distinction between Domestic Violence Officers (DVOs) and Domestic Violence Units (DVUs) normally 
indicates a rural/urban divide (HASC, 1993b). Thus where populations are dense, a domestic violence unit represents an 
effective use of resources. But where communities are scattered over a wider geographical area, a mobile officer with 
responsibility for domestic violence is seen as more apposite. 
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540 that dealing with domestic violence is in any sense "second-class" police 
541 work. It is also important for such units and officers to maintain close 
542 links with other units within Forces that deal with related issues such as 
543 "child protection" and with other relevant local agencies. To address 
544 domestic violence effectively and provide real help for those who 
545 experience it the issue must be addressed holistically. This requires the 
546 different agencies to work together. Survivors of domestic violence will 
547 also benefit if, when they report an incident, police officers are able to 
548 supply information about voluntary sector support groups, such as 
549 Women's Aid and Victim Support. The Women's Aid Federation England 
550 produces The Gold Book, a useful U. K-wide directory of domestic 
551 violence refuge and helpline services. 
The first three lines comprise persuasion for all police to work together intcmally. Thus 
"essential", "properly understood and supported" and the extreme cases of "no" and "any" 
all counter potential challenges that domestic violence is not 'real' police work. At line 
541, the persuasion focus shifts to "such units and officers". Interestingly, "the force" is 
reformulated here as "within Forces" and I think this capitalisation indicates the move from 
working together internally ("other units", 1.542) to externally ("other relevant local 
agencies", 1.543). Thus the police are afforded a more formal standing when non-police 
agencies are invoked. Also internal "related issues" are exemplified with "child protection" 
whilst what maintaining "close links" with outsiders can contribute is left vague. 
The next stage in the text is the presentation of a bottom line argument. This begins within 
an infinitive, "To address domestic violence effectively and provide real help" (1.543-4). 
This sets it up to be understood like an adage, such as 'to err is human'. And the 
imperative, "must be addressed holistically" (my emphasis, 1.545), seems to prioritise the 
truth-claim rather than a direct responsibilisation. And this reading is supported by its 
positioning immediately after the invocation of non-police agencies and the use of 
"holistically"; both of which imply relevance for this truth beyond the police. Indeed, the 
truth-claim is followed by another 'truth' which is framed as consequent upon it; in this 
case, that "different agencies" are 'required' to "work together". Thus it is the implied 
'nature' of domestic violence, not government which is constituted as demanding a 
particular response. 
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From lines 546 to the end, the roles formulated for Women's Aid within this working 
together framework become clear. Firstly, "Survivors of domestic violence" who report to 
the police are framed as in need of "information about voluntary sector groups, such as 
Women's Aid and Victim Support" (1.548-9). This partially genders them as female and 
partially constitutes them as non-gendered victims of crime. Women's Aid and Victim 
Support appeared side by side in Extract 15 on crime and disorder partnerships. Therefore, 
"Victim Support" can be seen as a resource invoked to delimit the relevance of female 
gendered support and increase the appropriateness of crime support. Further, "Survivors" is 
again used in the vicinity of "Women's Aid". Certainly 'survivors' is an important concept 
in feminist discourse (Kelly, 1996; Skinner, 2000). But here as a non-gendered term it is 
used to undermine Women's Aid which supplies the only female gender relevance to the 
term "Survivors". 
Also, like Extract 15, Women's Aid is presented as "groups". This provides a contrast with 
both "Forces" (1.542) and "other relevant local agencies" (1.543); both of which imply 
formal organisational bodies, not commensurate with the meaning conveyed by "groups". 
Thus the ascribed relation between the police and Women's Aid of "supply information 
about" is out of professional balance and cannot be seen as forwarding working together. 
This reading is borne out by the "also" at line 541. This positions maintaining "close links 
with", "other relevant local agencies", "holistically" and "work together" as qualitatively 
different from "supply information about". Consequently, Women's Aid is not invoked in 
discourses of working together when the police are being addressed on an individual 
agency basis. 
This formulation continues in the final sentence (1.549-51). However, there is a shift from 
"Women's Aid" to "The Women's Aid Federation England" (WAFE). And this switch in 
local/national constitutions apparently denotes an upward turn in ascribing credibility to 
Women's Aid. The full title of WAFE indicates a formal organisational name unlike 
"groups". The Gold Book is called a "useful U. K-wide directory". So its usefulness to the 
police as listing "domestic violence and refuge helpline services" is made explicit. "U. K- 
wide" works as an extreme case formulation to counter potential challenges that there are 
any police forces to whom this publication is not relevant. And "directory" implies a 
formal, professional organisation document. It is not, for example, 'a listing'. But 
253 
simultaneously the shorthand name "Women's Aid" is instrumental in how MAG 2000 
undermines that agency's relevance at the local level. 
Overall, the role of Women's Aid's ascribed importance is circumscribed by notions of 
female gender, crime and organisational standing. Specifically, at the level of individual 
agency advice to the police, Women's Aid is delimited to a knowledge-keeper and the 
object of some information that benefits survivors. There is no sense of working together 
between the police and Women's Aid in the day-to-day business of doing police-work. 
In Extract 17, the addressees are local housing authorities. Here, those who experience 
domestic violence are gendered as female in their own right and Women's Aid is afforded 
credibility at both the local and national levels. 
Extract 17 [MAG 2000 (2c): Housing, paragraph 2ciii. 1]: 
731 Local authority homelessness and housing allocation officers have an 
732 important role in giving women who are escaping domestic violence 
733 access to alternative accommodation. Officers should have a detailed 
734 knowledge of housing legislation and statutory guidance and how this 
735 applies to people fleeing domestic violence. A knowledge of what 
736 information and help is available to domestic violence survivors is also 
737 essential. Local Women's Aid Groups can be useful sources of advice. 
738 The Women's Aid Federation England produces The Gold Book, a 
739 U. K-wide directory of domestic violence refuge and helpline services. 
740 Welsh Women's Aid can provide specialist information on refuge, 
741 outreach and other support services throughout Wales. 
What is interesting about the opening sentence is that it is not a direct responsibilisation. 
There is no sense that it is either the responsibility or the duty of local housing authorities 
to provide "alternative accommodation" (1.733). Rather, they are ascribed an "important 
role" (1.732) and the emotive descriptor "women who are escaping domestic violence" 
(1.732) is suggestive of a moral argument. That is, women who are in danger at home need 
somewhere to live and local authorities are positioned to do something about this. The 
moral obligation of officers continues in regard to the professional knowledges they 
"should" have. These are presented as a three-part list: "housing legislation (1) and 
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statutory guidance (2) and how (3) this applies to people fleeing domestic violence" (1.734- 
5). The comprehensive sense invoked by the list suggests that officers should know these 
knowledges and their applications inside out. But a distinction is made between "housing 
legislation" and "statutory guidance" and "women" has been reformulated here as "people 
fleeing domestic violence" (my emphasis). This seems to indicate that "housing 
legislation" has somehow necessitated the de-gendering of those who experience domestic 
violence as moral obligation gives way to legal obligation. And that would be 
commensurate with much legal discourse. 
The next sentence (1.735-7), frames a qualitatively different type of "knowledge" about 
"what information and help is available". But although different, it is not constituted as 
lesser. The extreme case, "also essential", locates essentiality in the object of this 
knowledge. Once again the intervention population of "survivors" is formulated as gender- 
free. And this marks a move towards naming "Women's Aid". Indeed their ascribed client 
group through Extracts 15 to 17 is "survivors". I argued above that as a resource for MAG 
2000, "survivors" was useful for locating female gender relevance primarily in service 
provision rather than service users. But here "women" have been formulated in their own 
right as a worthy intervention population, regardless of who delivers services to them. 
Therefore, I think it has another benefit. 'Women who are escaping domestic violence', 
66people fleeing domestic violence' and "domestic violence survivors" all share the sense 
that those who are at risk from domestic violence are actively doing something about it. 
Whether, "escaping", "fleeing" or 'surviving' they can be seen to be managing the risks 
that they face. As such, they can be understood as 'good citizens' in the process of self- 
actualisation but requiring help from experts (Rose, 2000). 
In Chapter 41 drew attention to the fact that in the HOC 19/2000 policing domestic 
violence policy, the police were not charged with mobilising those who experience 
domestic violence. Neither was there any sense that those victims had responsibilities 
despite being ascribed rights. And that seemed dissonant with New Labour's 'rights and 
responsibilities' imperative (e. g. Giddens, 1998). Despite MAG 2000's simultaneous 
attempts to talk up and delimit the credibility of Women's Aid there are no explicit claims 
for how Women's Aid's information and knowledges are beneficial to "survivors". The 
suggestion is that individual agencies knowing about them and passing that on to 
"survivors" is commensurate with "survivors" being helped and guided. But in talk around 
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Women's Aid, there is an absence in explicating that process. This thought is pursued 
further in the analysis of Extract 18. 
The closing lines of Extract 17 form a three-part list of knowledges about "what 
information and help is available to domestic violence survivors" (1.735-6). Each part 
invokes Women's Aid in some form suggesting that organisationally they are 
comprehensive knowledge-keepers. In the first part, "Local Women's Aid Groups" (my 
emphasis, 1.737) is an unusual formulation as the capitalisation of "G" seems to raise the 
credibility of Women's Aid at the local level. Thus there is a sense, unlike the police as an 
individual agency, that in the day-to-day workings of housing authorities, Women's Aid is 
important. Indeed, they are framed as "can be useful sources of advice" (1.737). The 
conditional, "can be", implicitly invokes a two-way dynamic. The quality of the knowledge 
to be passed over is not in doubt. Therefore, converting the potential of the "advice" 
become the responsibility of housing authorities. That is, essential Women's Aid 
knowledge is there but it is up to housing personnel to access it. This suggests, albeit 
implicitly, some form of working together, not present in persuasions to the police. 
The second part, names "Women's Aid Federation" and its "U. K-wide directory" (1.739). 
As in Extract 16, this is talking up the credibility of Women's Aid at its national level. 
Unlike Extract 16, the word "useful" is omitted. Initially, I thought that this indicated that 
the police were understood to need more explicit persuasion to value The Gold Book. But 
on reflection, I think that less persuasion on this particular item is mobilised here, simply 
because of its positioning in a five line, three-part list doing persuasive work and the word 
"useful" has already been used in the preceding sentence. In the third part, there is an 
interesting development. "Welsh Women's Aid" is framed as distinct from WAFE. 
Originally, I thought this was just another part of ascribing value. But having considered 
what other benefits combining 'England and Wales' could bring, I was drawn back to 
"housing legislation' (my emphasis). Within the UK, England and Wales are subject to the 
same law. Thus Wales, does not attract the national distinctions of Scotland and Northern 
Ireland. Therefore, within the persuasion about the veracity of Women's Aid's 
knowledges, housing authorities' legal obligations are invoked. In addition, the ascription 
of "specialist" status, the three-part list of "refuge, outreach and other support services" 
(1.740-1) and the extreme case formulation, "throughout", all serve to justify Women's 
Aid's knowledges as "essential". 
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Overall, the talking up and delimitation of Women's Aid is organised around the axes of 
law, female gender and organisational status. Firstly, the absence of Victim Support as a 
relevant agency and the presence of the formulation 'England and Wales' locate the 
arguments made here in 'the law' rather than 'crime'. And the credibility of Women's 
Aid's knowledges is founded in its geographical legal relevance. Secondly, the population 
"women" is rendered apposite as part of a moral obligation not dependent on the services 
delivered by Women's Aid. However, a legal population of "people" is mobilised to de- 
gender "survivors" as the client group of Women's Aid. This repositions female gender 
relevance in the name "Women's Aid" and possibly promotes legal understandings as key. 
Also "survivors" suggests already self-actualising populations which sanctions an absence 
about mobilisation discourse. Thirdly, Kiroups, WAFE and Welsh Women's Aid as ways of 
organisational naming all impact upon a category entitlement for the essentiality of 
Women's Aid's knowledges. Unlike, persuasions to the police as an individual agency, 
housing authorities are encouraged to work together with Women's Aid around their day- 
to-day business at both the local and national levels. 
However, the usage of "survivors" around discourse on Women's Aid and how that 
impacts on meanings of female gender and self-actualisation is, up to this point, an 
unproved notion on my part. Therefore, in Extract 18,1 demonstrate the exception that 
proves the rule. The addressees are local social services. And the three key points of note 
are: a shift in the way the problem population is formulated; the absence of Women's Aid, 
female gender and "survivors"; and the only instance in MAG 2000 of victim self- 
actualisation discourse. 
Extract 18 [MAG 2000 (2c): Local Government Departments, paragraph 2c. iv. 4]: 
809 Social services departments should not see domestic violence as just 
810 another discrete risk from which they must protect children and other 
811 vulnerable people. A holistic approach, including the provision of family 
812 support services and other measures to enable all the abused members of 
813 the family to make themselves safe may be a more effective intervention. 
814 This will include support, where appropriate, after the violence has ended, 
815 in terms of helping victims re-build their lives. Departments should also 
816 recognise that the involvement of domestic violence experts, such as 
817 experienced workers within the voluntary sector, can lead to better 
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818 decision making. They can help ensure a comprehensive assessment of 
819 needs, risks, and protective steps which can be taken. 
The target population is framed as "children and other vulnerable people" (1.8 10-11) and 
"all abused members of the family" (1.812-3). Thus female gender is not made relevant, 
and one might say this passage appears to go out of its way not to gender, either service 
providers or service users. With a vague 'victim' formulation, "protect" might well invoke 
female gender (Ahmed, 1995). But here the objects of protection are explicitly furnished. 
Further "risk" is named (1.810). In other passages, notably Extract 17, it is invoked in the 
activities of "survivors" but it is not made explicit. Here, the social services are being 
persuaded of the efficacy of 'enabling' people "to make themselves safe" (1.813) and 
"helping victims re-build their lives" (1.815). These are classic neo-liberal 'good citizen' 
formulations of self-actualisation (Rose, 2000); an aspect of political discourse that was 
only implied around talk about "survivors". But it is still persuasion. There is some moral 
obligation, "should", around child protection issues; what is forwarded "may be a more 
effective intervention" (my emphasis, 1.813); and "where appropriate" (1.814) is vague, 
suggesting that social services can classify appropriateness within their professional realm. 
At line 815, another moral obligation persuasion begins, "Departments should also 
recognise" (my emphasis), which concerns, "the involvement of domestic violence 
experts". This forms a contrast with domestic violence as "just another discrete risk" 
(1.809-10) which suggests that domestic violence although coming under the auspices of 
social services is not their area of expertise. 'Experts' are framed as "experienced workers 
within the voluntary sector" (1.817). In Extracts 15 and 16, "such as" was followed by 
"Women's Aid" as the poll-position example. As a voluntary sector agency, already lauded 
in this document, Women's Aid, is therefore, notable by its absence. What is interesting is 
that the working arrangements of the "experts" in this extract is founded in their 
individuality, not their collective membership of a group, agency or organisation. Their 
status is made explicit and therefore not in doubt. But this seems to be founded on their 
individual expertise as "workers". 
What they can contribute is framed in terms of possibility: "can lead to better decision 
making" and "can help ensure a comprehensive assessment" (my emphases, 1.817-8). This 
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accomplishes two things. Firstly, it suggests that decision making and comprehensive 
assessments are the responsibility of social services even where they involve outside 
experts. Secondly, it implies that straight "involvement" does not produce the potential 
benefits. This seems to indicate, as in Extract 17, that the onus is on the addressee to 
convert potential into real benefits. Finally, the "comprehensive assessment" potential of 
domestic violence experts is talked up in a comprehensive three-part list of "needs, risks, 
and protective steps" (1.819). This further suggests that outside experts can be useful to 
social services across the full range of domestic violence issues. 
Overall, Extract 18, demonstrates the exception to prove the rule about the ways in which 
"survivors" and "Women's Aid" are invoked. Firstly, the intervention target population of 
MAG 2000 shifts depending on the addressee of a specific piece of guidance. For crime 
and disorder partnerships, the police and housing authorities, it is "survivors". Although 
these are partially gendered as female through the invocation of Women's Aid, it is only 
for housing that "women" are temporarily made relevant in their own right. For social 
services, the key population includes children, vulnerable family members and victims. 
Gender is not made relevant and "survivors" and "Women's Aid" are not formulated. 
Secondly, another part of the justification for not naming Women's Aid in this context is 
the location of expertise in individuals. From MAG 2000 it is clear that organisations are 
afforded a higher professional status above groups, but that continuum is not rendered 
apposite around social services. Thirdly, "survivors" would appear to warrant the exclusion 
of self-actualisation discourse. The effect of this is that the potential usefulness of 
Women's Aid's knowledges to individual and collective statutory agencies in mobilising 
populations of women to help themselves is never made explicit. 
The summary and implications arising from the analysis in section 4 are discussed more 
fully in the chapter part conclusion below. 
Part Two Conclusion 
Within this chapter part I was interested in investigating MAG 2000's truth-claims and 
responsibilisations, in promoting notions of working together. This comprised a focus on 
domestic violence as crime and constitutions of Women's Aid. 
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MAG 2000 renders domestic violence a local crime issue by framing government and its 
audience as objects of the law. The law made relevant is the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 
(CDA). And this is positioned in its own right as requiring local crime reduction 
partnerships. MAG 2000 invokes the legal obligations arising from CDA, framing the 
readership as needing to convert the potential of guidance and the government as an 
appropriate giver of that guidance. Further, it asserts domestic violence as a crime thus 
locating it within CDA's 'pre-existent' framework. The effect of this is that government is 
located in a 'reflexive government' and 'responsibilised others' dynamic with statutory 
agencies in a way that presents it as already fulfilling all of its responsibilities. The 
implication seems to be that understandings of New Labour flexing its sovereign power 
muscles through the law when persuasion alone fails (Garland, 1996,2000) are over- 
simplistic. It would appear, commensurate with a Foucauldian account (Foucault, 1980; 
also, Rose & Valverde, 1998), that the sovereign power of the law is mobilised as an 
occasional resource within this governance responsibilisation strategy on domestic 
violence. 
Formulations of Women's Aid vary according to the specific addressee of a piece of text 
and are orientated around three axes: the population to be governed, crime/the law and 
organisational standing. Firstly, Women's Aid's client population is framed as 'women' 
and this is most often accomplished through naming the agency. The importance of 
Women's Aid is talked up and/or delimited depending on the ascribed target population of 
the specific readership. Thus most relevance is afforded to Women's Aid in regard to 
housing where 'women' appear as apposite regardless of the presence or absence of 
Women's Aid. At the other end of the scale, 'women' and Women's Aiý are not invoked 
around social services where the clientele is constituted as children, family members and 
victims. Additionally, "survivors" is commonly formulated in discourse about Women's 
Aid. And it would seem that this term is understood to encapsulate 'already self-actualising 
citizens' in a way that renders text about mobilisation, and using Women's Aid 
knowledges to mobilise, unnecessary. 
Secondly, in guidance to CDA partnerships and the police, 'crime' is invoked through the 
constitution of Victim Support. This is used to disrupt notions of 'just women' service 
users and the effect is to circumscribe the credibility of Women's Aid in crime contexts. 
Further, in text on housing, where Women's Aid is most lauded, its reach across the 
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geographical legal domain of 'England and Wales' is implied as part of the working 
together persuasion at the individual agency level. Thirdly, distinctions between groups, 
agencies and organisations are employed to curb and/or ascribe value to Women's Aid. For 
example, in CDA partnership text "groups" undermines Women's Aid's position in 
relation to ethnic and faith 'representative organisations'. And in police guidance, "groups" 
contrasts with agencies and Women's Aid Federation England (WAFE) to delimit the 
relevance of Women's Aid to day-to-day police-work. But in persuasion to housing 
authorities, where Women's Aid is most praised, "groups" is given a capital "G". IWAFE' 
is used to talk up formal, professional organisational standing. For example, it founds 
claims to persuade police forces and housing authorities of the usefulness of The Gold 
Book. And moreover, housing authorities are guided to recognise the specialist status of 
Welsh Women's Aid's knowledges. 
The main implication arising from this analysis is that there is a strong sense that Women's 
Aid is important but being managed. This is a double-edged position. Certainly as the most 
named voluntary agency and the subject of government 'handling', they have prominence. 
But each time an argument is made to counter understandings of the key population as 'just 
women', this is accomplished at the expense of Women's Aid. Thus attempts to locate the 
agency in its appropriate setting are often detrimental. Another implication concerns the 
primary gendering of survivors as female through naming Women's Aid. The ambiguity 
allows for female gender to be understood as apposite to both service users and service 
providers. But explicitly, the former is used sparingly and the latter not at all. Therefore, 
one could ask how the discourse would be different if 'Refuge' were the key voluntary 
agency. It might be that gender would become less apparent, a move that could persuade 
Women's Aid to remain in government policy-making arena. Or, it could necessitate more 
overt female gender formulations. 
Moreover, I noted in Chapter 6 that it might be problematic to position 'Women's Aid' 
next to 'children' because it potentially invokes 'mother and child' meanings. Therefore, 
MAG 2000's emphasis on client populations, for example 'local housing authorities and 
women' and 'social services and children and families', seems to avoid invoking 'women 
and children' and all that entails. A further implication is that "survivors" seems to stand in 
for self-actualisation and mobilisation discourse. Thus it would seem that a feminist term 
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has been appropriated and used on feminists to render the uses to which their lauded 
knowledges might be put oblique. 
In the chapter discussion I compare and contrast the findings from the HOC 1995 and 
MAG 2000 analyses, and consider the implications of the continuities and disjunctures. 
Chapter Discussion 
Both HOC 1995 and MAG 2000 formulate domestic violence as a local crime issue. In so 
doing, goverment is set in a 'reflexive government' and 'responsibilised others' dynamic 
with its readership and framed as already fulfilling all of its responsibilities. The key shift 
is from warranting this version in 'moral obligation' to 'legal obligation'. This is perhaps 
unsurprising bearing in mind New Labour's strategy of generating statutory responsibilities 
under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. However, what is surprising is how the persuasion 
to statutory agencies is still pitched in terms of responsibilisation and governing at a 
distance. One might argue that obligation-invoking guidance is not enough. But equally, 
one might argue that 'the law' is not enough. MAG 2000 expends a great deal of discursive 
work founding claims that government is an object of the law and a guidance-giver. Again, 
this could be dismissed as 'sugaring the pill'. But if sovereign power is absolute it seems 
wasteful and unnecessary. Therefore, I read this as mobilising the power of the law in the 
service of the governance framework (after Rose & Valverde, 1998). The implication 
seems to be that accounts which point to the invocation of the law as indicating the demise 
of governmentality (Garland, 1996,2000) are probably over-simplified. 
In regard to Women's Aid, both documents problematise and manage the agency's 
credibility. Each uses female gender to undermine Women's Aid; each manipulates the 
ascribed value of the voluntary sector across different readership contexts; and each is 
oblique about the uses to which Women's Aid's knowledges might be put. Perhaps the key 
implication from these continuities is the way in which the implied discourse of 'just 
women' is used to the detriment of Women's Aid. It indicates the opportunities generated 
by female gendering activity to constitute negative femininity ascription. In particular, in 
MAG 2000, survivors afforded group category membership in terms of ethnicity and faith 
serve to disrupt the importance of those who support 'just women'. And in HOC 1995, 
'just women' is used to discredit feminist-led, informal, inter-agency practices. 
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The key shift appears to be around the consistency (or not) of how Women's Aid's worth is 
simultaneously talked up and delimited. HOC 1995's approach seems relatively haphazard; 
this is perhaps because it generates a contradiction for itself with a 'managerialist' account 
of Women's Aid's working practices and a 'community' account of self-helping women. 
But New Labour's management around crime/the law, organisational status and client 
group formulations appears more considered. In comparing the two approaches it has 
become apparent that what New Labour is possibly better at than the Conservatives is 
'doing' feminism. In Chapter 61 demonstrated the 'doing' of feminism as organisational 
naming, producing certain subjects of representation and asserting the causes of domestic 
violence. Attention seems to be paid to each of these three activities in both government 
policies where Women's Aid is formulated. 
Firstly, an attempt is made in HOC 1995 to appropriate and reformulate feminist-generated 
ways of working together at the local level by undermining 'just women' and suggesting 
that logically the police should be in charge. In terms of organisational naming, HOC 1995 
uses what is probably Women's Aid's own promotional discourse for warranting the 
importance of the organisation. But in so doing, it generates Women's Aid as a particular 
subject of representation to inter-agency initiatives; namely a politically relevant 'by 
women for women' agency which it cannot then manage. Further, the population. to be 
governed by inter-agency working is framed as 'women and children'; the same target 
population ascribed to Women's Aid. Thus it implies the absence of a mate parent and, 
although I have argued in Chapter 6 that this is not a very good way of 'doing' feminism, 
potentially invokes gender relational causes of domestic violence. 
By comparison, New Labour's appropriation of 'doing' feminism appears far more 
effective than that accomplished by the Conservatives. It too continues to promote the 
feminist-generated ways of working together at the local level but reformulated under 
6crime'; commensurate with Crawford's (1994) account. When it names the organisation 
'Women's Aid', New Labour does not invoke any political dimension of meaning. Thus it 
elides political differences as might have been expected (see Newman, 2001). But also by 
manipulating Women's Aid's standing through variation in the way it is named, MAG 
2000 exerts more control over Women's Aid than HOC 1995 did. Further, Women's Aid is 
produced as a government subject of representation to statutory agencies. It is represented 
to statutory bodies as valuable to their work and often crime/the law is used to shape the 
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relevance of Women's Aid's importance. Finally, notions of causes are quashed through 
the constitution of target populations. No children are formulated in the vicinity of 
Women's Aid. Where they do appear in text to social services, Women's Aid are absent. 
Additionally, "survivors" is a non-gender specific term; female gender relevance is only 
ascribed to it by its proximity to formulations of 'Women's Aid' and where the addressee 
is housing authorities. Thus female gender is made apposite to agency client groups rather 
than domestic violence per se. And male gender is neither present nor implied. 
Consequently, New Labour is seemingly accomplishing 'doings' of feminism to 'undo' 
feminism not only in adopting feminist-generated modes of working together and 
formulating "survivors", but also through organisational naming, producing Women's Aid 
as a subject of representation and managing the causes of domestic violence. On the 
surface, it seems like feminist discourse is being ascribed value and Women's Aid is being 
rendered credible. But their political relevance is consistently delimited. Therefore, it is 
almost as if Women's Aid and its ways of making meaning have been appropriated, 
reformulated and used upon them as modes of governance. 
In the thesis conclusion which follows, I draw together the findings and implications across 
the four analysis chapters of the various policy discourse `doings' of government, police 
realities and feminism. 
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Conclusion 
This thesis has used a discursive approach to interrogate exercisings of power, including 
responsibilisations and truth-claims, within policy-making activities around domestic 
violence during the decade 1990-2000. Of specific interest have been the 'doings' of 
government, Chief Officer police realities and ferninisms. 
I have identified how government in producing responsibilisations of 'reflexive 
government'Presponsibilised others' constitutes itself as 'already responsible'. And in 
formulating dynamics of 'professionalised police'Presponsible public', government is 
consistently positioned 'at a distance' from crime concerns ascribed as 'local'. Variations 
between Conservatives and New Labour apparently do not detract from a primary rationale 
of mobilising governmental power to persuade rather than force. Three strategies seem key 
to the governance of domestic violence: problem formulation, constituting victims and 
forwarding working together. The main shifts across the decade point to New Labour 
prioritising 'crime' as the most 'appropriate' way of understanding domestic violence 
rather than simply rendering domestic violence a subset of crime; repositioning female 
gender in a discrete category of 'violence against women'; and invoking legal rather than 
moral obligations for statutory agencies to work together combined with a more consistent 
management of Women's Aid through notions of crime/law, 'victim' populations and 
organisational. status. This would seem to indicate that 'doings' of government around 
domestic violence and female gender and across changes in political government are more 
worthy of note than is readily apparent in governmentalist literature. 
Additionally, I have shown that within policy activities, Chief Officers of police also frame 
themselves as 'already responsible'. 'Doings' of these police realities are accomplished, in 
the main, through identity-work; especially the invocation of police category membership 
identity pairs. Thus truth-claims and responsibilisations are located in the ascribed 
similarities and differences between pairings such as a Chief Constable/all Chief 
Constables or Chief Officers/other police staff. This device is present in both government 
policy-making talk in 1992 and police policy text in 2000. Thus despite contextual, 
discursive and audience variations, it is a common feature of Chief Officer police realities 
in terms of identity-work and boundary-work between police personnel and in the 
formulation of police/non-police divides. By contrast, the application of gender as an 
occasional resource demonstrates marked differences across the decade. In 1992, female 
gender is mobilised when understandings of gendered violence are useful for specific 
transactional aims. In 2000, (female) gender is generally mobilised to undermine 
gender(ed) violence understandings of domestic violence. This suggests that police realities 
mobilise government guidance as a resource and that 'police culture' is a current viable site 
for interrogating the policing of domestic violence. 
Further, I have demonstrated that feminist accounting in government policy activities 
seems less distinct than 'doing' government or police realities in that 'feminism' tends not 
to be rendered overtly apposite to founding truth-claims. 'Doing' feminism is, however, 
apparent in the activities of organisational naming, ascribing causes to domestic violence 
and producing subjects of representation. Some features of text and talk, such as 
constituting feminist organisations as the subject of representation, were indicative of 
accounts where feminism was 'done'. By contrast, features of talk and text which might 
have been expected to be indicative of non-feminist accounts, such as formulating passive 
women, were not a point of differentiation between 'doing' and not 'doing' feminism. The 
main differences between policy-making talk in 1992 and text in 2000 appear to reflect the 
change in position from which feminists speak. Therefore, warrants founded in women's 
service providers' truths give way to 'research' veracity and some exercisings of 
governmental power, commensurate with talking from the vantage point of government 
guidance, are apparent. However, 'doing' feminism is not exclusive to feminists to the 
extent that governments can be seen to 'do' a form of feminism too; but as a means of 
governing feminisms. This implies that concern about feminist participation in the 
government policy-making arena is well-founded. 
I began with an initial exploration of how government carries out the activities of problem 
formulation and constituting victims within successive government policies for the 
policing of domestic violence (Home Office, 1990,2000a). In terms of problem 
formulation, HOC 60/90 founds claims of domestic violence as gender(ed) 'crime' in 
truths about "public concern" and 'research'. Thus obligatory and non-police 'factual' 
knowledges are mobilised to persuade the police of the veracity of government's account. 
Domestic violence is framed as a subset of crime, one which is typified by violence against 
women in the home. Although offenders are gendered as male there seems a reluctance to 
do so consistently. Further, the government and the police are positioned in a responsibility 
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dynamic of `reflexive government'/`responsibilised others' whereby the `already 
responsible' government's role is formulated as `at a distance' steering and guiding. 
By contrast, HOC 19/2000 attempts to tell truths about 'domestic violence as crime' as 
distinct from understandings of gender(ed) violence. Themes such as "violence against 
women" and "women are more likely" are used to 'de-gender the problem and re-gender 
the blame' (Berns, 2001). Moral argumentation is employed to suggest that gender(ed) 
violence may be a viable way of understanding domestic violence but not in the crime 
context where it undermines the seriousness of what happens to male and same sex partner 
victims. When viewed as a dialogue with HOC 60/90 as its predecessor, HOC 19/2000 can 
be seen to be countering previous government persuasions to the police about domestic 
violence. Thus this government, presented as more 'reflexive' and more thoroughly 
'already responsible', does set itself in a responsibility dynamic with the police as 
'responsibilised others'. But this relation is indirectly invoked in a persuasion, the key 
transactional business of which seems to be to undermine the government of 1990 not the 
police per se. 
In regard to constituting victims, the competing accounts of female gender enshrined in 
each document are furthered. The key themes from HOC 60/90 for guiding police 
intervention with victims are "support" and "protection". Each generates women, either as 
active and in need of help to self-actualise by going to court or as passive and free from 
responsibilities but upon whom protective interventions are justified. In HOC 19/2000, the 
key themes are "needs" and "safety". These are used to generate ethnically and sexually 
diverse victims with choices and rights not to be delimited by criminal justice system aims 
and, apparently, without responsibilities for their self-actualisation. 
To some extent these finding are commensurate with what one might expect from a 
governmentalist approach. Policy does appear to be employed as a technology of 
governance (Shore & Wright, 1997) as its key strategy for governing 'at a distance' seems 
to be persuasion (Miller, 1986; Rose, 1999a, 2000); it frames 'good government' as a 
problematising and correcting activity which includes an account of those to be governed 
(Rose & Miller, 1992); and 'reflexive government' is an important formulation is ascribing 
and claiming responsibility (Dean, 1999). However, these findings also indicate more. 
Firstly, the theme of 'the already responsible government' is strong and seems to found 
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claims that 'doing' policy practically fulfils government's responsibility to 'do' 
government. In examining shifts between political governments it is clear that New Labour 
is more adept at tying up the loose ends that might facilitate countering its version of 'good 
government'. 
Secondly, the domestic violence "support" victims of HOC 60/90 comply with a 
governmentalist account of 'bad' or 'failing' citizens in need of expert help in order to self- 
actualise (Rose, 2000). But the "protection" victims undermine governmentalist 
expectation (Rose, 2000) that citizens will be required to take responsibility for their own 
risk. By contrast, the victims of HOC 19/2000, through "safety" discourse, are positioned 
as able to exercise choice and play a part in managing their own risk. But although ascribed 
rights, there is an apparent absence of accompanying responsibilisation and/or experts to 
assist in their self-actualisation. Whether these victim formulations are peculiar to the 
domestic violence context or similar to those of other crime policies is beyond the scope of 
this research. Thirdly, female gendering has only recently been named as a governmentalist 
concern (Rose & Valverde, 1998). Yet, these findings indicate that female gender is an 
important contested terrain in governmental attempts to problematise and correct domestic 
violence through its policing. 
From a feminist perspective, this analysis underlines the importance of inclusive feminist 
politics (Butler, 1992; Coote, 2000; Kelly, 1996; Mouffe, 1992). New Labour have 
associated individuality of need with diversity of bona fide victimhood. Thus accounts that 
see domestic violence as 'just' gender(ed) violence are positioned in a moral low ground 
that ignores the real sufferings of others. It is not problematic in and of itself for New 
Labour to formulate victims who are not exclusively women. Indeed it can be read as a 
responsible response to claims that other victims have needs not previously attended to by 
the police (Haymes, 2000; Kibblewhite, 2000). And it can be seen as an improvement that 
victims have been afforded rights and autonomies. However, the way diverse victims are 
talked up is accomplished to the detriment of gendered understandings of domestic 
violence and those who forward them in 'inappropriate' contexts. Thus there seems to be a 
real danger, as suggested by Kelly (1996) and Mouffe (1992), that feminists, having 
seemingly gained status for their knowledges and their work, could once more be 
marginalised if their political stances are understood as exclusionary. 
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Moreover, "violence against women" is not commensurate with accounts of gender 
relational violence. It renders violent men invisible (Dobash & Dobash, 2000; Itzin, 2000) 
and formulates women's bodies as the sites where violences are committed (Smart, 1992). 
Thus it generates opportunities to blame women for what happens to them and/or to frame 
'being' women as 'the problem'. Consequently, in New Labour's rendering of female 
gender as problematic and its absences of victim responsibilisation and police 
responsibility to help them self-actualise, there is space for some other experts to do 
corrective work with women as women. And this may indicate the role government 
envisages for feminists. 
A further problem that I had with governmentalist approaches was the absence of any 
accounts of resistances to exercisings of governmental power (Kemshall & Maguire, 2001; 
Miller, 2001; Stenson, 2000). This can give the impression that 'doing' government is a 
fait accompli (O'Malley, 2001). Therefore, it seemed appropriate to explore police policy 
discourse on domestic violence which was contemporary to the government guidance of 
HOC 60/90 and HOC 19/2000. Chief Officers, for whom policy is a key policing activity, 
were present at HASC in 1992 but no public domain account of consultation with them in 
2000 was produced by government. I have argued that the national and international 
dissemination by the Met Police of their 2000 domestic violence policy (MPS 2000a) can 
be understood as Chief Officers positioning the Met as national, and possibly world, 
leaders in the matter; an action counter to ACPO's current attempts to keep a low profile 
(Savage et al, 2001). As such, it is an exercising of power, laying claim to expertise and 
generating secondary audiences for the document. Consequently, like HASC it affords 
opportunities to 'do' Chief Officer police realities around domestic violence policy. 
Theoretically and methodologically, I considered police realities as 'doings' that would be 
demonstrable in identity-work, boundary-work and the mobilisation of gender as an 
occasional resource. 
The majority of police realities' work in both talk and text is accomplished through 
invoking a variety of identities; sometimes these are non-police related such as 'a 
reasonable man' or someone who 'sees the bigger picture'; but more common is the 
formulation of police officer category membership pairs within which are located claims to 
being 'already responsible'. For example, juxtapositionings of 'Chief Constable' and 'all 
Chief Constables' are formulated to argue why activities and understandings are 'coffect'. 
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In policy-making talk these usages can be seen to be managing immediate challenges from 
a non-police audience although they may also have resonance for the junior officers 
present. In policy text, the primary dialogue concerns warranting the authority of the 
account to other ranks, although a wider non-police audience may experience the 
performative effects of 'already responsible' managers. Thus this Chief Officer rhetorical 
device combines identity-work and boundary-work through category entitlement, 
agreement across witnesses, contrast and general/particular shifts in terms of who is 
positioned as the best person to tell the truth. 
Boundary-work does appear to be a major orientation of Chief Officer talk and text. Chief 
Officer talk in 1992 seemed most concerned with formulating barriers to the Chief Officer 
fulfilment of their responsibilities. Themes such as "public expectation" and the nature of 
"attitudes" and "organisations" were used to claim that Chief Officers were doing all they 
could in the face of such impediments. Further, police responsibilities were fenced off from 
"other agencies" and as "a matter for them". The primary transactional business of MPS 
2000a was problem formulation; specifically the constitution of the discrete categories of 
"domestic violence" and "hate crime". This document too drew organisational 
responsibility boundaries, although by contrast, "needs" was used to argue what did come 
within the police remit rather than as an exclusionary device per se. Further, the 
mobilisation of gender as an occasionally useful resource was demonstrable in boundary- 
work. Thus in 1992, arguments that delimited what the police could reasonably be 
expected to do mobilised notions of women's mental health but resisted notions of 
women's protection. And in 2000, "lesbian" was used to make female gender relevant to 
"hate crime" only in terms of sexuality and "regardless of gender" was used to undermine 
understandings of "domestic violence" as gender(ed) violence. 
In regard to resistances to, and recontextualisations of, government guidance, there is a key 
difference between policy talk and text. In HASC, the Chief Officer can be seen to be 
raising local and immediate resistance to the questions asked. Thus commensurate with 
Conversation Analytic understandings (e. g. Wooffitt, 2001), everything that occurs in this 
talk-in-interaction is accountable for in terms of what is physically there. Certainly the 
possible effects for the junior officers present and comparisons to truths claimed in HOC 
60/90 might be explored but they are neither directly demonstrable nor necessary for 
analysing the talk. By contrast, the MPS 2000a text produces versions that integrally make 
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no sense unless wider discourses are considered. And Conversation Analysts would argue 
that that is why talk is, and text is not, appropriate data material. Therefore, unpacking non- 
literal dialogues requires subscription to Foucauldian understandings of discourse (e. g. 
Carabine, 2001). From this perspective, MPS 2000a can be seen to engage with HOC 
19/2000 victim formulations and accounts of domestic violence as gender(ed). But perhaps 
most interestingly, these too are treated as occasional resources rather than strict guiding 
principles. 
Consequently, Chief Officer police realities can be seen as formidable truth-making 
machines. This would perhaps come as no surprise to those who have conducted research 
on the police (e. g. Stanko, 1989,1994b; Waddington, 1993,1999). But typically police 
culture has been reified (Chatterton, 1983; Reiner, 1992; Waddington, 1999); rather than 
unpacked as a 'verb' (Street, 1993). Police realities seem to constitute and shore up the 
organisation itself (Foucault, 1982; Wright, 1994); notional boundaries are 'policed' 
(McLaughlin & Murji, 1997; Tracy & Anderson, 1999; Whalen & Zimmerman, 1990); 
identity-work is used to undermine competing versions (Fletcher, 1991); and gender 
politics is accomplished (Auburn et al, 1995; Wowk, 1984). These aspects of 'doing' 
police realities are demonstrable in the main because of the influence of Conversation 
Analysis on participants' relevance to categories in identity-work (Widdicombe, 1993, 
1998). Consequently, instead of looking for culture in what the police say, I started from 
the point of considering how 'being' police officers is made relevant to truth-claims and 
responsibilisations. 
From a feminist perspective, there are two considerations arising from this analysis. Firstly, 
in the 1970s and 1980s, feminist critique of police culture and its relationship to the 
policing of domestic violence was common (e. g. Dobash & Dobash, 1979; Dunhill, 1989; 
Southall Black Sisters, 1989). As domestic violence became a distinct government policy 
domain (Home Office, 1990) and feminists became government domestic violence policy- 
making participants (HASC, 1993b), this site of enquiry seems to have slipped from 
academic currency. Based on the findings of this thesis, I would argue that overlooking 
police realities in this way is problematic. Secondly, the key strength of both 'doing' 
government and 'doing' police realities seems to be accomplished in 'reflexive 
government' and identity-work. Positioning the relevance and entitlement of the speaker 
within accounts seems to found boundary-work, including the constitution of categories, 
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victims and truths. Therefore, in the project of making feminism relevant to participation 
(Kelly, 1999), some form of self-presentation as feminist may be important to mobilising 
power in the service of feminist aims. 
However, an exploration of potentially feminist policy-making talk in 1992 and text, under 
the rubric of government policy-making guidance, in 2000, seems to indicate that feminist 
identity-work is at best implicit. 'Doing' feminism is most apparent in organisational 
naming, forwarding causes of domestic violence which are not permissive of women 
blaming and formulating certain subjects of representation. Likely indicators that feminism 
was being accomplished comprised mobilising 'research' to found claims of women as 
truth-tellers; explicit formulations of male against female gender relational violence; 
rendering female gender apposite to service providers; producing feminist organisations as 
the subject of representation; and invoking power relations such as police sexism. 
Discursive features that might have been expected to indicate whether or not feminism was 
being 'done', but which, in practice, did not, were constitutions of 'women and children', 
promoting the primacy of criminal justice interventions and generating passive women. 
The people whose talk and text were analysed in this regard were neither exclusively 
women nor feminists. Participation in the 1992 HASC oral evidence session was dependent 
on the category entitlement of 'non-statutory service providers'. By contrast, the 
qualification for participation in the What Works? memoranda of 2000, seems to be 
'academic researchers'. Thus despite the majority of participants 'being' feminist, 
feminism did not constitute the grounds for taking part. Whether this led to a reluctance to 
render feminism overtly relevant to proceedings is unclear. As might have been expected 
from such a shift, 'research' became a primary warrant in 2000. This seems to have 
produced some benefits and disadvantages in terms of 'doing' feminism. The advantages 
appear to be that directly naming feminist organisations, especially Women's Aid, and 
founding claims in the accounts of women survivors have become legitimised ways of 
telling truths in the government policy-making arena. The main disbcnefit is that the 
relevance of 'by women for women' service provision has become increasingly implicit. 
Thus although "Women's Aid" suggests 'women helping women' it neither explicitly 
warrants "women working in refuges and shelters" nor invokes the political dimension of 
46our experience" as produced by a representative of Southall Black Sisters. 
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Another difference in 'doing' feminism across the decade appears to concern abiding by 
the 'rules of engagement' as set by the contextual positioning of the speakers. This is 
apparent in three features of the talk and text. Firstly, in HASC there are occasions where 
the witnesses attempt to subvert the line of questioning and appropriate it for specific truth- 
telling activity. Although in 1992, Mrs Horley, in particular, is rendered immediately 
invisible for her 'digression', it remains part of the public record. If such subversions occur 
in the What Works? memoranda they are less obvious. Secondly, the 2000 documents all 
have the same main heading and are circumscribed in length which gives an overall 
impression of uniformity despite the different truths emanating from them. In HASC both 
Mrs Horley and Miss Patel draw attention to how their accounts differ from the others 
being presented. And I think that de-stabilising notions of a united feminist front in this 
way, renders 'feminism' less manageable to governmental exercisings of power. 
Thirdly, the What Works? memoranda position feminists as givers of government guidance 
to local crime prevention initiatives. Consequently, they have access to, and some 
demonstrate the exercising of, the governmental power which that position affords. The 
positive aspect of this is that feminist truths are lent a certain authority. The downside, as I 
see it, is that 'lent' is the operative word. At this moment in historical and geographical 
time and place, government renders 'academic researchers' who will say What Works? in 
reducing the crime of domestic violence 'appropriate' givers of guidance in the 
government's name. But 'feminist' participation in future activities is not assured as it is 
not presented as a condition of, or having relevance to, taking part. Further, as is apparent 
from both government and Chief Officer discourse in 2000, (female) gender is increasingly 
being undermined as apposite to domestic violence. Consequently, the governmentalist 
suggestion that 'indigenous knowledges', particularly those of non-statutory participants, 
may well have a 'shelf-life' in policy activities (Shore & Wright, 1997), seems to me a real 
danger for feminisms. 
This concern also seems to be somewhat borne out by an interrogation of government 
policies for 'working together'. Both the Conservatives and New Labour framed domestic 
violence as a local crime issue in this regard. Home Office Circular 1995 and MAG 2000 
produce the responsibility dynamic of 'reflexive government' and 'responsibilised others' 
whereby government is positioned as already fulfilling all of its responsibilities. The key 
shift for warranting this version of reality, reflected in the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, 
was from moral obligation to legal obligation on the part of statutory agencies. Thus the 
Conservative government is framed as occupying the moral high-ground and New Labour 
is formulated as a 'good' subject of the law as the main category entitlement for their 
appropriateness as guidance givers. From a governmcntalist perspective, it is interesting 
how New Labour mobilises the power of the law (Rose & Valverde, 1998). New Labour 
seems overly concerned with retaining the sense that they are persuading rather than 
forcing statutory agencies to comply. Indeed, the Crime and Disorder Act is presented as 
having appeared from nowhere and subjecting all statutory bodies to legal obligations. 
Thus Garland's account (1996,2001) of governmental power as sovereign power with a 
benign facade may be over-simplistic. 
Both documents problematise and attempt to manage "Women's Aid". In HOC 1995, 
Women's Aid is lauded as a well-organised and appropriate 'by women for women' 
agency. But these same formulations are used to locate it firmly in the non-professional 
voluntary sector. When inter-agency initiatives are forwarded, the gender of women's 
service providers is framed as not relevant and the purpose of their participation is made 
oblique. Individual guidance to the police and housing authorities positions non-gendered 
"refuges" as short-term, protection repositories for women. For the police, this produces an 
organisational responsibility boundary and for housing authorities this produces respite 
from their long-term responsibilities. Overall, there is a sense that talking up "Women's 
Aid" with 'professional' discourse has necessitated a clumsy correction of the 
'professionalised police/responsibilised public' dynamic. By comparison, MAG 2000, has 
a consistent set of rationales for managing the relevance of "Women's Aid". Notions of 
crime/law, organisational status and 'victim' populations are manipulated to position 
"Women's Aid" differently in dynamics with multi-agency initiatives, individual agencies 
and various tasks with the same statutory agency. But like HOC 1995, the uses to which 
Women's Aid's knowledges might be put is not always made explicit. 
From a feminist perspective, the shifts in New Labour's formulations of "Women's Aid" 
are cause for concern. The additions in 2000 are an increase in the organisational naming 
of "Women's Aid" and the preferred term of "survivors" in proximity to "Women's Aid". 
But the absences from 1995 comprise warranting Women's Aid on its principles, structure 
and the relevance of its 'by women for women' empowerment ethic; and the consistent 
gendering of the population to be governed as female. The additions led me to consider 
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whether or not governments in producing a feminist organisation and an active population 
as its subjects of representation were 'doing' feminism. The absences seemed to indicate 
that governmental power may be appropriating feminist 'doings' to 'undo' feminism and 
govern Women's Aid in line with government aims. 
For both governments, feminist-generated ways of working together at the local level have 
been adopted. The suggestion that they may have been appropriated and reformulated in 
line with 'crime' aims (Radford, 2003) is supported by the evidence from HOC 1995 in the 
way it attempts to undermine 'just women' and position the police in charge. MAG 2000 
continues these notions of crime-orientated multi-agency working arrangements. But there 
is also a sense that 'doing' feminism, in terms of organisational. naming, producing 
(feminist) subjects of representation and attuning to gender(ed) understandings of the 
causes of domestic violence, is accomplished. 
HOC 1995 names Women's Aid frequently, but mainly in one place where the text, 
including framing Women's Aid as a 'by women for women' organisation, seems to come 
from Women's Aid promotional literature. As a politicised and professionalised subject of 
representation this formulation of Women's Aid proves problematic and it and the female 
gender of service providers are absented in inter-agency, police and housing authority 
persuasions where "refuges" is the preferred term. Also in constituting the population to be 
governed as 'women and children', HOC 1995 'does' a form of feminism, albeit an 
inadvisable one, in that it implies an absent male parent and allows for understandings of 
gendered violence. 
By comparison, MAG 2000 names Women's Aid regularly around a variety of single and 
joint agency activities. But Women's Aid, other than the implied gender of service 
providers and users is not elucidated. Thus as a subject of representation it is not politicised 
only gendered. There is also some evidence that understandings of causes are being 
managed. Thus no children are constituted in text near Women's Aid. Where children are 
present in text on social services, Women's Aid is absent. Also "survivors" as a non- 
gendered term means that female gender is made relevant to it only through the client 
group concerns of Women's Aid and housing authorities. Consequently, female gender is 
rendered apposite to agencies not domestic violence per se. 
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The implications for ferninisms are twofold. Firstly, 'doing' feminism in terms of 
organisational naming, producing (feminist) subjects of representation and attuning to the 
(gendered) causes of domestic violence are not bounded to feminism. That is the activities 
that can be used to 'do' feminism can equally be used to 'undo' it. This suggests that New 
Labour's attempts to elide political differences (Newman, 2001) are facilitated by the 
current 'doing' of feminism. Secondly, MAG 2000 does not address its persuasions 
directly to the voluntary sector but as prospective participants ascribed value, they can be 
assumed as anticipated readers. Therefore, the gendering of "survivors" through 
organisational client groups, could indirectly be a persuasion to Women's Aid to remain in 
the multi-agency arena in order to keep female gender relevant. 
Within this thesis, I was concerned with exploring the 'doing' of government as 
exercisings of power in conjunction with the 'doings' of Chief Officer police realities and 
ferninisms as potential resistances. Because of this three-part focus and an interest in shifts 
across the decade 1990-2000, some absences have necessarily been incurred, either due to 
restrictions in space or questions that the selected data simply could not address. Therefore 
in the final part of this conclusion, I outline some of the possible further directions for 
research arising from this study. 
Firstly, the absence I most regret concerns the 'doing' of feminism around diverse subjects 
of representation. Butler (1990,1992) poses key questions for feminists about how 
representation and inclusion can be satisfactorily managed; particularly as designating who 
is 'in' necessarily incurs designating who is 'out'. I did look at how variations in victim 
formulations by government and the police potentially threaten to marginalise those who 
are not inclusive with their representational politics (Coote, 2000; Kelly, 1996; Mouffe, 
1992). And I looked at differences in active/passive women formulations (Chapter 6). But 
diversity in terms of sexuality and ethnicity did appear in both HASC and the What 
Works? memoranda. Thus there were data to pursue this question but the threc-part focus 
and the primacy of themes arising from the texts meant that this important area was under- 
interrogated. 
Secondly, although this research looks at shifts between policy activities across changes in 
political government, a single government focus would have produced different emphases. 
Therefore, a prospect for future research would be to trace a discrete policy-making process 
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from start to finish. For example, HASC 1992/3, its written and oral submissions, the 
government response, the consequent debate in parliament and the final production of 
HOC 1995 would have satisfied such an approach. This would generate an opportunity to 
trace the progression of key themes, such as 'domestic violence as crime' and 'domestic 
violence as gender(ed) violence', over a three year period but within the same transactional 
business. And it would allow for government talk rather than just text to be considered. 
Alternatively, the focus could be on New Labour's second term as domestic violence has 
continued to evolve as a governable matter (Home Office, 2003b). 
Thirdly, I had significantly more findings on police talk and text than could be 
accommodated in this work. Their written submissions to, and oral evidence session 
before, HASC 1992/3 could have supported a whole thesis in their own right. I focused on 
ACPO-ranked Chief Officers but representatives of The Superintendents' Association and 
The Police Federation participated too. Thus competing versions of police realities were 
actively (sometimes bitterly) contested with the Chair of the Committee keeping order and 
fuelling the conflict in equal parts. Whilst these are exciting data to interrogate there is a 
very serious point to be made. Waddington (1993) argues that despite appearances to the 
contrary, it is rank and file officers, those who do patrol duties and who are represented by 
The Police Federation who actually make policy on the street. Thus negotiations and 
contestations between police accounts of reality is likely to have something important to 
contribute to policy debates. 
Finally, much feminist critique of multi-agency working explores power struggles between 
the police and feminists at the local level (Gregory & Lees, 1999; Grace, 1999; Hague, 
1999). Detailed work has been conducted in this regard (Abrar et al, 2000; Kelly, 1999; 
Kelly et al, 1999). But discursive work has not. In this thesis, I have identified ways that 
police realities and feminisms are accomplished and demonstrable. Whilst this approach 
has not produced much in the way of good news for ferninisms it has elucidated some of 
the pitfalls they may face. Thus I believe that discursive enquiry into local multi-agency 
activities could be useful to feminists who participate. 
Appendix 1 
Glossary 
Although referenced within the main text, this list provides a full account of the most 
commonly used acronyms within this thesis. 
ACPO Association of Chief Police Officers 
CA Conversation Analysis 
CDA Crime and Disorder Act 1998 
DA Discourse Analysis 
DVU Domestic violence unit 
FA Foucauldian Analysis 
HASC Home Affairs Select Committee 
HOC Home Office Circular 
HRA Human Rights Act 1998 
LSPU London Strategic Policy Unit 
MAG 2000 Multi-agency Guidance (Home Office, 2000a) 
MPS Also 'the Met' and 'Met Police', the Metropolitan Police 
SBS Southall Black Sisters 





Some conventions are common to the presentation of all extracts. Thus: - 
The Extract Number refers to the chronological positioning of the extract within the 
chapter as a whole, regardless of chapter part, section, subsection or source document. 
( ... ) at the beginning and/or the end of an extract indicates that the Paraffal2h from 
which the data are extracted has not been included in its entirety. Where extracts follow 
directly on from one another this is made clear in the accompanying text. Where 
absences between extracts are due to concerns of brevity, this is made explicit. 
The line numbering starts from line one at the beginning of the document. It is meant to 
be useful for analytical reference but also to give the reader some indication of where 
the data appear in the text in relation to each other. 
(sic) indicates a typing error in the original. 
2. Home Office Circulars and MA G 2000 variations 
a) HOC 60/90: 
Extract 4 [HOC 60/90 (18: Action after the incident)]: 
248 ( ... ) Many women will be in a state of shock when the 
249 police first arrive, and unable to contemplate the prospect of 
250 a court case. ( ... ) 
(18: Action after the incident) reproduces the paragraph number and the relevant 
subheading that appears in the document. 
b) HOC 19/2000 
Extract 10 [HOC 19/2000 (Nature & Extent of Problem, 6" paragraph)]: 
92 ( ... ) The 
93 practical consequences for women, in ternis of accommodation, 
94 finances and childcare responsibilities are also likely to be more 
95 serious. 
The main difference concerns more detailed location information, e. g. (Nature & Extent 
of Problem, 6" paragraph). HOC 19/2000 is considerably longer than its predecessor. 
Therefore, information in addition to the subheading is provided for the reader to locate 
the text in situ. 
HOC 1995 
Extract I [HOC 1995 (4): "The Govemment's Approach"]: 
235 4.2 The Government's approach is based on the 
236 premise that domestic violence is a serious crime 
237 which must not be tolerated. ( ... ) 
The only additional remarkable feature of HOC 1995 is that all paragraphs are 
numbered within the original. Thus '4.2' is a faithful reproduction. And (4) indicates the, 
main subheading as numbered (and named) in the actual document. 
d) MAG 2000 
Extract 11 [MAG 2000 (1): Introduction, paragraph 1.3]: 
114 Partnership working is essential to providing a comprehensive response 
115 to the wide range of needs that domestic violence survivors may have. () 
Again all conventions are consistent with the thesis presentation. The main difference 
concerns the page width of the actual document. 
3. Home Affairs Select Committee oral evidence sessions 
Extract 3 [HASC 1993b: 240]: 
1212 Mrs Roche: Yes, thank you. Paragraph 16 of the 
1213 evidence we have had from the Metropolitan Police 
1214 refers to psychological abuse and mental cruelty as 
1215 examples of domestic violence. ( ... ) 
0 [HASC 1993b: 240] reproduces the paragraph number (240) allocated within the 
original. Within HASC 1993b, the paragraph numbers run consecutively through all the 
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oral sessions as a whole. Thus there is only one '240' and the police session begins at 
paragraph 178. 
* Names of participants are not emboldened in the original. This has been added by me 
for presentational clarity. 
Transcription conventions 
It is apparent that this talk has been 'tidied up' into sentences. Heavy use of the comma is 
used to accomplish this, rather than indicating pauses per se. The question mark is also 
frequently used and may be understood as rising intonation. A unique feature seem to be a 
long hyphen. On occasion this marks an interruption in mid-sentence. At other times, it 
appears to demonstrate a means of keeping a sentence structured as a sentence, not unlike 
the use of the comma. 
4. Metropolitan Police policy document (MPS, 2000a) 
Extract 9 [MPS 2000a (Annex A: 4hparagraph)]: 
4/1 Domestic violence 
4/2 Domestic violence is any incident of threatening behaviour, 
4/3 violence or abuse (... ) 
Extract 12 [MPS 2000a (Crime Manager: p. 18,1 st paragraph)]: 
() At every contact with the victim, their needs and risks should be 
reassessed to give the appropriate level of support. 
The main difference is that this text is printed in a very wide format. Thus its lines do not 
fit onto the line allowance of A4 paper. Thus: - 
The line numbering (e. g. 4/2) is fictitious. The '4' indicates the paragraph position 
under its relevant heading. But the V is simply the sixth line this paragraph produces 
when I put it into the widest format that my paper space allows. I did consider 
presenting each line of the text on a line and a half of A4 but it jarred visually. 
Where extracts were very small and the line numbers were not likely to be referenced 
within the analysis, they were omitted to eradicate confusion around the line numbering 
system. 
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5. What Works? memoranda 
Extract 10 [What Works? Civil Law (Edwards (2000b)]: 
179 e The police and courts are making good use of the 
180 FLA. (... ) 
* [What Works? Civil Law (Edwards (2000b)] indicates that this comes from the What 
Works? memorandum on 'Civil Law', authored as referenced. 
* Bullet points are a common feature of the documents and are reproduced accordingly. 
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